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VERDUN TO THE VOSGES
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Pierre Petit phot.
General de Castelnau.
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VERDUN TO THE | VOSGES
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IMPRESSIONS OF THE WAR ON THE
FORTRESS FRONTIER OF FRANCE
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BY
GERALD CAMPBELL
SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE TIMES IN THE EAST OF FRANCE
AUTHOR OF “EDWARD AND PAMELA FITZGERALD”
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SECOND IMPRESSION
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LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD
1916
[All rights reserved]
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PREFACE
.sp 2
At the beginning of September, 1914, I was commissioned
by The Times to go to France as its representative
on the eastern frontier, and it so happens
that, during the war, no other English newspaper
correspondent has been stationed for any length of time
on the long section of the front between Verdun and
Belfort. One or two paid flying visits to Lorraine after
I was settled there, but they were birds of passage, and
were off again almost as soon as they arrived. In
collecting the material for my despatches and letters
I was helped more than I can say by my colleague,
Monsieur Fleury Lamure, a French journalist who had
already worked for The Times in Belgium, where he
spent some exciting days in August dodging about in
front of the armies of von Kluck, von Bulow, and von
Hausen as they advanced on Charleroi and Namur.
Before the war he had served two years as an engineer
officer in the French and Russian navies, and had also
worked in Manchuria and the Near East, first as interpreter
to General Silvestre, the French military attaché
at Kuropatkin’s headquarters, and then as correspondent
of the Novoe Vremya, with the Servians, in the second
Balkan war. In the course of our wanderings together
we found that the French military and civil authorities
highly appreciated the fact that the newspaper which
.bn 008.png
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most of them consider the greatest of English journals
had associated a Frenchman with me in the work of
writing about the operations of their frontier force.
From the first our path was smoothed by what they
looked upon as a graceful and sensible act on the part
of the Editor. At a later stage in the war my French
colleague, who has been twice réformé as unfit for the
active exercise of his profession, offered himself at the
Admiralty in Paris for one of the auxiliary forces, but
was told that the best thing he could do for his country
was to go on working for The Times.
From September, 1914, to January, 1915, after which
no correspondents were allowed in the zone of the armies,
we made our headquarters at Nancy. Between us, at
various times, we visited a large part of the front from
Verdun to Ferette, close to the Swiss frontier, and only
fifteen or twenty miles from the Rhine. Sometimes
we were in the trenches, â bout portant of the enemy’s
rifles, and for four months hardly a day or a night passed
when we did not hear the sound of the guns. From what
we saw and from what we heard from those who took
an active part in it, we were able to get what is, I believe,
a fairly correct idea of the general run of the fighting
on both sides of the frontier. We were well placed, not
only for judging the temper of the civil population of
the invaded provinces, but also the spirit and fighting
qualities of their defenders.
Before we came to Lorraine we had both seen a
little of the early fighting in Belgium—at Namur and
Mons, and Charleroi and Dinant. But it was at Nancy
that I really got to know something of French soldiers
and learnt to admire the wonderful cheerfulness and
courage of the XXth Army Corps and the other splendid
.bn 009.png
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troops who talked with the enemy in the gate of France,
and blocked the passage with their dead bodies.
All that is long ago, though not so long as it seems
after the weary waiting of more than a year’s work in
the trenches. But the end is not yet. Those army
corps, or their successors—for nearly all of the original
officers and men are dead or wounded—are still steadily
pressing the enemy back, almost on the same ground
as when we were there, and, though the full story cannot
be told even now, it is neither too late nor too soon for
an Englishman to try and give some idea of the
debt which England owes to the French armies of
the east.
But I should like to say a word about England too.
It is always difficult to see ourselves as others see us.
Till long after I had gone abroad for this war—to be
quite frank, till the end of 1915—I had no real idea of
the view which other nations held at the beginning of
the chances of our taking a hand in it. I knew, of course,
that many Germans had declared since it began that
they for their part had never believed that we would
draw the sword. I knew from Englishmen who were in
Berlin two days, and even I believe one day, before we
did declare war, that Englishmen at that time were
received in the streets with cries of “Vive l’Angleterre,”
or rather “Hoch! England!” and that the bitter
revulsion of feeling against us only began when we had
thrown down the glove. But that—as I then thought—extraordinary
miscalculation and misunderstanding of
our national temper, the infuriated reaction from which
found vent in the “Gott strafe England” campaign
and the “Song of Hate,” I put down to an inexplicable
blindness peculiar to the German nation, and to the
.bn 010.png
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sort of fury to which we are all liable when other people
on important occasions do not act as we wish and expect
that they will. Since then—but only lately—I have
learnt better, from the vantage ground of a neutral
nation.
It is a fact that not only the Germanophil but the
Francophil Swiss were genuinely and deeply astonished
when they learnt—from the official communiqués—that
we intended to intervene in the war because the
soil of Belgium had been invaded. When the thing
was done they accepted it as a fact. They were bound
to. But they did not anticipate it. They found it
hard to believe that with an army, as they thought—and
they were not so far wrong—of only 150,000 men,
with nothing to gain and everything to lose, we would
be so quixotic as to throw ourselves into a contest in
which we were not directly concerned, and to send our
“contemptible little army” (even smaller than their
own) to fight in a foreign country the battles of another
state against the overpowering military might of
Germany.
It is also a fact—and to me a still more astounding
revelation—that a month after the war had begun there
were people in France, and among them soldiers of high
standing, who were honestly surprised at what we had
already done in the war, as well as profoundly grateful,
and who even then honestly doubted whether we really
meant to put our backs into it to any purpose.
One can understand their astonishment at what
we have done since. Even an Englishman may say,
without excessive national conceit, that the work of
our Navy, the huge volunteer armies raised in a year
from the Mother-country and our Dominions and
.bn 011.png
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Colonies and India, and our subsequent if only partial
acceptance of the principle of National Service, are not
everyday affairs. But the initial Swiss doubt or
scepticism as to our possible action, once the neutrality
of Belgium had been violated, and the fears of our friends
in France at the beginning, that having set our hand to
the plough we might turn back before the furrow was
finished, are not so easy for us Englishmen to comprehend.
We had thought that they knew us better.
No matter what Government had been in power, once
the Germans had declared their intention of passing
through the country of the Belgians, we must inevitably
have drawn the sword to defend or avenge them; more
than that, even if Belgium had not been invaded, we
must no less have put our sword at the disposal of
invaded France, for the one wrong was in reality as
great as the other. And, no matter what Government
may be in power to-morrow or the day after, the spirit
of England will not change. We stand by the side of
France and our other Allies to the end. And by now, I
fancy, the French have found that out.
But do we, even now, realize fully what the war
means, and what, as a nation, we have got to do before
we can expect to win it? I have just come back to
England after an absence of a year and a half. I find
that though Parliament and the great mass of the people
in all ranks have accepted the principle of National
Service, there are still in some quarters powerful organizations
which are vehemently opposed to it. I find
that in spite of all the warnings that have been issued
in the Press and by other means as to the imperative
necessity of thrift, and in spite of all the efforts made
by countless individuals and large sections of the
.bn 012.png
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community to model their lives in accordance with those
warnings, other individuals and other sections of the
community pay no attention to them at all. Money is
being earned in unexampled and hitherto undreamt-of
profusion, and is being spent with reckless prodigality.
Thrift there is on all sides, but cheek by jowl and hand-in-hand
with it there is appalling waste.
We have got to get rid of that word thrift altogether.
At the best it is an affair of calculation, and can never
inspire us to great deeds or counteract the personal and
ignoble motives by which human nature, even in the
greatest crises, is too often swayed. There is nothing
lofty or idealistic or spiritual about it. We must get
into an altogether higher region than that of economics.
We must learn the lesson not of thrift but of self-sacrifice.
Only that can save us. Without it, even though we
have the dreaded ships and the splendid men and the
all-necessary money too, we shall be in this war as
sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. With it, bearing
all things, believing all things, hoping all things, enduring
all things, we shall move mountains and overcome
the world—the world of the powers of darkness. It is
the lack of it, and nothing but the lack of it, which is
at present preventing us from winning the war and
putting an end to its intolerable misery and evil.
.ll 68
.rj
G. C.
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London,
March, 1916.
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.h2
CONTENTS
.ta h:60 r:10
CHAPTER I
LONDON TO DIJON
| PAGE
Departure from London, September 8th, 1914—A German officer’s\
analysis of the invaders’ plan of campaign—Paris—General\
condition of doubt and uncertainty—Travelling during the\
Battle of the Marne—Effect in France of the news of the\
victory | #1#
CHAPTER II
DIJON TO BELFORT
Arrival in Dijon—The laisser-passer difficulty—Besançon—An\
anxious moment—Arrival at Belfort—Doubtful reception—A\
Socialist private—Manifesto “Aux Camerades Socialistes”—National\
Service—A Capitalists’ War—The Strike of Strikes—The\
struggle for freedom—État de siège—A city of darkness—Welcome\
by the Governor | #11#
CHAPTER III
IN ALSACE
On German soil—Montreux Vieux—The first ruined village—Towards\
the Rhine—A night reconnaissance in Alsace—Ferette—Covert\
drawn blank—Cheerfulness of the French\
soldier—His longing for home—His home at the front—Taube\
“over”—A Colonel’s hobby—An army in earnest | #21#
CHAPTER IV
ROBBERY UNDER ARMS
Eve of the War—French neutral zone along the frontier—German\
raids in time of peace—Sunday, August 2nd—The affair at\
Joncherey—First blood—A German epic—The Suarce raid—Robbery\
under arms—Political importance of the incident—Prisoners\
of war where no war was | #33#
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CHAPTER V
BELFORT TO NANCY
News of Nancy—German lies—Security of Belfort—After twelve\
months—Breakdown of German plans—Visit to the Préfet of\
Belfort—A Prefect’s duties and position—Check on militarism—Special\
duties during the war—The Préfets and Sous-Préfets\
of the frontier Departments—Posts of danger—Example and\
precept—Return to Dijon—Chalindrey—British Tommies—Wounded\
French officers—Toul—Arrival in Nancy | #39#
CHAPTER VI
ÉTAT-DE-SIÈGE IN NANCY
Discouraging start in Nancy—General de la Massellière—Visits to\
the Prefect and Mayor—Their appointment—Madame Mirman—Their\
example—The Lorraine stock—Nancy by night—The\
sound of the guns—A united people—The French renaissance—Nancy\
newspapers—Nancy hospitals—Nursing sisters | #48#
CHAPTER VII
THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE
The German territorial gains—Bearing on peace proposals—The\
French offensive—General moral effect—Uncertainty as to\
direction of German attack—Sources from which eastern\
armies were drawn—Their offensive—General account—In\
the Woevre—Verdun and Longwy—From the Moselle to Mulhouse—The\
frontier force—Justification of the offensive—Description\
of frontier—Of Alsace—Importance of the Vosges—The\
Sundgau—First French advance on August 7th—Altkirch\
retaken | #61#
CHAPTER VIII
OCCUPATIONS OF MULHOUSE
Advance on Mulhouse—Unopposed entry—Popular rejoicings—German\
counter-attack—Smallness of French force—Their\
repulse—Terrorism—Harsh treatment of foreigners—Reorganization\
of French under General Pau—Second advance on\
Mulhouse—Battle round the town—Victory of the French—Second\
occupation began | #77#
CHAPTER IX
MORHANGE
Description of the Vosges—French advance—Triumphs in Lorraine—The\
check at Morhange—Why the French fell into the trap—The\
disaster—New birth of the army—Bad news—The offensive\
abandoned | #88#
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CHAPTER X
GENERAL DUBAIL’S STAND
Combination of reverses for France—Soldiers’ ignorance of contemporary\
events—Reliance on barrier of fortresses—Determination\
to fight in the open—Different conditions—Position\
after Morhange—German advance—Trouée de Charmes—Epinal—Vesouze,\
Mortagne, and Meurthe—Brave resistance of\
Dubail’s army—The reverse of the picture—The terrorists’\
Credo—Condemnation of frightfulness—An example—The\
German excuse | #100#
CHAPTER XI
THE MARTYRED TOWN
Gerbéviller—Visit with M. Mirman—The ruins—Murder of old\
men—How the town was taken—Incendiarism—S[oe]ur Julie—An\
act of “sacrilege”—Other martyred towns—Badonviller—The\
first occupation—The second—Fight in the streets—St.\
Benoit—Col de la Chipotte | #114#
CHAPTER XII
BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ. I
The battle of the Grand Couronné—Two parts—The position south\
of the Meurthe—Transport of Dragoon regiment from Alsace—Arrival\
at Charmes—Towards Lunéville—Procession of\
fugitives—Description of field of battle—South and north of\
Meurthe up to Nancy-Lunéville road—General Bigot’s divisions—Retreat\
of the XVth and XVIth Army Corps—General\
retreat—Lunéville abandoned—Position of XXth Army Corps—The\
troops from the south reformed—A miracle—The battle\
begins—Germans cross Mortagne and Meurthe—A battle\
symphony—Across the field of battle—Scenes of desolation—The\
battle continued—German attack checked—Retreat turned\
into advance—The XVth Army Corps leaves for the Argonne—Their\
regeneration | #125#
CHAPTER XIII
BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ. II
Nancy, the woman-town—Absence of fortifications—Attitude of\
her defenders—The pivot of the line—Kaiser’s dreams of\
conquest—Description of four German lines of attack—Of the\
country—General de Castelnau’s line—Champenoux villages—Réméréville—Farms\
and cottages—Loopholed blockhouses—The\
wounded—The refugees—Account of Nomeny—German\
brutality—Rottenness of German civilization—Germany’s\
future—Inspiration of soldiers of Lorraine—The part of the\
women—A woman’s letter | #141#
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CHAPTER XIV
BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ. III
The attack on Nancy from the north—St. Généviève—The assault—How\
it was repulsed—The attack from the east—Dombasle—Courbesseau—Réméréville—Soldiers’\
disregard of fire—In\
Champagne—French disadvantages in Lorraine—Their\
gallantry—Individualism—Main attack from north-east—Attack\
on plateau of Amance—September 8th—Importance of\
the date—What it meant to the Kaiser—Final assault on\
Amance—Relations between Battle of the Marne and Battle of\
the Grand Couronné—Bombardment of Nancy—The German\
retreat—Last struggle in Champenoux—Losses of the victors—Their\
graves—The horror of the horizon—The reassurance\
of the front | #155#
CHAPTER XV
LUNÉVILLE
Effect of Battle of the Grand Couronné on Lunéville—Extent of\
damage in the town—Entry of Germans—Familiar faces—M.\
Minier, M. Mequillet, M. Keller—Faubourg d’Einville burnt—German\
Governor’s proclamation—Hostages—Plight of inhabitants—Outside\
the town—The turn of the tide—France and\
Germany—A duel to the death—Last fights before the town—German\
bestiality—General Joffre’s message—The last advance—French\
enter the town—Restored to France | #178#
CHAPTER XVI
NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS
After the storm—A Prefect’s duties—Newspaper correspondents—War\
a serious matter—Enemy’s means of information—On the\
battlefield—“Behind the front”—German dread of newspapers—Their\
own—French and British—The truth concealed—In\
Belgium—Effect in neutral Switzerland—Change of opinion\
due to knowledge of state of internés—Confidence of M. Mirman—The\
Times an agent for good—Expulsion from Nancy—Hopes\
of return | #193#
CHAPTER XVII
A DAY WITH A PREFECT
A Conseil de Révision—Comparison with English recruiting—French\
boys’ enthusiasm—Their experience of terrorism—A\
greybeard—The Mayors of Lorraine—A war to kill war—Lunch\
at the Préfecture—Through the French army—At the\
front—A deserted village—Towards Nomeny—A check—Retreat—M.\
Puech—A souvenir—French sang-froid | #205#
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CHAPTER XVIII
THE ATTACK ON THE RIVER FORTS
Position after Battle of the Grand Couronné—German failures\
reviewed—Mystery of Manonviller—Position of Toul—Of the\
barrier of fortresses—Description of the Woevre—Troyon—The\
first bombardment—German demand for surrender—The\
attacking force—Relief from Toul—The attack abandoned—Renewed\
bombardment of the river forts—Formation of the\
St. Mihiel triangle | #218#
CHAPTER XIX
THE “SOIXANTE-QUINZE”
The Emperor William—His advisers—The modern Huns—The\
barrier of the trenches—The Soixante-Quinze—Its superiority\
to its German rival—The French gunner—Pride of the nation\
in its artillery—Determination in the workshops—The struggle\
of the trenches—A German description | #244#
CHAPTER XX
SIEGE WARFARE
Second period of the war—Germany besieged—The pressure on the\
west—Partial offensives—The lack of shells—Its effect on the\
war—“Craters of Death”—Monotony of the trenches—A\
National Army—Soldier-priests—Their contempt of death—Their\
self-sacrifice—Their spiritual work—Influence on the\
troops—The realities of life—Church and State—The example\
of the State—Spirit of unity—Points of attack—Hammer and\
tongs—The St. Mihiel salient—Chauvoncourt—Les Eparges—Bois\
d’Ailly—Bois Brulé—Bois le Prêtre—The Vosges and\
Alsace—The soldiers of France—France and England—The\
Boche standards of right and wrong—The German cancer and\
the end of the war | #263#
CHAPTER THE LAST
GERMANY AND THE ALLIES
Pride and prejudice—English pride before the war—Pride of France—Pride\
of race—Noblesse Oblige—Pride of Germany—Pride of\
the parvenu—Peaceful pre-war invasion of German commerce\
and kultur—Neutral views of Germany’s guilt—French views\
of England—Redemption by hate—What is “the right”?—Greater\
Germany?—Tannenberg’s views—The Kaiser’s conversion—Germany’s\
designs on neutral countries—The new\
year—The dead | #282#
EPILOGUE | #301#
By M. Léon Mirman
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
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| FACING PAGE
General de Castelnau | #Frontispiece:FRONTIS#
Les Halles, Raon l’Etape | #22:i022#
French Advance in Village Street of Magnières | #36:i036#
M. Léon Mirman | #44:i044#
M. Simon | #50:i050#
French Advance at Sainte-Barbe | #92:i092#
General Dubail | #104:i104#
Gerbéviller | #116:i116#
Farm of Léomont | #134:i134#
General Foch | #156:i156#
Infantry Attack on Farm of Saint Epvre, on the Heights above\
Lunéville | #190:i190#
Outside the Préfecture, Nancy | #202:i202#
Nomeny | #214:i214#
Réméréville | #222:i222a#
Château de Haraucourt | #222:i222b#
French Attack from Cemetery of Rehainviller near Lunéville | #258:i258#
Church at Drouville | #286:i286#
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LIST OF MAPS
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| PAGE
Eastern Frontier | #59:i059#
Alsace and the Vosges | #71:i071#
Lorraine Frontier | Facing page #126:i126#
La Woevre | ”\ \ \ \ ”\ \ \ #272:i272#
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VERDUN TO THE VOSGES
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER I | LONDON TO DIJON
.sp 2
We left London on the evening of September the 8th
with passports viséd for Dijon, and a faint hope that,
if we were lucky, we might succeed some day in getting
to Belfort, the immediate object of our journey. In
ordinary times, and even now, after more than a year
of the war, that is not a very difficult undertaking. In
the second week of September, 1914, it was in its way
quite a little adventure. Everything was obscure,
everybody was in the dark. For all that most of us
knew the retreat that had begun at Mons three weeks
before was still going on. The possibility of the enemy
pressing on to Paris was by no means at an end, and
even in the eyes of those who had some inside knowledge
of what was happening on the different fields of battle
the risk was still so great that the French Government
had left that capital for Bordeaux some days
before.
Nowadays we rattle gaily along in the trains between
Paris and Boulogne or Dieppe, safe in the assurance
.bn 024.png
.pn +1
that though the Germans are not so very much further
off there is between them and us a great gulf of entrenchments
fixed, as well as two huge French and English
armies, to say nothing of King Albert and the Belgians.
There were practically no trenches in those days, and
the enemy were in almost overpowering force. General
French’s army, though not so contemptible as the
German Emperor believed, was certainly little. There
was still good reason for anxiety about the possible fate
of Paris. After I left Belgium in the middle of August
I had spent some time in Holland, where I saw a good
deal of a young Prussian engineer, who had offices in
London, and was also an officer in the Imperial Flying
Corps. He had to report himself at headquarters in
Germany, but had been given short leave to go to
Flushing, and there wait for his English wife, who was
to follow him from London. That was the story he told
me, and I believe it was true, as far as it went, though
it is possible that he may also have been connected with
the Intelligence Department of the German army, or
what is commonly termed a spy. In any case there was
no doubt about his own intelligence, which was remarkable,
or his fund of information, which was extensive.
Day after day, at the time when the retreat from Mons
had begun and afterwards, he predicted to me (with
many apparently genuine expressions of sympathy for
the evil fate that was in store for the British army and
for England) what the next step in the victorious German
advance would be, and day after day he proved to be
right. It was not till I had left Holland and was well
on my way to Belfort that I had the satisfaction of
.bn 025.png
.pn +1
knowing that some of his prophecies were beginning to
go wrong.
I find it interesting to recall now what they were,
because they undoubtedly represented at the time the
German plan of campaign, as it was mapped out by the
General Staff, and confidently anticipated by most of
the thinking rank and file of the German army. The
great drama, as everyone knows now, was to be preceded
by the violation of Belgium as the lever de rideau. But
the plot of the front piece was felt to be weak, and it
had to be strengthened. So the fiction was invented
that French soldiers were already in Belgium before the
war began, and that evidence had been discovered in
Brussels of a promise by the Belgian Government to
allow the Allies free passage into Germany through their
territory. The proofs of this conspiracy (the alleged
story of which was not so widely known then as it is
now) would, my young Prussian assured me, be produced
at the end of the war. Without that pièce justificative
there could be, he admitted, no excuse for Germany’s
preliminary step. He knew other things that were not
at the end of August common property—outside Germany
and the Germans—about Zeppelins and guns and submarines
and other not-to-be-divulged surprises which
were to be sprung on us during the course of the war.
He was able, for instance, to tell me all about the
mammoth 42-centimetre guns, served not by ordinary
artillerymen but by specially and secretly trained
artificers from Krupp’s works, which were to batter
down the vaunted French fortresses as they had smashed
the forts of Liége. They looked, he said, less like
.bn 026.png
.pn +1
cannons than huge unwieldy antediluvian animals compounded
of wheels and levers. They had been assigned
an important part in the final act of the drama to be
played in front of Paris, which was timed to finish by
the end of the year. More in sorrow than in anger he
explained how Paris would be reached. The armies of
the German right wing which had poured through
Belgium (von Kluck’s and the rest) would be rushed
forward in irresistible masses and by incredibly rapid
stages so as to envelop the French and English left wing
from the north. At the same time a corresponding
hook (he was continually talking of this “hook” as the
be all and end all of German strategy) would take place
from the south. Under the command of von Haeseler,
the idol of the German troops (a man of iron will with
ribs of silver which he wore in the place of those he lost
in the Franco-Prussian War), the left wing were to
advance through the Vosges, Lorraine, and La Woevre,
crushing the cupolas of Belfort and Epinal and Toul and
Verdun on their way like so many egg-shells, and, with
the Crown Prince’s army as the connecting link between
them and the northern hook, to round up the whole of
the French and British armies, on or near the plain of
Châlons. Meanwhile a specially detached army was to
march on Paris and inform the Government and its
inhabitants that unless the terms of peace proposed by
Germany were immediately signed the city would be
bombarded, and the French, he assured me, sooner
than see their beloved Paris reduced to ruins by the
42-centimetre mammoths, would certainly comply, and
leave Germany free to turn her attentions and the
.bn 027.png
.pn +1
super-mammoths which she was preparing for their
especial benefit to London and England.
To-day all this sounds very fantastic and foolish—the
idle vapourings of an irresponsible young man of no
importance. But that it was in outline the German
plan there is no doubt, and, but for the heroic resistance
of de Castlenau and Foch and Dubail on the eastern
frontier and the taxi-cab march of Gallieni’s Paris army
and the other circumstances which caused that curious
flank march of von Kluck’s on the north at the moment
when his part in the programme was on the eve of completion,
it might have gone near to succeeding. We
know that if it had it would not have ended the war,
for the French would undoubtedly have sacrificed Paris
and fought to the bitter end, rather than agree to the
proffered peace. But up to the end of the Battle of the
Marne no one could say with any approach to certainty
that they would not be put to the test.
That was the position when we started for Paris.
The whole ordered course of modern civilized life had
been upset, and anxiety and uncertainty had taken its
place. Telephones and telegraphs were only used by the
official world, who were nearly as much in the dark as
the rest of us. Channel boats were few and far between.
Long-distance trains were either not running at all or
were restricted to not more than two journeys in the
twenty-four hours, and they felt their way like skirmishers
advancing over open country, stopping and making a
prolonged halt at every single station. The journey
from Havre in a carriage dimly lit by a single candle
seemed as if it would never end, and I had plenty of
.bn 028.png
.pn +1
time to reflect with mixed feelings on certain articles
which had recently been published in The Times pointing
out the crying necessity of reducing the time of the
whole journey between the two capitals to something
under seven hours. This time it took rather over thirty.
I was beginning to learn the first lesson of the war, the
sovereign virtue of patience.
In Paris we had to put up with another day’s delay.
There was, of course, no question of taking the ceinture
or driving straight across to the Gare de Lyon. Instead
we had to dawdle about from five in the morning till
ten at night, getting passports viséd and buying tickets
(a two hours’ job), and then sitting in the train for
another two hours before it started so as to keep the
places which by good luck and the help of a friendly
police official, after a series of humiliating rebuffs from
about half a dozen other commissaires and commandants,
all of them harassed and suspicious, we had had the luck
to secure. That was the second lesson, afterwards
many times repeated—never to expect to get a laisser
passer or a permis de voyage or séjour or any other
necessity of a journalist’s existence, until you had
approached at least three of the powers that be.
When at last we started, at midnight, the atmosphere
of the crowded carriage was so suffocating that I
migrated to the corridor and tried to sleep, with a suit
case for a pillow, on the floor, while other restless
passengers walked about on various parts of my body.
Once more we stopped at every station with a violent
bumping and jolting, repeated at each fresh start, and
due to the combined facts that the train was about a
.bn 029.png
.pn +1
quarter of a mile long, that it was made up of a job lot
of carriages, and that the understudies of the regular
drivers and stokers mobilized for active service were not
very well up in their parts. Still, all things considered,
we were uncommonly lucky to reach Dijon in thirteen
hours instead of in five; and, all things considered, we
knew quite well that we had nothing to complain of.
As the Battle of the Marne was being fought at an
average distance of about seventy miles from the line
on which we were travelling, the wonder was that passenger
trains were running at all. When the real history
of the war is written a good deal will have to be said
of the splendid way in which the railwaymen of France
have done their important but trying and dreary
share of the country’s work in the country’s hour of
need.
We were not, as I wrote at the time, a cheerful crowd.
Many of us had come long distances, some even from
America. The compelling hand of the war was on
everyone in the train. Except in the deserted streets
of Paris during the few hours that I spent there the day
before, I had never seen such uniform sadness on so
many faces at once. The women especially, bravely as
they tried to face their grief and their anxieties, kind and
helpful as they were to one another and the tiny babies
that some of them had with them, were indescribably
pathetic.
These people were not refugees, like the trainloads
one had seen lately in Belgium and Holland. They were
going to the scene of the war instead of away from it.
Most of them were reservists or the wives and children
.bn 030.png
.pn +1
of reservists, bound for their old homes near the various
headquarters to which the men had been called up.
Some of them were nurses of the Croix Rouge, middle-aged
women and quite young girls; some were on their
way to visit wounded relations. Each and all carried
the same heavy burden. Not one but many of those
near and dear to them were at the front. They knew
in some cases that they were already among the dead
or wounded or missing. But generally they knew
nothing at all except that, if they were still alive, they
were there somewhere on one of the many battlefields
on the long line of the Allies’ front, face to face with the
enemy and death.
We made many friends of different conditions in life
during the slow hours between dawn and midday, and
all had the same story to tell. But there was no need
to ask. It was written in their faces. The natural
vivacity of these sorrowing women of France was gone.
They talked, when they did talk, quietly and sadly, and
of only one subject. More often they sat with unseeing
eyes, looking far off into the darkness of the unknown
future, fearful of the fate that waited for the men by
their side, and appalled by the thought of the ruin and
suffering that threatened their homes and their children.
The tragedy that has brought sorrow to the women of
half the world had come upon them with the suddenness
of a bomb from a Taube, and some of them were wounded
and all were stunned by its effect. That was when we
were still in the dark about the result of the great battle
that had begun to rage on the left wing near Paris,
before the German retreat began. On the second day
.bn 031.png
.pn +1
of our stay in Dijon there was a sudden change in the
emotional atmosphere. Directly I left the hotel in the
evening I felt that good news had come. Relief and
happiness were in the air. In the railway station, in
the streets, in the cafés, on the pavements outside the
newspaper offices where the daily news of the war was
posted up, the look of the people was absolutely different.
For the moment personal griefs and losses were hidden
and forgotten. General Joffre’s general order of September
11th had been published to the troops, and
from them the news had spread so quickly that in
half an hour everyone seemed to know what had
happened.
It was the first real success of the war, the first time
since its very early days that the French had begun to
lose the feeling of apprehension produced in their minds
by the steady retreat of the allied troops from the
Belgian frontier, after the battles of Charleroi and Mons.
Even the officers at Dijon were affected by it. Up till
then, though they spoke confidently enough of eventual
success, the subject uppermost in their minds and their
conversation was always the wonderful perfection of the
German organization. That was a nightmare which
they had not so far been able to shake off. Now suddenly
it was gone. In a day it had become evident that
France and England had their organization too, as well
as the common enemy, and that the strategy of the
allied forces was beginning at last to tell. And the really
hopeful sign of it all was, if I may venture to say so,
the English way in which Dijon and France received the
good news. They behaved, in fact, much better than
.bn 032.png
.pn +1
some English had done in similar circumstances in past
days. There was no mafficking and no hysterical excitement,
but only a more determined resolution than ever
to see the thing through to the end, a strengthening of
the national spirit of unity, and a fuller realization of
the value and sincerity of the alliance with England
and of the fine fighting qualities of our troops.
.bn 033.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER II | DIJON TO BELFORT
.sp 2
In Paris, when we passed through it, it was still possible
for inoffensive travellers to feel themselves free men.
At Dijon we had our first real taste of the restrictions
on personal liberty imposed by the war in the zone of
the armies. Each time that we came to a new place
we had to get at least three separate signed and stamped
permits (from three or more officials) empowering us to
leave the station, to stay, even for an hour, in the town,
and to go into the station again, or anywhere outside
the town, when our business was done. To all such
applications the attitude of officialdom, entrenched
behind barriers and supported by bayonets, and vindictive
or regretful according to the temperament of the
individual representative of the law and the degree of
exasperation to which he had been brought by previous
encounters with the public, was, as a rule, one of uncompromising
refusal. At first that kind of thing, even
when it has become a commonplace of one’s existence,
is rather trying. The shock to one’s self-esteem and
the sense of confinement are both extremely galling. It
is not pleasant day after day to put yourself in a position
in which you are liable to be treated like a naughty
.bn 034.png
.pn +1
schoolboy, nor to feel that you are as restricted in your
walks abroad as a Dartmoor convict. From the
abominable feeling of being shut up in a cage there was,
with rare exceptions, no escape, any more than there is
for the lions at the Zoo. But we soon found that the
chase after permits, if we treated it as a kind of game,
was tolerable and even exciting, because each time we
played it, though with The Times as our trump card we
almost invariably won, we stood a good chance of losing.
The real skill consisted in knowing when it was wise
and safe to play it. Our opponents, destined in time to
become our friends, were generals, staff officers, gendarmes,
station guards and their commandants, military
police commissaires, civil police “agents,” and other
officials of all sorts and sizes. Most of them started by
being suspicious of us and our mission, and generally
speaking the more humble their post the more they
wanted humouring before they could be brought to see
that the rules of the game might perhaps be slightly
relaxed in our favour. But once they had reached that
point, as soon, that is to say, as they got to know us for
what we said we were, they were ready to do anything
in their power, because we were allies and representatives
of The Times—which has not yet been burnt, and never
will be, on any Bourse in the east of France. With the
exception of a fierce-moustachioed warrior who had a
holy horror of German spies (and therefore, if you see
the connexion, of English journalists) the only French
officials, high or low, who persistently refused anything
important for which we asked them, were a distinguished
General Officer and his Chief of Staff, who always dealt
.bn 035.png
.pn +1
with us through their subordinates. If only we could
have seen and known the General himself I firmly believe
that he would have been as kind as all the rest. But
he had other things to do, or else he never got our cards
and letters.
Having got into Dijon, and having received reluctant
permission to stay there, first for a night, and then for
as much longer as we liked, the next thing was to get
out of it, using it, if it would allow itself so to be used,
as a stepping stone to higher things. It was occupied
at that time by the 20th (Reserve) Army Corps, which
had its staff headquarters at the hotel where we put up.
Both before and after we received the news of the Battle
of the Marne all the officers whom we met there were
chafing to be at the front, and openly envious of our
poor little chance of getting there before them. They
little knew how slender it was. However, in General
Brissaud, the Governor of the town, we found after a
time a real friend, and from him we got a personal visa
as far as Besançon, which was the limit of his jurisdiction,
together with a verbal recommendation that we should
be passed on to Belfort. At Besançon we had a bad
quarter of an hour, as the station-commandant hesitated
a long time before he agreed to let us go on, and we only
just escaped being sent back to Paris. Something, however,
turned the scale in our favour, and at last, though
with rather a wry face, he sent us on our way rejoicing,
greatly relieved at our escape, but careful not to show
it till we were safe in our carriage.
It was long after dark when we got to Belfort.
There was nowhere for us to sleep in the station, and no
.bn 036.png
.pn +1
return train. Otherwise I think the little knot of
officers who shook their heads doubtfully over our passports
on the dimly lit platform would certainly have
packed us into it straight away. There were some
grounds for their hesitation. We had reached one of
the chief of the gates of France, and were getting near
the enemy. The Trouée de Belfort, the wide flat opening
between the foothills of the Vosges and the Jura
mountains, had to be defended from possible foes within
as well as without. War, as the warrior with the fierce
moustachios remarked to me a month or two later, is
a serious matter, and nowhere were the French taking
it more seriously than in the war-worn outpost fortress
that stands sentinel in front of the Belfort gap, linked
to the heart of the Republic by the long chain of lonely
sentries that guarded the railway night and day all the
way to Paris. Outside it very little was known at that
time—in England nothing at all—of its then condition.
Even the Germans knew nothing, so they, or their
newspapers, invented lies about it, and said that it was
closely invested. But though no German soldier,
except in an aeroplane, ever got within miles of it, the
state of siege proclaimed by the Governor was enforced
with rigid strictness, and the whole of the civil population,
except those who catered for the needs of the garrison,
had been evacuated some days before we got there.
At the best, therefore, however genuine our passports
and however innocent our appearance, we were two
bouches inutiles who would have to be fed; at the worst,
as journalists, the chances were that we should be
indiscreet (that is the normal view); and anyhow it was
.bn 037.png
.pn +1
very doubtful if we had any right to be there at all.
But there, undeniably, we were, and so—well, perhaps
after all the best way out of the difficulty was to send
us to the Governor’s headquarters and leave him to deal
with our case. So to the General’s quarters, the heart
of the fortress, which we were as anxious as any German
to reach, we set out, under the escort of Private Jouanard,
election agent and newspaper correspondent, a convinced
socialist and anti-militarist, but, like his idol Jaurès, a
Frenchman first of all, and therefore an ardent soldier
of France, a warm admirer of England, and a bitter
enemy of the Boche and all his works.
I suppose that long before this book is published
England will have at last realized the truth of the creed
of French soldiers like Private Jouanard, and will have
demanded as one man to be put, like France, on the footing
of national service. But I may be too sanguine;
we may have to grapple with the industrial revolution
threatened by Mr. J. H. Thomas, M.P. In any case
I should like to quote once more a proclamation written
by Private Jouanard for l’Humanité, which, before our
acquaintance was twelve hours old, he gave me for
publication in The Times. It was addressed “Aux
Camarades Socialistes,” and signed “L. J. A mobilized
comrade.”
“We are now at the parting of the ways. After
having fought stubbornly against that human scourge—war,
the insatiable ambition of a despot forces us to
take up arms. Despite the immense sorrow that grips
us at the thought of being the involuntary murderers
of those Germans and Austrians who have the same
.bn 038.png
.pn +1
communion of ideas, in their name and in our own, for
humanity, socialism, right against the arbitrary, civilization
against barbarism, in the name of all these sacred
principles, our brothers of England, of Belgium, of Russia,
and ourselves have answered ‘Present’ with one voice
to the call of our native land. Each one filled with
emotion and confident in the justice of our cause, we
have flown to arms at the cry of Liberty, like the great
revolutionaries of ’93.
“Socialists of the allied armies, we have not to weep,
but to avenge the death of the martyr of the Idea, our
great friend Jaurès, our guide and our light in difficult
moments. Humanity loses in him a great defender, the
indirect victim of the unmitigated Teuton aggression.
“The most competent among us are giving a manly
example by entering the Governments of the Allies, thus
taking, in the eyes of their countries, a position of responsibility
for the Party which they represent. More than
others we socialists must prove the error of this monstrous
accusation of anti-patriotism. Let us prove, in
defending ourselves, that we are firmly resolved to fight
to the end for our national independence.
“Forward, comrades! Take heart, take courage,
and the bar of red, which mingles with the two other
colours, forming a trinity symbolic of liberty, peace, and
labour, will not be defiled by the bloody hands of the
bandits who would make us slaves! May the furrows,
sprinkled with our blood, bring forth the ear of corn
beneath the branch of olive, symbolizing fruitful labour
in eternal peace.”
“Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast Thou
.bn 039.png
.pn +1
ordained strength, because of Thine enemies, that Thou
mightest still the enemy and the avenger.” Out of the
mouth of a French simple soldat the Englishmen who
are still holding back as I write from the supreme
sacrifice or privilege of national service, the Britons who
never, never, never will be slaves, are condemned. A
year of the war has passed, and hundreds of thousands
of their fellow subjects of all classes have given up their
professions and their positions, their pleasures and their
ease, their wives and their families, and have freely
offered themselves on the field of battle as part of the
strength by which the enemy can be stilled. But they
themselves have done none of the things for which their
French socialist comrade unhesitatingly gave them
credit. They have not—up to October, 1915—realized
that we are at the parting of the ways, they have not
with one voice answered “Present” to the call of their
native land, they have not flown to arms at the cry of
liberty, they have not proved by defending themselves
that they mean to fight to the end for their national
independence. Instead, they sit at home and strike—not
for freedom, but for higher wages and less work—and
prate of Conscripts and a Capitalists’ War and a
Capitalists’ Press, and all the other labour shibboleths
which have lost whatever sense they had before the war
and become mere nonsense, because the war is different
from all other wars and has changed everything in the
world. It is a Capitalists’ War, of course. It was made
by the Prussian Junkers and the business men of
Germany with no other object than that of increasing
their capital and destroying that of the Allies and
.bn 040.png
.pn +1
particularly of England. It is a war fought by “conscripts”
(though I should like to hear Mr. J. H. Thomas,
M.P., use that term to Private Jouanard) in the case
of every country engaged in it except England. And it
is also, because of these two undeniable premises, the
greatest strike against selfishness in high places that has
ever taken place, and the conscript brothers who are
fighting or working for it are the champions of freedom,
and the men who refuse to stand by their side are, without
knowing it, the blackest blacklegs in the history of the
world. And no one knows better than they and the
newspapers and politicians who support them what
blacklegs are. They are the men who in the wars of
labour refuse to submit to the Compulsory Service of
trade-unionism, which is sometimes the most servile
service and the most autocratic and deadening compulsion
that ever was enforced in a free country, and the
badge and livery and alpha and omega of the god with
the feet of clay before which they bow down and worship.
.tb
Though it was a clear starlight night when we walked
up to General Thévenet’s quarters, the moon had not
risen and the town was wrapped in silence and dense
darkness. Not a lamp was lit in the streets, not a chink
of light escaped through the closely shuttered windows,
not a sound was to be heard but the steady tramp of a
distant patrol and the clatter of our feet on the cobbles.
Afterwards, in Toul, and Epinal, and Commercy, and
Nancy, and Lunéville, and other towns near the front,
we got used to the conditions of a state of siege after
couvre feu, when people go to bed at eight or nine o’clock—the
.bn 041.png
.pn +1
deathly night stillness, broken only by the barking
of dogs, the shrill despairing shrieks peculiar to French
engine whistles, and the dull boom of cannon, and, in
the empty streets, walled in by tall houses teeming with
unseen human life, the solid blackness of the grave.
In time you get used to it and forget to wonder whether
the Germans too can hear the howling of that far-off
dog that is baying the moon. You even crack jokes
with the heavy-footed sentries and stealthy police
“agents” who loom up uncannily out of the darkness
and may or may not request you to follow them to the
“poste.” But that first night in Belfort, before I had
seen the miles and miles of solid entrenchments that lie
between it and the frontier, the effect of it all, and the
thought of the long line of millions of men, stretching
almost from our feet far away for five hundred miles
across France and Belgium to the Channel, thousands
of them watching and waiting and fighting and suffering
under the wide canopy of the quiet night, was curiously
eerie. You seemed to hear Europe sighing and groaning
in her sleep.
Suddenly, out of the unseen came a sharp challenge—“Qui
vive? Halte là! Avancez à l’ordre! Le mot!”—and
we stopped dead, as it is wise to do when you
meet a night patrol in a town in état de siège if you are
anxious to go on living. Then, one by one, we walked
forward, gave the word, handed our papers to the
corporal to be examined by the light of his lantern, and
finally, after a few more challenges, half blinded by the
dazzling glare of the lamps of a motor-car standing in
the courtyard in front, were ushered into General
.bn 042.png
.pn +1
Thévenet’s business-like office. Our reception was as
different from what had gone before as the abrupt
change from darkness to light. At last we had struck
a man of real authority and decision. After a word
or two of explanation—who we were and what we had
come for—we were welcomed as warmly as if we had
been the whole British army, horse, foot, guns, and
aeroplanes, instead of two troublesome journalists. We
had come at a happy moment. England and The Times
would in any case have been passports enough for the
General and his staff. But we shone also with the
reflected glory of the common endurance of the retreat
from Mons and the common triumph of the Battle of
the Marne, which had brought our two countries closer
together than they had been since Balaclava and Inkermann.
And when we had explained the immediate
purpose of our mission—to publish the truth and to
contradict the lying reports spread by the enemy about
Belfort and Verdun and Nancy—the General at once
promised us all the help in his power.
.bn 043.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER III | IN ALSACE
.sp 2
Next morning the General was as good as his word.
A note was brought to our hotel by an orderly to say
that if we would be round at his quarters after lunch
we should be able to see des choses intéressantes, and by
half-past one, in a motor-car driven by an Alsatian
sergeant (who, like many others in the same position,
had preferred service in the French army to his pre-war
occupation as a German private), we were driving
between the outlying forts on our way to the
with Captain de Borieux of the Headquarters Staff as
our guide and friend. Lie number one was soon disposed
of. It was quite evident that the German claim
that they were investing Belfort, and had even taken
two of its forts, was false. Till we reached the frontier,
after passing for eight miles over a wide, rolling plain,
which even then was scarred in all directions with line
upon line of French entrenchments and other formidable
defences, there was not a sign of them, and even then
it was only the negative sign that the boundary post
erected by the Germans after 1870 was now rebaptized
with the colours of France. A yard further, and I
was in Alsace, the first of the very few Englishmen who
.bn 044.png
.pn +1
since the beginning of the war have crossed into the
part of the annexed provinces which had been won back
from the enemy.
.il id=i022 fn=i_b_022fp.jpg w=600px ew=95%
.ca
Photograph by Libert-Fernand, Nancy.
Les Halles, Raon l’Etape—Vosges.
.ca-
We stopped first at Montreux Vieux, the German
name for which was Alt Munster—a little town a mile
or so beyond the frontier on the Rhine-Rhone Canal,
just before it takes a turn to Dannemarie and Altkirch—in
which a month before there had been some brisk
fighting. In their attack on the town, which suffered
pretty severely from their guns, the Germans pushed
forward their infantry as far as the canal, about two
hundred yards across the fields from the French sandbag
defences in front of the station. That was the
nearest point to Belfort which they reached. Before
they got to the movable bridge over the canal a sergeant
who was on guard in the bridge-house, ran out under
heavy fire and turned the wheel by which it is raised
and lowered till it stood erect on the French side.
“Il était temps que j’y aille, mon Colonel,” he said afterwards
to his commanding-officer, when the enemy had
been finally driven back from the canal banks to the
woods round Romagny, a scattered village a mile or
two off which we visited later in the afternoon. The
Germans visited it too, on the same day that they failed
to get into Montreux Vieux, and vented their spite on
its feeble inhabitants (their own fellow-subjects) in the
now familiar way, bombarding church and houses
from a distance of a few hundred yards, and then setting
fire to a quarter of its cottages and homesteads, in none
of which were there any French soldiers. I have often
thought since of the two pictures—the quiet sergeant by
.bn 045.png
.bn 046.png
.bn 047.png
.pn +1
the canal bridge and those smoking piles of rubbish
that once were peasants’ homes—though the destruction
in Romagny was nothing at all compared with the
wholesale ruin and desolation which we saw afterwards
in Meurthe et Moselle and other departments further
north. They seem to me typical illustrations of the
difference between the French and German conceptions
of making war. For we know now that one of the
normal features of the much-vaunted German organization
(till the deadlock of the trenches made it impossible)
was the organized burning by squads of disciplined men
of defenceless villages, peopled, as a rule, only by old
men and women and children. Even for the malign
fits of bad temper which found vent in these wanton
acts of incendiarism, the mailed fist of the drill sergeant
gave the signal, and the men, acting under his orders
and those of his superiors, carried them out, working
shoulder to shoulder, as part of the regular system.
There was nothing systematic about the act of the
French sergeant at the bridge-house. He just did his
duty, as he saw it himself, and on his own initiative,
when he felt that it had to be done. The German
soldier, for all his courage, is part of a mass, a cog or a
nut in an unthinking machine. The Frenchman, for
all his discipline, remains an individual, and the French
army is made up not of men burning with the spirit of
la revanche, but of patriots who have gone to the defence
of their country because they thought it time.
That night, five weeks after the war had begun,
we penetrated a good deal further into Alsace, to within
about twenty miles of the Rhine. It was before the
.bn 048.png
.pn +1
hard-and-fast line of the trenches had been drawn, and
between the outposts on either side there was a wide
stretch of No-Man’s land in the Sundgau (the corner
of the Rhine plain in the angle between the ranges of
the Vosges and the Bernese Jura) which was constantly
traversed by both French and Germans. Colonel Quais,
the officer commanding the brigade stationed at Montreux
Vieux, had arranged for the following day a reconnaissance
in force as far as Ferette, which lies close to the
Swiss frontier a little way west of Basle. Part of his
object was to round up the German troops by which
it was tenanted, as they had been making themselves
a nuisance to his cavalry patrols. His force consisted
of two regiments of infantry and two batteries of 75’s,
with detachments of dragoons and bicyclists. From
Montreux Vieux to Pfetterhausen, to which they had
marched that evening, was only eleven miles, and from
Pfetterhausen to Ferette another seven or eight. But
night marches are leisurely affairs, and to be on the
ground in good time in the morning, we had to start
before midnight. So after a very early dinner with the
Colonel and his staff we turned in at eight o’clock on
the shake-downs which he provided for us, and, after
three hours’ sleep and a hasty snack, five of us packed
into a smallish car and set off for what he called his
little fête, with high hopes of what the morrow might
bring forth. Unfortunately, for all of us—our kind host
as well as ourselves—the promised fight did not come
off, but for all that the trip was well worth making. It
is not every night in the war that English journalists
get a chance of a forty-mile march into German territory
.bn 049.png
.pn +1
with an escort of between two and three thousand
French troops.
On the way to Pfetterhausen we were challenged
several times by sentries posted at different barriers
on the road. At each stop the car slowed down and was
pulled up, the officer sitting next the driver got down
and opened the slide of his lantern—the night was pitch
dark, with only a thin crescent moon high up in the
cloudy sky—gave the word, advanced to the barrier,
showed our papers, and finally turned the lantern in our
direction to show that we might come on. Once or
twice he must have found the pauses before the sentries
would let him walk up to the muzzles of their loaded
and levelled rifles uncomfortably long. We were
cutting across the narrow strip of French territory
which lies between Montreux Vieux and Pfetterhausen,
and their lonely posts were quite close enough to the
frontier to make the question of dealing with an unknown
motor, arriving suddenly in the dead of night, rather a
nervous problem. They could not know for certain,
till they had examined the permits—even the Acting-Brigadier
had to have one—whether we were friends
or foes, and to fire first and inquire afterwards might
have seemed to them the better part of discretion if
not of valour. That did happen more than once to
harmless travellers like ourselves while we were driving
about Belgium, where the sturdy patriots of the troisième
ban, who guarded the barriers with ancient weapons
that looked as if they had been dug up on the field of
Waterloo, were a real terror by night. But these sentries
were disciplined French soldiers, not ignorant Wallachian
.bn 050.png
.pn +1
peasants, and gave one quite a pleasant feeling of
security—once we had passed them. No German
scouts were likely to be prowling about within, at any
rate, a mile or two of their posts.
When we had left the last of them behind and had
turned into Alsace again we seemed to be alone in the
quiet night, when, all of a sudden, startlingly close
beside us, there was the clink of a chain and the stamp
of a horse’s hoof, and we could just see that we were
abreast of a long line of horses and guns and men drawn
up along the side of a narrow lane, barely leaving room
for us to pass on to the cross-roads of the village. Here
there was a long wait while the officers of the different
units got their orders from the Brigadier. The men,
who were drawn up along the roads leading to the
village, were curiously quiet. They spoke very little
and only in whispers, and even the tramp of their feet
when the column began to get on the move soon after
two o’clock had struck, with the Colonel marching with
the infantry at its head and the dragoons darkly
silhouetted against the grey walls of the houses, made
hardly a sound. We gave them a long start and then
followed on in the car, continually overtaking and
passing different bodies of the long column, horse and
foot. At one time, at a moment when we happened to
be out of touch with any part of it and were rather
afraid that we might have lost our way, we roused a
scared German villager out of his bed and took him on
board to show us the road. We were not anxious to
come upon the enemy unawares, and when we sighted
and caught up another body of troops, it was distinctly
.bn 051.png
.pn +1
comforting to see in the dawning light that the colour
of their trousers was red and not grey. Just after
that, in the middle of a thick wood, the car stuck for a
time in some boggy ground as we were trying to get past
a couple of trees which the Germans had felled the day
before and dragged across the road—a likely enough
place for an ambush. Nothing, however, happened,
and a mile or two further on, as the sun rose in front of
us beyond the Rhine, a quickly-fading picture of gorgeous
rose and crimson and deep blue, we overtook the head
of the column, picked up the Colonel, as fresh and
eager as a boy for all his sixty-two years, and five minutes
later were eating bread and cheese and other good things
in the orchard which was to be his headquarters in the
battle of Ferette. And after all, there was no battle.
The batteries took up their position in our rear,
the infantry deployed in open order over the fields, the
cyclists and dragoons exchanged snap-shots with the
enemy’s vanishing scouts and skirmishers far away on
the left flank, and gradually the town, which nestles
among the wooded hills of the Bernese Jura, was
surrounded. But not a German soldier was left in it, and
the only result of the reconnaissance was to prove that
in that part of Alsace there was no body of enemy
troops strong enough to risk an attack on our half-brigade.
If the Colonel had been a German officer he would
probably have treated Ferette as the enemy had
Romagny, by way of revenge and as an object-lesson
in terrorism to the Alsatian villagers. There was
nothing and no one to prevent him. He had the men
.bn 052.png
.pn +1
and the guns and at a pinch could have improvised the
fire-lighters which the Frenchman does not carry ready-made
in his haversack, like the Boche. But that is
not the French way. They fight like soldiers, not with
women and children, and they do not wantonly destroy
property. At the same time I am bound to say that
just to show what the 75’s, though served by territorials,
could do, they were allowed to fire one shot at
the ruined castle which stands on one of the wooded
heights above the town. The range was about three
miles, the target was invisible to the gunners, the
observation officer was perched in a tree three or four
hundred yards from the battery, and yet the shell
struck the wall exactly in the middle of the panel above
the central window, making a neat little extra window,
absolutely round, which was even an improvement on
the original architect’s design.
It was a trifling little incident, but it was very characteristic
of the light-hearted boyish way in which
the French set about the business of war. The nearer
you get to the front the more that fact strikes you.
Behind the armies, far away from the trenches, war is
a dreary affair. The office-clerks, the road-menders,
the men who guard canals and bridges and lines of
communication, or are scattered about in little postes
of twenty or thirty, in ugly suburbs and out-of-the-way
villages, and all the other hosts of soldiers (including
most of the embusqués), who have never come face to
face with an enemy, except, perhaps, a disarmed
prisoner—these are the real unfortunates of the war.
They only see its unpicturesque side, where if there is
.bn 053.png
.pn +1
little danger there is also no glory and no excitement,
and are apt to lose heart and take a gloomy view of its
prospects. The optimists and the real light-hearted
children of the nation are the fighting men who suffer
its horrors and its hardships day and night, summer and
winter, at the front. Their life, as was said shortly
before his death by an Eton boy and gallant English
soldier, is a glorified picnic—a picnic with an object.
They live the open-air existence, which is the proper
environment of the natural man. It is better fun to
ride and march through the night to Ferette, with a
chance of a scrap with the Boches at the end of it, than
to put on a stiff collar and hard hat to crawl to a stuffy
office day after day in a crowded suburban train. It is
better fun, as well as a more dignified calling, to be a
soldier fighting your country’s battles than a waiter
or a flunkey or a billiard-marker or a rich idler with no
real work to do. That is how the French soldier at the
front takes the war, in spite of its hardships and sufferings
and its deadly home-sickness, the aching separation
from those he loves, which is the worst thing that
the soldier has to bear. For a long year now in the
east of France his home for the most part has been in
the big woods that, in the Vosges and Lorraine and La
Woevre, lie almost everywhere behind the lines, and it
is because he is a boy at heart that when he has built
his leafy wigwam or his wooden or stone hut, or hollowed
out and roofed his cave in the ground—just the things
that boys love to do—he is able to keep lively and
cheerful. He surrounds his new home with little paths
and garden-beds—generally with coloured stones
.bn 054.png
.pn +1
arranged in patterns instead of borders and flowers—he
decorates it with war trophies, and, if he is an artist,
with war pictures and even frescoes, he collects round
it young boars and owls and other live mascots (which
boys would call pets), he builds his own fires and has
picnic meals in the open, he is constantly doing things
with his hands, he goes to bed early and sleeps like a
top (when he is not in the trenches), his relaxations,
which he has to invent for himself, are simple and clean,
and, officer or man, although he is living constantly
face to face with death, he manages somehow, but chiefly
because he is a Frenchman, to be nearly always gay and
young-hearted.
I remember once coming to a nearly roofless village
near Thiaucourt, which was held as part of the front
line of trenches by an infantry battalion of territorials.
An enemy aeroplane was whirring overhead, and
occasional shells were dropping not very far off. It was
an off-time, and the men were mostly in the street,
playing with their baby sanglier and posing for a snap-shotting
photographer. When the Taube came “over”
they all bolted for cover like a lot of cheerful rabbits,
and in half a minute came running out again, laughing
and joking like schoolchildren, and crowding together
in front of the camera to be taken in a regimental group.
The spirit of the officers was just the same. Four young
lieutenants were just starting to play tennis on a vilely
bad mud court, and, Taube or no Taube, they went on
with their game. But the Colonel, portly and middle-aged,
was the real joy. He had just invented and
rigged up an ingenious system of taps and pulleys and
.bn 055.png
.pn +1
cisterns and boilers, thanks to which his men could
enjoy the luxury of hot as well as cold shower-baths.
As he was showing it off he stopped for a moment to
listen to the scream of an approaching shell, then said,
“Ce n’est pas pour nous,” and went on enthusing over
the merits of his new toy. Apparently he had not a
thought of war in his head.
That is one side of the character of French soldiers
as I have seen it in this war. But there is another,
which almost seems to have been born during the war,
some little time after it had begun. I only speak from
a very slight experience, but some of the French as
well as the Belgian officers whom we met right at the
beginning gave me the idea of being nervous and rattled
of knowing nothing about their own plans or the enemy’s
whereabouts, and of being generally in a state of mental
confusion and irritable uncertainty, which looked
extremely likely to lead to disaster. When I came to
France later on I saw an extraordinary change, or
perhaps my original diagnosis was entirely wrong. Bad
mistakes were certainly made at the beginning, and
probably the greatest service rendered by General Joffre
to France was the way in which, quietly and without
unnecessary publicity, but with perfect firmness, he
weeded out the men, whatever their rank, whom he held
to be at fault. But these, perhaps, were exceptions.
The spirit and training of the great bulk of the army
may have been as admirable from the first as it is now,
and that spirit may have been in existence before the
war, and not produced by it and by the example and
warning of the preliminary failures. At all events,
.bn 056.png
.pn +1
there is no doubt about it now. The confusion and uncertainty
and nervous apprehension, if they ever existed
to an extent greater than what was naturally caused
by the suddenness of Germany’s unprovoked attack,
are gone—were already gone when we arrived in Belfort.
Even in those anxious times, when we had only just begun
to throw back the impetuous rush of the enemy, there
was everywhere order, and method, and quiet confidence,
and a fixed determination to go on, neither unduly
elated by success nor troubled by failure, to the absolutely
certain end. No one was in a hurry, but every
one was quick and alert. The army, officers and men,
seemed to be an army of real soldiers, masters of their
profession, and not a collection of bunglers. If mistakes
had been made, or should be made, they would have to
be rectified. But no mistakes and no defeats, and no
possible combination of circumstances, would alter the
final issue, because France and her Allies were fighting
for the cause of the liberty of the world, the triumph
of which was absolutely certain. That was the spirit
of the French a year ago, and it is so now more than
ever. For all their light-heartedness they are taking the
war as seriously as a religion, and out of the travail of
it a new France has been born.
.bn 057.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER IV | ROBBERY UNDER ARMS
.sp 2
Between Montreux Vieux and Pfetterhausen there is
a little French village called Suarce, which, on the very
eve of the war, was the scene of an incident almost as
dramatic from a historical point of view as the violation
of Belgium two days later. At the end of July, for
some days before the war began, the French had withdrawn
their troops to a distance of six miles from the
frontier all along the line from Luxembourg to the
point, a mile from Pfetterhausen, which is the meeting-place
of the boundaries of France, Switzerland, and
Alsace. They were acting, I believe, partly at the
suggestion of the English Government, and certainly
with their warm approval. A few frontier posts, consisting
chiefly of douaniers and gendarmes, had to be
left, but, short of their recall, everything possible was
done to remove temptation from the path of swashbuckling
Uhlan patrols, and so to diminish the risk of
incidents likely to precipitate the declaration of war.
Unfortunately, these precautions were thrown away,
and were even turned to France’s disadvantage. Before
war had begun, Germany had sent a number of small
patrols across the frontier with roving commissions,
.bn 058.png
.pn +1
to promote the very incidents which France had tried
to avoid. After it was declared, in part of the border
district between Metz and Luxembourg, she gained
valuable time by the ease with which her troops advanced
in the neutral zone which France had created. France,
hoping against hope for peace, had played the game:
Germany, bent on war, had broken the rules before it
began.
There were nineteen of these deliberate acts of
trespass by armed men on the soil of a friendly power
between Longwy and Belfort, twelve of them, on
Sunday, August 2nd, in the Belfort district, the rest,
either on the Sunday or the Monday, at Cirey and
other places further north. The number of them and
the wide extent of ground which they covered, were
in themselves enough to prove that they were part of a
premeditated scheme, and not merely the casual acts of
a few irresponsible and excitable individuals. But there
were facts about the affair at Suarce which made it
different from the others and established beyond question
that the German soldiers concerned in it (and therefore
in the other eighteen cases) were acting under the
orders of their superior officers.
The affray in which the first lives were lost on each
side took place at Joncherey, close to Delle on the Swiss
frontier, five miles nearer to Belfort than Suarce. A
glowing account of it was given in the Elsasser Kurier,
a paper published at Colmar, which not only acknowledged
the raid and the date (August 2, 1914), but
deliberately gloried in the achievement of its leader,
Lieutenant Mayer, of the 5th Chasseurs. He was, it
.bn 059.png
.pn +1
says, when he received his orders from the general officer
commanding the brigade to reconnoitre in the direction
of Belfort, “full of joy and the lust of fighting, and
proud to be the first to teach the enemy the might of
the German trooper.” When he and his patrol of six
or seven crossed the frontier into France they found,
according to the same authority, that the numerous
French cavalry and infantry detachments which had
patrolled the district for some days before had
disappeared—in obedience, of course, to the orders of their
Government. On the way to Delle they saw, however,
two sentinels posted on the road. “Like a flash of
lightning,” wrote the Colmar enthusiast, “Lieutenant
Mayer overtook them, and with the first stroke of his
German sabre cleft to the breast the head of a French
pioupiou, who was almost paralyzed by terror. At
the same time, just as quickly, first-class trooper Heize
thrust his lance with such fury into the breast of the
other private that he could not withdraw his weapon
from the body which he had pierced (“overtaken” is
the word used), and was obliged to continue his ride
with his sabre (and not his lance) in his hand.” The
German story then goes on to tell how the little troop
proceeded to gallop through a company of fifty French
infantry without losing a man, how Lieutenant Mayer
was shot down after they had passed them, and how
first-class trooper Heize then took command and finally
reached the German lines with a further loss of three
men. As a matter of fact, the feats of arms of the
gallant lieutenant and first-class trooper Heize were not
quite so charmingly mediæval as the story makes out.
.bn 060.png
.pn +1
What really happened was that when they came upon
the French post, consisting of a corporal and four men,
Lieutenant Mayer, by way of answer to Corporal
Peugeot’s challenge, fired three shots at him with his
revolver, one of which wounded him mortally, and
was himself hit and killed by three bullets fired by the
guard. (He was afterwards buried at Joncherey with full
military honours, and a wreath was placed on his grave
by the French.) The rest of the German account, except
the appearance on the scene of the fifty worst shots
in the French army, is fairly correct. In any case it
is near enough to the truth to prove without need of
further witness that the raid was not a mere youthful
indiscretion on the part of the unfortunate Lieutenant
Mayer.
.il id=i036 fn=i_b_036fp.jpg w=600px ew=95%
.ca
French Advance in Village Street of Magnières, Meurthe et Moselle.
From “En Plein Feu.” By kind permission of M. Vermot, Rue Duguay-Trouin, Paris.
.ca-
But the affair at Suarce is the most really damning
piece of evidence supplied by any of these pre-war
violations of French territory. It is not necessary to
depend on the testimony of a Colmar newspaper, which
might possibly be still further mistaken in its statements,
to make the complicity of the German haut commandement
historically certain. Early in the morning of the
same fateful date (August 2, 1914), two cyclists and
seven troopers of the German 22nd regiment of Dragoons
rode into the village and informed the inhabitants that
it was conquered territory. Later in the day an officer,
a non-commissioned officer, and twelve troopers of the
same regiment appeared, and after breaking up the
telephone apparatus, forced a provision convoy, consisting
of nine men, two waggons, and twenty-two
horses, on its way to Belfort, to turn round and
.bn 061.png
.bn 062.png
.bn 063.png
.pn +1
accompany them to Germany. The waggons and horses
were taken as loot; the men were presumably the first
specimens of the new kind of civil prisoner which, during
the war, the Germans have been pleased to label as
“hostages.” But in time of peace it is not the custom
of civilized nations to take either loot or hostages from
their neighbours, and, since there were no soldiers
engaged in the affair on the French side, and therefore
no fighting, the act could not be defended as an act of
retaliation. Nor is there any question of the officer
having done what he did merely on his own responsibility.
You cannot take a troop of French horses and waggons
and men into Germany and hide them under a bushel.
The officer would not, in fact, have dared to commit
the crime of international robbery and kidnapping, and
then carried off his spoil with him to barracks, unless he
had known that it would be condoned by his superior
officers. In other words, like the Roman centurion, he
was a man set under authority, and only did what he
was told to do. The facts of the incident, as I have
given them, are indisputable. If, at the time when
the British cabinet was weighing the reasons for and
against joining in the war, there were any of its members
who doubted the extent of Germany’s guilt, the story
of Suarce may well have played (as I have heard it did)
an important part in helping them to make up their
minds. For it was possibly the earliest positive evidence
which proved beyond a shadow of doubt Germany’s
deliberate intention of going to war. As far as I know,
the story has not previously been published, at all
events in any detail, and therefore it may be of a certain
.bn 064.png
.pn +1
amount of historical interest to give the names of the
nine Frenchmen who were made prisoners of war before
war was declared. They were: Edouard Voelin (58
years of age), Eugène Mattin (52), François Verthe (66),
Isidore Skup (57), Céléstin Fleury (55), Henri Féga (53),
J. Pierre Marchal (51), Charles Martin (29), and Emile
Mouhay (29). The last two had been passed as “bons
pour l’armée” in the class of 1914. The rest were
obviously far beyond the military age. Two of the
nine have died during their indefensible imprisonment
in Germany.
.bn 065.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER V | BELFORT TO NANCY
.sp 2
Our first direct news of Nancy was given us by an
army-surgeon whom we met in Dijon. He had just
been invalided home suffering from septic poisoning as
the result of an operation which he had performed in
one of its many hospitals. In these days very little
information was getting through from the Lorraine
front. The general situation was so obscure that at one
time some of the map-drawers of the English newspapers,
probably owing to a too naïf confidence in the accuracy
of the statements published by the Wolff bureau, actually
placed the line showing the position of the German front
on the west side of Nancy, as though it had been occupied
by the enemy. Fortunately they were mistaken.
Though the capital of Lorraine had been lightly bombarded
on the night of September 9, two days before
the médecin-major left it, it was then, as it has since
remained, in spite of the enemy’s persistent efforts to
reach it, Nancy l’Inviolée. But though the Germans,
after three weeks of incessant fighting, during which
they suffered very heavy losses, had been driven back,
they were still only a few miles away, and when we got
back to Belfort from Alsace, we had already decided
.bn 066.png
.pn +1
that, if it could be managed, Lorraine was the place for
us to go to.
Even if we could have got leave to stay in Belfort
the outlook there, from our point of view, was not
promising. The field defences between it and the
frontier, without taking into account the troops stationed
at Montreux Vieux and in other parts of Alsace, were
enough to convince us that there was little chance of
the enemy getting anywhere near it. The lessons of
Liége and Namur had not been thrown away. It was
pathetic now to remember how when we were in Belgium
everyone had gone about repeating the parrot cry,
“Namur est imprenable” (just as they had said “Les
forts de Liége tiennent, et ils tiendront toujours”),
when, except inside the girdle of the forts, it was not
protected by a single earthwork of any value. The
confidence of the French in Belfort was better founded.
The commanders of the garrison had learnt very early
in the war that forts, to be of any use in modern
warfare, must themselves be flanked, as golf-architects
guard their greens, with an interminable network of
bunkers. Acting on that principle they had constructed
a position of such formidable strength that not even the
German generals, who had shown such a complete disregard
of losses in their advance after Charleroi, would
be likely to face the huge waste of life which a frontal
attack on the Vosges fortress would have entailed.
A year has passed since then, and instead of getting
nearer to it they are miles further back than the place
where Lieutenant Mayer met his death. Pfetterhausen
and Montreux Vieux and Dannemarie and a good slice
.bn 067.png
.pn +1
of Alsace are still in the hands of the French, and the
siege of Belfort (unless the enemy try the desperate
expedient of a flanking movement through Switzerland)
is more unlikely than ever. So confident are the
authorities of their security that most of the civil
inhabitants who had been evacuated at the time of our
first visit have now been allowed to return, and the life
of the town is becoming almost normal again. That is
a healthy sign. It is one of the numerous proofs that
the apparent deadlock at the front is really a signal
victory for the Allies. For it means that for all their
carefully prepared organization and their calm disregard
of the conventions of war by which the other nations
consider themselves bound, the original plans of the
enemy have broken down. The cupolas of the forts of
Belfort, which were to have been so easily crushed, are
still intact; their guns have not yet fired a shot, except
at aeroplanes. As in 1870, no German soldier has set
foot within its walls. Its famous lion is still a lion
couchant.
Just before starting on our way back to Dijon we
paid a visit to M. Goublet, the Civil Governor and Préfet
of the Territoire de Belfort (who has rejoined his old
service, the Navy, and is now in command of a small
cruiser), another warm friend and admirer of England
and The Times. During the war M. Goublet and all his
fellow-préfets of the border provinces have been most
valuable servants of the State. No men in France,
except perhaps the ministers and the great chiefs of
the army, have had heavier responsibilities on their
shoulders or more anxious duties to perform, and no
.bn 068.png
.pn +1
account of the way in which France has faced the
invader can be anything like complete which does not
give some idea of their share in the common work.
We have nothing in England that corresponds to the
office of the French prefect, who, as the direct representative
of the Government in his Department, plays
a very important part in the civil administration of the
country. The eighty-six Departments, each governed
by its Prefect, are divided into sub-districts under the
sous-préfets, and the sub-districts into Communes or
Mayoralties. The Mayor, as with us, is a municipal
officer, and looks after only what concerns his own
commune, which is called, in the case of the big towns,
an Arrondissement. In his Department the Prefect is
supreme. Every civilian official in it—the Sous-Préfets,
the Mayors and their subordinates, and all the minor
officers of the State, such as the gendarmerie and the
special police commissaires whom he controls himself—is
under his orders. He is saluted not only by all these
civilian officials and employés, but by the officers and
soldiers of the army. He ranks with the Generals commanding
army-corps, and in time of peace even takes
precedence of them. When a new General comes into
a Department he calls on the Prefect, and by him is
introduced to the civil authorities, and in the same way
all the official calls on New Year’s Day are paid first to
the Préfecture. Even in time of war, because the State
is greater than its army, it is only in strictly military
matters that the Generals in his Department are his
superiors. Thus a proclamation by a General to the
people can only be issued through the Prefect and over
.bn 069.png
.pn +1
his signature, and he has the power, subject of course
to the General’s right of appeal to the Généralissime and
the Minister of War, to refuse to sanction any decree
affecting the civil population which the military authority
might wish to enforce. There has been one striking
instance of the exercise of this power during the present
war. By an agreement between the Prefect and the
Military Governor the population of an important town
near the frontier were evacuated in the early days when
it appeared very probable that it would be besieged by
the Germans. After a time, as nothing happened and
all fear of an investment seemed to be at an end, the
inhabitants began gradually to come back, and no notice
was taken of their return till suddenly the Military
Governor issued a second proclamation, without consulting
the Prefect, ordering them once more to leave
the town. To this the Prefect objected, on the ground
that his sanction had not been asked. He announced
that they might stay, and the action which he had
taken was upheld by the Minister of the Interior.
The Prefect, therefore, acts either as the channel,
or (if he thinks it necessary), as the barrier between the
military authorities and the people of his Department,
and is therefore a standing safeguard against the militarism,
which, according to some English critics, is
bound to arise in a country which has a “conscript”
army. The mere fact of the existence of the office, with
its extraordinary powers, is a sufficient guarantee that
in France the militarism of which these people make a
bugbear can never make any real headway.
Amongst his other duties the Prefect is responsible
.bn 070.png
.pn +1
for the care of the main roads and State monuments
(such as cathedrals) in his Department; for the holding
of Conseils de Révision (the periodical assemblies of the
young men of the nation, at which they are finally
examined, in classes dependent on the year of their
birth, to see if they are physically and mentally fit for
service in the army); for the provisioning and lighting
of the towns and villages in his district; and for the
control of the Press, or what is commonly termed the
censorship, which, in time of war, he exercises jointly
with the military authorities. In the invaded districts
the importance of each of these several duties is obvious,
and no praise can be too high for the way in which they
have been carried out, all along the battle-line from
Belfort to Briey, by M. Goublet (Territoire de Belfort),
M. Linarès (Vosges), M. Léon Mirman (Meurthe et
Moselle), M. Aubert (Bar le Duc) and the sous-préfets of
Lunéville, Toul, and Briey, M. Minier, M. Mage, and M.
Magre. To the sorely tried people under their charge
these men have set a fine example of unity, hard work,
self-sacrifice, confidence, and courage, with a leaven of
the less ornamental virtue of common-sense. They have
unflinchingly carried out the often risky work of visiting,
as soon as the enemy was driven back from one position
after another, the burnt and ruined villages which he
left behind him. They have been the stand-by of the
brave mayors who have stuck to their posts in the hour of
danger, they have cheered the wounded in the hospitals,
they have cared for the homeless and destitute refugees,
and they have stimulated and encouraged the whole
population by giving them a true and lofty ideal of what
.bn 071.png
.bn 072.png
.bn 073.png
.pn +1
the war means for France and the world, and of the way
in which Frenchmen and French women and children
should face its perils and its inevitable sufferings and
distress. And—si parva licet componere magnis—those
of them whom we have been fortunate enough
to know have been exceedingly kind and helpful to
two grateful journalists from London.
.il id=i044 fn=i_b_044fp.jpg w=315px ew=60%
.ca
Woelflin, Nancy, phot.
M. Leon Mirman, Prefect of Meurthe et Moselle.
.ca-
At this particular moment, however, it was the
military, rather than the civil authorities, who were
able to help us on our way. By the service de renseignements,
or military intelligence department, at Belfort,
we were given a special pass to go to Nancy by way of
Dijon and Chalindrey (the direct route by Epinal being
impossible), and when we got back to Dijon General
Brissaud himself viséd our passports for the same
destination.
Armed with these double credentials we started
from Dijon on what in ordinary times is a journey of
six hours, instead of which it took us from three o’clock
in the afternoon till half-past eight next morning.
The first big check was at Chalindrey, close to Langres,
where we had a three hours’ wait during which we saw
two interesting little sidelights on the war. In those
days all station-restaurants had been taken over for
the use of the army, and as we were not allowed to
stay on the platform or to sit in the train, we thought
at first that we should have to kick our heels till midnight
in the station yard. It was a dark and chilly
prospect. However, by the help of a friendly private
and persistent knocking at a back door, we did at last
force our way into the refreshment room, and on the
.bn 074.png
.pn +1
strength of being English were allowed to order some
supper. While we were eating it a taciturn sergeant
demanded our papers and carried them off into the
outer darkness. Then there was a long pause. We
waited and waited, each moment getting more and more
afraid that they were not going to get us through after
all, when the door opened and out of the ewigkeit, nearly
two hundred miles from the nearest English troops,
two Red Cross Tommies, an Australian and a Lanarkshire
miner, walked into the room. They were under
the escort, not to say the arrest, of the Station Commandant,
who wanted to confront them with us to see
if the story they told was true. It was, as a matter of
fact, rather lame. They said that after the Battle of
the Marne they had lost the rest of their detachment
somewhere near Compiègne, and being tired of hospital
work were trying to reach the front, in the hope of
being allowed to do some fighting. Whether they were
deserters or not they certainly had their full share of
Scotch and Australian mother-wit, or they could never
have got so far without being arrested. Three months
later, by some miracle, for they spoke no French and
had only their ordinary soldiers’ passes, they turned
up in Nancy, still on their own, and were taken to Toul,
this time, I believe, under close arrest. As they were
the unconscious means of doing us a good turn, I rather
hope that they were not impostors, and that they
were not too hardly dealt with. Hearing me talking
to them, a French officer, Commandant Chesnot of the
360th Regiment of the Reserve, introduced himself
as an ardent admirer of England, and invited us to
.bn 075.png
.pn +1
make the rest of the journey in the reserved carriage
which he shared with another officer. They were old
schoolfellows belonging to the same regiment, who
had been knocked over by the same shell three weeks
before at Réméréville, and were now returning to duty,
still limping from the effect of their wounds. Like
every wounded French officer and soldier whom we
met, their one idea was to get out of the surgeon’s
hands and back again to the front as soon as possible.
It was lucky for us that they were so keen.
At Toul, where we had to wait for another three
hours, we sat with them in the waiting-room reserved
for soldiers, instead of being herded with the civilian
crowd next door, and from Champigneul, beyond which
no passenger trains had been running for some time,
we travelled as their friends in one of the familiar trucks
built to accommodate forty men or eight horses, sitting
on bundles of sacking filled with the disinfected uniforms
of dead soldiers. Since the service had been suspended
at the beginning of the war, we were, I believe, the first
civilians who made their entry into Nancy by train.
.bn 076.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER VI | ÉTAT-DE-SIÈGE IN NANCY
.sp 2
Our start in Nancy was not encouraging. We reported
ourselves first at the Place, the military headquarters
of the town, and were ushered by mistake into the room
of an officer (we never knew his name), who was not the
Military Governor, and was just packing up to go elsewhere.
Therefore he said he could do nothing for us
himself, though he had had friendly relations with
Printing House Square, and he much doubted whether
any one would give us leave to stay in the town for more
than a night. The only General who possibly might
was, according to him, a strong stern man who had
a rooted objection to journalistic enterprise, and he
earnestly advised us to keep out of his way. So we went
off to lunch, in rather low spirits—and sat down at the
next table to a third General, who looked particularly
human and friendly. He was, the waiter informed
us in a whisper, General de la Massellière, the Commandant
d’Armes, and in about two minutes M. Lamure
had introduced himself and me and explained our
business, and we had received a polite invitation to
present ourselves and our credentials at the Place at
two o’clock. By a quarter-past we had a permis de
.bn 077.png
.pn +1
séjour for one night, next day it was extended to four
nights (with the understanding that we must go at
once if the enemy resumed their abortive bombardment
of the 9th), a day or two afterwards it was prolonged
“till further notice,” and eventually we stayed for four
months.
Our second visit was to the Préfet, M. Mirman, and
our third to the Mayor, M. Simon, and, thanks to the
warm welcome which they gave us, we went to bed that
first night hoping for the best and feeling that we had
already made three very good friends.
Both M. Mirman and M. Simon were appointed to
their posts ad hoc on the outbreak of hostilities, and
Meurthe et Moselle and Nancy very soon found out
that they had got the right men in the right places.
M. Mirman had served his time in the ranks of the
army as a Chasseur-à-pied, while he was the Député for
Reims and still a very young man, and was known in
his constituency and Paris as the député soldat. Before
the war he was Directeur de l’Assistance Publique in
Paris, at the Ministry of the Interior, but resigned that
post when fighting began in order to get as near to the
front as possible. At Nancy he had his wish even
without leaving the Préfecture. During part of August
and September it was only five miles from the German
lines, and just near enough to the Cathedral, supposing
that the bombs of the enemy airmen missed one of
their favourite targets by a short hundred yards, to be
one of the danger-spots of the town. Madame Mirman
came with him to Lorraine, and was followed soon
afterwards by her daughters, all under twenty, and her
.bn 078.png
.pn +1
young son. Their presence in Nancy greatly helped
M. Mirman in a very important part of his work as
Prefect. Apart from the compassionate services which
they rendered to the wounded and the refugees, the
mere fact of their being there was a constant encouragement
to the townspeople in the dark and critical days
at the beginning of the war. It meant, presumably,
that the Prefect thought that the apparently imminent
danger would be averted, or at least that he expected
them not to run away from it. As a matter of fact,
except the Post Office employés, who bolted in a body
(I believe in obedience to orders), surprisingly few of
the Nanceïens did run away, either after the Germans
had rained shells on the town for an hour at the end
of the fierce battle which poured streams of wounded
into its hospitals day and night for three weeks, or later
on when they had come to look upon Taubes and Aviatiks
as a sort of gratuitous cinema show, and had further
been roused from their sleep on Christmas Eve by the
first Zeppelin that ever dropped bombs on an open town.
.il id=i050 fn=i_b_050fp.jpg w=350px ew=70%
.ca
Dufey, Nancy, phot.
M. Simon, Mayor of Nancy.
.ca-
The people of Nancy, like all Lorrainers and all
border-races, are by nature a hard-plucked breed. Their
fathers and their fathers’ fathers before them for many
generations have stood in the great gap of western
Europe and fought for their liberty against Huns and
Romans and Germans and half a dozen other tribes and
nations, till war and all its ghastly consequences have
been burnt into their bones. They come, therefore,
of a fighting stock, and it was to be expected that they
would show a brave front to the enemy. But for all
that it was largely owing to the example of M. Mirman
.bn 079.png
.bn 080.png
.bn 081.png
.pn +1
and M. Simon (a true Nanceïen, who looks like a fighter
all over, and was unanimously chosen by his municipal
colleagues as the right man to be Mayor of Nancy in
time of war) that the town kept its head and its bonne
humeur through the anxious weeks when the enemy
was pounding at its gates.
When we arrived there were still gaping holes in
the houses that had been struck by the German shells,
and every here and there heaps of broken glass and timber
and masonry piled up on the pavement. All through
the day convoys of prisoners and long columns of
marching troops, horse, foot, and guns, and strings of
carts and ambulances, carrying provisions, ammunition
and wounded men, were constantly passing through
the streets. At night, like Belfort, Epinal, Commercy,
Toul, and Verdun, the town was in complete darkness,
and hardly a soul was stirring. And all day and all
night there was the sound of the guns, rumbling and
roaring with monotonous regularity. Every few
seconds the thunder of them kept breaking out, dull,
angry, and continuous, pressing with leaden weight on
one’s ears and head, like the banging of a furious wind
roaring down a gaping chimney. You heard it as you
went to sleep, you heard it whenever you woke up in
the night and the first thing in the morning, and you
heard it all day long. And after a time you took no
notice of it. You heard it less than the rattle of the
tramcars, except when it burst into particularly furious
claps, and then you turned to your neighbour and said,
“Ça tape,” and went on with what you were doing.
But in spite of it all—the noise of battle and the sad
.bn 082.png
.pn +1
and stirring sights of the wounded and the soldiers, the
shattered roofs, the war proclamations on the walls
and the war-pictures and war-accoutrements (even to
a suit of chain armour) in the shop windows—it was
difficult to believe that the enemy were so close and that
actually as well as technically Nancy might at any
moment be in a state of siege. For apparently the life
of the place, except for the wounded and the number
of women who were dressed in black, was very little
different from the normal life of an ordinary garrison
town. The streets were crowded and lively, the tramcars
were running, and motor-cars dashing about in all
directions; the shops and cafés were open, and though
most people looked thoughtful, no one was gloomy.
Every one had his share of the common work to do,
and did it cheerfully and unselfishly. Come what might,
they would not despair of the Republic. Come what
might, they felt that they were going to win, because
their cause was just and God would defend the right.
Above all, they were a united people. Soldiers and
citizens, governors and governed, were all one. At
the Préfecture, at the Place, at the Mairie, in the Press,
there was only one spirit and only one aim—to sink all
differences and jealousies and work shoulder to shoulder
for France and for freedom. There was no question of
one authority setting himself up against another; the
times were too serious. Party feeling was dead—or
peradventure it slumbered. State and Church had
buried the hatchet. No one talked or thought of politics
except to hope and believe that the politicians in Paris
would continue to preserve the peace.
.bn 083.png
.pn +1
All the time we were in Lorraine I never once heard
a soldier or a Churchman or a freethinker or an editor
or a politician of any complexion say a word about
his personal political views. For all I knew from the
men themselves they might have had none; except
by inference it was impossible to tell what they were.
The war and the common danger had wrought a miracle.
France had been born again, and the watchwords of
Liberté, Egalité, and above all Fraternité, were become
lifegiving spiritual facts.
We did not grasp all this the first day we were in
Nancy, though we felt it, for it was in the air. But little
by little we began to know the people, largely
owing to the kind offices of M. Mirman, M. Slingsby,
the President of his council, and other members of his
staff. The Press we met in a body twice at the Préfecture,
once at a dinner given in honour of our own
newspaper and England, and once when we were all
formally presented to M. Viviani. For each of us the
then Prime Minister had a ready and graceful remark.
“Le Times,” he said to me, “est toujours si bien
renseigné”—possibly, I think, with a little touch of
self-consciousness. For no one knew better than he
the restrictions under which the Press had suffered, in
its quest of information, during the war. The five
excellent newspapers which supply the needs of Nancy’s
100,000 inhabitants—L’Est Republicain, l’Eclair de
l’Est, l’Etoile de l’Est, l’Impartiale, and the Journal de
la Meurthe—have been particularly severely treated.
There have been times when their editors have not been
allowed to announce even the fact of some local incident
.bn 084.png
.pn +1
(such as the visit of the Zeppelin, which was naturally
known at once to every one in the town) till the news
had been published in the Paris newspapers and telegraphed
back to Nancy. Often they have suffered
the mortification of being forbidden to say things which
could not possibly have given information to the enemy
and would certainly have been of real service to the
community. But their loyalty has never wavered.
Like the rest of the Lorraine world they have put their
country and the need for unity before everything else,
and have done excellent service to the State, not only
in keeping before their readers the sufferings and necessities
of the wounded, the refugees, and other victims of
the war in the town, but in holding up to every one a
lofty ideal of patience and courage.
More obvious in the streets than the work of the
Nancy press, because nothing is more conspicuous than
the Red Cross flag, was the work of the Nancy hospitals.
In the early days of the war the arrangements for picking
up and bringing in the wounded were to a large extent
inadequate and primitive. We talked with many
French soldiers who, during the great battle in front of
Nancy, lay on the field for two, three, and even four days
without food or water, suffering from their wounds,
before the ambulance men could come to their assistance.
That was largely the fault—or the crime—of the
Germans, who often lay hid in the woods commanding
the scene of a recent fight and fired on every man lying
there who stirred a limb as well as on the stretcher-bearers
who tried to carry the wounded away. When
at last those who were still alive could be got at, large
.bn 085.png
.pn +1
numbers of them had to be carried to the hospitals in
clumsy rickety country waggons, the jolting of which,
to men in their condition, was almost past endurance.
A large proportion of the deaths which took place in
the hospitals were due to one or both of these causes—the
days and nights of exposure on the battlefield,
and the long-drawn-out torture of the slow journey to
the rear—and some of the men who survived them
both told me that for sheer agony of suffering the second
was the harder to bear. Nowadays that has been
altered. In the summer of 1915 I saw near Commercy
some English motor-ambulances sent to supplement the
French Red Cross service at the front, which, for
arrangement and comfort and swiftness, were as good
as anything to be found. But in the early days there
is no question that the provision for the transport of
the wounded from the field was painfully deficient.
In Nancy itself full preparations had been made
from the beginning. Besides the regular hospitals
a large number of supplementary establishments were
organized by the Union des Femmes de France, the
Commission Municipale des Hospices, the Société des
Secours aux Blessés, and other more or less temporary
agencies of the Red Cross. The Union des Femmes
de France in particular showed praiseworthy forethought.
Soon after the fighting began they had twenty or more
temporary hospitals in working order in Nancy and the
surrounding towns, and also provided a motor convoy
for collecting the wounded, which was quickly taken
off their hands by the Army Medical Service. All of
these hospitals were arranged in buildings temporarily
.bn 086.png
.pn +1
converted from other uses. The most important of
them, wonderfully well supplied with everything needed
by the wounded, were those administered by M. Lespines,
in the Lycée Poincaré, and by General Schneider and
his wife and some of their friends from Paris, in a
training-school for teachers.
In the two big permanent hospitals, the Military
and the Civil, the arrangements, at all events to my nonprofessional
eye, appeared to be perfect. The first is
probably one of the best equipped hospitals in Europe.
There is plenty of cubic space and plenty of air in its
long, well-lighted corridors and roomy wards. Storerooms
of all kinds, pharmaceutical, bacteriological,
and chemical laboratories, radiograph rooms, operating
rooms, baths, laundries, kitchens, disinfecting chambers—everything
that is necessary for the care and the cure
of the wounded and the sick—have their appointed
place, and are furnished with the best appliances that
surgical and scientific skill can devise. When I visited
the hospital the members of the regular military staff
who work there in time of peace had gone to the front.
Among the men who had taken their places were some
of the foremost physicians and surgeons of the city.
Some of them belonged to Nancy’s own famous school
of medicine, some came from Paris and other headquarters
of science in different parts of the country,
and all of them, whether they were mobilized or had
volunteered their services, had become part of the
military organization of the State, and were freely
giving for the benefit of the wounded and of generations
yet unborn the fruits of their life experience as civilian
.bn 087.png
.pn +1
doctors. In the Civil Hospital, since the war began
a civil hospital in name only, another wonderfully well-equipped
and well-officered institution, there was everywhere
the same spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice for
the good of the nation and the same high level of surgical
and scientific attainment among the members of the staff.
Of the sisters of mercy and the nurses in all these
hospitals, also in very many cases volunteers, it would be
difficult to speak too highly. The loving care with which
they tend and mother the wounded—“mes garçons”
they call them—and the grateful affection with which
they are rewarded by their patients, are unspeakably
touching. I was never in one of the Nancy hospitals
during the trying time—far more exacting for the nurses
than any operation—when the men’s wounds are being
dressed and the agonized cry of some sufferer will sometimes
spread its infecting example from bed to bed
through almost a whole ward. But no one who has
seen at ordinary times the fortitude and cheerfulness
with which the French bear their sufferings and talk
of their wounds and of the day when they will be able
to get up and go to fight again for their beloved country
could ever forget the sight of those rows of quiet beds,
so different from the wards in an ordinary hospital.
There were no horrible diseases, nothing repulsive or
unclean, nothing that is the result of decay and sin.
A few hours or days or weeks before these weak and
helpless sufferers had been young and strong and
vigorous, the physical pick of the manhood of France.
Now, when they were not talking or reading or smoking,
they lay with closed eyes and uncomplaining wistful faces
.bn 088.png
.pn +1
or looked at one like dumb animals with a marvellous
inarticulate patience that seemed to ask what it all
meant, and why, when diplomatists differ and nations go
to war, it is their poor bodies that have to pay the price.
War and wounds certainly have the effect of putting
the human body in its right place and of doing away
with all the false shame and prudery with which we are
so apt to surround it. When these thousands of men
are well and strong again—or as well and strong as they
can ever be—it hardly seems possible that they can ever
forget the frank purity of their sweet-faced, tender-handed
nurses and sisters of mercy, or the lessons of
the dignity of the body and of life which they have
unconsciously learnt from them.
One day I saw some of the sisters kneeling in the
little chapel in the grounds of the Civil Hospital. The
choir was singing some kind of a litany, the burden of
which was the words “Sauvez la France,” repeated
over and over again. It was one of those days when
the sound of the guns, from some trick of the wind, as
well as from their actual nearness, was more than usually
loud, and each time that the three words of the prayer
rang out through the open door of the chapel they were
followed without a moment’s pause by the booming
roar of the heavy shells. And of the two, the cannon
that had shattered their limbs or the kneeling women
who had soothed and tended them, there was not,
I think, much doubt in the minds of the wounded men
who were well enough to sit about in the sunny courtyard
outside the chapel as to which was the finer force—and
the stronger.
.bn 089.png
.il id=i059 fn=i_b_059.jpg w=412px ew=80% link=i_b_059large.jpg
.ca
THE
FRENCH FRONTIER
FROM
VERDUN TO THE VOSGES.
.ca-
.bn 090.png
.bn 091.png
.pn +3
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER VII | THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE
.sp 2
There is no denying the importance of the German
territorial gains in Belgium and France, even with the
smaller acquisitions of the French in Haut Alsace as
a set-off. But the effect which they will have on the
final results of the war has been much exaggerated, not
only by the Germans, but by the States which call
themselves neutral, the wavering small Powers in the
Balkans, and our own faint-hearted pessimists at
home. All of these people habitually forget or ignore
that practically the whole of this advantage was gained
in the first month of the war, and that since then the
tide has hardly ever stopped flowing, however slowly,
the other way. Once the immediate effects of the first
surprise shock had spent themselves and the war had
settled down into its long-distance stride, it was the
Allies who, army for army, proved themselves the better
men. Other things being equal—and what inequality
is likely to arise in the future is in our favour—the
conclusion is that little by little the enemy will inevitably
be driven to his own side of the frontier which he has
violated and invaded. If before that time comes there
.bn 092.png
.pn +1
is any serious talk of peace proposals and neutral
intervention, based on the relative positions of the combatants
on the western front, it will be difficult for the
would-be peacemakers to go on ignoring all that has
happened since the first month of the war.
Looked at from this point of view, the offensive in
Alsace and Lorraine, with which the campaign on the
eastern frontier opened, was not the mistake which it
was considered at the time by many of General Joffre’s
French and English and German critics. France could
not in honour invade her great neighbour to the north
of Longwy, because of the neutral barriers of Luxembourg
and Belgium. But to the south of that point,
or at least south of the obstacle of Metz and its defences,
she could and did. Along the line where the frontiers
of France and Germany march there were no considerations
of loyalty to treaty obligations to deter her from
attacking instead of waiting to be attacked. And that
was the course on which General Joffre decided. His
offensive was twofold. The advance north of the
barrier of the Vosges failed. But south of them, in
front of the Trouée de Belfort, intersected by the Rhine-Rhone
canal and the tributaries of the Doubs and the
Ill, it so far succeeded that the scene of action has
remained ever since in the enemy’s country. The
consequent moral and strategical gains to France are
enormous. The position of the Germans would have
been infinitely better than it was (even without taking
into account the possibility of a consequent further
advance) if they had been able to dig the almost
stationary line of trenches which they have occupied
.bn 093.png
.pn +1
since the middle of September, 1914, in the soil of
France instead of in the Sundgau.
After the French had mobilized their armies, their
great difficulty was that they could not be sure where
to expect the main attack. For many years the
military experts and prophets of both countries had
asserted confidently that it would come by way of
Belgium; on the other hand, it was a traditional belief
of the great mass of the French public that it would be
made through Lorraine. Both routes were possible,
both had to be taken into account, but to a certain
extent, from a lingering belief in Germany’s honour
as well as out of deference to the popular expectation
(which, on sentimental and political grounds the
French Government could hardly afford to ignore),
greater provision was made for resisting the possible
invasion on the eastern frontier than further north.
It came, as a matter of fact, by both routes at once,
but of the two main assaults, which culminated at
Charleroi and Nancy on the same day, the more important
and dangerous was that delivered in Flanders,
where the French had relatively the smaller defensive
force.
In the north the first meeting between the French
and German armies did not take place till August 15th
at Dinant. In the east they were in continual contact
from the first day of the war. At first, in this sector of
the front, things went well for our allies. In front of
the three great fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, and Toul,
the vanguards of three armies began at once to strike
towards the frontier, the first into Alsace, by the plain
.bn 094.png
.pn +1
of the Sundgau, the second through the passes of the
Vosges, and the third across the boundary river, the
Seille, into the flat country between the Vosges and
Metz.
On the exposed part of the frontier guarded by these
armies the opening period of the war lasted for three
weeks. At the end of that time, on August 24th, the
French were in apparently desperate straits. Their
extreme left was driven back at Charleroi, in the centre
they were just beginning, with a defeated army, the
defence of Nancy, and on the right they had been
obliged by the imminent danger on the left, to withdraw
their forces from Mulhouse for the second time.
But up till then, or at least till the disaster at Morhange
on August 20th, they had on the Eastern sector done
much better than they probably expected. The Verdun
army, though not strong enough to adopt an effectively
vigorous offensive, had been able to keep the enemy from
attacking its forts, and south of Metz the commands
of de Castelnau and Dubail had advanced well into
German territory.
In the Metz, Verdun, Longwy triangle, bisected by
the valley of the Orne running directly east from Verdun
to the Moselle, the fighting was at first not very important.
Conflans, Maugiennes, Spincourt, and several
other towns and villages were early victims of German
savagery, both sides scored moderate local successes,
and the net result was that the enemy secured no
advantage except what was due to their surprise invasion
of the strip of territory from which the French withdrew
their troops on the eve of the war. They would
.bn 095.png
.pn +1
have advanced further and more quickly (as they confidently
expected to do) but for two unforeseen obstacles.
In the first place, there was the Verdun field-force,
which, instead of falling back under the protection of
its forts, persisted in coming out into the open; in the
second, there was Longwy. Its defender, Colonel
Darche, had only one battalion under his command, and
consequently was not strong enough to follow the example
of the Verdun field-army. But with his slender force
he could and did hold up a whole German army till
August 27th, three weeks after the Crown Prince had
arrogantly summoned him to surrender. That officer’s
failure to take the town at the first time of asking was
a bitter disappointment to the Germans, as his army
was intended to form the connecting-link between the
two great offensives through Belgium and Lorraine,
and orders had actually been given to German reservists
to report themselves at Verdun in the second week of
August. It was the first of the many misfortunes which
have since dogged his footsteps, and it is not surprising
that it brought him into disfavour with his Imperial
father. For the heroic resistance of Longwy, like the
defence of Liége and of Nancy, was one of the determining
incidents of the early part of the war.
In the meantime, while Verdun and Longwy were
proving that “its dogged as does it,” to the south of
them the characteristic élan of the French troops was
having its fling from the Moselle to Mulhouse, along
a front of over a hundred miles. The strengthening of
the forces in this region and the consequent weakening
.bn 096.png
.pn +1
of the armies on the Belgian frontier was partly, as I
have said, due to political considerations. But there
were also sound military reasons for this distribution
of the available forces, and for the subsequent French
offensive in Alsace and Lorraine. For forty-four years
the garrison and field armies of the rival pairs of
fortresses—Verdun and Metz, Toul and Saarburg, Epinal
and Strassburg—had been waiting like kennelled watchdogs,
ready, once they were let loose, to fly at one
another’s throats. Primarily the French troops were
intended not for attack—which was the German métier—but
for defence. Both by training and tradition
they were the frontier force of the Republic. In time
of peace they held the post of honour on the vulnerable
border-line between Luxembourg and the Swiss frontier,
always ready for war, as their ancestors before them
had been for generations. Most of the best generals
of France had served their apprenticeship in one of
these famous frontier army corps, and ever since 1870
officers and men, nearly all of them children of the
soil, had been bound more and more closely together,
at first by the war-cry of la revanche, and later by the
nobler feeling that, when the threatened and expected
invasion came, the task and the glory of repelling it
would be theirs. They were the flower of the French
army, and they looked upon the post of honour as their
birthright.
When the blow fell at last there were several reasons
which justified General Joffre in using them for purposes
of offence instead of in the which French and
.bn 097.png
.pn +1
Germans alike expected of them. Being a soldier and
not a politician, he realized that he could not afford
to wait and see. It was a clear gain that his action
should be the exact opposite of what the Germans
looked for. They were so overwhelmingly sure of their
military superiority that they practically counted on
a walk-over. Besides Verdun, other towns far behind
the line of the frontier fortresses, such as Besançon and
Dijon, were the appointed rendezvous at an early date
in August of the German soldiers who could not be
ready to join the colours at the outset, and even the
officials who were to have governed these towns after
their expected conquest had received their commissions
well in advance of the declaration of war. The Kaiser
and his advisers had made the common mistake of
despising the enemy they were sent to attack. Both
in morale and in men the armies of the east proved far
stronger than they had expected.
The consequent upsetting of their original plan of
campaign was in itself a strong vindication of General
Joffre’s policy. But he had another object in view.
The first point was to have enough troops on the eastern
frontier to prevent the Germans from breaking through
the line of fortresses. The second—no less important,
once the march through Belgium had begun—was to
keep a large part of the enemy’s forces busily employed
at a distance from the northern theatre of operations.
That was the reason and the justification of the offensive
in Alsace and Lorraine.
Up to a point this forward movement of the French
.bn 098.png
.pn +1
was successful. From Metz the frontier runs south-east
for about sixty miles, up the valley of the river
Seille, to the Donon, a mountain just over 3000 feet
high at the north end of the Basses Vosges, and from
there, a trifle west of south along the crests of the range
and across the Trouée of Belfort for about the same
distance to Pfetterhausen on the Swiss frontier. The
Vosges half of this line, practically parallel with the
course of the Rhine, is divided into three sections, from
the Donon to the Climont (12 miles), from the Climont
to the Col de Schlucht (20 miles), and from the Col de
Schlucht to the Ballon d’Alsace (18 miles).
In the northern section the range is broken by
the valley of the Bruche, commanded from the north
by the Donon, which runs from south-west to north-east
past Saales and Schirmeck towards Strassburg.
In the central section, steep on the French side, but
on the east sloping gently down to the valley of the Ill,
the chief passes are Ste. Marie aux Mines and the
Col du Bonhomme, with a narrow wooded crest seven
miles long at an average altitude of 3000 feet between
them.
In the southern section the slope is easier on the
French side and more abrupt on the east, and besides
the Col de Schlucht the chief pass is the Col de Bussang.
The summit and eastern slopes of the range command,
of course, an uninterrupted view across the plain to the
Rhine, about fifteen miles from the foothills. Strassburg
is a little lower down the Rhine than the level of the
Donon. Colmar lies about the centre of the plain,
.bn 099.png
.pn +1
midway between the level of the Col du Bonhomme and
the Col de Schlucht, and nearly all the towns which
have so far played a part in the war are in or on a
level with the third section—Munster, Guebweiler,
Soulty, St. Amarin, and Thann in the Vosges valleys
between the Schlucht and the Ballon d’Alsace, and the
rest—Cernay, Dannemarie, Altkirch, Mulhouse, and
Pfetterhausen—south of the Ballon in the plain
opposite to the Trouée of Belfort, which is called the
Sundgau.
It was intended that the French offensive should be
carried out along the whole of this frontier line south
of Metz, but especially in the plains north and east of
the Vosges. The Belfort army was to advance into
Alsace, occupy Mulhouse, cut the bridges of the Rhine
below Basle (at Huningue, Neuenburg, and Vieux
Brisach) and flank the main advance of the first and
second armies in Lorraine.
In spite of their various acts of trespass on French
territory before the declaration of war, the Germans at
first showed little activity. Beyond the abortive attempt
to recapture Montreux-Vieux, in the Belfort district,
practically all they did was to shell and occupy Blamont,
Cirey, Badonviller, and Baccarat, four small towns
close to the frontier and almost midway between the
Donon and Lunéville, on August 5th, 6th, and 8th,
and to bombard Pont-à-Mousson, an unfortunate town
on the Moselle fifteen miles below Nancy and the same
distance above Metz, which since then has been shelled
more than two hundred times, but, except for one short
.bn 100.png
.pn +1
period, has always remained in the hands of the
French.
Our Allies were much more energetic, and the
advance in Lorraine, the Vosges, and Alsace was begun
with wonderfully little delay. Of these three theatres
of war in the east the third, the country between Strassburg
and the Swiss frontier, cut off from the rest of
Germany by the Rhine and the Black Forest, is strategically
of great importance. Its western boundary,
the chain of the Vosges, is the pivot of the long line of
the French defence stretching from Dunkerque to Belfort,
and on its stability depends the security of the whole of
the rest of the front. In order to make that stability
absolutely sure the French had to hold, besides the
chain itself, at least a part of the plain of Alsace, including
especially its natural bastion, the Sundgau.
.il id=i071 fn=i_b_071.jpg w=419px ew=90% link=i_b_071large.jpg
.ca
ALSACE AND THE VOSGES.
(By kind permission of The Times.)
.ca-
The Sundgau, which is the part of Alsace to the
south of Cernay, is divided by the Rhone-Rhine canal
into two regions, the physical aspects, geological structure,
and tactical value of which are essentially different.
The country to the south of the canal, known as the
Alsatian Jura, is thickly studded with rounded
mammelons, like a nest of giant molehills, intersected
by a series of irrigation canals, some of which are two
or three yards wide and useful as lines of defence. The
country, as a rule, is thinly populated, there are few
isolated houses, and the villages are some distance
apart. It is watered by three rivers, the Thalbach,
the Ill, which flows northward from the Swiss frontier
past Altkirch, Mulhouse, Colmar, and Strassburg to
.bn 101.png
.bn 102.png
.bn 103.png
.pn +3
the Rhine, and the Largue. On the right bank of the
Ill there is a light railway, constructed shortly before
the war, running from Ferette to Altkirch, and on the
left bank of the Largue an ordinary-gauge line, running
from Porrentruy, just across the Swiss frontier, to
Dannemarie. There would be a formidable risk of a
German flanking movement by this approach on the
fort of Lomont, to the south of Belfort, if it were not
for the careful watch kept by the Swiss army on their
frontier. The general character of the country is suitable
for guerilla warfare, but not for operations on an extended
scale. It has two main defensive positions against a
French attack based on Belfort along the line Petit-Croix,
Dannemarie, Altkirch, at Altkirch itself, and at
Britzy-Berg. The first of these consists of a series of
heights on the south of the spur of the Schweighof
(Hill 381), and on the north of a ridge running in the
direction of Heidwiller and the junction of the Ill and
the Largue. The value of this position is especially
great on the south-west side where it commands the
important point at which the lines of communication
converging on Altkirch meet and the defile in which
lie the railway, the river Ill, and the main roads from
Mulhouse and Basle. The Britzy-Berg position, three
or four miles further north, near Illfurth, commands
the whole of the surrounding country to a considerable
distance nearly as far as Mulhouse, and also sweeps
with its fire all the roads that meet at Altkirch. Both
these positions had been strongly fortified by the
Germans.
.bn 104.png
.pn +1
The part of the Sundgau north of the Rhine-Rhone
canal is quite different from the Alsatian Jura. It
is a rolling tableland, with gentler slopes and wider
valleys, and the crests of the rises less wooded than
to the south of the canal. The open country is more
thickly populated and better suited for the movements
of large bodies of troops. The main road from
Belfort to Cernay and thence to Colmar runs across
the middle of it, and at right angles to the road, west
of Mulhouse, runs the Doller, a quick-flowing tributary
of the Ill. Between this river and the Rhine-Rhone
canal there is a wide, moderately-wooded plateau, in
which the chief military position is at Galfingen, commanding
the approach to Aspach, Mulhouse, and
Altkirch on the Colmar road, to the south of the bridge
of Aspach, where on some heights round the twin
villages of Burnhaupt, the Germans had prepared a
strong position overlooking the wide bare plain called
the Ochsenfeld, between them and Cernay. East of
the Ochsenfeld they had a second line of defence in the
valley of the Thur (another tributary of the Ill, rising
in the Vosges on the Rheinkopf and flowing down the
valley of St. Amarin, past Thann and Cernay, a deep
river with marshy banks, from fifteen to twenty yards
wide). This line extended from the heights of Steinbach
to the forest of Nonenbruck. It was in this country,
on both sides of the Rhine-Rhone canal, that the French
began their main advance into Alsace.
On Friday, August 7th, a French brigade arrived
about eight o’clock in the evening in front of Altkirch,
ten miles from the frontier, coming by Petit-Croix and
.bn 105.png
.pn +1
Dannemarie. On the same day another detachment of
French troops came down the valley of the Thur as
far as Thann. The smallness of the combined force
was perhaps accounted for (though it was not excused)
by the fact that the French airmen had reported that
the bulk of the German troops were on the other side
of the Rhine, and that little opposition was to be
expected between Mulhouse and the French frontier.
Altkirch was at the time occupied by a German brigade
of about equal strength, with their chief entrenchments
south of the town, on the precipitous spurs of the
Schweighof. A little higher up, towards the top of the
hill, they had a battery of eight 77’s and a number of
mitrailleuses. These were quickly silenced by the
French 75’s, and the trenches were then carried by a
surprise infantry attack which drove the Germans at
the point of the bayonet off the Schweighof in disorderly
flight. They were chased well past their second line
of entrenchments on the Britzy-Berg, five miles further
north in the direction of Illfurth and Mulhouse, by a
dragoon regiment supporting the infantry, and a
number of prisoners were taken before night put an
end to the pursuit. Thus, three days after the declaration
of war, at a total loss in killed and wounded of
less than 150, Altkirch, after forty years in the wilderness
of German domination, was once more in the
hands of the French. The inhabitants received their
long-hoped-for deliverance with every sign of frantic
delight. The uprooted frontier-posts were carried in
triumph through the flag-decked streets, flowers were
rained on the heads of the triumphant troops, every
.bn 106.png
.pn +1
one was cheering or in tears, and in the general tumult
of joy and excitement no one apparently stopped to
consider the remarkable ease with which the victory
had been won or the extent of the guile which the retreat
might possibly conceal.
.bn 107.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER VIII | OCCUPATIONS OF MULHOUSE
.sp 2
Encouraged by their success at Altkirch, the French
set out early next morning for Mulhouse, ten miles
further down the valley of the Ill. The troops which
had descended the previous day on Thann also advanced
by way of Cernay, and along the twelve-mile front
between Thann and Altkirch the whole way to Mulhouse
no trace of the Germans was seen except their deserted
entrenchments. At one o’clock a small patrol of
dragoons trotted up to the Hotel de Ville, and after a
momentary halt clattered away again to report that
not a single German soldier was left in the town. As
a matter of fact, they were not, however, very far off,
and the dragoons had hardly disappeared when a squad
of Bavarian infantry marched into the principal square,
seized a tramway car which was standing in front of the
town-hall, and forced the driver to follow the dragoons,
breaking the windows of the car as they went to make
convenient rests for their rifles. By chance, however,
they took the Brunstatt or south road out of the town,
whereas the dragoons had gone west along the Dornach
road, so that after a short and fruitless journey, they
thought it wiser to turn back and join the main body
.bn 108.png
.pn +1
on the further side of the town, once more leaving it
empty of all but the civilian inhabitants, who by this
time were in a state of the wildest excitement. After
that there was another long wait till after six o’clock,
and then, at last, a couple of platoons of dragoons and
Chasseurs-à-cheval came riding in along the Dornach
road, and the whole population turned out to greet
them and the main body, which followed a quarter of
an hour behind them, with the same extravagant manifestations
of delight and enthusiasm as at Altkirch on
the previous day.
That was on the Saturday evening, during which
the French took up their position on the heights at
Rixheim, about two miles east of the town, their front
protected by the road and railway which curve down
southwards to Basle, the Germans being a few miles
north of them along the Rhone-Rhine canal towards
Neu-Brisach and also in the Hardt (a big forest about
twenty miles long between Mulhouse and the Rhine)
on their right.
Next day, though some of the wiser of the townspeople
were shaking their heads over the smallness of
the French force, the rejoicings continued until the
middle of the afternoon, when suddenly, between three
and four o’clock, the guns on each side began firing,
covering and resisting the advance of the XIVth German
Army Corps, which was directed on Mulhouse through
the Hardt Forest by the road from Mulheim and two
other roads further north. The battle continued
through the evening and all night till six o’clock on
Monday morning. The artillery duel was at its height
.bn 109.png
.pn +1
at about two a.m., and before that time a number of
shells had fallen in the town, across which the batteries
posted on the left flank of the French were firing. For
the Germans the disadvantage of the position was that
after leaving the shelter of the forest they had to advance
for about two miles over an open plain, where they were
exposed to the fire not only of the 75’s on the heights
of Rixheim, but of the French infantry on the slopes
below them, and here they lost heavily. Their numbers
were, however, so superior that they were able to press
on without paying any attention to their losses, whereas
the French, for the opposite reason, ran a great chance
of being surrounded and cut off from their line of retreat
on Belfort. They fought on, however, with much
determination (at one time only the embankment of
the railway to Basle separated the front lines of the
two forces) till six o’clock in the morning, when, after a
series of skirmishes in the streets of Mulhouse, they were
finally withdrawn in good order and most fortunately
were able to fall back on Belfort. They probably owed
their escape to the fact that the German plans had not
been carried out exactly as had been intended. Besides
the XIVth Army Corps, the XVth were also to have
joined in the attack, coming by train from Strassburg
to Colmar, and from there down to Cernay, where they
hoped to catch the French after they had been driven
westwards by the XIVth. The only flaw in the execution
of this scheme was that the XIVth started too soon and
had finished their part of the work before the XVth
arrived on the scene. At seven o’clock on the morning
of Monday, August 10th, they marched into the town,
.bn 110.png
.pn +1
and the French occupation—a dream the realization of
which lasted for just thirty-six hours—was over.
Exactly what the intention of the French haut-commandement
was I do not pretend to know, though
it is improbable that they could have seriously contemplated
the permanent occupation of an open town like
Mulhouse, and any attempt at a further advance through
the Hardt Forest on the strongly entrenched positions
on each side of the Rhine with the inadequate forces
at their disposal would have been madness. The probability
is that the enemy, fully informed by some of
the German-born Alsatians with whom the district
swarmed of the pitiful smallness of the French army,
deliberately fell back in the hopes of luring it on to
destruction, while the French, on the other hand, intoxicated
by the welcome which they had received and the
ease with which they had marched twenty-five miles
into the enemy’s country in two days, thought of nothing
but the moral triumph of the recapture of Mulhouse.
They made their advance with far too small a force
and much too quickly, and they neglected the vital
precaution, all the more necessary because they were
so few, of entrenching step by step the ground which
they had won. At all events, we have it on the authority
of the French Commander-in-Chief that the Alsace
part of the offensive was badly carried out by the
General Officer in charge of it, and that he was at
once relieved of his command.
For the French, therefore, the net result of the first
occupation of the town, beyond the temporary moral
effect which it produced in France, was nil. For the
.bn 111.png
.pn +1
loyalist inhabitants of Alsace it was the beginning of an
organized system of terrorism by which the Germans,
after burning the food and forage storehouses of Mulhouse
when they left it on August 8th, endeavoured to create
through the length and breadth of the country a paralyzing
dread of the cruel weight of the mailed fist.
In Mulhouse itself the time that followed was also
one of great hardship for many of the inhabitants. The
enemy were furious at the welcome given to the French
troops by the Alsatians (after forty-four years of the
beneficent sway of the Fatherland), and they punished
what they chose to consider their base and inexplicable
ingratitude by treating all whom they suspected of
French leanings in the true Savernian manner. To discover
them was an easy matter. The two elements of the
true Alsatians and the German colonists (whom the natives
of the old French stock still persist in calling immigrés)
have never really amalgamated, and the town was therefore
thickly peopled with German sympathisers, only too
eager to act as informers against their fellow-citizens.
But it was the foreigners resident in Mulhouse who
at that time suffered the worst treatment at the hands
of the enemy. Directly after the retreat of the French,
several scores of them, men of all ages (from boys of
fourteen to old men of over eighty) were peremptorily
rounded up in the town barracks, and carried off to
Germany as prisoners, leaving behind them practically
all their possessions except the clothes in which they
stood up. Before their departure, after they had been
left for many anxious hours herded together without any
food, they were suddenly told to form themselves into
.bn 112.png
.pn +1
ranks, and the first batch were lined up, in front of some
soldiers with loaded rifles, with their backs to the wall.
Not unnaturally they concluded that they were to be
shot, and some of them even gripped the hands of those
standing near them in a last farewell. But it was
only the torture of the anticipation of death, not death
itself, that they were to suffer, though I suppose none
of them will ever forget the time of agonized suspense
that they went through before they were brusquely
ordered by the officer in command to fall out, with the
explanation that he had meant to show them exactly
what would happen to them if they gave any trouble,
and that now they knew. Afterwards, when they were
on their way to their first prison-camp, one young fellow
who had just married a girl-wife, who was forcibly
torn away from his side, driven half crazy by his sufferings,
made a feeble attempt at an assault on the guard,
and was at once shot. The rest of them, after a long
journey in cattle trucks, were kept in prison-camps in
the interior of Germany for periods of varying length
up to about six months, in many cases insufficiently
fed and clothed, and as a rule it was the Englishmen
among them who were the most harshly treated and set
to do the most ignominious and disagreeable tasks.
All of them during their journey east and on their
arrival at Rastadt were constantly jeered at and insulted,
not only by the populace, but by their guards.
Five days were enough to effect the reorganization
of the force which had been forced to retire from
Mulhouse, and on August 14th, this time under the
command of General Pau, and strongly supported by
.bn 113.png
.pn +1
the field army of the territory of Belfort, the French
resumed the offensive. On that day Thann was taken
for the second time, and with this place and Dannemarie
and Guebwiller, a few miles further north, as his base,
General Pau once more drove the enemy back on Mulhouse.
But whereas on the previous occasion the main
attack had been made from the south, by Altkirch,
this time the advance was rather from west to east, with
the left flank gradually swinging round from the north,
with the object of cutting the Germans off from their
line of retreat on the bridges of the Rhine and forcing
them southwards towards the Swiss frontier. The
French left was directed on Colmar (about twenty miles
due north of Mulhouse) and Neu-Brisach, and the right
wing on Altkirch, and advancing from west to east they
quickly swept the enemy back on Mulhouse for the
second time.
On the morning of August 19th the town was once
more in a seething state of unrest and suppressed excitement.
The loyalist inhabitants knew nothing of what
was happening, except that the German soldiery were
obviously ill at ease. Most of the crowd were collected
in front of the chief hotel, where the soldiers kept pushing
them back with their rifles in order to keep a clear
passage for the strings of throbbing motor-cars which
were ready waiting for the swarm of military and civil
officials who kept hurrying backwards and forwards
carrying the papers and valuables which were to accompany
them in their flight to the Rhine. No policemen
were to be seen. They were changing from their uniforms
into mufti. Transformed into innocent-looking civilians,
.bn 114.png
.pn +1
their service to the Fatherland was to stay behind in
Mulhouse and keep their eyes open for such information
as might be useful to the military chiefs, supposing
that during the coming occupation the French succeeded
in making good their footing in the town. An hour
after the procession of cars had at last started, with
intervals of a few yards between them, the barracks
were clear and not a soldier was left in the Then
there was a further long wait. The German agents
and spies kept quiet and bided their time. The real
Alsatians, the overwhelming majority of the townsfolk,
were so wrought up with the feeling that they were
rid of the Germans—this time as they hoped for ever—and
so rapturously looking forward to the entry
of the French troops, that nearly all of them went on
standing about in the streets for hour after hour right
through the day. They did not even go into their
houses to eat their lunch, but bought what they could
from enterprising street-merchants who went about with
baskets of food, and ate it where they stood.
At last, at five o’clock, the first Frenchmen appeared,
a handful of Chasseurs-à-cheval, who rode in not from the
west, from which quarter they were expected, but by
the Basle road at the other side of the town, where they
must have passed dangerously close to the enemy.
Like the patrol which had been the heralds of the first
occupation, they were merely a scouting party, and,
having established the fact that the Germans had
retired, quickly rode off again to make their report to
the Staff. The people, who had followed them in a
body, then split up into two main detachments, and
.bn 115.png
.pn +1
streamed out to Dornach and Brunstatt, on the Thann
and Altkirch roads, the Germans having meanwhile
massed their forces two or three miles to the east and
south-east of the town, from which they were in full
view, at Rixheim, Habsheim, and Zimmersheim close
to the Basle railway, just about where the French had
taken up their position after the first occupation.
This time, however, there was to be no triumphant
entry—at least not as yet. The enemy meant to make
a fight for it, and so far as that day, August 18th, was
concerned, the faithful population of Mulhouse had
had their long wait for nothing.
During the night a big change was made in the disposition
of the German troops. From their lines on the
Basle railway they advanced above and below the town
till they occupied a position of considerably more than
a semicircle round it from Pfastatt and Lutterbach
on the north to Brubach, Brunstatt, and Hochstatt
on the south, and some of them were even at Dornach,
to the west of the town. The French line, which was
much straighter, extended from Illfurth on the south, by
Zillisheim and Morschweiler to Reichweiler on the north,
where it slightly outflanked the German right at Pfastatt.
Early on the morning of the 19th the greater part of
the German force in Dornach advanced to Lutterbach,
and there was a general flight of the villagers, carrying
their household goods and driving in front of them as
much as they could of their cattle and even poultry.
At ten o’clock the French batteries on the rising ground
at Morschweiler opened fire, and the battle soon became
general all along the line. All day long the artillery
.bn 116.png
.pn +1
duel continued, and after a time the French gunners
became so confident of their own superiority, and so
indifferent to the bad shooting of the enemy, that they
advanced into the open and worked their guns as calmly
and with as little regard for cover as if they were engaged
in ordinary training man[oe]uvres in time of peace. All
day long, too—for the fighting was at very close quarters—one
hand-to-hand infantry engagement after another
between two sets of men who fought with desperate
dash and tenacity, resolved on the one hand to advance,
on the other to stand firm, for the honour of their
respective countries, caused a vast amount of bloodshed.
On the left, near the big engineering works, commonly
known as “The Red Sea,” a body of French skirmishers
advanced early in the engagement to within forty yards
of a German company which was posted on the road
in front, and killed and wounded half of them almost
before they could reply. The rest fled to the shelter
of the neighbouring houses, and there was a helter-skelter
fight along the street, and in and out of doors
and windows and gates and outhouses. Half of a
battalion which was sent to support the routed men
was wiped out by the artillery, and the other half refused
to advance. A little further south, at Hochstatt, the
35th and 42nd French regiments suffered severely in
the same way at the hands of the German gunners. In
the afternoon, however, the 75’s altogether dominated
the guns opposed to them, their fire ceased, and except
for stray rifle shots here and there, the battle seemed to
be over, large numbers of the enemy having been driven
to take refuge in Mulhouse.
.bn 117.png
.pn +1
One more effort was made, but it was their last.
A strong body of reinforcements were sent out of the
town, and, by using a large building which till then
had been sacred to the Red Cross as a redoubt, managed
to keep the fighting going on for some time longer. But
driven out of this refuge by infantry and artillery fire,
they were once more compelled to retire to Mulhouse.
Soon afterwards Dornach, where the bulk of the fighting
took place, was captured, and by five o’clock the French,
having surrounded and captured twenty-four guns and
a large number of prisoners in the outlying suburbs,
entered the town for the second time in less than a fortnight.
This time there was no question of the enemy
having retired of their own free will in order to entice
them to advance further than was prudent. They had
been beaten fairly and squarely in one of the few pitched
battles of the war, and were flying in confusion to the
shelter of the Hardt Forest and the Rhine. It was a
great moment for General Pau’s army and for France,
even though the engagement, compared with the events
which were to take place in Lorraine and Belgium, was
a comparatively small one. But unfortunately it was
a moment that did not last. Twenty-four hours after
France knew that the tricolour was once more floating
in Mulhouse, it learnt also of the defeat at Morhange,
and although there was no immediate connexion between
Morhange and the evacuation of Mulhouse (only five
days after its recapture), the gravity of the crisis on the
more important fields further north completely out-shadowed
the really considerable triumph in Alsace.
.bn 118.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER IX | MORHANGE
.sp 2
On the map the main ridge of the Hautes and Basses
Vosges (and the boundary line of that part of the
frontier) follows almost exactly the shape and position
of a small manuscript “q.” At the head of the curl
of the “q” is the Donon, and at its lower curve the
Col de Saales, with the town of St. Dié a trifle to the
west of it.
Through the valley represented by the curl the river
Bruche flows north-east past St. Blaise and Schirmeck,
and then turns nearly due east past the fort of Mutzig,
to Strassburg.
Following down the stroke of the “q,” the principal
passes, from north to south, crossed by roads which
even the snows of winter do not often make impassable,
are the Col de Sainte Marie aux Mines, the Col de Bonhomme,
the Col de Schlucht (from near which the north
branch of the river Fecht flows past Stossweiler to
Munster), the Col de Bramont (from which the valley
of the Thur descends past Wesserling and St. Amarin
to Thann and Cernay), and the Col de Bussang, and at
the southern extremity of the stroke is the Ballon
d’Alsace.
.bn 119.png
.pn +1
Since the beginning of the war there has been a
continuous series of violent struggles for the possession
of nearly the whole of this string of important positions
on the crests of the range. Some of them the French
have gained and kept; some they have taken and lost,
and then regained; some they have taken and lost, and
not succeeded in recovering up to the present moment.
They have always kept their footing secure on the
summits of the southern part of the range from
the Ballon d’Alsace to the Col de Schlucht. From the
Col de Bonhomme and the Col de Sainte Marie aux
Mines, which they captured at the beginning of the
campaign, they were compelled to retire in the fourth
week of August, 1914, but they recaptured these passes
after the Battle of the Marne. The whole of the curl
of the “q,” from the Donon to the Col de Saales,
and also the valley of the Bruche, which the French
won and held for the first fortnight of the offensive,
were then evacuated and have remained ever since in
the hands of the enemy. All efforts to dislodge them
from that sixteen-mile stretch of the frontier have
failed, and their continued presence there has been
and is a distinct nuisance to our Allies.
For the present, however, we are concerned only
with the events which took place in this region during
the successful opening of the French offensive, up to
the Battle of Morhange, and the second retirement from
Mulhouse. By August 7th, largely thanks to the effective
fire of the Fort of Servance, on the north-west
of the Ballon d’Alsace, our Allies were complete masters
of the Ballon itself and of the Col de Bussang, five miles
.bn 120.png
.pn +1
further north, and, as we have already seen, had sent
a force down the valley of the Thur to Thann. By the
evening of the 8th, they were astride the Bonhomme and
Sainte Marie aux Mines passes, and by twelve o’clock
next day, after a violent struggle which lasted all night,
the town of Sainte Marie aux Mines was commanded
by the fire of their guns. Almost at the same time
another French column began a resolute attack on
the Col de Saales. On August 12th, supported by a
well-directed artillery fire which swept the rear of the
German position, the infantry advanced impetuously
to the attack, and the enemy retired from Saales in
disorder, leaving behind them in the hands of the
French four guns, a large amount of equipment, and eight
hundred prisoners, most of them belonging to the 99th
regiment of the line, which formed part of the garrison
of Saverne and was brought into public notice shortly
before the war by the exploits of the notorious Lieutenant
Forstner.
Early the next morning the French followed up
their attack by advancing in the valley of the Bruche
in the direction of St. Blaise, where they were opposed
by a strong German force consisting of the 99th and
its sister corps the 132nd, two batteries of 77’s, and one
of field-howitzers, and a company of machine-guns.
The engagement began with a brisk artillery combat,
which resulted in the complete silencing of the enemy
batteries by the shrapnel of the 75’s. Most of the
horses of the gun-teams and a large proportion of the
artillerymen were killed, and the guns, deserted by
the survivors, were taken by the French, practically
.bn 121.png
.pn +1
undamaged. During the early part of the action some
German machine-guns placed in the tower of the St.
Blaise Church did a considerable amount of damage,
but as soon as their position was discovered the 75’s
made short work of the tower and all it contained. Just
before nightfall a battalion of French chasseurs—the
1st, I believe—charged the German positions with
fixed bayonets and in half an hour had driven the enemy
out and settled themselves down for the night in the
captured trenches. Besides eight guns, four mortars,
six mitrailleuses, ninety horses, and over five hundred
men, the spoil included the colours of the 132nd Regiment,
which were taken by a private of the 5th company of
the Chasseurs battalion—the first trophy of the kind
that was secured during the war. Among the many
Germans killed was a general of division.
So far, with the exception of this last engagement,
the fighting in the Vosges had mainly consisted of affairs
of outposts, though the occupation of the passes was
obviously a strategical gain of great importance. From
August 15th onwards, though only for a few days, the
offensive was pushed steadily forward in stronger force
and a good slice of German territory was occupied. The
possession of the Donon and the Col de Saales, commanding
the valley of the Bruche, enabled the French to
occupy Schirmeck, seven or eight miles north of Saales,
while another column branched off to the right and
took Villé on the road to Schlestadt. There was, in
fact, a general advance along the valley of Bruche and
the other valleys running down into the plain of Alsace.
Prisoners and war material were captured in considerable
.bn 122.png
.pn +1
numbers, in some places the plain itself was reached,
and the chief difficulty of the officers was in restraining
their men, who were quite unaffected by the losses
which they had suffered, from going too far ahead.
I have already spoken of the voluntary evacuation
by the French of the neutral zone along the frontier
before the declaration of war. If it had not been for
that political and pacific act of military self-abnegation,
which, once hostilities began, carried with it the disadvantage
that the enemy had to be dislodged from
the passes before any advance was possible, the progress
made would have been much greater. As it was, General
Dubail’s forces had got far enough forward (coupled
with the second occupation of Mulhouse by General
Pau) to become a possible menace to Strassburg, and the
Germans, seriously alarmed by the prospect, hurriedly
began to push forward reinforcements for their armies
in Alsace. The first of these reinforcements advanced
in the direction of Sainte Marie aux Mines, and the
French advanced posts in Villé, confronted by greatly
superior numbers, were obliged to fall back on the main
body. Otherwise the positions remained practically
unchanged—till after Morhange—though in face of the
arrival of these fresh troops the situation was not as
promising for the French as it had been.
.il id=i092 fn=i_b_092fp.jpg w=600px ew=90%
.ca
French Advance at Sainte-Barbe, Vosges.
From “En Plein Feu.” By kind permission of M. Vermot, Rue Duguay-Trouin, Paris.
.ca-
Meanwhile, to the north of the Basses Vosges, in
Lorraine, on the level ground between the Donon and
Metz, de Castelnau’s army during this same fortnight
had been even more successful. Beginning with the
occupation by the French cavalry on August 6th of Vic
and Moyen Vic, two small towns on the German side
.bn 123.png
.bn 124.png
.bn 125.png
.pn +1
of the frontier, close to Château Salins and sixteen
miles slightly north of east of Nancy, they had gone
on from triumph to triumph. Except for the temporary
occupation of Domèvre, Cirey, and Badonviller, between
the Donon and Lunéville, and a quickly suppressed
attempt at a German counter-offensive on August 10th
and 11th, all the gains were on the French side. Their
most considerable success was on August 15th, in the
Blamont-Cirey-Avricourt district, where they routed
a Bavarian Army Corps and part of the Strassburg
garrison army, under the command of the Crown Prince
of Bavaria. Four German field batteries were destroyed
before they had time to open fire, and the enemy finally
retired in confusion, leaving behind them eight mitrailleuses,
twelve ammunition waggons, and a large number
of guns badly damaged by the French shells.
The remaining triumphs were not, as a matter of
fact, of great importance. Still there is no denying
that they were triumphs, and, as a result of them, they
pressed steadily forward, day after day, from one victory
to another, till finally, on August 20th, they found
themselves in front of Morhange, about fifteen miles
on the further side of the frontier, with a line extending
from the Seille well past Dieuse across the Marne-Rhine
canal to a point south of Saarburg.
But that was the end. In front of Morhange and
Saarburg a formidable series of entrenchments had
been prepared, largely by the genius of the veteran
general, von Haeseler, and behind them and in them the
coming of the French was eagerly awaited by a greatly
superior force of the enemy. The result was inevitable.
.bn 126.png
.pn +1
It fell to the army of Lorraine, first of all the armies
of France, to learn by bitter experience the great
strategical lesson of the war—that no troops can stand
up against modern weapons in the hands of soldiers
properly disciplined and properly entrenched. The
French were fighting in the open. They were taken
unawares. They were unsupported by their artillery.
In the splendid offensive movement in Champagne, on
September 25, 1915, it is true that the Second and
Fourth Armies advanced across the open exposed to
the full fire of the German trenches for distances varying
from one hundred to eight hundred yards, and then
drove them back over a belt of country averaging a
mile and a half in depth. But then they started from
their own trenches, which, except in one or two places,
were not more than two hundred yards from those of
the enemy, they were supported by a very heavy artillery
fire from their rear, and for three days and nights before
they made their heroic dash the enemy’s trenches and
wire entanglements had been heavily pounded and
destroyed by an incessant deluge of explosive shells.
The army that was defeated at Morhange had none of
these advantages. They attempted the impossible.
Their attack was extraordinarily brave, but it was
foredoomed to failure, and their losses, considering the
number of men engaged, were very severe. It is not
surprising that after a time some of the troops exposed
to the hottest fire flinched. They would have been
superhuman if they had not. Possibly even some of
their sternest critics would have done the same.
At all events, there the thing was, and I see no
.bn 127.png
.pn +1
reason for slurring it over. On the contrary, the Battle
of Morhange, which the Germans and Mr. Hilaire Belloc
prefer to call the Battle of Metz, is, because of what came
after it, as worthy of our attention as the retreat to
the Marne, though it is not, as a rule, a popular subject
of conversation with the French. They are, as it seems
to me, unduly susceptible about it. The actual result
of the engagement and the want of forethought which
was its primary cause were certainly not subjects for
congratulation. During the previous fortnight the
army had been led on by one success after another,
gained without very much difficulty, till they had come
to imagine that their élan was irresistible and the
opposition in front of them as unimportant as it seemed.
Both the spirit of their advance and the cause of its
abrupt and decided check were typically characteristic
of the French and German methods of making war—as
they were, or as most people thought they were,
before the great war began. The French were like Mr.
Gladstone. They were intoxicated with the exuberance
of their own pugnacity. They were engaged in a holy
cause, the recovery of the beloved province ravished
from them in 1870. At each forward step they found
themselves amongst their own people, and were fêted
as deliverers, until they completely forgot the dangerous
leaven of German-born Lorrainers among them, and the
value of the information which they were able to carry
back to the enemy’s lines. Without doubt the composition
of their force was fully known to the Germans
long before they suddenly found themselves confronted
by the far superior numbers based on the carefully
.bn 128.png
.pn +1
prepared positions at Morhange and Saarburg. The
trap had been set and the path up to it baited with true
German thoroughness, and the French romped into it
with their eyes dazzled by the glare of their previous
successes, exactly as they had been meant to do. When
the fatal moment came the XVth Army Corps in the
centre were too far in advance of the XXth on their
left and the XVIth on their right. They had plenty
of dash, these men of the south, too much, in fact, for
in the ardour of their advance they had outrun the
artillery which should have supported them. But when
they came up against the solid barrier of the Bavarian
Army Corps from Strassburg and Saarburg their bolt
was shot. Even if they had been strong enough to
break through the impossible odds and positions before
them, they had not, in any case, the same compelling
sentimental interest in the reconquest of Lorraine as
the mass of men forming the armies of the east. They
were far from their homes on the shores of the Mediterranean.
Comparatively speaking, they were strangers
in a strange land, and on some of them the feeling
may have had a depressing effect. At first they fought
as bravely as could be wished, but the odds and the
slaughter (far heavier than any that had so far been
seen in the war) and the general impossibility of the
situation were too much for them, and at last they
broke and fled. The French estimate of their total
losses was something less than 10,000: the Germans
(who certainly exaggerated) claimed to have taken that
number of prisoners alone, besides over fifty guns.
That, as far as I can gather from men who took
.bn 129.png
.pn +1
part in the battle and the subsequent retreat, is a fair
general account of what happened at Morhange. If
that is so, then shame is certainly not the feeling with
which the disaster should be regarded. Both it and its
causes belong essentially to the pre-war period. At
some moment during the war the French army, as well
as the French people, was born again. For the XVth
Army Corps, and perhaps for other units in the armies
of the east, the blood-drenched battlefield of Morhange
was the agony-chamber of that new birth. On
August 20th they were flying in confusion towards
Lunéville and Nancy. But even while they fell back,
almost as soon as they found themselves under the
steadying influence of the 75’s of the XXth Corps and
General Dubail’s left wing, the change began. Two or
three days later, when they had been rested and reformed
behind the curtain of the divisions with which
they afterwards shared the defence of Nancy, they
were different men. They were no longer the happy-go-lucky
children of the south, brilliant in deed but
deficient in the power of resistance. One battle had
made them seasoned, stern, resolute men of war, ready
to take their place by the side of the finest soldiers of
France, because they were themselves, as they afterwards
proved over and over again, in front of Nancy,
and in the Argonne, an army of heroes. And that is
why France should think of Morhange with pride.
The triumph of the armies that defended Nancy
was preceded, like the victory of the Marne, by an
overwhelming defeat and a painful retreat. Before
the war every one was prepared to find the French
.bn 130.png
.pn +1
brilliant in attack. But the whole world, themselves
included, was almost equally sure that once their attack
had been stemmed, the effect of enforced retreat would
be to dash their spirits to the ground, and impair,
perhaps irretrievably, their morale as fighters. As for
the Germans, they had apparently calculated on a
whole series of Morhange victories, leading right up to
the gates of Nancy and of Paris. Like the rest of the
world, they were wrong. Out of the fiery whirlwind
of the two retreats came a still small voice, the voice
of the New France, or rather the reincarnation of the
undying spirit of the Old France, cleaner and saner and
more vigorous than ever it had been in all its glorious
history, because the nation knew that the task before
it was the highest and most vital that it had ever been
given to France to perform.
For the moment, however, whatever the future
might have in store, the position of affairs could hardly
have been more serious and alarming. In the north,
Charleroi and the retreat to the Marne were still to come.
But in the east of France the effect of Morhange was
felt at once. Along the Château-Salins route, by Vic
and Moyen Vic, by Avricourt and Cirey, by the Donon,
the Saales and all the northern passes of the Vosges,
past the scenes of their late successes, the beaten troops
and the troops which had not been beaten came pouring
back into France, closely followed by the pursuing
Germans. And then, four days later, to fill the cup of
disappointment to the brim, came the order from General
Joffre that Mulhouse was to be evacuated. The crisis in
Belgium and in France had become too acute. It was
.bn 131.png
.pn +1
no longer possible to spare enough men to continue the
occupation of Alsace on a line so far removed from the
base at Belfort. They were wanted elsewhere. There
seemed to be every chance that the enemy might even
strike at Paris. It was necessary to shield the heart
of the nation, and beyond a covering force large enough
to screen Belfort all the troops in Alsace had to be withdrawn.
For the time being all hopes of the offensive
for the recovery of the two ravished provinces, which
had begun with such fair promise, had to be given up,
and, three weeks after the war had begun, France, on
French soil, had to fight for her very existence.
.bn 132.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER X | GENERAL DUBAIL’S STAND
.sp 2
The days that followed—I may be more precise and say
the three weeks that followed—were the most critical
that France had ever known. Crowded together between
August 20th and September 2nd came the capitulation
of Namur, the defeats at Morhange, Charleroi, and Mons,
the evacuation of Mulhouse, the retreats on Nancy and
the Marne, the menace of von Kluck’s advance on Paris,
and the migration of the President and Government of
the Republic to Bordeaux. The war had begun in
earnest. All along the line the soldiers of France were
either making a desperate stand against superior numbers
or, worse still, were retiring as fast as they could go.
It was the hour of the supreme test. Except along the
twenty miles between Thann and the Swiss frontier the
whole line of the front had been drawn in a position
chosen, not by the French, but by the Germans. Every
day it was being pushed further on, and no one could say
where the limit would be reached. Even the arrival of
the English Expeditionary Force had made very little
apparent difference. We know now how great was the
part that they played in the work of saving Paris, in
spite of their small numbers. But at the time all that
.bn 133.png
.pn +1
they could do was to share in the general retreat, and
make the pursuit as costly as possible for the triumphant
Germans.
That was how the position in the north presented
itself to the armies in the east, when they had time to
look beyond their own share in the common defence,
though as a matter of fact they were much too fully
occupied to take the calm and dispassionate view of the
situation which is now possible.
A soldier during a modern battle can see and understand
nothing of what is going on except on his own
immediate front. He is in a state of complete ignorance
as to what may be happening to the other half of his
own battalion in the next village. But these men were
hundreds of miles from the events in Flanders. Even
their chiefs can have known very little of what was
going on. Only one thing was certain. All the news
there was was bad news. Everywhere France and her
armies were getting the worst of it, and all that the
individual soldier could do was to obey his orders and
do his own bit of fighting with all the courage and
endurance he could command.
I suppose that if we could see into the minds of the
rank and file of the first and second armies in those
black days of disaster and doubt, we should find that
the one thing that sustained them, next to their proud
love of France, was the thought that they had Belfort
and Epinal and Toul and Verdun behind them. They
had been brought up in the belief that the four famous
fortresses were to be the main defence against the
invading Germans, they knew nothing of the crushing
.bn 134.png
.pn +1
effects of mammoth siege guns, and believed that the
forts of Liége were still holding out, and possibly, if they
had been left to their own devices, they would have
fallen back at once, as soon as they realized that the
offensive was over, on the solid protection of these
bulwarks of the frontier. Fortunately their generals
knew better, and the series of battles that saved the
entire line, and therefore France, was fought in the
open country, well in advance of the fortresses. But
the fine strategy and inspiring leadership of de Castelnau
and Dubail and Pau and Foch, magnificent as they were,
could have done nothing without the marvellous spirit
of the officers and men under their command. And that
spirit, after nearly a year and a half of the war, is more
alive and vigorous than ever. The point is worth
dwelling upon, because of its bearing on the future.
The French in all probability have had their worst time
and the Germans their best. But even if that is not
the case, even if our Allies and we have to go through
deeper waters still, we have this to depend upon, that
those armies of the east, like their brother soldiers who
fought at Charleroi and on the Marne, never once
despaired, even when they might well have thought that
their cause was hopelessly lost. Instead they first set
their backs to the wall, and organized victory out of
defeat, and then contentedly settled down to a method
of fighting entirely foreign to the genius of their race.
The fourth stage is yet to come, but as to the results of
it we need have no fears.
Exactly, as it happens, a year ago, from the day on
which this chapter is being written, I ended an article
.bn 135.png
.pn +1
on a visit to the front trenches at Celles in the Vosges
with these words: “The best of it all was just the one
thing that it is most difficult to describe—the wonderful
temper of the French troops that we passed, and sometimes
talked to, on the road. In spite of cold and
hardships and wounds and the constant nearness of
death, these men at the front had a spirit of cheerful
endurance and fearlessness that I believe nothing can
conquer. If it comes to sitting in the trenches for a
year looking at the German trenches fifty yards away
they will sit the Germans out.” The year I spoke of
has gone, and they have not sat the Germans out—yet.
But they are still sitting, and before November 21st
comes again—well, we shall see.
Three months before that visit to the Vosges, on
August 21st, 1914, there were no trenches to sit in, except
the pathetic kind of enlarged rabbit-scrapes that the men
used to scoop out how and when they could. But they
had not much time for digging. The enemy were hard
on their heels. As soon as they knew that the French
troops which had fought at Morhange were retreating,
followed inevitably by those which lined the frontier of
the Vosges, from the Donon down to the Ballon d’Alsace,
they hurried additional regiments across the Rhine as
quickly as they could, and very soon the force available
for the attack amounted, it is believed, to seven army
corps, or something over 300,000 men. General Dubail’s
army, already reduced in size by the numerous levies
made on it for the commands in the north, had also
been obliged to extend its left wing in the direction of
Nancy, and its centre, doubly weakened by these two
.bn 136.png
.pn +1
causes, gave way to a certain extent, under the heavy
pressure brought to bear upon it, and allowed the
Germans to pour into France by Saales, Sainte Marie aux
Mines, and the Bonhomme. Those who crossed the Col
de Saales drove the French back as far as Ramberviller,
twenty-five miles due west of the pass, and occupied
Provenchères, Senones, Raon l’Etape, and St. Dié, while
those who advanced by the two southern passes occupied
St. Léonard, a few miles south of St. Dié, and threatened
an attack on Epinal by the valley of Rouges-Eaux and
the Col de la Chipotte.
That was the position—the very alarming position—a
day or two after the battle of Morhange. The Col de
Donon had been abandoned on the 21st, and other
German troops had advanced by Badonviller and
Baccarat as far as Gerbéviller and Lunéville, while a still
larger army had crossed the Seille and the frontier by
the Château-Salins road, and arrived nearly within
striking distance of Nancy. The German front extended
almost in a straight line north-west and south-east from
Etain past Pont-à-Mousson, Champenoux, Lunéville,
Gerbéviller, St. Benoit, (close to Ramberviller) and the
valley of the Rouges-Eaux (just west of St. Dié) to the
Col de Bonhomme.
The best way to arrive at a fairly clear idea of the
operations that followed is, I think, to leave for the
present everything that happened north of the Bayon-Lunéville
road, culminating in the Battle of the Grand
Couronné of Nancy, and to follow first the German
advance south of the line between Lunéville and the
Donon, in the department of the Vosges.
.bn 137.png
.il id=i104 fn=i_b_104fp.jpg w=352px ew=70%
.ca
Record Press phot.
General Dubail.
.ca-
.bn 138.png
.bn 139.png
.pn +1
Nothing had happened so far to cause any alteration
in the grand plan of campaign conceived by the general
staff at Berlin before the war. Its execution had only
been delayed (for about a fortnight) first by the unexpected
resistance of Liége and the Belgian army, and
secondly by the Alsace-Lorraine offensive. Now that
these two obstacles had been disposed of the German
armies were able to set themselves once again to the task
of rounding up the French and English in the neighbourhood
of Châlons-sur-Marne, to be operated by a
simultaneous “hook” or encircling movement from the
north and from the south, and so to leave open the way
to Paris. From the beginning Metz was meant to be
the pivot of the double advance through Belgium and
through Lorraine. It was, so to speak, to represent the
hinge of a pair of compasses. The left or lower leg of
the compasses was composed of the armies of von
Strantz, von Heeringen, and the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, those which acted against Alsace and Lorraine.
The right or upper leg consisted of the remaining armies,
from the Crown Prince of Prussia’s to von Kluck’s.
The two legs were to be gradually squeezed together till
they crushed the French and English armies between
them, and then—and not till then, in my opinion—Paris
was to be invested. As the war went on the left leg
of the compasses, which was at first meant to stretch as
far as Belfort, was gradually shortened, bit by bit,
under stress of circumstances. At the date at which we
have arrived it only reached as far as Epinal, a little
later still as far as Nancy, and when it was found that
here too the resistance to the squeezing in process could
.bn 140.png
.pn +1
not be overcome, the original left leg was discarded, or
at least left where it was, and a fresh and still shorter
one forged in Metz, and thrust out to St. Mihiel. But
that was not till later. In the fourth week of August
the original plan had not yet been modified. The part
allotted to the armies commanded by the Crown Prince
of Bavaria in the east was still to break through the line
of frontier fortresses, and join hands with the other
Crown Prince’s army somewhere near Bar le Duc, in
order to carry out the encircling movement from the
south.
In front of the left wing of his forces, which was now
established to the west of the Vosges south of the
Lunéville-Donon line, there was nothing but the open
and unfortified Trouée de Charmes (the wide plain south
of Nancy between Epinal and Toul), and the attenuated
army of General Dubail. If they had succeeded in
breaking through that human barrier, and if their companion
Army Corps north of Lunéville had been equally
successful in disposing of General de Castelnau’s army
(two rather large suppositions) it is possible that they
may have intended to bring up fresh forces and heavier
siege guns for the investment of Epinal and Toul, and
that the main army, without waiting for their reduction,
would have been pressed forward to effect the contemplated
junction with the armies operating from the
north, just as von Kluck and von Hausen advanced to
Namur and Charleroi while at least one of the forts of
Liége was still holding out. But at any rate General
Dubail’s army had to be dealt with first, and to this
work they turned their immediate attention. As for
.bn 141.png
.pn +1
Epinal, which was directly in front of their left flank,
they found that it, like Belfort, was protected for some
miles in front of its forts by a formidable network of
trenches and wire entanglements, against which they
decided not to run their heads, though the salient just
north of Bruyères in the line of their furthest advance
on this sector seems to show that they meant to make
the attempt at first. That was the second stage in the
process of shortening the lower leg of the compasses.
The position defended by Dubail’s army after the
retreat from the Vosges extended from a point a few
miles south of Lunéville to the Bonhomme, along the
line forming the diagonal of an approximate square,
(with a side twenty miles long) of which Lunéville, the
Donon, the Col de Bonhomme and Epinal (nearly due
south of Lunéville) were the four angles. This tract of
land is watered by three smallish rivers, the Vesouze,
the Meurthe, and the Mortagne, all rising in the Vosges,
and flowing through shallow valleys towards Lunéville.
Along the banks of each of them there is a good road
and a railway. The Vesouze follows very nearly the
north side of the square, and the chief towns on it are
Cirey and Blamont. The Meurthe and the Mortagne
flow close together, from south-east to north-west, one
on each side of the diagonal. On the Meurthe the chief
towns are St. Dié, Raon l’Etape, and Baccarat, and on
the Mortagne, to the west of it, Rambervillers and
Gerbéviller. The three rivers, after meeting in Lunéville
or just below it, continue their joint course through
Nancy to Frouard, five miles further north, where they
join the Moselle, which rises near Belfort and flows to
.bn 142.png
.pn +1
the west of the three other rivers through Epinal,
Charmes, and Bayon, to Toul, from which it makes a
steep bend to the east to Frouard, where it is joined by
the Meurthe, and then flows nearly due north past
Pont-à-Mousson to Metz.
It stands to reason that the position and direction of
each of these rivers has had a most important bearing
on the course of the campaign in this sector. Along the
valleys of the Vesouze, the Meurthe, and the Mortagne,
and over every yard of the Lunéville-Donon-Bonhomme
triangle which they traverse, the fighting from August
21st onwards was of the most furious description, and
in the top right hand corner of the triangle, towards
the Donon, it still continues in the less murderous form
of trench warfare. To follow it in detail through all its
ups and downs and advances and retreats in that first
period before the battle of the Marne is as yet practically
impossible. But the general tendency of the engagements
is, I think, fairly clear, though as yet very little
has been written about them. The main point is that
the enemy, though in some of the fights they outnumbered
the French by ten to one, never succeeded in
getting within twenty miles of Epinal, or (except near
Gerbéviller) to the west of the line of the Mortagne, and
were obliged to give up any hopes they may have had
at the beginning of marching straight across the Trouée
de Charmes and so getting round behind Toul. Instead
of advancing due west in this way they were forced (or
possibly they may have chosen) to incline north-west
along the course of the Mortagne and the Meurthe
towards Lunéville. Both before and after St. Dié was
.bn 143.png
.pn +1
occupied on the 25th, after an attack that lasted for
four days, there were fierce engagements at practically
every town and village on and between the two rivers.
Besides the bigger places which I have already mentioned
there were many others, starting from the Col de Bonhomme
and working up towards Lunéville, which one
by one, and sometimes more than once, were the scene
of furious and bloody encounters.
At la Croix aux Mines, Mandray, Entre-Deux-Eaux,
Sauley-sur-Meurthe, Taintrux, Le Bois de Champ,
Brouvelieures, Mortagne, la Vallée des Rouges-Eaux, le
Haut Jacques, Autrey, La Bourgonce, La Salle, Nompatelize,
St. Rémy, Etivalle, St. Michel, Col de la
Chipotte, St. Benoit, Bru, Menille, Doncières, Xaffévillers,
St. Piermont and Le Plateau de Moyen thousands
of French and Germans fought and died in those few
August and September days. The fighting was particularly
violent at La Bourgonce, La Salle, Nompatelize,
St. Rémy, Etivalle, the Col de la Chipotte and St. Dié.
At the two last the number of the German dead alone
was probably over 20,000. There was no question then
of off-times in leafy cantonments between the spells of
duty in the trenches. The men ate and slept where they
could on the ground where they had fought. Day
after day and hour after hour the fighting went on.
Brilliant bayonet charges and desperate struggles hand-to-hand
and body-to-body followed each other with
hardly a moment’s break. The same positions were
lost and taken over and over again, and the firing of the
guns and the explosions of the shells kept up a ceaseless
hurricane of noise, as the storm of shells ploughed up
.bn 144.png
.pn +1
the green fields along those valley roads and mangled
the bodies of the two armies that had been set to butcher
each other to suit the purposes of the Prussian Junkers
and the Kaiser’s militarist advisers. But the French
soldiers never flinched, outnumbered and outweighed as
they were. Above all the Chasseurs-à-pied and Chasseurs
Alpins, whom the Germans feared and respected more
than any other troops in General Dubail’s army, covered
themselves with glory—glory that is none the less
immortal, though very few individual acts of bravery
will ever be recorded because most of the officers who
saw them are silent in their graves. But that hardly
matters. They were fighting not for glory and for
recognition but for France and the freedom of the
world. And they did their work. If they had failed,
if the Teuton hordes had broken through between
Epinal and Toul and the grand German plan had been
carried out in all its completeness, then the whole defence
of France would have broken down. But they did not
fail. They gave their lives and France was saved.
Unhappily there was another side of all this fighting
in the Vosges which was not so splendid. It is obvious
that if the French soldiers quitted themselves like heroes
in all this horrible strife the men they fought against
were brave too. But not gallant, but not gentlemen,
which the French are to a man. They had as a body
imbibed too deeply the teaching of certain of their own
philosophers. They had learnt or been drilled to substitute
in time of war the religion of force for every other.
Their Credo was the antithesis of all the recognized beliefs
which civilized men must inevitably hold or pretend to
.bn 145.png
.pn +1
hold in time of peace. “I believe in the God of Battles,
Maker of the rulers of the earth, who giveth the victory
to those who shrink from nothing and no means in
order to attain it. I believe in terrorism and pillage and
destruction and death. I believe in stifling all my softer
feelings, and in making the life of the people in whose
country I fight a hell.”
Is that too severe a judgment? I am afraid not.
No creed is consistently held or acted upon by all those
who are supposedly its adherents. There are of course
thousands and thousands of gallant gentlemen among
the officers and the rank and file of the German armies.
Innumerable letters found on their dead bodies show
how the frightfulness of their fellow-soldiers shamed and
angered them, and how they abominated German
“Kultur” as deeply as Nietsche himself. But unhappily
for Belgium and France, and more unhappily still for
Germany, their opinions and example, even if they were
in the majority, were powerless to control the acts of
the thorough-going believers in the German war-creed.
When the war is over, if not before, their voice will
prevail. They will tear that creed, and perhaps the
men who made it, to pieces as their Government did the
treaty by which they bound themselves to respect the
rights of Belgium. No nation can possibly consent to
go on living under the shadow of such a disgrace as these
men have brought on Germany. But for the present
they must be judged by their present deeds, and it is
impossible to write about the war in Alsace and Lorraine
and the Vosges and the Woevre without saying something
about the crimes which have been committed in
.bn 146.png
.pn +1
the name of Germany by German soldiers. I will not
weaken the case against them by repeating second-hand
fairy-tales of “atrocities” which have not come under
my own notice. There is enough material in the more
carefully attested official reports, in what my colleague
and I have been told by the victims and reputable eyewitnesses
of these cruelties, and in what we have ourselves
seen and heard, to prove beyond doubt that a very large
number of soldiers in the German army have for some
reason or other behaved during the war as brute-beasts.
In this chapter I will quote only one case of “frightfulness”
taken from a volume published officially by the
French Foreign Office. The Foreign Office report,
properly attested by the military authorities, is that at
the end of August, 1914, thirty soldiers of the French
99th Regiment, having exhausted all their ammunition,
were surrounded in a suburb of St. Dié by a company of
Bavarian soldiers, and were shot down at close range
at the moment when they were surrendering as prisoners.
There is, I believe, no doubt that the butchery was
deliberate, though possibly a special pleader might argue
that the executioners did not know that their victims
had no ammunition left and killed them either from
motives of precaution or in self-defence. That line of
defence cannot be adopted with regard to the numbers
of instances of wilful incendiarism which cry for justice
all over the invaded provinces. Many of the ruined
villages which we saw in the Vosges were destroyed by
shot and shell in fair fight. They are the eggs without
which the omelette of war cannot be made. But that
is not the case with Gerbéviller, Baccarat, Badonviller,
.bn 147.png
.pn +1
a whole group of villages south of Raon l’Etape, and
several other towns and villages in the same district, all
of which have been wholly or partially destroyed by fire
wantonly applied to them without a shadow of excuse
on military grounds. I will reserve for another chapter
the case of Gerbéviller, which, although it was perhaps
the most cruel and wholesale of them all, may be fairly
taken as typical of the rest. In every instance it is
practically certain and generally proven that these acts
of incendiarism (more common in the smaller villages
where public opinion had not the same restrictive weight
as in more important places) were accompanied by the
murder of innocent and unoffending civilians. For the
only excuse ever urged in their defence was that they
were a painful necessity forced upon the Germans by
the people themselves because they had fired upon them
as franc-tireurs. And in practically every instance the
more responsible of the inhabitants declare that that
statement was a pretext and a lie.
.bn 148.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XI | THE MARTYRED TOWN
.sp 2
It was certainly a lie with regard to Gerbéviller. That
unhappy place was twice bombarded, first by the
Germans and afterwards by the French, and at the first
time of asking there was also a running fight through
its streets. But it was not the shells of the 75’s and
the 77’s that left roofless all but about six of its 463
houses. They were burnt by fire deliberately applied
by the Bavarian soldiery by means chiefly of sulphur
sticks and gunpowder pastilles, little black discs about
the size of a florin, which apparently all the German
soldiers carried with them. I have specimens of both
taken from their cow-skin haversacks. The first time
that we saw the town, about ten days after they had
been driven out, we drove there with M. Mirman, the
Prefect of Meurthe et Moselle, who had paid it his first
official visit about a week earlier, and had at once carefully
examined all the available evidence as to what had
happened on the spot. That is a way M. Mirman has.
He is not a collector of second-hand rumours. He deals
with facts, and the mass of duly authenticated details
about the doings of the Germans in his Department
which he is putting together will form a damning indictment
against them at the end of the war.
.bn 149.png
.pn +1
We drove to Gerbéviller by the road which, after
crossing the Meurthe at Dombasle, skirts the river and
the lower edge of the forest of Vitrimont for some miles
and then cuts through the southern part of the battlefield
on which for three weeks the defenders of Nancy
made their memorable stand. We had therefore many
chances of seeing the ruin caused by the battle at
Blainville, Mont, and other villages on the way. But
in none of them was there anything comparable to the
wanton and wholesale destruction at Gerbéviller. In
Lorraine they speak of it as Gerbéviller-la-Martyre.
That is just what one feels about it. The town is like
the dead body of a woman whom some inhuman monster
has violated and kicked to death and then thrown into
a bonfire.
When we got there some of the ruins were still
smoking. We did not go inside what was left of the
walls of the church. They were not in a very safe
condition. In many places in the fields on the edge of
the road just outside the town, and behind some of the
tottering fragments of masonry that had once been the
walls of houses, were lying the twisted carcases of horses;
every here and there there was a horrible smell of burnt
and putrefying flesh. There were also some pigs, routing
about among the ruins for what they might devour. At
first they were the only living things we saw. Everything
else was dead, everything was burnt and smashed
except the stone figure of the dead Christ on the Cross
that stands at the corner where the principal street
branches in two directions, fully exposed to the shattering
volleys that were poured along it. By some miracle it
.bn 150.png
.pn +1
had escaped destruction. Neither fire nor shells had
touched it. From the church the street winds down
the slope past the Christ on the Cross across the bridges
that span the three streams into which the Mortagne
divides as it flows through the town, then past what
was once the private chapel of the family that owns the
old chateau on the opposite side of the road, up the
hill on the other side of the valley where there are half
a dozen houses—at last—with roofs and walls and even
windows, from one of which a Red Cross flag is floating,
and then on to the wreck of the railway station. Some
people have likened the remains of the town to the ruins
of Pompeii. There is no need for that. They are the
ruins of Gerbéviller. That will be description enough
as long as the stones that are left hang together. The
ruin is monstrous and unholy, especially in the part of
the town on the right bank of the river, where it is, like
Jerusalem of old, a city laid on an heap. We climbed at
one place over the piles of stones and rubbish that had
formed the front walls of one of the houses, and in a
sort of ruined vault open to the air, which had been the
cellar, saw lying on its back the blackened skeleton of
a woman. She was one of several of the inhabitants
who were burnt in the cellars in which they took refuge
from the German shells and the German brutality.
They could hardly be called hiding-places, because in
some cases they were shot if they tried to come out of
them. Others were shot in the streets like rabbits, as
spies, or franc-tireurs or what not. Any pretext or
none was good enough. I have seen a photograph which
is in the possession of the French Government, taken by
.bn 151.png
.bn 152.png
.bn 153.png
.pn +1
a responsible official, of fifteen white-haired old men
whose dead bodies were found after the German withdrawal
lying in a field near the town. Their hands were
bound together, their trousers had been unbuttoned and
were clinging round their knees, either as a brutal insult,
or else—the irony of it—to prevent them from running
away. They were shot in batches of five. The signal
for their “execution” was given by the senior officer of
the troops which had occupied the town. He sat at a
table placed close to the scene of their murder drinking
with some other officers. Three times he lifted his glass
to his lips, and each time that he did so a volley was
fired and five old men fell dead on the ground.
.il id=i116 fn=i_b_116fp.jpg w=600px ew=95%
.ca
Photograph by Libert-Fernand, Nancy.
Gerbeviller—Meurthe et Moselle.
.ca-
By fire and by bullet probably a hundred and certainly
not less than forty people were assassinated and
the whole population rendered homeless, because, as the
Germans said—the usual lying excuse—some of them
had fired on their troops. The truth of what happened
is apparently this. When they attacked the town it
was defended only by a body of Chasseurs, sixty or
seventy strong. These men held out all day against
the Bavarian regiments engaged in the attack, that is
to say about 4000 men. Till the enemy entered the
town in the afternoon the defenders were subjected to a
bombardment as well as to the fire of rifle bullets. After
they entered it the fight was continued along the street
till late in the evening, when the men were driven back
to their last stand behind a barrier which they constructed
on one of the bridges. From here during the
night they escaped—they had fought like heroes and
nothing was to be gained by staying any longer—all
.bn 154.png
.pn +1
except two or three who had got separated from the
rest and had hidden in a cellar. Before morning these
others also got away safely, but in order to do so they
had first to kill a sentinel who was posted at the fork
of the roads, near the stone Cross. When his dead body
was discovered by the Germans, who were furious at
the resistance they had met with, they decided that he
had been killed by one of the inhabitants, and by way
of punishment the acts of incendiarism were begun and
were continued at intervals till the final general bonfire
was lit on the day when they were driven out by the
French soldiers.
Through the two bombardments, and the fight in the
streets, and the burnings and the executions, the horrible
story of human blood-lust and brutality was redeemed
by the womanly courage and pity and devotion to duty
which was shown by a little band of Sisters of Mercy,
who, with the now famous S[oe]ur Julie at their head,
nursed the wounded all through those dreadful three
weeks, with no thought of their own danger. The cross
of the Legion of Honour was pinned on S[oe]ur Julie’s
serge robe by the President of the Republic, in front of
the house where the Red Cross flag is still floating from
the window, and where she and her fellow-Sisters gave
such a splendid proof of the faith that was in them.
Of the many deeds of heroism which they performed there
is one little story which belonged entirely to herself.
When the German soldiery were first let loose in the
town, sacking and pillaging, they sacked and pillaged
amongst other places the church (or perhaps it was the
chapel, which is much nearer her house), and tried in
.bn 155.png
.pn +1
vain to break open the sanctuary above the altar, by
firing bullets at the lock. After they had gone S[oe]ur
Julie came to the place and with a bayonet which they
had left on the stones wrenched open the door of the
sanctuary, for fear that the sacred elements might fall
into their sacrilegious hand if they came again. Though
no one but a priest had the right to touch the wafers
which were scattered on the floor of the sanctuary, she
took them and the chalice, pierced by the Bavarian
bullets, to her own house, and then, still with the same
fear, herself consumed them, as David did the Shewbread,
though with a rather higher object. And then,
I am told, she felt rather uncomfortable in her mind—till
she had made her confession to an ambulancier
priest and received absolution for her “sin.”
Gerbéviller differed only in degree from what happened
in scores of other towns and villages all over
Lorraine and the Woevre and Alsace and the Vosges.
It was not an isolated case. At Baccarat, at St. Benoit,
at Badonviller, and many other places south of the
Meurthe, as at Nomeny, Réméréville and many other
places north of it, there were the same burnings, and the
same shootings of innocent civilians. At Badonviller,
where, besides eleven other victims, the wife of the
singularly brave mayor, Monsieur Benoit, was shot in
the street before his eyes, much more damage was done
by incendiarism than by the fights that went on for the
possession of the town. On the French side of the town
there are few signs that it has often, since the beginning
of the war, been the centre of furious fighting. A
few French and German graves, distinguished by képis,
.bn 156.png
.pn +1
or spiked helmets, one or two houses damaged by shells—and
that is all. Then, as the road drops down into the
town you see on the crest of the opposite ridge the ruins
of the church, which, with the cemetery behind it was
the part of the town that suffered most from the bombardment.
Dome and roof have both been entirely
shot away; shattered fragments of the pillars in front
of the church and the shapeless remains of the four walls
are all that is left, except for one thing—a statue of
Joan of Arc, with one arm broken off short at the
shoulder, standing erect and serene on its pedestal,
surrounded by the piles of stone and mortar and timber
and glass that litter the floor of the roofless nave. Outside
in the cemetery, at the time of our first visit, coffins
stripped of their covering of earth, broken tombstones,
and shattered crosses completed the dreary scene of
desolation, another proof that the church was the chief
target of the German artillery. But of that there is no
doubt. In the rest of the town, away from the church,
comparatively little damage had been done by the shells,
and there is this further curious fact to note, that the
bombardment which did the mischief took place while
the place was actually occupied by German troops.
They were simply ordered to keep out of the range of
the fire—which meant away from the actual neighbourhood
of the church.
These troops—they were Bavarians—completed the
work of destruction by burning the quarter of the town
nearest to the German frontier, some thirty houses in
all, besides pillaging many others. They also shot
twelve of the inhabitants, including a woman and the
.bn 157.png
.pn +1
child she was holding in her arms, and an old man of
seventy-eight, who was sitting peacefully by his window.
These were the chief events of the first occupation,
which took place early in August. The second—there
have been three in all—began on August 23rd. At eight
in the morning the French hurriedly evacuated Badonviller
and took up a position at Pexonnes, about two
miles to the rear, and the Germans, after a desultory
bombardment, which went on all day, marched in at
six in the evening. For the next few hours there was
furious fighting in and around the town between the
Chasseurs Alpins and the Chasseurs d’Afrique on the one
side and the Landwehr, the 162nd Regiment of Strassburg,
and the regiment of Lieutenant von Forstner
(since reported killed), the 99th of Saverne, on the other.
During the night a stronger German force approached
the town, and as soon as they entered it, began ordering
the terrified inhabitants to come out of the cellars in
which they had taken refuge, when suddenly they were
interrupted by a furious counter-attack of the Chasseurs,
and driven out of the town at the point of the bayonet.
Once more the natives shut themselves up in the cellars
and listened panic-stricken to the noise and confusion
of the struggle overhead. One comfort they had in
their alarm. All the time, above the din of the fighting,
they heard the stirring notes of the French bugles
sounding the charge, and all the time the voices of the
French soldiers singing, as they charged, the famous
Sidi-’Brahim bugle-march:—
.pm start_poem
“Pan! Pan! L’Arbi!
Les chacals sont par ici!
Mais plus haut c’est les Turcos!”
.pm end_poem
.bn 158.png
.pn +1
Little by little the Germans retreated, and the sounds
died away in the distance, and then suddenly they began
again, as the Chasseurs, still chanting the Sidi-’Brahim,
marched back through the town and retired to their
position at Pexonnes. Then once more the Germans,
and at last the silence of the night.
St. Benoit, near Raon l’Etape, is another of these
murdered towns. It has been destroyed, that is to say,
burnt by the Germans, about as effectually as Gerbéviller.
The church has only its four walls left. The
Germans, during their occupation, placed mitrailleuses
in the tower, which stands high up and commands the
main road. A body of French troops passing along this
road, which skirts the village to the north, came under
the fire of the mitrailleuses and suffered severely, without
being able to see where the attack came from. A second
detachment was more fortunate in finding out the position
of the machine guns. A battery of 75’s was trained on
the church. Shortly afterwards the French retired on
Rambervillers, and when the Germans reached St. Benoit
they set fire to the village to avenge the death of their
comrades who belonged to the same corps. They did
not, however, the Mayor told us, kill any of the
inhabitants, of whom only 12 out of about 250 were
missing.
In the little schoolhouse there are no doors, the blackboards
are riddled with bullets, and there is not a pane
of glass in the windows. But in this skeleton of a house
we found the schoolmaster teaching a class of twelve little
boys who had their fathers’ coats and old sacks hung on
their shoulders to keep out the cold, and when we came
.bn 159.png
.pn +1
in they stood up like one man and sang a verse of the
“Marseillaise.”
A little further on, in the Col de la Chipotte, which
both sides called the “Hole of Hell,” we came to the
place where for several days was fought the bloodiest
battle of all this border warfare. Three or four hundred
feet below the road on the left, as it rises to the top of
the pass, there is a beautiful valley, with a quick little
burn running at the bottom of it with fir trees growing
thickly on each side. On the right the ground falls
away in a more gradual slope. For some miles along
each side of this road there is not a space of ten yards
in which there are not the graves of French and German
soldiers, marked by crosses made of branches of trees,
and here and there by a battered képi. On the crosses
are carved little flat slabs. If you read the rough
inscriptions on them—“Thirteen Germans,” or “Seventeen
French Soldiers”—you will see that those on the
German graves are written sometimes in German (in
which case the number of the regiment is given), and
sometimes in French, but those of the French in French
only. In other words, the enemy buried only their own
dead, and only some of them, and it was left to the
French to finish the work for both sides, or to finish
it partly. For up from the valley and the woods came
the sickening smell of still unburied bodies, the last
remains of this butchery of a battle.
There was fighting for about twelve or thirteen days
round that stretch of valley and mountain road, German
attacks from both sides that drove the French back by
weight of superior numbers, and later a counter-attack
.bn 160.png
.pn +1
of the French in stronger force which pushed the enemy
back over the crest. It was a battle of rifle fire and
hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets and knives and
rifle-butts and fists, a battle on one side of the road of
short breathless bursts and long painful scrambles up
and up to the deadly trenches cut on the bare slopes,
on the other of slow aimless groping through the low
branches of the dripping fir trees, so thickly planted that
where they grew neither aeroplanes nor artillery could do
their work, a bewildering, nerve-shaking game of blindman’s-buff
under a hail of whistling bullets that came
from all sides at once, a hideous battue in an impenetrable
covert with men for ground-game.
But, after all, it was a fair stand-up fight between
gallant soldiers, with no quarter given or asked, in
which each side could respect the other, not a shameful
massacre of unarmed innocents among the flaming
wrecks of their ruined homes, like those which in other
parts of the Vosges and Lorraine covered the Bavarian
butchers with undying disgrace. Gerbéviller and Nomeny
were far more hellish “Holes of Hell” than the
Col de la Chipotte.
.bn 161.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XII | BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ. I
.sp 2
By this brilliant series of hand-to-hand, town-to-town
struggles, Dubail’s army, operating in the Bonhomme-Donon-Gerbéviller
triangle, had prevented the enemy
from penetrating westwards between Epinal and Toul.
At the same time, on their left, de Castelnau’s men were
fighting the desperate battle of the Grand Couronné of
Nancy. Their line, continuing in the same direction as
the valley of the Mortagne, ran from Gerbéviller across
the Meurthe west of Lunéville to Crévic, and on to
Amance, north of the Nancy-Château-Salins road, and
some distance beyond it. It was a real pitched battle
which lasted for nearly three weeks, and was one of the
most important of the whole war. For on its result
depended not only the fate of Nancy and of Toul but
of all the other armies further north. In order to get
an idea of one part of it we can hardly do better than
to take our stand at the point which we have reached
with the Second Army, to the west of Gerbéviller, on
the Bayon-Lunéville road. From there, through the eyes
of a French officer of dragoons who found time after he
was wounded at Héraménil to publish an excellent little
book on La Victoire de Lorraine (Berger-Levrault:
.bn 162.png
.pn +1
Nancy), we shall be able to follow in some detail the part
of the battle which was fought to the west of Lunéville
south of the Nancy-Lunéville road. That was where the
battle was fiercest in its early stages. The section on
the other side of the Nancy road we will leave till later.
It was there that the XXth Army Corps held the line
northwards up to Amance, and that the victory was
finally won.
At one o’clock on the morning of August 19th our
dragoon officer’s regiment started from near Altkirch,
where they had formed part of General Pau’s army, for
some uncertain destination further west. The Colonel,
of course, knew where they were bound, but he kept his
own counsel, and the junior officers could only speculate.
Clearly, however, since they were being withdrawn from
one successful offensive, they were wanted to smash the
Germans somewhere else, either in Lorraine over the
border, which was over-run (they believed) by French
cavalry, or in Belgium, where report said that the enemy
had been pulled up short in front of Liége.
.il id=i126 fn=i_b_126fp.jpg w=500px ew=90% link=i_b_126fplarge.jpg
.ca
THE LORRAINE
FRONTIER.
.ca-
After an interminable train journey by Belfort, Lure
and Epinal, they reached Charmes in the middle of the
night, rested for a few hours, and then started towards
Lunéville. This time they felt there could be no doubt.
They were making for the frontier, and next day would
certainly see them in the annexed province. It was a
long march, but the sun was shining brightly on the
forest of Charmes, the valley of the Moselle on their
left, and the hills of Lorraine in front of them, and
everyone was in the best of spirits. Then suddenly there
came an unexpected check. An orderly rode up to the
.bn 163.png
.bn 164.png
.bn 165.png
.pn +1
Colonel with despatches, the regiment was halted at a
little village on the road half way between Bayon and
Lunéville, and there they spent the rest of the afternoon
and the night of the 21st in ignorant inaction. Next
morning everything was changed. The sunshine had
gone out of the air, a steady drizzle was falling, and
when the Colonel informed his officers that they were
to be attached to an infantry division which was to
organize a line of defence behind Lunéville they could
hardly believe their ears and began to wonder anxiously
why, instead of continuing the march to the frontier,
they were ordered to fall back on Einvaux, on the south
side of the Bayon-Lunéville road.
It was still raining when they reached the road, and
they were obliged to halt to let a long convoy, which
was passing along it across their front from east to west,
go by. They waited five minutes, ten minutes, half an
hour, and still the stream of men and horses poured on
and on, an odd jumble of peasants’ carts, farm-carts,
tradesmen’s carts, and every imaginable kind of country
vehicle, plodding along drearily through the rain, the
soldiers who were driving them huddled under the
awnings, and all the ammunition and provision carts
piled high with wounded. It must at least, they thought,
be the convoy of a whole Army Corps. But why was
all this mass of men and vehicles hurrying along in the
mud, away from Lunéville, towards Bayon? Their
hearts began to misgive them. They asked some of the
drivers what it all meant, but no one seemed to understand
and no one answered, until at last they stopped
a non-commissioned officer and from him learnt part
.bn 166.png
.pn +1
of the incredible truth—that the triumphant army
which had invaded Lorraine was in full retreat.
After that they waited no longer. The melancholy
string of carts which stretched along the road in both
directions as far as they could see was halted to let
them through, and they continued their march to their
cantonments at Einvaux, five or six miles south of the
road. There the young dragoon officer was at once
given his marching orders. He was to take with him
half a dozen troopers, cross the Meurthe and the forest
of Vitrimont as far as the Lunéville-Nancy road, and try
and get in touch with the enemy, who were pressing
hard on the heels of the retreating troops.
When he reached the Bayon-Lunéville road again he
had on each side of him two railways running nearly due
north and south and cutting the road (which to the east
crosses the Mortagne at Lamath, and then turns northward
past Xermaménil, Rehanviller, and Hériménil to
Lunéville) at a distance of about three miles apart. The
one on the right curves away behind to Gerbéviller, the
one on the left to Bayon, eventually to meet some
distance to the south at Epinal. In front, to the north,
both of them join the railway which runs from Lunéville
to St. Nicolas-du-Port round the lower edge of the forest
of Vitrimont, following closely the course of the Meurthe.
On the further side of the forest the road from Lunéville
to Dombasle, St. Nicolas-du-Port, and Nancy stretches
across from right to left, and, as you see it on the map,
the whole area composed of the forest and the ground
beyond, as far as the Lunéville-Nancy road, is shaped
like a feeding-cup, with Lunéville for the handle and
.bn 167.png
.pn +1
Dombasle for the spout. North-west of Lunéville, along
the Dombasle road, comes first the Faubourg de Nancy,
and then two miles and four miles further on the villages
of Vitrimont and Hudiviller, with the farm of Léomont
midway between them, standing up on much higher
ground just to the north of the road. In the parallelogram
between the two railways south of the forest (which
is about five miles long by two and a half deep) there
are two villages, first Mont (with a bridge over the
Mortagne), and then a little further west Blainville, both
of them on a road which runs parallel to the Meurthe and
quite close to it. At the point where this road crosses
the Dombasle-Bayon railway there is another small
village called Damelevières, and, also on this railway
and a mile south of it, the village of Charmois. Taking
a wider view of the whole terrain, the Lunéville-Dombasle
road and the railway running round the forest with the
two railways south of it and the stretch of the Bayon-Lunéville
road between them form a rough figure of
eight. To the west of the lower half of it trenches had
been dug that morning on the plateau south of the
Meurthe by the troops under the command of General
Bigot, one of General Dubail’s brigadiers. The plateau
of Saffais, midway between the Meurthe and the Moselle,
was occupied by the 64th division, and on their right
another division, the 74th, guarded the gap between
Saffais and the Mortagne. Between them they formed
a curtain of troops which was to play a very important
part in the coming battle, which was fought
chiefly over the ground covered by the figure of eight,
but partly also further south, below the Bayon-Lunéville
.bn 168.png
.pn +1
road, as far as the line between Bayon and
Gerbéviller.
When the little party of dragoons once more reached
the road, at the level crossing where it cuts the line from
Epinal to Nancy, it was still covered with a dense mass
of fugitives. This time it was not merely a procession
of carts but of the army itself, the soldiers of the XVth
and XVIth Army Corps. It was the final stage of the
retreat which had begun after their defeat in front of
Morhange and Saarburg by the armies of Metz, of the
Crown Prince of Bavaria, and of General von Heeringen.
For two days, by all the roads that cross the frontier
between Vic and Réchicourt and meet on the south-east
side of Lunéville, they had come crowding along to this
harbour of refuge, the angle between the Mortagne and
the Meurthe, where they were to find sanctuary behind
the curtain of troops prepared by General Dubail and
General Bigot. Infantry of the line, chasseurs, artillery,
young men of the active army, territorials, troops of
peasants, women and children and old men, some in
carts and some on foot, all mixed up in inextricable
confusion with the soldiers and regimental wagons, the
drivers flogging their worn-out horses in the vain effort
to make them move faster, the men on foot, almost as
many of them wounded as not, too tired or too weak
to get out of the way, marching anyhow without any
formation or any attempt to keep to their own
companies, splashing along in a slough of mud, wet
to the bone by the ceaseless rain, without discipline,
without courage, almost without thought, the tragic
procession filed slowly by, away from the enemy,
.bn 169.png
.pn +1
away from the frontier that they had been sent to
defend.
But only for the time being, and only for two days.
That was the marvel of it. By their failure—in face
of the impossible task by which they were confronted—they
had thrown the whole scheme of the eastern campaign
out of gear. The XXth Army Corps under General
Foch, which had the position on their left at Morhange,
was forced to retire with them, and worse still would
have befallen the corps from the Midi and the Pyrenees
if it had not been for the steadying influence of the men
of Lorraine and the magnificent rearguard action which
they fought as they retreated steadily and in perfect
order to their position in front of Nancy, marching by
the roads to the north of Lunéville and the Meurthe.
Much the same thing had happened on the right, as we
have already seen. The advanced regiments of Dubail’s
army, finding their left uncovered, were also obliged to
give up their successful offensive and fall back on
Baccarat, Raon l’Etape, and St. Dié, leaving to the
enemy the strategical advantage of the positions on
the crests of the Vosges, and at the same time prolonging
their line westwards to the angle between
the Mortagne and the Meurthe, so as to stand between
the fugitives and the pursuing Germans and join
in the one object that now mattered—the defence of
Nancy.
That, then, was how the scene was staged for the first
act of the Battle of the Grand Couronné on August 23rd.
There was no question of the defence of Lunéville. It
might possibly have been attempted, and successfully
.bn 170.png
.pn +1
attempted, by the men whom we have just seen straggling
along the road to Bayon. But they were not ready for
so great a task yet. So the town was abandoned. The
enemy marched into it without any resistance on the
23rd, and the line was drawn further back, behind
Lunéville and behind the Mortagne instead of in front
of them. On the left, from the Meurthe to Amance,
were Foch and his men, the XXth Army Corps with its
heart of gold—the famous 11th Division de Fer. Of them
we need have no fear. What man can do they will do.
But those others, who have retired in confusion behind
Bigot’s covering troops, prolonging, between the Meurthe
and the Mortagne, the line occupied by the XXth—what
of them? This of them, not in my own words,
but as they were seen by the young lieutenant of dragoons
whom we left on his way to the Meurthe to look for the
enemy—
“Ils se sont reformés avec une souplesse meridionale
étonnante. Et ce fut un sujet d’admiration sans pareil,
que de voir ces soldats hier encore battus, découragés,
revenir ardents à la bataille deux jours après, leurs
regiments reformés, les brigades dans la main du chef—lutter
en héros—et vaincre!” And again: “Ce sont
ces mêmes troupes qui, dans trois jours, reformées, vont
contribuer à de la trouée, et ne
laisseront pas un seul instant branler la muraille vivante
dressée contre l’envahisseur: chaque soldat deviendra
un rampart infranchissable. Miles murus erit.”
On the right, too, then, as well as on the left, France
had an army of heroes, all the more invincible because
they were thirsting to blot out the memory of Morhange.
.bn 171.png
.pn +1
They were to have the chance they wanted. From all
directions through the forest of Vitrimont and along the
roads south of Lunéville the enemy’s vanguard was
converging on the angle between the two rivers. The
rain of heavy shells which all day long had been speeding
up the French retreat was continued now to cover the
German advance. Far off across the forest, from the
plateau where the farm of Léomont crowns the ridge
that runs along the north side of the Nancy road, the
75’s of the XXth corps were firing at the big German
batteries behind Lunéville. Suddenly, as the dragoons
advanced towards the Meurthe, the farm burst into
flames, which shot up like a huge bonfire into the
crimson evening sky, streaked with the screaming shells
and specked with the white puffs of the shrapnel which
littered farm and road and plateau with wounded and
dying men. At Mont, the little village where the two
rivers meet, a battalion of Chasseurs Alpins, who had
just come through the forest, were engaged in blowing
up the bridge over the Meurthe. They told them that
not a Frenchman was left on the other side, and warned
them not to go on, as the forest was full of German
scouts. The lieutenant’s orders, however, were to see,
and not only to hear, where the enemy were, so, as his
men were ready for anything, they crossed the river by
a ford five hundred yards lower down, and advanced
along one of the numerous rides through the forest till
a brisk fusillade put the matter beyond a doubt. Then
they rode back, without a scratch, to make their report,
first to the Colonel, and then to the General at Bayon.
The night and the next day passed without any vigorous
.bn 172.png
.pn +1
action on the part of the enemy, though some of their
patrols crossed the Meurthe. They were probably themselves
not too fresh after their long forced march from
beyond the frontier, and wanted to collect their strength
and their forces for the grand attack.
On August 24th the storm burst at last. From
Damelevières and Mont on the near side of the forest of
Vitrimont, from Lunéville along the Bayon road, and
out of the two smaller forests of Vacquenat and Clairlieu,
which, from Lamath on the Mortagne, stretch along each
side of it up to the most western of the two railways,
the enemy came pouring on, battalion after battalion,
regiment after regiment, till they had nearly got up to
the concave sweep of the French defensive position,
extending from the Sappais plateau eastwards across
the road and railway in the direction of Gerbéviller.
At the same time the German guns began to speak, and
along the whole French front a hurricane of explosive
shells and shrapnel ploughed and tore up a belt of ground
over a mile deep. An hour after midday, in brilliant
sunshine this time, no longer under the depressing rain,
the French batteries opened fire and went on firing
all through the afternoon and night, after a time
without any sustained reply from the enemy except for
one general cannonade before sundown.
.il id=i134 fn=i_b_134fp.jpg w=500px ew=90%
.ca
Photograph by Libert-Fernand, Nancy.
Farm of Leomont—Meurthe et Moselle
.ca-
If you are standing on the outskirts of a modern
battle—say at a distance of a mile from the nearest
battery, for a civilian is not likely to get much closer
in these days—you hear what I may call the symphony
of it far better than those who are actually taking part
in the fighting, who are deafened to all other sounds
.bn 173.png
.bn 174.png
.bn 175.png
.pn +1
but the guns that fire and the shells that burst near
them, and the rifles of their own company. To the
spectator, when heavy guns, field guns, rifles, and
machine guns are all booming and banging and rattling
at the same time, the noise is so tremendous that it
seems that it must be beyond the limits of human
endurance to face the storm of steel and fire. At
the hottest moments it keeps changing curiously
and horribly in character, volume, and tempo, rising and
falling with alternating diminuendo and crescendo and
hurrying and slackening pace. It is all extraordinarily
relentless. Sometimes the deafening volleys of reports
sound like the clattering of a clumsy, lumbering wagon,
jolting heavily over the frozen ruts of a rough country
lane; sometimes like the brisk hammering of thousands
of carpenters and rivetters at work on thousands of
wooden joists and steel plates; sometimes like the
rumbling of hundreds of heavy goods-trains thundering
and bumping over uneven points and meeting every now
and then in hideous collision. Against the changing
undercurrent and background of sound and confusion
the different kinds of reports are always distinguishable—the
heavy slow boom of the big guns, the sharp
vicious bang of the field pieces, with their lightning-like
velocity and shattering irresistible force, the shrieks of
the shells, the whistle of the bullets, the crackling and
spitting and spluttering snap of the lebels and mannlichers,
the rapid pitiless tapping and rattling of the
machine guns, and most awful of all, I think, the sudden
unexpected silences, which make you hold your breath
and wait—like a condemned murderer with the noose
.bn 176.png
.pn +1
round his neck must wait on the scaffold—for the
dreadful moment which you know will come when
the storm will all begin over again da capo, and in the
twinkling of an eye hundreds and hundreds of living
vigorous men will be struck down dead. Mercifully
few things are so false as the saying that every bullet
has its billet. Otherwise not a man of the armies that
fought in front of Nancy would be left.
Soon after the great battle, long before nature had
begun to heal the gaping wounds that French and German
had made in the bosom of the brown old earth, I or my
French colleague or both of us visited most of the roads
north and south of the Meurthe and north and west of
the Mortagne which cross the ground on which it was
fought. The whole country—the once happy villages,
the wooded hills and wide rolling plains of grass and
stubble fields with never a hedge and hardly a ditch—is
one vast field of battle and one huge cemetery. From
part of it the German flood of invasion was just beginning
to recede. What was left of the towns and villages and
farms, which had first withstood its advance like massive
breakwaters and then been submerged as the tide of
battle ebbed and flowed, looked much more like piles
of rugged and weather-beaten rocks than human habitations.
Everywhere the fields had been drenched with
the blood of French and Germans. Everywhere they
were scarred with deep shell-holes surrounded by great
clods of brown earth scattered in all directions. It is
a characteristic feature of the Lorraine country that in
many places the roads, when they run between two
belts of woodland, are bordered on each side by level
.bn 177.png
.pn +1
stretches of grass, fifty or sixty yards wide. In these
roadside glades—because roads lead to towns and
villages, and because armies move more easily along
them than over the soft fields—the shell-holes were so
close together that often they were almost touching.
In other places, where only a single line of trees marked
the two sides of the road, trunk after trunk had been
cut straight through by the shells, or whole rows of them
ruthlessly felled to open up the line of fire. And everywhere
there were blown-up bridges, broken telegraph
poles, hanging wires, hop-gardens scorched and withered
by sheets of fire, blackened corn-stooks rotting where
they stood, ploughs and farm-carts twisted and smashed,
festering bodies of dead horses in hideously ungainly
attitudes, rifles, bayonets, caps, helmets, coats, saddles,
haversacks, socks, shirts, boots, water-bottles, all kinds
of things that men have made and used and worn, all
manner of rubbish that once had form and beauty—a
horrible unsightly jumble and litter of wreckage and
decay, a tragedy of untellable noise and fury and suffering
and death. And then there were the dead themselves—the
pitiable little heaps of clothes, red or blue or grey,
that once were men, that helped to make this tragedy
and fell its victims. Most of them had been buried and
hidden away in the shelter of the earth. But here and
there they were still lying, sometimes prone on their
faces as they fell, more often carefully laid on their
backs, staring up at the sky with unseeing eyes. Some
looked peaceful and at rest. Others had suffered horribly
before they died, and their coal-black faces were
twisted and drawn, and their outstretched arms and
.bn 178.png
.pn +1
hands clutched at emptiness in an agony of intolerable
pain.
The three weeks’ battle was now well under way.
On the first day the opening rush of the German attack
had spent itself in vain against the French right wing
south of the Meurthe. The fire of Morhange had done
its work. It had forged a tough line of Ironsides, which
the Bavarian corps could neither bend nor break, and
during the night they began to fall back toward the
Mortagne leaving masses of dead behind them. A
French cavalry patrol, sent out early on the morning
of the 15th along the Bayon-Lunéville road to reconnoitre,
got as far as Lamath, on the left bank of the
river, before they found the enemy. During the day
the village was gallantly carried by a battalion of
Chasseurs-Alpins. Further south, in the triangle beyond
the road and the forest of Vacquenat, the enemy held
on more persistently to the ground which they had
gained, and on the 25th and 26th at Einvaux, Clayeures,
Réménoville, Rozelieures and other villages between
the two rivers they were only driven back step by step
as the result of most determined and gallant efforts on
the part of the French. The loss of life on both sides
was very great. A little stream which flows through
Réménoville into the Mortagne was so choked with
dead that the cavalry found it impossible to water their
horses in it. All over the field of battle, especially in
the woods, the air was tainted with the smell of putrefying
bodies. But death and wounds had no effect on
the morale of the two French Army Corps. Now that
they had made their stand they were irresistible. They
.bn 179.png
.pn +1
were constantly attacking instead of being attacked,
and retreat was everywhere turned into advance. At
the same time the chief weight of the German counter-attack—for
though they were retiring they were always
trying to make ground—was gradually shifted southwards
away from the Bayon road towards Gerbéviller
and Moyen, higher up the river, probably in the hope of
breaking through between the XVth corps and the First
Army on their right. But no breach was made. On
the 27th a Colonial Regiment was fighting a little to the
west of the martyred town. They had suffered severely
and had lost two colonels since the 24th. A third came
to join them, reported himself to the brigadier, rode
forward towards his men and was knocked over and
killed by a shell before he had been ten minutes in command.
But still his men and all the other regiments
fought on, the batteries continually shifted their positions
from one place to another with wonderful mobility,
some of the villages where the fighting was hottest were
taken and retaken two or three times over, and step
by step the long line of French bayonets forced the
enemy back towards and at some points beyond the
two rivers.
At last, on September 4th, though the battle was still
far from won, the great attack had been so effectively
checked that it was found possible to move the XVth
corps across to the Argonne, to help General Sarrail and
the Third Army in their struggle against the Crown
Prince. From the moment when they had assumed the
offensive on August 25th, they had fought with extraordinary
courage. In two days one regiment alone, the
.bn 180.png
.pn +1
112th of the line, had forty-eight officers killed and
wounded out of sixty-one. But losses had no effect on
them now. The past was wiped out, and both during
the defence of Nancy, and later on in the Heights of the
Meuse and the Argonne, especially at Vassincourt, they
took a prominent share in the victories by which
General Sarrail relieved the pressure on Verdun. From
every point of view the story of what they did and
suffered and the way in which—like a ship on her maiden
voyage—they found themselves after their first defeat,
was and is one of the most significant features of the
war. For it means that France cannot and will not be
beaten. The steadying support and fellowship which
they received in the hour of crisis from the sorely pressed
corps on either side of them, their own heroic recovery,
and the confident and confidence-inspiring leadership of
the generals under whose command they redeemed
themselves from the reproach of their momentary failure,
all point to the same conclusion—the invincible
solidarity of the whole of the French armies. On
August 20th the chain of the eastern armies snapped at
its weakest point. By the 25th the jagged ends of the
broken link had been welded together and it was firmly
joined up, stronger than it had ever been, with those on
each side of it. Morhange might have been the beginning
of another Sedan. Instead it was the prelude to the
glorious triumph of the Battle of the Grand Couronné
of Nancy.
.bn 181.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XIII | BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ. II
.sp 2
All towns are feminine by rights, but Nancy, I think,
more than any that I have ever known. In its municipal
arms the chief feature is a Scotch thistle. The emblem
should belong rather to the gallant armies of the east,
and especially to the famous XXth Army Corps, which
was the backbone of General de Castelnau’s army.
During all that long three weeks, while the XVth and
XVIth with part of General Dubail’s army were checking
the attack south of the Meurthe, along a front of
about fifteen miles, the XXth held a still longer line
on the north side of the river, from Dombasle nearly
as far as Pont-à-Mousson. To all of them, but particularly
to the men of the 26th, or Nancy Regiment,
and the 11th Division, long and proudly known as the
Division de Fer, the town appealed as a beloved and
graceful and beautiful woman. She was their mother
and their sister and their bride. She was in deadly
danger from the covetous assaults of the Germans
and the German Emperor, and they alone stood between
her and ruin. For, woman-like, she had no defences
of her own—fortunately for her and for France. When
Bismarck interfered in 1874 to prevent the construction
.bn 182.png
.pn +1
of fortifications round the town by threatening to renew
the war of 1870, he was unconsciously working against
the interest of his country instead of for it. If Nancy
had been encircled by a ring of stereotyped forts, like
Toul and Verdun, it is highly probable that after the
rapid retreat from Morhange the French would have
fallen back on the protection of their guns, and that
Nancy would have been overtaken by the same fate
as Liége. It was because her defenders did not, because
they could not, put their trust in forts, that the town
was saved. For the success of the Allies, for their
delivery in the hour of their deadliest peril from almost
certain disaster, that meant everything. To the south,
as we have seen, the enemy had swept across the difficult
barrier of the Vosges and continued their triumphant
advance right up to the moment when the battle for
the defence of the town began. To the north the whole
of the rest of their line swung across Belgium and part
of France as far as Compiègne, and even far south of
Verdun on each side of it, like a bar (though never a
straight nor a rigid bar) hinged to a fixed point. And,
with the not quite parallel exception of Verdun, the
only part of the line that remained firm, the immovable
pivot which those three weeks of persistent and frenzied
sapping on three sides was powerless to undermine, was
the open and unprotected town of Nancy. Its defenders,
or, at all events, the rank and file of them, knew almost
nothing of what was happening elsewhere. They were
fighting in the dark with their backs to the wall. But
they knew what their own job was, and they did it,
always, it seems to me, from the way they talk about
.bn 183.png
.pn +1
it, with that feeling that they were standing in front
of a helpless woman, whose honour they must defend
at any and every cost. And when finally they had
saved the town, when the fear of a barbarous assault
like those which had wrecked and ravished one after
the other of the towns and villages of Lorraine was at
an end, they called it—still from that personal objective
point of view—Nancy l’Inviolée.
The German conception of its importance was more
strictly military. The Kaiser himself appears to have
cherished some imperially sentimental notions on the
subject of its capture. No doubt if he could have
ridden in triumph into the beautiful Place Stanislas at
the head of the White Cuirassiers of the Guard (who
were on the spot in readiness), like a Cæsar or a Roman
general swaggering along the Via Sacra, he would have
felt extremely pleased with himself, and the moral
effect on the people of both countries would have been
immense. But it was also obvious that through Nancy
lay the way to the barrier of the frontier fortresses.
Until General de Castelnau’s army had been disposed
of the project of smashing the forts of Toul was only an
idle dream. To that end the whole force of the German
left wing, except the troops (chiefly Landwehr) which
were held up in Alsace, was concentrated on this one
point. The march of von Heeringen’s men from the
south-west along the valleys of the Mortagne, the
Meurthe, and the Vesouze, we have already followed,
up to the time of their check by de Castelnau’s right.
At the same time an even fiercer attack was made on
his left, from the east, north-east, and north by the
.bn 184.png
.pn +1
Crown Prince of Bavaria’s army and some additional
troops of the Metz garrison army.
Before the Germans spread out into battle formation
the four main lines of the whole of their advance on
Nancy were from Pont-à-Mousson, Château-Salins,
Cirey, and St. Dié. If we substitute London for Nancy,
the relative positions and distances of these places will
be approximately represented by Waltham Cross,
Brentford, Sittingbourne, and the village of Sandhurst
(half-way between Tunbridge Wells and Rye). Or, to
put the matter still more simply, the enemy advanced
in directions which coincide almost exactly with those
of the Great Northern, the Great Eastern, the London,
Chatham, and Dover, and the South-Eastern Railways;
and they were not finally checked till they had reached a
point nearer to Nancy than Walthamstow is to Charing
Cross.
For the people of Nancy the prospect was sufficiently
alarming. It is not surprising that at that time some
of them, though not many, migrated to what they
thought were safer quarters. But they need have
had no fears. To the north-east and east of the town,
in the quadrant of the circle between Pont-à-Mousson
and Lunéville, the legionaries of the XXth corps were
to prove an impenetrable barrier. Once they had
crossed the boundary river, the Seille, in the general
retreat, there was no favourable position in which to
make a stand until they came to the ring-fence of wooded
heights which long before the war was christened by
some French strategist the Grand Couronné of Nancy.
The term is, as a matter of fact, rather a stretch of the
.bn 185.png
.pn +1
imagination. If you stand at the top of any high
building in the town and look eastwards towards the
frontier (which is as near to Nancy as Wimbledon to
Hyde Park Corner) you see, with one or two unimportant
exceptions, no hills at all. The ground for the most
part is flat and unbroken, rising in a gentle slope to the
horizon five miles away. (Once and once only a body
of German cavalry came over the rise, and, till they
were driven back, were visible for a short time from the
town.) On that side the Couronné consists only of the
Forests of Champenoux and St. Paul, about seven miles
north-east of the town, north and south of the Château-Salins
road, the woods of Crévic and Einville north of
the Marne-Rhone canal, a low ridge beyond Léomont
on the north side of the last two or three miles of the
road to Lunéville, and the Forest of Vitrimont south of
the road. To the west of the town, and to the north
in the direction of Metz, the Couronné is, however, well
marked, and a semicircle of hills, about one thousand
feet high, broken only by the valley of the Meurthe,
stands high up above it, and sweeps round to the north-east,
where the wooded Plateau of Amance carries on
the curve almost as far as the forest of Champenoux.
The position defended by the left wing of General
de Castelnau’s army extended from Ste. Généviève, a
few miles south-east of Pont-à-Mousson, past the heights
of Mont St. Jean, La Rochette, and Amance (the rock
on which the attack broke), and then by Laneuvelotte
and Cerceuil across the plain to Dombasle, just east of
St. Nicholas-du-Port and west of the forest of Vitrimont,
in a line which is almost parallel to the course of the
.bn 186.png
.pn +1
Meurthe below Nancy, and about five miles in front of
it. From Dombasle, south of the river, it was continued
in a slightly concave curve, as we saw in the last
chapter, through Saffais, across the Bayon-Lunéville
road, to Gerbéviller on the Mortagne.
In the prolonged battle which was fought along that
front—of course very many times as large as the field
of Waterloo—the losses of the enemy in killed alone
probably amounted to nearly 50,000. Every scrap
of the ground between it and the frontier, that is to
say, a length of about thirty miles and a depth varying
from five or six to well over twenty, was fought over
at least twice and in many places still oftener. Everywhere
there are long wide stretches of ground so torn
and ploughed by shells that it seems impossible that
any single soul could have gone through that awful
fire and come out alive. On the heights of Frescati
above the Lunéville road as far west as the farm of
Léomont (in the last chapter we saw it flaming against
the evening sky from the other side of the forest of
Vitrimont), all round the forest itself, particularly near
the now ruined building called the Faisanderie, and
from there right away up the line past Crévic and Maixe
and Courbesseau and Réméréville, the ghastly ruin
of the battlefield south of the river was repeated over
and over again. In some places it was not so bad as
in others. But that is all you can say. In the worst
it is beyond belief. Trenches in the modern sense of
the word hardly existed; what there were were comparatively
rare and shallow. The slaughter was therefore
much greater than it ever is in these later times,
.bn 187.png
.pn +1
except when an offensive movement is being carried
out. The villages and churches and scattered cottages
and farms were battered and pounded by the shells
of both sides till nothing of them was left but heaped-up
ruins. Here, as elsewhere, many of them were burnt,
and always for the same miserable and lying excuse.
At Réméréville, near the forest of Champenoux, the
epitaph of the murdered village, composed and signed
by “Un Allemand,” was still chalked up on the blackboard
in the little schoolhouse when we first saw it:
“Réméréville n’existe plus, parce qu’on a tiré sur les
troupes Allemandes. Ainsi soit il fait sur toutes les
endroits pareilles.” His French was not, perhaps, of the
best, but his conclusion was correct enough. Réméréville
n’existe plus. In some of the villages, where incendiarism
had not done its destructive work, there is hardly a
square inch of house-wall, except where gaping holes
were torn by the shells, that is not pitted with bullet
marks. There is hardly a wall enclosing a yard or a
compound or a farm that was not loopholed for purposes
of defence, and when the wall ran all round an enclosure
it was loopholed on all four sides. That shows exactly
what the fighting in a large number of cases was like.
Both French and Germans held the farms and the other
isolated buildings like block-houses, and resisted attack
sometimes from all four quarters at once. There was
no getting away from them. Death, surrender, or
victory were the only alternatives. Both sides showed
extraordinary bravery, but it was the French, because
of what depended on their success, and because they
were being attacked, who put most fire into their fighting.
.bn 188.png
.pn +1
They knew that they could not afford to give way. They
were fighting in their own country, in the homes of their
own kith and kin. Day after day and night after night
long convoys of wounded jolted slowly and painfully
past them, back to the hospitals of Nancy, where for all
the preparations that had been made there was sometimes
not room for them all to be admitted at once,
and for a long time they lay on their stretchers in the
corridors, and once or twice even in streets and squares
of the town under the open sky, before they could be
cared for. Almost more melancholy still were the
troops of homeless refugees who were forced to turn
their faces in the same direction, carrying with them in
their hands, or piled in confusion on their ricketty
carts, the poor little household gods that they wanted
to save from the clutch of the marauding German
or his cruel fires. But not all of them escaped. Some
were too dazed by the suddenness of the invasion, or
too old, or too young, or too feeble. Of these many were
remorselessly butchered by the German soldiery, drunk
or sober. Yet their deaths were not in vain. Wretched,
uncounted, unconsidered victims of the war, they, too,
had a hand in the victory. For if any one thing had still
been needed to nerve the armies of Lorraine to do all
that armed men can do for the defence of their country,
it was the sight of the blighted homes and murdered
bodies of these unfortunates. That was why France,
and especially France’s soldiers in the field, realized long
before England the deadly importance of putting every
ounce of their strength into the war. They had no need
of newspaper reports and blue books and recruiting
.bn 189.png
.pn +1
appeals to awake them. They saw with their own eyes.
“In Nomeny,” one of them wrote in a letter home,
“the dead bodies of the inhabitants are more or less
everywhere; on the staircases, in the cellars, on the piles
of rubbish, in the open street. In one heap there
were five corpses, two of which were children, and a
little farther on were lying three young girls. Our impression
was that these unfortunates had been shot
down, and not killed by shells. In what were once
the streets there are pigs wandering about and feeding
on human flesh. Whenever we catch one we shoot it
and bury it at once. Nothing is left of this charming
little town but dangerous panels of walls, which every
now and then tumble down. You can still make out
the lines of the streets. The few houses that are left
have been stripped and pillaged. You walk about on
linen undergarments. The furniture has been disembowelled”—the
word exactly describes what one
sees in one house after another—“the doors torn off
their hinges. On the floors there is a litter of clothes,
letters, burst mattresses and eiderdowns, fragments
of furniture, shattered pottery, broken food, dung,
and other rubbish, so that you cannot set foot on the
boards of the floor.”
In letters, by word of mouth, with our own eyes,
M. Lamure and I heard and saw over and over again
similar stories and similar sights. I did not see the
scene which was described to a French officer by an old
maidservant in a house near Lunéville, where a party
of German officers, some of them stark-naked except
for their helmets, some of them dressed in the nightgowns
.bn 190.png
.pn +1
and undergarments of the ladies of the house, danced
with one another in a drunken carouse, and defiled the
beds and the other linen which they left in the drawers
of the clothes-chests; I quote it because the French
officer who had it from the heart-broken old family
servant who saw it happen seems to me to be an absolutely
reliable witness. But there is a deeper reason
than that for repeating it. It is typical of the extraordinary
vein of bestiality which even before the war
was known to run through certain strata—and certain
of the higher strata—of German society. We are always
asking and wondering who is going to win the war—even,
in some of our darker hours, the most optimistic of us.
The answer is written in these ravaged villages and towns
of Lorraine and other parts of France. When to the
mere wanton destructiveness of war is added the particular
form of bestiality of which disgusting traces have
been found by the French in many houses which had
escaped the flames, it is practically certain that the
roots of it must lie deep down in a bed of rottenness
digged and prepared long before the war began. A
nation, the cultivated circles of which are to any serious
extent tainted with the unnatural vice of which this
filthiness is a sure sign—even if its existence and its
toleration had not already been notorious in Germany—is
intrinsically corrupt and has in its organization the
seeds of death, no matter how highly it may have
developed its Kultur and commerce and physical and
military science. Germany has grown with extraordinary
rapidity and to extraordinary proportions
in an extraordinarily short period of time, like a rank
.bn 191.png
.pn +1
weed, forced in an ultra-scientific hothouse. Outwardly
her structure is in many respects a marvel and even
a thing of beauty. But with this canker at the core
she cannot be a healthy organization. You cannot
gather figs of thistles. The war has brought the canker
(which is in the whole body, though it does not poison
the whole of it) to the surface. Perhaps the war, which
Germany has brought on herself, is the surgeon’s knife
that will finally eradicate it, as it must without doubt
excise other tumours from the bodies of all the nations
engaged in it. But the difference between Germany
and the others is that they have entered upon the
war with cleaner hands and cleaner minds, and that
cleanness, because the world is continually being purified,
is going to win in the long run. For even if it were
the other way, if Germany were going to win this
particular war, which is, after all, only a moment in
the history of time, that could make no difference in
the final result. Right must triumph and the world
must progress, and the Allies, since they have right on
their side, are fighting not only in its defence and the
defence of their countries, but to give Germany a
chance after the war of redeeming herself. For it is
as certain that only her own people can purify her and
make her what she is meant to be as it is that not the
united powers of the whole world can wipe her as a
nation off the map of Europe. Of course, individual
soldiers and individual politicians think and speak
differently. There are many people in France and
England with whom the last sentence of the following
paragraph, which was written by a French soldier in
.bn 192.png
.pn +1
the armies of the east on August 26th, 1914, is a fixed
creed. “We will make these barbarians pay dear,”
he wrote, “for their robberies and their proud folly.
In front of us there is nothing but miles of ruins, burnt
villages, and corpses of old men and children. Truly
this race is not worthy to have produced Goethe,
Schiller, and Wagner. This time she must disappear
from the map of the civilized world.”
That she should disappear from the map of the
civilized world is obviously a wild impossibility. You
cannot, even if you wished, wipe out a nation of
65,000,000 people, nor even reduce them to a state of
unarmed defencelessness. Inevitably they would again
become in course of time a powerful menace to the peace
and freedom of the rest of the world. What we can do,
and what, please God, we will do, is to beat them
thoroughly now, and then to believe that the German
people themselves will rise up and insist that in their
own country an end shall be made of the mad folly and
the mad fools whose pride and selfishness and moral
uncleanness have brought this vile war on Germany and
the suffering world.
But that is to look far ahead, much further
than was possible or desirable for the defenders of
Nancy. All that they had to think of was the town
and the country and the cause for which they were
fighting. All that they had to inspire them was the
love of Lorraine and France, and the detestation of what
they saw in front of them in the track of the Huns,
which filled their hearts with rage and the burning desire
for vengeance. In that they were united with the
.bn 193.png
.pn +1
whole people of Lorraine, and because they were united
they won. They had their mothers and their wives and
their sisters and their sweethearts at their backs. A
great deal has been said—but not nearly enough—of the
part which the women of France have played in the
war. I will not try now to add my personal tribute to
the marvellous courage and unremitting self-sacrifice
of the section of the French people upon whom the war
has borne most cruelly. I will, instead, let one of them
speak for herself, and for all the rest. She was writing
at the beginning of September, 1914, from Moyen Vic,
on the German side of the Lorraine frontier, to her
brother at the front, and this is what she said for herself
and for another sister:—
.pm start_quote
“My dear Edouard,—
.ti 6
“I hear the news that Charles and Lucien
died on the 28th of August. Eugène is dead too. Rose
has disappeared.
“Mamma is crying. She says that you must be
strong, and wishes you to go and avenge them.
“I hope that your officers will not refuse you that.
Jean has won the Legion of Honour: you must follow
his example.
“They have taken everything from us. Out of
eleven who were fighting eight are dead. My dear
brother, do your duty, that is all we ask.
“God gave you your life: He has the right to take
it back from you. It is Mamma who says so.
“We embrace you with all our heart, though we
should long to see you first. The Prussians are here.
.bn 194.png
.pn +1
The young Jandon is dead. They have pillaged everything.
I have just come back from Gerbéviller, which
is destroyed. The cowards!
“Go, my dear brother, make the sacrifice of your
life. We have the hope that we shall see you again,
for some kind of a presentiment makes us hope.
“We embrace you with all our heart. Adieu, and
au revoir, if God allows it.
.ll 68
.rj
“Your Sisters.
.ll
“It is for us and for France. Think of your brothers
and of grandpapa in 1870.”
.pm end_quote
With women like that to encourage and inspire
them, with those other women, outraged and murdered,
to avenge, with their woman-city of Nancy and their
mother-country France to defend, is it any wonder that
the men of Lorraine fought as they did, and won?
“Thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of
women.” Yes, but the courage of women—is there
anything in the world that passes that, or even equals
it? I wonder.
.bn 195.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XIV | BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ. III
.sp 2
The attempt to reach Nancy from the north was to be
carried out by a detachment of the Metz army. In
the earlier stages of the campaign, that army, or a part
of it, had marched westwards towards Verdun, probably
with the idea of joining up with the Crown Prince of
Prussia’s command—that fatal illusory missing-link
on which hinged so much of the German plan—or else
of filling up the gap which at that time broke the continuity
of the lines across what has since become the
base of the St. Mihiel triangle, from Pont-à-Mousson to
Fresnes in the direction of Verdun. After General de
Castelnau’s army had retired to its position on the
Grand Couronné, a considerable portion of the Metz
force wheeled round facing south, with Pont-à-Mousson
as their base. The opportunity certainly seemed a
good one. Whatever was the precise object which the
troops from Metz originally had in view, it was well
worth while to sacrifice it for the moment, in order to
take the extreme left of the French force from the flank
and in the rear almost before they had taken up their
new position after their exhausting retreat. Instead
of being able to strengthen the main line of General
.bn 196.png
.pn +1
de Castelnau’s defence against the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, the French on their exposed flank had to turn
their attention to a new enemy coming up behind them
from the north. Fortunately, that part of the line
was under the command of General Foch, a leader whose
reputation has gone on steadily increasing since the
war began. The Germans were full of confidence. To
them, no doubt, and perhaps also to the much smaller
body of French troops whose business it was to check
them, there seemed to be excellent grounds for the
boastful cries of “Sainte Généviève to-night: to-morrow
Nancy,” with which, on the morning of the 22nd, they
set off on their march up the valley of the Moselle.
Ste. Généviève is a village that lies about five miles
south-east of Pont-à-Mousson, and rather less south-west
of Nomeny, on the line of hills that runs from Nancy along
the valley down to Metz, rising a little way back from
the right bank of the river. As soon as the Germans
turned off the road to their left to climb up to the French
outpost at Ste. Généviève, which they were obliged
to reduce before they could march further south, they
began to find trouble. A thick belt of wire entanglements
which the French had prepared to the left of their
trenches and about half a mile in front of them obliged
the attacking force to make the final advance from their
own left front up a steep and exposed pitch. They did
not, however, move forward at once. There was no
need to take unnecessary risks, or they thought there
was not, and for two whole days, with field artillery
and a few heavier guns, which fired in all some four
thousand shells on the village, they prepared the way with
.bn 197.png
.bn 198.png
.bn 199.png
.pn +1
the now fashionable preliminary bombardment. The
French had only one infantry regiment in Ste. Généviève,
but they were well sheltered in their trenches, and in
the two days they lost no more than three men killed
and about twenty wounded. The batteries in support
were also well-concealed—too well for the German
aeroplanes, which failed to locate them—and they
allowed the enemy to waste their ammunition without
firing a shot in return. That must have been a severe
test of their powers of self-restraint, but they knew that
the crisis was extremely serious, and that in all probability
the fate of Nancy depended on their standing
firm.
.il id=i156 fn=i_b_156fp.jpg w=354px ew=75%
.ca
Pierre Petit phot.
General Foch.
.ca-
On the evening of the 24th the German commander,
possibly deceived by their silence and imagining that
the infantry had been crushed by the bombardment,
gave the order for the attack. In massed columns his
formidable little army of 12,000 men, four German
soldiers for every Frenchman in front of them, advanced
up the hill, still supported by the fire of their artillery.
Then at last, when they had come to a convenient
range, the 75’s opened on their closely formed ranks.
Most of the work fell on one particular battery from
Toul, as the others were so placed that they could
not fire effectively without endangering their own
infantry. For three hours they pounded the Germans,
cutting them up badly, and then, when he had fired
the last shell, the commandant of the battery ordered
his men to join the infantry in a last resolute effort to
check the assault.
Crouching low as they came up the slope, the
.bn 200.png
.pn +1
Germans now advanced in earnest. The infantry
had been ordered to let them get within three hundred
yards. When they reached that distance the French
officers shouted at the top of their voices the command
which, at that period of the war, always seemed to inspire
the Germans with terror, “En avant à la baïonette!”
But the command was a ruse. The regiment had been
warned that, when it was given, they were not to
charge but to fire a succession of volleys from the
trenches. As soon as the Germans heard the order
snapping along the ranks and the bugles sounding the
charge, the front ranks hurriedly rose from their crouching
positions and with fixed bayonets advanced to meet
the attack. That was their undoing. The first volley
caught them just as they reached the wire entanglements
two hundred yards in front of the trenches and mowed
them down in hundreds. They fell in such dense masses
that the men coming on from behind climbed and jumped
over their bodies and the first line of entanglements
at the same time. But they could get no further. Four
separate times they came on to the assault over the
open with fine courage, and each time they were checked
by the withering fire from the Lebels, till at last, almost
at nightfall, they gave up the attempt, and fell back on
Pont-à-Mousson, leaving four thousand dead in front of
those murderous trenches. For the moment their
demoralization was complete. In the darkness some
of them lost their way, and stumbling over the wire
entanglements in front of Loisy-sur-Moselle, fell into
the river and were drowned. This time, when the
survivors reached Atton, the village south of Pont-à-Mousson,
.bn 201.png
.pn +1
which they had passed through so confidently
two days before, there were no longer shouts of “Nancy
demain!” They had made their attack in overwhelming
force and they had failed, and for Ste.
Généviève they had coined a new and more expressive
name. They called it, in bitter memory of the losses
which they had suffered there, “The Hole of Death.”
On the same day that the force from Metz started
on their disastrous expedition, the battle was raging
fiercely all along the line which was being attacked by
the German Sixth Army under the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, from Mont St. Jean, a little south and east
of Ste. Généviève, to Dombasle on the Meurthe. In that
twenty-mile stretch there were many Holes of Death,
many desperate encounters, and many uncounted acts
of corporate and individual gallantry on both sides.
But for coolness and forethought and disciplined restraint
as well as for mere courage in what might have seemed
to officers and men an almost hopeless position, the
defence of Ste. Généviève must rank with the very first
achievements of the army of heroes that fought and
won in front of Nancy.
At first on this section of the line the most furious
fighting was on the right, along the Marne-Rhine canal,
round Haraucourt and Dombasle, which, on the 22nd,
was actually occupied for a time by the enemy, though
they were quickly driven out and forced to retire on
the heights and woods of Crévic. The next day there
was the same kind of give-and-take struggle along the
ridge north of the Dombasle-Lunéville road, round the
farm of Léomont, and along a front north and south of
.bn 202.png
.pn +1
it, from Crévic to the forest of Vitrimont. On the 25th,
still a little further north, between Drouville and Courbesseau,
a strong German position was attacked by five
French regiments. For some reason, however, they
were not properly supported by their artillery, and
suffered severely, one regiment losing sixty-five per cent.
in killed and wounded. But, although for the time
being that particular attack failed and had to be given
up, the general run of the battle, all through the last
week of August and the first few days of September,
was slightly but surely in favour of the French. That,
always bearing in mind the disastrous retreat which it
followed, was the amazing wonder of it. It is true
that the final retreat of the Germans to the frontier did
not take place till September 12th, when the Battle of
the Marne had been won, and that the movement to
their rear of the Crown Prince of Bavaria’s and von
Heeringen’s armies was therefore in a sense part of the
general retirement of the whole German line with which
it coincided. But it is also true that on the day when
the Battle of the Marne began, at the end of that first
fortnight of fierce charge and counter-charge, in the
forests and hedgeless fields and ruined and smoking
villages of Lorraine, the enemy, though they were still
there, had been beaten almost to a standstill. That,
at least, was the case on September 5th along the whole
right half of the front, north and south of the Meurthe,
from Gerbéviller through the forest of Vitrimont, past
Crévic as far as Haraucourt. Further north it was a
few days later before the attack was finally rolled back.
The batteries of Amance drew the German battalions
.bn 203.png
.pn +1
like a magnet, and it was here and in the forest of
Champenoux that the final fury of the assault spent
itself.
Before that, at Drouville, Courbesseau, Cerceuil,
Réméréville, Hoéville, Erbéviller, Champenoux (into
which the guns on Amance poured shells at the rate of
between 2500 and 3000 rounds a day for a fortnight),
and other small hamlets round the forest, most of which,
like Réméréville, n’existent plus, there had been a long
series of hand-to-hand struggles and trench warfare,
during which day and night the roar of the guns and the
rattle of the mitrailleuses and rifles, was almost continuous.
In the trenches the men got so used to the
turmoil that though they slept through it peacefully
in their off-moments, they missed it when it stopped.
It was the sudden lulls and not the noise that they
found startling. As a young officer who was wounded
at Réméréville said to me one day when he was talking
of the night on which he was knocked over, “The silence
woke me.” “The shells,” wrote another, “keep falling
all round, but there are so many that one takes no notice
of them. Even the horses don’t move, which pretty
well proves that there is nothing heroic in keeping cool.”
In a way, of course, that is true enough. It is all, as
he said, a matter of luck, and the less one thinks about
getting hit the better, though the fact remains that men
have imagination and horses have not, which does
make a difference. But, imagination or no imagination,
men who are used to fire certainly do become extraordinarily
fearless and even contemptuous about its
effect. I was talking one day—not in Lorraine, but
.bn 204.png
.pn +1
on the Champagne front—to the commandant of a
battery of 75’s, which were trying to put out of action
a German machine gun about three miles off which
was worrying the infantry in a particular trench in
front. He pointed to the corner of a wood two or three
hundred yards behind us round which were coming about
twenty men, mounted and on foot. “They don’t seem
to mind a bit,” he said, “about getting hit. They all
know that the German gunners can see the rise at that
corner and that they have got the range of it to a yard,
and yet—now look,” he added quickly. A shell, three
shells together, whistled over our heads. There was
a roar, a column of brown smoke thirty feet high shot
up into the air at the exposed corner, apparently right
in the middle of the group. The horses bucked a little,
and one of them screamed, but a second or two later
the men on foot, who had thrown themselves flat on
their faces when they heard the shells coming, got up and
came slowly sauntering past us quietly smoking their
pipes, and the commandant went on with his conversation—which
was interrupted twice again in the next
few minutes by exactly the same abrupt interlude.
“Nothing can teach them,” he said. “They know
that these big German shells have a way of bursting
straight up and down instead of laterally, the corner is
a short cut, and they prefer to take the risk. After all,
the Boches may not shoot—and they don’t care.”
In Lorraine, at the moment of which I was talking,
the men were not so used to fire as they are by this time;
they were exposed, not to occasional shells like those
nine which between them only wounded one horse and
.bn 205.png
.pn +1
spoilt one helmet, but to a constant rain of them, and
they were fighting a great and all-important battle,
without the sense of security conveyed by an elaborate
system of deep trenches and shell-proof abris. Also
they were wearing the old képis and the conspicuous
dark blue coats and red trousers in which France has
won or lost all her battles since the days of Napoleon.
The famous new cloth of tricolor blue was still on the
looms of England, and steel helmets were undreamt of,
or many lives that were lost in front of Nancy would
have been saved. Compared with the German corps
in their uniforms of invisible grey, the French soldiers
were in those days at a distinct disadvantage.
But neither did they care. Death had no terrors
for them, and as for their wounds, there would be time
enough to think about them afterwards, and then only
because they fretted and fretted until they were healed
so that they might go out and meet the hated Boche
again. Now they had their work cut out for them.
Very largely it was individual work, for in these scattered
fights in the woods and village streets and the shallow
concealing hollows which in many places furrow the
rolling plain small bodies of infantry as well as cavalry
patrols were often thrown on their own resources.
Young lieutenants and sergeants and corporals and even
privates constantly had to assume responsibility and
think and act for themselves in sudden emergencies—a
style of fighting which, when it came, was much better
suited to the temper and genius of the French soldier
than that of the more strictly disciplined German—and
no one will ever know the number of unrecorded acts of
.bn 206.png
.pn +1
gallantry and quick-witted coolness which helped to
swell the general tide of the French success.
But one more combined effort was wanted before
the victory was complete. There was still that one
part of the line round Champenoux where the French
were acting purely on the defensive. Erbéviller,
Réméréviller, and most of the villages round the forest
where so much blood had been spilt, are on the east
and south of it, and Amance, in front of which the final
struggle took place, on the west. Here, where the main
and probably the most seasoned body of the German
troops were concentrated, our Allies had been slowly
driven back. But they had behind them the plateau
of Amance—barely six miles, remember, from the outskirts
of Nancy. It was the key to the position. The
whole of the battle was in reality and in the end directed
to the defending or the gaining of this particular point.
At all costs it had to be taken. At all hazards it had to
be held. The violent struggles in the villages on the
other side of the forest had been only a preliminary
to the grand general attack which was to come, first
from the south and then from the north and east. Up
till then the splendid batteries from Toul, by which it
was manned, had taken only a comparatively distant
part in the battle, in support of the infantry in front
of them. Now they were to defend the hill itself at
close quarters. The last two days of August were a
time of trying suspense for them. The hill and the
men on it were surrounded by a thick mist. Instinctively
they felt that the enemy were drawing nearer,
that the attack was coming. But they could see nothing.
.bn 207.png
.pn +1
All the practical work they could do was to put the
finishing touches to the entrenchments which they had
been constructing since their arrival, and occasionally
to shell at a venture the roads along which the enemy
might be approaching. The Germans, meanwhile,
had been getting their heavy guns into position, and on
September 1st the bombardment, which lasted for a
week, began. On the 4th enemy airmen flew over the
plateau, and though they kept very high they were able
more or less to make out the positions of the batteries.
The fire then became more severe than ever, and at one
time most of the men serving the French guns were
ordered to take cover in the village behind the hill.
But there as well they were quickly detected by the
enemy airplanes and captive balloons, and were followed
by a volley of shells which sent the villagers scuttling
to their cellars or flying over the plains towards Nancy.
As for the troops, they made a dash back to the plateau,
through a very hot fire, and once more got into their
trenches, managing to take their wounded with them.
Fortunately the guns had been well concealed, and were
undamaged, so that when at last there was a lull in the
storm, presumably because the Germans concluded
that they were silenced for good, they were able to come
out into the open again and soon had them once more
in full action.
The rest of the engagement was very much a repetition
of the affair at Ste. Généviève on a larger scale. But
there was one big difference. In spite of the gravity
of the situation on the Marne the Kaiser had journeyed
to the eastern front to give to his armies there the
.bn 208.png
.pn +1
encouragement of his presence and authority—or for
another reason. Exactly when he arrived no one seems
to know, but he was certainly in Lorraine on September
8th, that is to say, the day before his first five armies
began their retreat from the Marne. That seems to
me to be a fact of some significance. On the 8th and
even on the 9th the line of the first five German armies
still stretched from near Paris south of Compiègne across
the Marne, well south of Epernay and Châlons, to a
point not so very far north of Bar le Duc, before it
curved north of Verdun on its left and came down again
on the other side of the Meuse almost to the Rupt de
Mad, which flows north-east from near Commercy, to
fall into the Moselle at Metz. Then there was a gap
of some miles where neither French nor Germans had
any considerable force, and after the gap, on the east side
of Rupt de Mad, the German line began again with the
Sixth and Seventh Armies.
On September 8th it was still possible that the first
five German armies might hold their ground against
the French and English attack. On September 8th
it was still possible that the Sixth Army under the
Crown Prince of Bavaria might break through the
opposition of General de Castelnau’s army, and open
up the way to Nancy and Toul. Nothing could have
been better timed. The Germans were a little late
(say about three weeks) in carrying out their original
programme, but the correspondence between the two
parts of it was exact, almost to a minute. Only two
things were necessary to carry out the famous “hook”
and begin the encirclement of the main armies of the
.bn 209.png
.pn +1
Allies: the first five armies from von Kluck to the Crown
Prince had to stand firm; the other two, under von
Heeringen and the Crown Prince of Bavaria (and the
Kaiser) to advance. It is not surprising that the Great
War Lord chose to place himself with the two armies
which were to advance. It was (or it should have been)
even leaving out of account the possible triumphant
entry into Nancy, incomparably the more interesting
and picturesque position. Any soldier, let alone any
War Lord, would have given all that he most prized to
lead the armies that were to carry out the actual work
of completing the circle by taking the French and
English armies from Bar le Duc to Paris in the rear.
It is at least highly probable that that was what was in
the Kaiser’s mind. He went to Lorraine, not to encourage
the Bavarian armies in a forlorn hope, but to
secure the front seat for the display of the final
tableau.
How nearly exact his calculations were will probably
never be known. It was certainly a case of touch
and go whether they came off or not. In my opinion
what upset them more than almost anything else was
the final stand at Amance, in which guns and infantry
both bore their full share. For consider what they
did, and above all when they did it. They were put to
the supreme test on September 8th, the day, let me
recall, before the retreat from the Marne began. The
Kaiser himself gave the order for the final assault.
From the woods a mile away, headed by their fifes and
drums, wave upon wave of Germans advanced as steadily
and as pompously as if they were on parade, to the
.bn 210.png
.pn +1
attack of the French infantry positions on the side of
the hill. The French guns were silent. There was
nothing to show whether they had been put out of action
by the preliminary bombardment or were only biding
their time. Except the music of the bands there was
not a sound, for the infantry also reserved their fire
till the enemy were within two hundred yards.
Then their time had come. With their bayonets fixed
and with shouts of “Vive la France!” they sprang
suddenly from the trenches and charged. The two lines
met with a desperate shock, and after a violent hand-to-hand
struggle it was the German ranks which broke.
As they fled to the shelter of the forest the 75’s came
into action, and firing at short range mowed them down
rank by rank. But they were splendidly gallant. They
fought like knights, not like the savages who had sacked
and burnt the villages of Lorraine and the Vosges.
There were always others ready to take the places of
the men who fell. Six times they advanced towards
that deadly hill, and six times they were driven back
to the sheltering woods. At some places at its base the
bodies were piled up five or six feet high, and when the
survivors took cover behind the heaps of dead and
wounded the 75’s still raked them through and through,
smothering dead and living in a horrible mire of flesh
and blood, while the 155’s, firing over the heads of
the front ranks, finished off the work further back. The
losses were enormous. Thousands of German dead
were left lying on the plain, and in the evening they
asked and were granted a few hours’ truce to bury them.
The victory was complete. There was no longer any
.bn 211.png
.pn +1
risk of a German advance. Nancy was inviolate. The
Grand Plan had broken down.
But supposing the defeat had been a victory? Then,
I think, after the preliminary walk-over into Nancy, an
army could have been sent forward to Bar-le-Duc,
large enough, even if it could not bring about the
rounding up of the Allies, to form a serious menace to
Sarrail and Langle de Cary, and perhaps even to have
altered the whole course of the Battle of the Marne.
It is true that Toul and the Meuse stood in the way.
But the garrison of Toul had been seriously weakened
by the withdrawal of the guns and troops that had
taken part in the defence of Nancy, and in any case the
Germans might have walked round it, as they did round
Verdun, supposing that they had not the guns to blow
it to pieces as they had the forts of Liége.
But after all these are unprofitable speculations.
What has been has been, and the operations in front of
Nancy, though comparatively little attention has been
drawn to them, were obviously of such vital importance
in the huge general battle which saved France that there
is no need of “if’s” and “an’s” to prove it. At the
same time it is well worth while to notice how the two
great victories of the Marne and the Grand Couronné
reacted on each other. Each was an indispensable part
of the homogeneous plans of German invasion and
French defence. If the armies of the east, by their
stand in front of Nancy, helped to make the victory of
the Marne possible, the victory of the Marne certainly
helped them to finish off the work they had begun so
well. Even after their repulse at Amance, when a
.bn 212.png
.pn +1
sadder if not a wiser Kaiser had motored back to
Germany, the enemy were still uncomfortably close to
Nancy. The French believe that they took advantage
of the four hours’ truce which was granted them on the
evening of the 8th to place two heavy guns in position
at Cerceuil. At all events, the next day, there the
guns were, and between eleven and twelve that night
seventy of their shells crashed into the streets of Nancy,
damaging a few houses and killing six or seven harmless
civilians. People went to bed very early in those days,
and most of the inhabitants had been in bed and asleep
for an hour or two before the shelling began. A violent
thunderstorm was raging at the time, and it was not till
the 75’s began to reply that the town woke up and
realized what was happening, and then, almost before
there was time to wonder seriously whether the bombardment
was to be the prelude to a German entry, the
whole thing was over. The smart little 75’s had done
their work and silenced the heavier pieces from Essen,
or the men who were serving them, in less than an
hour. The town heaved a sigh of relief, not unmixed
with indignation and contempt—and went to sleep
again.
The whole affair was singularly futile and pettish.
It was like a little boy throwing stones from a safe
distance at an opponent whom he has failed to beat in
a fair stand-up fight, before he runs away. Possibly
the object was to damage the Cathedral, which was
exactly in the line in which most of the shells fell, as
a parting message to the Nanceiens of what they might
expect another time. Or they may have hoped to
.bn 213.png
.pn +1
start a conflagration or an explosion by hitting the gasworks
or the huge boilers of some big works close beside
them. That was a thought which occurred to the
young Yorkshire engineer in charge of the works (about
the only Englishman in the town at the moment), who
at once went down through the streets where the shells
were falling and emptied the boilers himself. But
anyhow there was no military object in the pyrotechnic
display, since there were no soldiers sleeping in the town,
and the chief inconvenience it caused—a very real one—was
that in some of the hospitals the wounded had to
be carried down from the upper wards to the ground-floor
or the basement.
Whatever the meaning or no-meaning of the bombardment,
it was the beginning of the end, and a sign
that the Germans were going. It was a habit of theirs
always to destroy before they retired. Many of the
acts of incendiarism were, so to speak, parting shots,
or exhibitions of temper on a large scale. But they
fought, too, with desperate if sullen courage. The retirement
had now become almost general and once more the
unfortunate villages in the path of the receding Army
Corps were deluged by the double baptism of fire. Before
the enemy were finally driven out of the forest of
Champenoux the French had to charge them again
and again, and whole regiments were decimated on both
sides. But step by step, all along the line from Pont-à-Mousson,
which was evacuated on September 10th,
to the Vosges, they were forced steadily eastwards—from
Champenoux along the Château-Salins road, and
through the group of villages on the edge of the forest
.bn 214.png
.pn +1
past Arracourt; from Velaine and Creceuil past Courbesseau
and Serres; from Harraucourt and Dombasle
along the canal, past Crévic and Maixe and Einville,
from which some of them went north along the road to
Vic and others kept along the banks of the canal to the
forest of Parroy; and south of the canal and south of
the Meurthe, through Lunéville and on each side of it,
past Gerbéviller and Baccarat and Raon l’Etape and
St. Dié—in all cases back towards the frontier which
they had crossed in triumph three long weeks before.
Except for a narrow strip on the edge of Lorraine and
a rather larger tract in the Department of the Vosges
west of the Donon, the occupation was at an end. The
attack on the Epinal-Verdun line by way of Nancy had
completely failed. The Kaiser and his men had looked
at the promised land and turned their backs on it,
leaving misery and disaster—and perhaps 50,000 dead—behind
them, but carrying with them in their hearts
the greatest disappointment of the first part of the
war. The Germans are rather fond of mixing metaphors;
for once let me imitate them. They had nibbled greedily
at the Thistle of Nancy, but the Mailed Fist was not quite
long enough to reach it.
But the French troops, the men who had turned
defeat into victory, had suffered horribly. In one
division, 22,000 strong on August 23rd, only 8000 men
capable of fighting were left on September 10th. Still,
dead and living, they had done their work: de Castelnau
and Pau, Foch and the XXth Army Corps, Dubail and
Bigot, the men and guns of the Toul garrison and the
whole of the armies that stood in that deadly breach,
.bn 215.png
.pn +1
had covered themselves with undying glory and had
written in letters of blood on the plains of Lorraine
and in the spurs of the Vosges one of the most
splendid chapters in the history of France and the
world.
The whole of the country over which they fought
is now one vast cemetery. There are graves everywhere,
by the roadside, in the woods, in the middle of exposed
plateaux, in remote corners of fields, in the steep passes
of the Vosges, in the trenches and village gardens where
the dead men fought each other and died—long green
mounds, carefully fenced and tended, where hundreds
of broken bodies lie side by side in the last sleep of life,
lonely little neglected heaps of earth, marked only by
a rough cross of sticks and a tattered and weather-beaten
képi. You cannot get away from them and their
silence.
While the battle was still raging the life of the countryside
never seemed to come to an end altogether. Somewhere
near, sometimes in the very places over which
the shells were screaming, there were always—when
they were not hiding in the cellars—old men and boys
at work in the fields, children playing on the doorsteps,
and dazed and anxious women occupied in household
tasks. On the day of judgment, up to the very moment
when the last trump sounds, I believe there will still
be women washing clothes in the Meuse and the Moselle
and the Mortagne and the Meurthe and all the other
rivers of Lorraine and France which through all these
terrible months have run red with the blood of France
and Germany and their Allies—British and Belgians,
.bn 216.png
.pn +1
Australians and Canadians, Sikhs and Ghurkas, Algerians
and Moroccans.
Now, where the battle has rolled back, it is the turn
of the dead. They lie in the midst of life, and the living
can never forget them. The last time that I stood
by one of these resting-places, covered already with
green grass, it was an autumn evening, cold and dreary.
We were on ground from which the enemy had been
driven back with huge slaughter on both sides. Almost
as far as one could see the face of nature was hideously
scarred with an intricate network of saps and trenches.
What had once been happy homes were piles of brown
rubble and gaping walls and spires. What had once
been green woods were stiff rows of shattered leafless
stumps. It was a flat country, but in front, a little
further on, there was a ragged man-made dune, thirty
or forty feet high and ten times as long, enclosing a
deep crater in which were lying hundreds of mangled
bodies, some of them with their limbs sticking through
the surface, killed and buried or half buried by the same
appalling explosion in one dreadful moment of eternity.
Far beyond, but not so far that it was out of range of
the guns, the horizon, where the enemy lay concealed,
loomed up grim and threatening against the evening
sky. To me the horizon on the Lorraine frontier, seen
from far off, always had that dark and ominous look.
The vague and dreamlike mystery of what lay beyond
that silent line of low dark hills, the thought of the
preparations that might be going on behind it, the
feeling that no Frenchman or Englishman could go up to
it and live, and most of all, I think, the knowledge that
.bn 217.png
.pn +1
across the road on which one stood, and all the other
roads and railways that once were thoroughfares between
the two countries for all the world to use, a line was now
drawn which no man might pass, always seemed to make
of the frontier a dreadful symbol of the war and its
menace of evil to come. Close at hand it is different.
When you reach the impassable line of the furthest
trench or the tall barrier of sandbags on the other side
of which the enemy, in the same trench, is lying behind
a similar barrier twenty yards away, the sense of mystery
and foreboding melts away. There is no cure for a fit
of the blues like a visit to the front. For after all,
the line is not impassable. It has been crossed and
pushed back before, and it will be crossed and pushed
back again. All along it, where you had let yourself
think there was only the foe, there is an underground
world swarming with French soldiers, watching and
fighting, or ready to fight, day and night, up to any
move that the enemy may attempt to make, and sworn
and resolved for France and freedom to push on to the
end. And that is the view that all of us have got to
take when the horror of the war and its limitless and
frowning horizon is upon us. We must get right up
to our difficulties and meet them face to face. We must
work and watch and pray, like the men in the trenches—for
they do pray in the trenches—and leave the rest
to God.
But that day I was four or five miles back from the
front, and the weight of that horror of the horizon was
heavy upon me. Man goeth forth to his work and to
his labour until the evening. It was evening now,
.bn 218.png
.pn +1
and getting dark, yet still the cruel unending work
went on. Behind me quick red flashes of flame showed
the position of the nearer French batteries, which till
then one could only guess at from the sound of the guns.
Far off in front brilliant flares shot up into the darkness
over the trenches, that the men on both sides might be
able to go on watching and killing all through the night.
After all, was God in His heaven? Was all right with
the world? I thought of General de Castelnau, the
winner of that great victory in Lorraine, and his three
dead sons. I thought of all those French and German
lying there dead behind me, and the husbandless wives,
and fatherless children, and brotherless sisters, and friendless
friends, and sonless mothers, whose agonized prayers
for their young lives had been answered by those silent
graves. I thought of the killing that was going on
through the night, and the killing that was still to come
for weary months and perhaps for weary years. And
then I thought of something else, of the splendid heroism
and self-sacrifice of the women who prayed and suffered
and the men who fought and fell, and of some words
that I had seen before the light faded, written over one
of the graves that I had passed—it makes no difference
that the man buried there was a German, for surely
German soldiers as well as French believe that they are
fighting for the right—“Be thou faithful unto death,
and I will give thee a crown of life.” And that, it seems
to me, when you get right up face to face with death,
instead of standing and looking at it afar off, is the only
possible meaning of the Battle of the Grand Couronné,
and all the battles and all the horrors and all the suffering
.bn 219.png
.pn +1
of the whole war. For all of us, even for the enemy, even
for those who do not fight, it is a war of redemption, and
the greatest and most hopeful war of redemption that
the world has ever seen, and it will be won by those
whose faith in what is right lasts up to death and
beyond it.
.bn 220.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XV | LUNÉVILLE
.sp 2
One of the immediate and most satisfactory results of
the victory in front of Nancy was the hasty withdrawal
of the Germans from Lunéville, after an occupation
which lasted for just three weeks. For four or five
days before the evacuation the Bavarian troops in
front of the town had been gradually falling back on
the protection of the batteries in and beyond it. Only
one of these batteries, I believe, was in Lunéville itself.
It was placed, in obedience to the maxim that war and
what the Professors call sentimentality are poles asunder,
close to one of the hospitals, under the shadow and protection
of the Red Cross. During the bombardment
one of the French nurses, a girl of eighteen, was unfortunately
killed by a chance shell. But the battery
was perfectly safe. For naturally, seeing where it was,
the French gunners did not choose to fire on it. They
could not play the game except as gentlemen, and the
other side consequently scored, as has been known to
happen in our own country in the kindred game of football,
also rather apt to suffer from the disease of “Professoritis.”
In any case, when the French got near
enough to bring an effective fire to bear upon the town,
.bn 221.png
.pn +1
their bombardment was bound to be half-hearted. They
knew that there were German soldiers quartered in the
barracks and in many of the houses. But they knew
also that a large proportion of its inhabitants were
still there and they naturally shrank from the chance
of spilling French blood and the certainty of destroying
French property, beyond what was absolutely necessary.
As a matter of fact, the amount of damage done by shells
was surprisingly small. The chief monument to the
power of the 75’s was the melancholy wreck of the
official residence of M. Minier, the Sous-Préfet, which a
couple of shells completely gutted. Not far off, near the
station, one or two other houses were about as badly
wrecked, but except for a certain kind of destruction
which was due, not to French shells, but to German fire-lighters
a short-sighted man might have walked through
nearly all the streets a day or two after the evacuation
without once noticing that there had been a bombardment.
Inside some of the houses there was more to be
seen. One of the inhabitants, for instance, showed me
with quaint pride the mess which a 75 shrapnel shell
had made of his comfortable home. It had first drilled
a neat little round hole through the wall of his dressing-room,
and then burst and sent bullets and jagged fragments
of the case flying through the walls into his
study and the kitchen and every room on the first floor.
Amongst other things, it had riddled his bath-tub like
a sieve. Fortunately, he was not in it at the time.
He was out on one of the heights west of Lunéville
talking to the commander of the very battery which
broke up his happy home, and actually saw the shot
.bn 222.png
.pn +1
fired. Like every one else who suffered at all from the
bombardment (including M. Minier, who lost practically
everything he had), he took it quite cheerfully because
the shell which did the mischief and the cause in which
it was fired were both French.
But the bombardment, which was mainly cautionary,
was not yet. It came at a later stage in the occupation,
when there began to be a chance of turning the enemy
out. The first Germans entered the town on the evening
of August 22nd, after a stiff fight which had lasted all
day and resulted in the orderly retreat of the garrison,
too few in numbers to hold them back indefinitely, in
the direction of Gerbéviller. They marched in slowly,
with marked caution, as if, the inhabitants said, they
were afraid of a surprise attack. However, there was
no further opposition, and on the 23rd, with drums beating
and bands playing triumphal music, a much larger
body of troops made a parade entry into the town and
spread over it like a flock of locusts. Here, as elsewhere,
they seem to have had a particularly keen appetite
for wine and women’s underclothing and anything in
the shape of a clock. They were not all strangers to
Lunéville. As commercial travellers, and in other
capacities connected with the peaceful pursuit of trade,
several of them had been well known to the inhabitants
for years before their arrival in the guise of warriors,
and, for their own purposes, made good use of their
local knowledge. But on the whole, the behaviour of
the Germans, considering that they were Germans,
was not particularly outrageous. A military governor
was appointed and some effort was made to preserve
.bn 223.png
.pn +1
order and even justice. The pillage was not wholesale,
the incendiarism only extended to one part of the town,
the Faubourg d’Einville, and one or two single buildings
in other quarters, including the Jewish synagogue, and
the cases of cold-blooded murder of civilians were not
very numerous. Lunéville is not an obscure village,
and it is not unfair to say that, as a general rule, the
larger the place which the fortune of war had placed at
the mercy of the German troops, the more careful they
were in the way in which they treated it. Still, even in
Lunéville, in spite of the restraining influence on their
actions of such important witnesses as M. Minier, the
, M. Mequillet, the local Député, and M.
Keller, the Mayor, all of whom behaved in very trying
circumstances with great judgment and courage, the
German record was pretty bad. Most of the cases of
shooting at sight seem to have been due not so much to
wanton lust for blood as to the nervous haste of sentinels
in the streets who imagined when they heard a window
suddenly opened that their own lives were in danger.
But the burning of the Faubourg d’Einville, a row of
about forty houses which were set on fire two or three
at a time for days till the whole street was destroyed,
was an unwarrantable and unpardonable crime. For
the Military Governor, from the moment of his entry
into the town, had taken every precaution to prevent
the acts of franctireurism which were usually made the
excuse for this kind of outrage. In the first place rules
of extraordinary severity were made and published and
rigorously enforced as to what the civilian inhabitants
must or must not do while the Germans were in the
.bn 224.png
.pn +1
town. One of these affiches is, I think, worth quoting
as a historical document:—
.pm start_quote
.ce
“AVIS À LA POPULATION
“Le 25 Aout 1914, des habitants de Lunéville ont
fait une attaque par embuscade contre des colonnes
et trains allemands. Le même jour, des habitants
ont tiré sur des formations sanitaires marquées pas la
Croix Rouge. De plus on a tiré sur des blessés allemands
et sur l’hôpital militaire contenant une ambulance allemande.
“A cause de ces actes d’hostilité, une contribution
de guerre de 650.000 francs est imposée à la commune
de Lunéville. Ordre est donné à M. le Maire de verser
cette somme en or et en argent jusqu’ à 50.000 francs,
le 6 septembre 1914, à 9 heures du matin, entre les
mains du représentant de l’autorité allemande. Toute
réclamation sera considerée comme nulle et non arrivée.
On n’accordera pas de délai.
“Si la commune n’exécute pas ponctuellement l’ordre
de payer la somme de 650.000 francs, on saisira tous les
biens exigibles.
“En cas de non paiement, des perquisitions domiciliaires
auront lieu et tous les habitants seront fouillés.
Quiconque aura dissimulé sciemment de l’argent ou
essayé de soustraire des biens à la saisie de l’autorité
militaire, ou qui cherche a quitter la ville, sera
fusillé.
“Le Maire et les otages, pris par l’autorité militaire,
seront rendus responsables d’exécuter exactement les
ordres sus-indiqés.
.bn 225.png
.pn +1
“Ordre est donné à M. le Maire de publier tout de
suite ces dispositions à la commune.
“Heramenil le 3 septembre 1914.
.ll 68
.nf r
“Le Général en chef,
“Von Fasbender.”
.nf-
.ll
.pm end_quote
In addition to the stringent regulations and threats
contained in this and other proclamations of the same
kind (the statements in which were unproved and false)
the German authorities in command of Lunéville took
a further precaution to guard themselves against any
kind of reprisal on the part of the French population.
Every day six prominent residents of the town had to
present themselves before the Governor and remain
at his disposal for twenty-four hours as hostages responsible
for the orderly behaviour of their fellow-citizens.
Their position was not enviable. Exposed, like every
one else in Lunéville, to the danger of being killed by
the shells of their friends outside the town, they were
guarded day and night by sentries with loaded rifles,
knowing (because they had been warned) that at any
moment they were liable to be shot if one of the inhabitants
in a fit of desperation lifted a finger against
the sacred body of a German soldier. The fact that
they were not shot is proof positive that no acts of the
kind were attempted, and that therefore there was
no sort of excuse for the burning of the Faubourg
d’Einville.
As the occupation continued, as the fortune of the
battle between Lunéville and Nancy turned more and
more against the Germans, and the French troops and
the French shells came nearer and nearer, the Germans
.bn 226.png
.pn +1
in the town day by day became more nervous and
irritable and their attitude to the hostages and the
rest of the townsfolk more and more harsh and capricious,
and it was with something more than a sigh of relief
that at last, on September 12th, M. Minier, M. Mequillet,
and M. Keller realized that for the town and themselves
the time of trial was at an end. M. Keller I only knew
slightly; the other two I met often while I was in
Lorraine. All three make light of the difficult part
which they played when the Germans were in the town
and while they were waiting at their posts for their
coming. But I know from others that the courage
and quiet dignity and practical wisdom with which they
stood between their fellow-citizens and the invader
were beyond all praise. They were all three fine types
of the scores of Frenchmen in official positions all over
the occupied provinces who stuck to their posts in the
hour of danger. During those three weeks, when it
was cut off from the rest of the world, life in Lunéville,
under its twofold tribulation of occupation and siege,
was not exactly gay for any one. The stern application
of martial law, the regulations about open doors and
lights, the growing shortness of food, the restrictions
on personal liberty, the noise and risks of the bombardment,
the glare of the burning houses, the fear for every
one of possible death by a bullet fired by some drunken
soldier, and, for the women, of something worse than
death, and the constant presence of the hated and
domineering invader, all combined to keep the inhabitants
in a continual state of anxiety and alarm and
general wretchedness. But it was on the shoulders
.bn 227.png
.pn +1
of those three men that the burden of it pressed most
heavily, and the debt which Lunéville owes them is
real and great.
While they were doing their best inside the town to
save it for France, or, at all events, to save it from being
sacked and burnt, they were in a state of complete
ignorance as to what was happening outside it.
Rumours, of course, there were, but nothing was
certain. They were surrounded on every side, left
stranded on a lonely island in a German ocean of
invasion. They could only guess vaguely from the
nearing or receding sound of the guns and the temper
of the German men and officers round them how the
battle was going. Yet all the time they kept up their
spirits and the spirits of all the French within the
reach of their influence. At the worst they never
allowed themselves to doubt—think what that meant—that
the turn of the tide would come and Lunéville
be joined to the mainland of France again. And they
were right. Their splendid confidence in their own
men and the destinies of France was justified. All the
time the rush of the tide was slackening and the hour
of their deliverance coming nearer.
The ebb began in earnest on September 8th. On
that day the young dragoon officer in whose company
we began the great battle, crossed the Mortagne at
Mont by a temporary bridge erected by the engineers,
and after a brush with half a dozen Uhlans on the
Lunéville side of it, rode with his men along the Meurthe
to Rehainviller, a village only two miles from the south-west
corner of the town, and found that not a German was
.bn 228.png
.pn +1
left in it. That news he sent back by one of his men
to the general, and then walked on alone, as the sun
was rising, along the wall of the cemetery on the right
of the road just beyond the village. “I reached,” he
says, “the corner, where I stopped dead. I found
myself face to face with a German captain, like me
alone and on foot. He was as thunderstruck to see me
as I was to meet him. Like me he had his map-case
in his hand. He had been examining the country....
We looked at each other, with our eyes wide open. He
felt for his revolver. Feverishly I tried to open my case.
Both of us knew that this contest of speed would decide
our fate, and we looked straight into each other’s eyes.
Then I smiled, my revolver came out of its case, the
butt tight in my hand. My arm stretched out. Then
the officer no longer felt for his weapon: he knew that
he was beaten. My revolver flashed. He fell, with
one bullet full in his heart. The whole thing only lasted
a second. It hurt me to see him lying there; he had
large blue eyes, open in death.”
To me that young French dragoon is only a name,
or not even that, since he has none, but a type of all
the gallant soldiers of France who fought in the gap
between those blood-stained rivers. Still more, after
that contest of speed, that duel to the death at sunrise
by the corner of the cemetery wall, he becomes for me
a symbol of France—France facing Germany, both
knowing that one or the other must fall, both clutching
at their weapons and staring into each others’ faces with
wide open eyes. I think we will not leave him now till he
in his turn rides in triumph into the streets of Lunéville.
.bn 229.png
.pn +1
The sound of the shot brought his men running up
to him, and also drew the fire of the company of the
dead German officer, who were hidden in a ravine a
quarter of a mile further on. Luckily for the handful
of dragoons, whom presumably they took for the
advance-guard of a larger body of men, they did not,
however, advance, but retired to the corner of the
buildings of a big manufactory, almost in Lunéville
itself.
The German position was now on the road just in
front of the town, the first houses of which were within
easy range of the rifles of the French, who had by this
time occupied Rehainviller and were gradually closing
in all round. But they still had three days of stiff fighting
in front of them before the end was reached, during
which they were heavily handicapped, as they had
been all through the early part of the war, by the fact
that even their 155’s were outranged by a large number
of the German pieces, whose average effective range
was at that time about six miles, while the French could
barely reach four. Supported by these heavier guns
from behind Lunéville the enemy advanced again in
force to within a mile of Rehainviller, up to a line between
Hériménil and the wood of Fréhaut, and it was not till
the evening of the 11th that they were finally driven
back and that the French were able to look forward
with confidence to the prospect of being able to enter
Lunéville on the next day.
On one of the three days our lieutenant with some of
his men was riding through a village which had been
occupied by the enemy a few hours before. Not a
.bn 230.png
.pn +1
single inhabitant was left in it. All the houses were
sacked. The flight of the Bavarians had been so hurried
that they had not had time to burn them. The rest
of his story, which it seems to me ought to be told to
English readers, I give—because English readers have
English ways of looking at life and talking about it—in
the original French:—
.pm start_quote
“Par la fenêtre brisée, je voyais la salle à manger
d’une demeure confortable. Le buffet eventré, renversé,
écrasant la table. La vaisselle s’amoncelait sur le parquet,
avec les bouteilles vides et cassées, jusqu’à la hauteur
des chaises. Une suspension, tombée du plafond,
s’était abîmée sur le buffet, et son globe vert, sans une
félure, par un prodige d’équilibre, se maintenait sur
ce meuble penché, comme sur la table.
“Une voix m’appela par mon nom.
“C’était un officier du bataillon de chasseurs qui
avait pris le village. Il était à la fenêtre, au premier
étage de la maison dévastée.
“Monte un peu, me dit-il.
“Je repondis: ‘Je suis fatigué et pressé de rentrer
cantonner.’
“Il reprit. ‘Cela en vaut la peine. C’est un de
ces cochons qui est crevé au sein de son fumier.’
“Je descends de cheval. Sur la porte de la maison
une plaque de cuivre brillante: ‘Etude de M. X.
. Je monte. Mon camarade rit aux éclats,
entouré d’un groupe d’officiers. Il y a de quoi.
“La chambre est saccagée, comme le reste de la maison;
le linge sorti des armoires, piétiné, les meubles démolis.
Le lit est défait et sale. Un lieutenant allemand a
.bn 231.png
.pn +1
passé là la nuit précédente, et s’est couché dans les
draps sans retirer ses bottes. Une odeur écoeurante
règne dans la piece. Mais pourquoi S ... m’ a-t-il
fait monter?
“Regarde, dit-il.
“Je n’avais pas vu! Un lieutenant bavarois est
assis, mort, entouré d’ordures, d’excréments humains,
dans le tiroir ouvert d’une commode ancienne. Ses
culottes sont abaissées sur ses bottes. Sa tête et ses
épaules penchées tombent sur la poitrine vers les jambes.
Il est dans une posture ignoble, grotesque, malgré la
mort.
“‘Nous sommes entrés brusquement dans le village,—me
fit S..., sans crier gare. De cette maison on
nous tire un coup de . Je monte. C’était un soldat
qui nous visait de cette fenêtre. Je l’abats. Je me
retourne; et je vois ce cochon de gaillard en train
de faire ses insanités dans le tiroir de ce beau meuble,
sur les dentelles de famille! Il était si ahuri de me voir
qu’il ne s’est même pas levé, restant dans sa position
ignoble et relevant sa chemise à deux mains. Je lui
ai tiré un coup de revolver. Il s’est abattu sur son
fumier....’
“Et je pense à la fiancée allemande, dans ce village
de Bavière, qui apprendra la mort de ce lieutenant et
se représentera cette mort héroique et chevaleresque ...”
.pm end_quote
It is not a very pleasant story, as we say in England,
but then the seamy side of the war is not pleasant,
especially war as it is made in France by some Germans.
And the more people in England realize that fact
.bn 232.png
.pn +1
the better for the cause and hopes of us and our
Allies.
On the night of the 11th, or rather at two o’clock in
the morning of the 12th, the lieutenant assisted at a
rather different scene, as dramatic and glorious for all
the sons of France as the other was vile and ignoble
for all Germans. He was roused from his sleep by an
orderly with the news that the General wished to see all
the officers at once. With all the others he hurried to
the General’s quarters, and there—it was in the police
station—the brigadier handed them the famous telegram
of General Joffre, announcing that the Germans were
retreating, the Battle of the Marne won, Paris freed from
the menace of the enemy, and France saved.
There was no more sleep for those men that night.
They embraced each other, as Frenchmen do, they cried,
as all men may sometimes in hours of great joy after
times of exhausting strain and anxiety, they congratulated
each other as though each man was the victorious
Commander-in-Chief himself, and at four o’clock the
order was given “To horse! To Lunéville!” On
the Marne the enemy were beaten and in full retreat.
From the Grand Couronné they had been driven back
to the Seille. Only one thing remained to be done here,
on de Castelnau’s right—to hunt them out of Lunéville
and chase them back to the frontier without a moment’s
delay.
.il id=i190 fn=i_b_190fp.jpg w=500px ew=90%
.ca
Infantry Attack on Farm of Saint Epvre, on the heights above Lunéville.
From “En Plein Feu.” By kind permission of M. Vermot, Rue Duguay-Trouin, Paris.
.ca-
The way was across the Meurthe, through the forest
of Vitrimont, out past the ruined Faisanderie with its
loop-holed crumbling walls, over the shell-pitted slope
below it and the shell-pitted dip beyond, and up the
.bn 233.png
.bn 234.png
.bn 235.png
.pn +1
slope again and down to the Nancy road to the right of
the ruins of the farm of Léomont, ragged and blackened
against the sky, always past rows of deserted German
trenches, littered with rifles and ammunition and haversacks
and empty bottles—especially bottles—and then
right-handed along the broad road to the Faubourg of
Nancy, the north-west entrance to the town. Till they
reached the road not a sign of the enemy. Only near
the ruined farm-buildings of St. Epvre on the ridge of
Frescati beyond it, covering the retreat, a company of
Bavarian Chasseurs, dislodged with some difficulty, for
they fought bravely, and then the road to Lunéville,
clear at last. They entered it, these dragoons of the
advance-guard, at a gallop, galloping over the cobbles
and pavements of the streets in an ecstasy of triumph,
dashing across the river somehow (for the Germans had
blown up the bridges), active little Chasseurs-à-pied
running beside them and easily keeping up with their
thundering chargers, women scattering flowers on them,
waving handkerchiefs from the doors and windows,
and cheering and crying, and every one shouting “La
France! Vive la France! La France!” up to the wide
square in front of the grave old Palace of Stanislas, up
to the line of sweating horses of another squadron of
dragoons which had galloped into the town just as madly
by the shorter road from the south. It was Mulhouse
over again, without the Mulhouse mistakes. It was
utterly different from the measured entry of the Germans
three weeks before, with their massed bands and formal
triumph. If the men were a trifle excited they had
excuse enough. For that frenzied headlong entry into
.bn 236.png
.pn +1
Lunéville put the finishing touch to the victory of the
Grand Couronné, and set the seal on all the sacrifice
and all the heroism of those splendid three weeks.
That night Lunéville was free and French once more;
not a German was left within some miles of it. That
night, for the first time for more than a month, our
lieutenant of dragoons was able to take a bath and
sleep between sheets. And on that night, September 12th,
1914, thousands and thousands of French men and
women all over France slept more soundly and more
calmly than on any night since the war began because
from Paris and Nancy and little Lunéville the abominable
menace of German occupation was gone, never to return
again.
.bn 237.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XVI | NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS
.sp 2
As soon as not only the menace but the cruel reality
of the occupation was lifted from the smaller towns
and villages, some of which had suffered so far more
terribly than Lunéville, M. Mirman and M. Linarés, the
Prefects of Meurthe et Moselle and Vosges, and M.
Minier, the Sous-Préfet of Lunéville, were engaged
almost every day in visiting different parts of their
Departments in the track of the ruthless invader, partly
to take stock of the crimes and destruction of which he
had been guilty, but chiefly with the object of doing
what could be done to relieve the bitter distress of what
was left of the population. It was principally owing
to the courtesy, and, if I may say so, the wise tolerance
of these gentlemen and of M. Simon, the Mayor of
Nancy, that M. Lamure and I were able to see with our
own eyes some of the handiwork of the Teuton Kulturists
in that part of France. I say wise tolerance because,
although I know from personal experience that newspaper
correspondents are as a rule a despised race, I still
believe that they have their uses. The newspapers
which they help to supply with news and comments on
news are read by every one, and not only, as is commonly
.bn 238.png
.pn +1
supposed in some quarters, by the enemy. They are
even read by the high authorities who to all appearances
are minded to thwart them and throttle their vitality,
partly, perhaps, because they think that they may catch
them tripping (in spite of the watchful supervision of
the censorship), but partly and still more because they
have the natural and human craving for news and like
to be interested and well-informed. When, therefore,
ministers and other high officials try to suppress and do
suppress as effectually as they have in this war the
liberty of newspaper correspondents, they inevitably
put themselves in a false position and even do harm to
their country. No sensible man in such serious times
as those in which we are now living objects to a thorough
supervision of news published in the newspapers by
men who are supposed to know more of the wider issues
of the war than the editors who control them. That is
what the censorship on the despatch and receipt of
telegrams and all the calculated delay of the postal
service exists for. But these well-meaning but autocratic
gentlemen are not satisfied with that. They go
a long step further and not only say to the newspapers
(and their readers), “Everything in the shape of news
about the war shall be censored”—which is right—but
“As far as is possible we will prevent you from
getting any real news about the war at all”—which is
wrong. For truth, unfortunately for their theory,
will out, and if it is violently suppressed it has a way of
finding its way out like lava from a volcano, which will
certainly do a great deal of harm before, as it must,
because it is truth, it does good in the end. My own
.bn 239.png
.pn +1
belief is that nations, like men and women, practically
never gain anything by concealing the truth, because
its place is certain to be taken by mistakes and doubts
and lies—as has been proved over and over again during
this war. It is partly because diplomacy is, perhaps
necessarily, founded and built up on concealment that
it is so often, as it has been more than once in the last
eighteen months, a complete and dismal failure. And
as for war—as my warrior friend said to me earlier in
this book—“War is a serious matter: let us make it
seriously.” By all means let us make it and take it
with the utmost seriousness possible. But also let
us be sensible about it. His own complaint against the
journalists whom he implicitly accused of taking it
lightly was that he could not move out of his quarters
without the enemy knowing it. Yet till he met me,
not a journalist, French or English, had been within
miles of his quarters, as he knew perfectly well. What
he did not appear to know, like many other people in
authority, is that the Germans have no need to go to
French or English newspapers for information about
the movements of generals or of troops. They know
in any case that to do so would be futile, since they are
already checkmated in advance by the censor. Most of
the information that matters they gain in open fight in
the field. They knew long before even The Times knew
it that the English army was short of shells and especially
of the right kind of shells. A soldier does not take
much time to learn whether he is being fired at with
shrapnel or with high explosives. They knew long
before any newspaper correspondent could have informed
.bn 240.png
.pn +1
them of the fact (supposing there had been any at the
front, which, of course, there were not) that the French
and English were going to attempt a strong offensive
movement in Champagne and at Loos on September 25th,
1915. Their informant was a preliminary bombardment
along that particular part of the front which lasted for
seventy-two hours. As for other kinds of useful military
information, which cannot be gathered on the field of
battle, but only from behind the enemy’s lines, for that
they depend once again not on newspapers but on
aeroplanes and spies (including, thanks to the scanty
patriotism and common-sense of some soldiers, women
belonging to the profession of Rahab). From each of
these sources alone they probably get as much news in a
week as all the correspondents of all the newspapers
“behind the front” could gather in a year.
But there is another side to the question. Under an
enlightened censorship there is practically no fear of
newspapers and newspaper correspondents doing harm.
Under enlightened editors there is every chance of their
doing a great amount of good for the cause of their
country and its navy and its armies in the field. Every
body knows that, even the enlightened censorship itself,
whose members have had precisely the same training
at the same schools and universities as the purblind
editorial staffs. But most of all the enemy know it,
and, because they know it, they fear the newspapers
and rejoice when their freedom of speech is curtailed.
They fear first of all their own newspapers; and because
of that fear they forbid them not only to tell the truth,
but urge them, if they do not command them, to tell
.bn 241.png
.pn +1
lies. That is the sort of thing, I suppose, which is meant
when one is asked to take war seriously: as in most
things, even in their follies, the Germans are more
thorough than England and France. But even more
than their own newspapers they fear those of London
and Paris, for two reasons. They dread them first
of all for the effect which they have on public opinion in
the neutral countries, and secondly because they know
that to them and their pressure are due practically all
the political and military changes, useful to the Allies
and detrimental to Germany, which have been brought
about during the course of the war.
The second of these two points I will not labour to
support by instances. They are written large in the
leading articles and military articles of The Times and
other newspapers. All the world knows what they are,
though all the world does not as yet acknowledge them.
About the other point, the question of the effect
which English and French newspapers have and might
have (and might have had) on the opinions of neutrals,
I have a word or two to say. I said just now that nations
practically never gain anything by concealing the truth.
There is an important exception to that rule. They
gain, or at least they seem to gain, and do gain for the
time being, when they conceal their own misdoings.
That is exactly what happened in Belgium and in the
invaded provinces of France. For a considerable time
the horrible wrong-doings of Germany in those two
countries were concealed from the world, and are even
now not fully believed by those who do not wish to
believe them, because they were not seen and recorded
.bn 242.png
.pn +1
at the time by credible eye-witnesses, that is to say, by
competent newspaper correspondents. A few days
before those atrocities began to be committed in Belgium
all the foreign newspaper correspondents were ordered
by their own governments to leave the country. As a
consequence practically every account of them which
we have is second-hand, taken, that is to say, from the
lips of the victims who escaped death some little time
after they occurred, and therefore not made known to
the public of the allied countries and to the rest of the
world, except in general terms, till a further time still
had elapsed. What England and France gained by
this suppression of newspaper correspondents, and therefore
of the truth, it is difficult to see. What Germany
gained is obvious. I will take only one instance the evolution
of which I happen to have watched on the spot.
At the beginning of the war most of the public opinion
in Switzerland was strongly in favour of Germany. That
this was only partly due to natural racial tendencies
(for seven out of every ten Swiss are of German origin
and speak or read the German language) is obvious from
the way in which, after about six months of the war,
a large proportion of the German-Swiss majority began
to lose their pro-German proclivities and to come round
to the side of the Allies. Naturally we all wish to have
the neutral nations on our side, not only because it is
our side, but for the higher reason that we believe it
to be the side of right. But besides this there were
and are particularly strong economic military reasons
which made it desirable for us to secure the support,
or at least the really benevolent neutrality, of the Swiss.
.bn 243.png
.pn +1
While any considerable part of them, especially before
Italy joined the alliance, were for the Germans and
against us, secret contraband was bound to run riot,
with disastrous consequences for our projected blockade
of German war-material. And that is exactly what
happened, chiefly owing to our policy with regard to
the Press. At the beginning of the war, Switzerland,
like America, could only form her views of the rights
and wrongs of the conflict and the course which it was
pursuing, from the newspapers. In German-Switzerland
numbers of the newspapers are financed by German
money and even written by German writers. Quite
naturally the readers of these papers believed what they
told them. In other words, they were convinced that
the atrocities in Belgium were either imaginary or grossly
exaggerated, that Germany would at the end of the war
make good her promise to make up to Belgium for the
violation of her neutrality, and that meanwhile she was
winning all along the line.
That was the positive side of the newspaper evil in
Switzerland, over which France and England had, of
course, no control. The negative side, which they might
have controlled, which was indeed of their own making,
was that the true news, which should have acted as a
corrective to the false, hardly existed at all on the
question of the atrocities in Belgium, because there were
no correspondents in Belgium to give it. If the Swiss
had known then, as they know now, though many of
them still do not choose to believe it, the real truth about
Belgium, there is no doubt at all that the greater part
of the old pro-German feeling would have perished at
.bn 244.png
.pn +1
the beginning. It throve only on lies and the concealment
and ignorance of the truth. That is a fact which
can be very simply proved. As soon as the Swiss knew,
because they saw it for themselves with their own eyes,
something of the way in which Germany has made war,
the revulsion against her and therefore in our favour
began. It happened in this way. From the ruined
villages of Lorraine and the other occupied provinces
the Germans carried away to Germany at the beginning
of the war a large number of what they called “hostages”
and the French “internés,” old men and women and
children, mainly of the poorest classes. They had committed
no military or political crime, they had only
lost their homes and their possessions and most of their
relatives, and they could under no conceivable circumstances
affect one way or the other Germany’s chances
of winning or losing the war. For months, wretchedly
clad and fed, they were kept in prison-camps in the
fatherland. Then by the good offices of the compassionate
Swiss and partly probably because the Germans
were beginning to find them a nuisance and to wonder
why they had ever taken them away from France, they
were sent back in relays of three or four hundred at a
time to their own country by way of Switzerland. At
the same time the far smaller number of internés whom
the French had detained in France or taken from Alsace
in retaliation were sent back in exchange. I never
myself saw any of the internés from France on their way
back to Germany. But the Swiss, who worked untiringly
day after day and month after month to show practical
sympathy to all these unfortunates on their way through
.bn 245.png
.pn +1
their country, constantly saw both the French and
the Germans, and the effect on their judgment of the
German nation, even against their own natural inclinations,
showed very decidedly which nation had treated
worst these innocent victims of the war. I never met
a Swiss man or woman, German-Swiss, or French-Swiss,
who had seen the French internés on their way back to
France—not to their homes, for their homes in most
cases no longer exist—who was not intensely shocked
and indignant at the state in which they were and the
sufferings which they had undergone, and from the date
at which they first began to see them and act the good
Samaritan to them, at Schaffhausen, at Basle, at Zurich,
at Berne, at Lausanne, and at Geneva, from that moment
the marked revulsion of a large part of the Swiss people
against Germany and Prussian militarism took its rise.
It is my firm opinion that it would have begun long
before if only the correspondents of French and English
newspapers had been allowed from the beginning
to see for themselves, as nearly as they could, what
happened in Belgium, and to publish it to Switzerland
and the world.
All this is only a parenthesis—I am afraid rather a
long one—to what I was saying some pages back about
the large-minded tolerance as well as the great personal
kindness which the Prefects and Sous-Préfets of the
eastern provinces of France, from Belfort to Commercy,
showed to M. Lamure and myself as representatives of
the English Press. All of them, like every Frenchman
who has talked to me on the subject, and, unfortunately,
unlike some Englishmen, believed in The Times as a
.bn 246.png
.pn +1
great power for good. With that feeling in their minds
they took us with them, as they had, of course, an
official right to do, on some of their official visits to the
ravished districts, because they believed that the
publication of the truth about them in The Times would
be of service to the common cause. M. Mirman in
particular held that view. He believed that the articles
we sent to London, which, but for him and his fellow-Prefects
and Sous-Préfets, could never have been written,
were of real positive use for France and against the
common enemy.
I seem, perhaps, to be getting a long way from the
main purpose of this book, which is to state, as strongly
as I can, the debt which I believe France and England
owe to the generals and armies that have fought for the
common cause in the east of France. But while I am
on the subject I mean to go a little further, and to
illustrate what I have said on the subject of newspaper
correspondents (if the Censor will let me say it) by a
reference to a personal matter, because as I see it, it
is not a personal matter at all, but of real importance
to the country. After we had been in Nancy for four
months, during all which time we were in constant
and friendly relations with many of the civil and military
authorities, we were one morning politely but peremptorily
ordered to leave the town within twenty-four
hours. Otherwise we were told that we should be
arrested and tried before a court-martial on a charge
of espionage—not, of course, because we were spies,
but because we were journalists exercising our métier
within the zone of the armies (in which, up to a few
.bn 247.png
.bn 248.png
.bn 249.png
.pn +1
days before that time, Paris was also included!). No
complaint was made against us personally, because none
could be. In a letter which M. Mirman wrote to me at
the time, most of which is too personal to quote, though
he gave me full liberty to show it to any French authorities
whom I might meet, he expressly said that I had
been guilty of no indiscretion during my stay, that my
papers and my comings and goings had always been
perfectly in order, and that he would be happy to see
me come back to Nancy.
.il id=i202 fn=i_b_202fp.jpg w=500px ew=90%
.ca
Photograph by Libert-Fernana, Nancy.
Outside the Prefecture, Nancy.
M. Mirman, Mme. Mirman, M. Puech, who acted as M. Mirman’s chauffeur, and some members of the staff of the Prefecture.
Seated in front, the author and M. Jean Rogier of the Petit Parisien.
.ca-
Now, a Prefect of France, and above all, one of M.
Mirman’s standing and record and experience and ardent
patriotism, does not take upon himself the responsibility
and trouble of making a direct appeal to the highest
authorities on behalf of the correspondent of a foreign
newspaper without very good reason. In this particular
case I believe that what chiefly affected him was
the conviction that in the present critical times one of
the most important functions which an allied newspaper
can fulfil is the promotion of a fuller understanding
and still more cordial relations between England and
France, and that few things could serve that purpose
so well as the permanent presence of an English correspondent
near the French fighting-line.
Since then, in my efforts to return to the place where
I believe honestly I can be of most use to my country
in this war, I have shown that letter to some of the
highest authorities in France, but without practical
effect. Sometimes it has nearly melted their hearts,
but not quite. But I mean to go on trying. That is
why I am writing this chapter. I not only believe,
.bn 250.png
.pn +1
but I am certain, not because I am I, but because I
am a responsible correspondent of The Times, that
“somewhere in France”—somewhere in the east of
France for me—I can in my small way (but The Times
is not a small paper) help to win this war, and, with a
little encouragement and help from the military authorities,
do much more useful work than was possible
under the restricted conditions by which M. Lamure
and I were handicapped during our stay in Lorraine in
1914. And I believe firmly that that is true of the great
mass of correspondents of the big English and French
newspapers, and that a grave mistake is being made
in not using us, and giving us real and not little snippets
of pretended liberty. We are not out for scalps and
“scoops,” as we might be in ordinary journalism and
an ordinary war. We are ready to take the war as
seriously as any general or any minister. What we
want to do is to tell the truth, or as much of it as the
Censor and our own discretion will let us, because we
know that only the truth will prevail.
.bn 251.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XVII | A DAY WITH A PREFECT
.sp 2
Having said so much of what our friends of the various
Préfectures did or tried to do for two humble newspaper
correspondents, I should like, before going on to consider
the next phase of the war, to try and give an idea of
the work which they did for the people in their districts,
and the risks which they often ran in doing it. I will
begin with a description of a Conseil de Révision at St.
Nicholas-du-Port, to which I went with M. Mirman
and one of the Generals of the district. While we were
in Lorraine there were a large number of special sittings
of these courts, at which the young men of the nation
go through their final medical inspection before entering
upon their statutory term of military service. Sometimes
they were presided over by the Préfet himself,
sometimes by M. Slingsby, the President of the Prefectorial
Council, a direct descendant of the old Yorkshire
family but a Frenchman to the bone. In ordinary times
the regular annual inspections take place in March,
and the normal age of enlistment is twenty. Soon after
the war began boys of nineteen were called up to undergo
training for service with the colours, and it was to judge
of their fitness to bear arms and also to revise cases
.bn 252.png
.pn +1
that had previously been turned down or put back
that these extraordinary Conseils de Révision were
held.
There was, of course, an obvious difference between
the case of these boys and the armies of volunteers which
Lord Kitchener was at that time recruiting in England.
This was compulsory service in being, the so-called
conscription which then and for many a long day after
so seriously agitated the tender bosoms of English
agitators and champions of personal liberty. These
young Frenchmen had got to be soldiers whether they
liked it or not. But compulsory service, whatever its
uninformed opponents may say, is service and not
slavery. That is precisely why in France, in peace as
well as in war-time, the inspections are presided over by
the civil and not the military authorities. The Prefect,
or his deputy, in conducting them, is fulfilling one of
his chief functions, which is to represent the people
as their official champion, and check any tendency to
the possible evils of militarism. It is his bounden duty
to see that no man is taken for service in the army who
on account of physical incapacity or for any other
reason ought and has the right to remain a civilian.
There was, however, little need for this kind of
paternal surveillance in the extra Conseils de Révision
which were held during the war, except possibly in the
way of restraining some whose capacity to bear arms
was not so certain as their enthusiasm. There was not
a suspicion of reluctance. One and all they were itching
to be up and at them. When we arrived at the Hotel
de Ville a crowd of between three and four hundred of
.bn 253.png
.pn +1
them were waiting outside in the street, talking to
their friends and relations, who looked just as proud as
the boys themselves that they had been called up, and
just as eager that they should be passed as fit—if not
bons pour service in the Army, at all events for some kind
of auxiliary service. It was impossible to look at them
and not to think of the hundreds of thousands of boys
in England who, in spite of all that could be done to
coax and wheedle and bribe them into the army, in
spite of every kind of ignoble coercion short of compulsion,
were at that time still hanging back from the
honour and glory of serving their country in arms.
Not even the thought of those other still more numerous
hundreds of thousands who had gladly volunteered and
given up everything else at the one supreme call could
quite take the taste of the contrast out of my mouth.
In ordinary times I dare say some of those French
boys would have been frankly annoyed at the prospect
of giving up their civil employment and their personal
freedom for a period of enforced military service. But
now as they came pouring up the stairs after us into the
big bare room—decorated only by a tricolor flag and a
white bust of the République Française, crowned with
a wreath of oak leaves—there was no mistaking their
extraordinary enthusiasm or the reason for it. The
soldiers of the Kaiser when they went to the war,
believed firmly that they were going to fight because
the Fatherland was in danger, because otherwise it
would inevitably be crushed by the ring of jealous
nations by which it was surrounded. That was the
idea which had been carefully drilled into them. That
.bn 254.png
.pn +1
was what they had been told by the ignoble and servile
army of professors and sergeants. But these boys of
Lorraine needed no telling. They knew. If they did
not all actually come from the blackened and ruined
villages and towns which marked the track of the
retreating incendiaries, they lived without exception
within a few miles of them. Saint Nicholas-du-Port had
only just escaped occupation by the enemy. Dombasle
was only two miles off. For weeks the Germans’ guns
had been thundering in their ears, for weeks they had
heard—and known—of the murder of innocent women
and children and old men; for weeks they had been
familiar with the effects of pillage and incendiarism and
rape. No wonder they were willing to die for la patrie.
If the things that were done in Lorraine and the Vosges
had been done in Kent and Norfolk the shirkers of
England would long ago have repented in khaki and
ashes. There would have been no need of lurid posters
and cinematograph films and compulsion to bring them
in. They would have fought because they would have
known—as these French boys knew—that otherwise
their country and all that they loved must die. And
if they had been rejected because, though the spirit
was willing, the flesh was too weak to make a fighting
soldier, they would have been as bitterly disappointed
as these boys of Lorraine were whenever they failed to
pass the doctor’s tests.
Among the boys, in one of the batches that came in
a dozen at a time to be examined, there was, I remember,
a man of well over fifty, long past the military age but
still perfectly fit and strong, who had been called up
.bn 255.png
.pn +1
owing to some mistake made by a clerk. It was curious
and it was exhilarating to see this greybeard standing
up stripped to the skin, quietly and with proud dignity
explaining to the uniformed full-dressed committee
in front of him that he had already served his terms as
active soldier, reservist, and territorial, but that he was
still able to fight and asked nothing better than to be
reckoned bon pour service if the country had need
of him.
There were other grey beards in the room besides
this willing veteran’s. Ranged at the upper end of it
by the daïs on which M. Mirman sat with the committee,
were the mayors of the various towns and cantons
from which the boys came, about twenty in all, ready to
answer questions on doubtful cases. Before the actual
inspection began, the whole thing reminded me oddly
of a Public School function at home, except that the
headmaster wore the uniform of a Prefect of France,
the boys were all of the same age and practically of the
same height, and the assistant masters, many of them
humble peasants, looked like hard-bitten farmers from
the Yorkshire moors or the lowlands of Scotland. There
was a great contrast between them and the boys.
Mayors, as a rule, are men of peace, associated in the
mind with gold chains and heavy dinners. But the
mayors of Lorraine are different. They live very close
to the frontier, and, as M. Mirman said in an earnest
and spirited speech to the young recruits, they had
lately had need not only of much patience and good
humour, but of unusual physical and moral courage.
All of them whose cantons lay between St. Nicholas-du-Port
.bn 256.png
.pn +1
and the frontier had a few weeks before at least
run the risk of being carried off as “hostages,” to say
nothing of graver perils. Still, after all, the men by
the daïs, bravely as they had stuck to their posts, had
escaped with their lives. But the boys—I was looking
at them, and thinking of the pity and wickedness of it
all, when M. Mirman began to talk to them. The war
that they were going away from their homes to fight
in was, he told them, a war to kill war. When he put
to them the question, “Do you want not to serve?”
they thundered out the kind of “No” with which in
England political audiences are in the habit of declaring
to the world and to each other that they are not down-hearted.
Sometimes these political negatives are not
as confident as they seem, and are rather efforts at self-encouragement
than statements of fact. But the
“No” of the boys of St. Nicholas-du-Port was absolutely
genuine. There was no question of that. Their only
wish was to join the ranks and fight, and fight, and
fight—till the wrongs of France were avenged and the
victory won.
Another day that we spent with M. Mirman almost
directly after our arrival in Nancy was rather more
mouvementé. It was a week after the Germans had finally
been driven back from Amance and Champenoux, and
the news had been brought in that Nomeny, a town
between St. Généviève and the frontier, had just been
evacuated by the enemy. So M. Mirman was going to
visit it, and he offered to take us with him. Before we
started we lunched at the Préfecture with a fairly large
party which included, besides M. Mirman and his eldest
.bn 257.png
.pn +1
daughter, M. Abeille, his sécrétaire général (who has
since been killed fighting for France), M. Mage, the Sous-Préfet
of Toul, M. Guiran Scevola and M. Royer, two
well-known French artists, painters in ordinary to the
Ministry of War, temporarily attached as artillery
privates to the Toul garrison, M. Dominique Bonnaud,
the Parisian chansonnier, attached to the staff of the
Préfecture, M. Jean Rogier, of the Petit Parisien, the
only special correspondent of a London or Paris newspaper
besides ourselves who stayed more than a few
days in Nancy, and M. Puech, a big ironmaster of
Frouard, five miles down the Moselle, who for the first
part of the war acted as M. Mirman’s chauffeur, and
went with him through some rather exciting scenes
during his prefectorial visits. After lunch—it is a
pleasant way the French have—there were a few
speeches, one of which fell to the lot of the English
correspondent of The Times, and was delivered haltingly
and slowly in Public School French. As events proved
afterwards, it was fortunate for us that there were
speeches and that one of them took some time, for if
we had started ten minutes sooner we should probably
not have come back—at all events for some months.
We set off at half-past one, M. Rogier and I in the
Préfet’s car, an open one, with him and M. Puech, the
rest in a larger and slower Limousine behind. At that
time there were a large number of troops in and round
Nancy—most of them the men who had fought in the
Battle of the Grand Couronné—and for the first five or
six miles we were constantly passing them, in the town
and the villages and along the roads, marching, driving
.bn 258.png
.pn +1
long processions of hooded country-carts, hauling down
a captive balloon, lighting fires against the walls of the
houses, cooking their meals, grooming their horses,
furbishing up their arms and accoutrements, foraging,
laughing, singing, shaving, washing, tailoring, eating,
drinking, smoking, and chatting as busily and light-heartedly
as if the enemy were a hundred miles away
instead of only a little way beyond the horizon on the
frontier.
After we had gone some way along the Château-Salins
road we turned northwards, leaving Amance on
the right, and began to get away from the many soldiers
who were off duty to the smaller number who were
fighting. The road we were now on ran parallel to the
frontier at about three miles from it. On our left was
the range of hills which stretches northwards to Ste.
Généviève and Pont-à-Mousson, on our right an almost
flat plain sloping down to the frontier and the Seille.
By the side of the road a battery of 75’s was banging
away into the distance, and in one or two places clouds
of white smoke were rising up from burning villages.
We stopped to speak to the gunner commandant, who
looked rather suspiciously at a car-ful of civils. But
there is no mistaking the silver lace on the képi of a
Préfet, and eventually he said that as far as he knew
there was no reason why we should not go on to Nomeny,
though he advised us not to dawdle for the next few
miles, as we were rather close to the frontier and the
enemy. M. Puech, who can drive as well and as fast
as any one I know, consequently let her rip, and we
covered the next seven or eight miles in almost as few
.bn 259.png
.pn +1
minutes. Batteries on the hills on our left were firing
over our heads at the enemy positions across the Seille,
and once or twice we passed trenches manned by companies
of fantassins, but the return fire did not come
our way, and some minutes later we passed into a quieter
region, by contrast curiously still and peaceful. As
we drove up to a small village about a mile from Nomeny,
the day, which had been beautifully sunny, suddenly
clouded over, the sky in front of us became inky black,
and the German horizon looked darker and more
threatening than I ever saw it. In the village, not
very badly damaged considering its position, we saw
not a soul except one old woman who was standing at
her door looking out with dazed eyes, but quickly turned
in and disappeared as we dashed past. That might
have warned us. We ought to have been struck by the
death-like emptiness of the village street. But we were
thinking of other things, of the pace we were going at,
the gathering storm, of what Nomeny would be like,
and especially of the slower car behind, and why we
had not seen it for so long. I was just looking round
for it again when suddenly the car slowed and stopped
dead. Then “Cachez-vous,” said M. Puech quietly,
and though it did not feel very glorious, we did, without
losing very much time. As I crouched down on the
seat (the Préfet was in front with M. Puech) I looked
ahead and on the brow of the slight slope up which
we had been running, not more than a full iron shot
from where we were, saw four grey figures in spiked
helmets, with levelled rifles pointing straight at us,
kneeling by the side of the road. It was a tight place,
.bn 260.png
.pn +1
and it was lucky for us all that we had M. Puech to drive.
Instead of trying to turn the car, as he might have done,
on a convenient bit of level ground by the side of the
road, he made up his mind what to do, and did it, in
the same second, jamming his lever into the reverse speed
directly we stopped, and the car began moving steadily
backwards, though not quite as fast as we should have
liked. He was sitting bolt upright in front of me, with
one hand on the steering-wheel and the other on the
back of his seat, looking away from the Germans along
the road behind us. As soon as they saw that we were
not coming on they began to fire. Still perfectly cool
and French, he backed down the slope of the hill, which
was as straight as a two-foot rule, counting the shots
out loud as we went: “One, two, three, four....”
They made a flick just like the crack of a small hunting-crop.
“Another thousand yards and we’re all right
... five, six—that touched us” (it had grazed the
right front lamp and glanced on to the trumpet)
“seven ...” and so on up to “nine, ten ... eleven,”
and with that we reached a side lane into which, with
the same quick decision, he backed the car to turn her.
And then, just when it seemed as if we had got off safely,
things began to go wrong. The engine stopped dead, and
the off-wheels stuck in the ditch. So out we jumped.
M. Puech to the front to start the engine if he could,
M. Mirman and M. Rogier and I to push behind—our
very hardest, but without the slightest effect, M. Puech
grinding away just as hard and just as vainly at the
engine crank—and then suddenly the engine started,
and we flung ourselves into the car, this time with our
.bn 261.png
.bn 262.png
.bn 263.png
.pn +1
backs to the foe but our heads erect, and in a moment
were flying back to the village as fast as our excellent
M. Puech could push her along.
.il id=i214 fn=i_b_214fp.jpg w=350px ew=70%
.ca
Nomeny.
By permission of M. Martin, Secrétaire Général, the Prefecture, Nancy.
.ca-
In the village street we found M. Lamure and the
others and the second car, standing in the middle of a
group of excited villagers. When they had come along,
a minute or two behind us, the whole population, instead
of only our old woman, rushed out and barred the road
in front of them, and when they had pulled up told them
they could not possibly go on as sixty Uhlans had just
left the village, only ten minutes before our car went
through. While they were talking to them, wondering
what to do, the shots fired at us, or rather at M. Puech,
began to sing into the village, but over their heads,
chipping the plaister off the upper walls. And that,
no doubt, was the explanation of our escape. The
Germans had been firing from the village, most probably
at a long range, before we came into it, and when they
retired towards Nomeny the four men whom they had
left on the road as a rearguard had forgotten to lower
their sights, till one of them saw what he was doing,
corrected his mistake, and fired the shot which hit the
lamp of the car.
I expect when our four friends got back to the other
fifty-six, or at all events when they learnt that they
had missed bagging a Prefect of France, they had a
poorish time of it. But that was not our affair. Thanks
to the courage and nerve of M. Puech we had got safely
out of a rather awkward fix, for at the best, if they
had crippled our chauffeur or the car, we should have
paid a prolonged visit to Germany. And thanks to
.bn 264.png
.pn +1
the speeches at lunch, including, I am proud to think,
the one in Public School French, we had escaped by ten
minutes running our head into a much larger nest of
hornets in the village.
So we decided to put off our visit to Nomeny till
another day. We had had enough of Germans for the
present. Also we thought it more prudent to go home
by a different road, at the back of the hills where the
French batteries were stationed, round by Ste. Généviève
and up the valley of the Moselle, especially as, before
M. Lamure and the other party reached the village, when
their car was panting after ours, one particular shell had
fallen rather too near them to be pleasant, and there
was no urgent need to repeat the experience.
When we got back to Nancy, after getting stuck in
the middle of a large field flooded by the Moselle, from
which the car had to be dragged out by a passing team
of artillery horses, M. Mirman wrote for me a petit mot
on one of his cards. It was dated Nancy, Dimanche
20 Septembre, 1914, and ran as follows:—
“Léon Mirman, Préfet de Meurthe et Moselle,
s’excuse très humblement de n’avoir pu montrer à
M. Richard Campbell”—he always would call me Richard—“la
pauvre ville de Nomeny, assassinée par les Allemands,
et qui garde les traces des meutres commis sur
des civils et de l’incendie systématiquement et scientifiquement
organisée comme il en verra un exemple
demain à Gerbéviller—et il lui remet cette carte en
souvenir très amicale d’une promenade ... un peu
mouvementée où le ‘feu’ et l’eau n’ont pu altérer leur
commune bonne humeur.
.bn 265.png
.pn +1
“Et vive l’Entente Cordiale d’hier qui a préparé
l’action commun de deux grands nations pour assurer
le triomphe de la civilization contre la Barbarie
Teutonne!”
So “now you know,” as M. Rogier wrote in the
vivid account of our trip which he sent to the Petit
Parisien, “why I didn’t go to Nomeny.” But at least
I am glad that we tried to go. For it showed me first
of all the sort of chances that a Prefect in the occupied
provinces had to take in carrying out his duty, and
secondly what our Allies mean by sang-froid. It seems
to me that is rather a fine quality, in a motor or outside
it, and that it will yet help us to win the war.
.bn 266.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XVIII | THE ATTACK ON THE RIVER FORTS
.sp 2
In following the course of the war in the eastern provinces
up to this point we have seen first of all how the
tide of it ebbed and flowed for five weeks along the line
of the frontier, that is to say, the river Seille and the
range of the Vosges. Broadly speaking, the net result
of this five weeks of fighting was that on the left or
northern section of the line, from a point a little east of
Nomeny nearly as far as the Donon, the French had
pushed the enemy back to the frontier; that in the
centre from near the Donon to about Ste. Marie aux
Mines, half way along the Vosges, the Germans still held
a footing in France in the Department of the Vosges;
but that on the right of the line the French were a little
way across the frontier in Southern Alsace.
We have seen, secondly, that behind this first line
there was another, roughly parallel to it, running from
Pont-à-Mousson past Dombasle and Gerbéviller and then
on to St. Dié in the direction of the channels of the
Moselle, the Meurthe, and the Mortagne, along which
the Battle of the Grand Couronné was fought.
Beyond this second line there was, and is, a third,
which stretches from Verdun along the valley of the Meuse
.bn 267.png
.pn +1
to Toul, from which it is continued to Epinal and Belfort—the
line or barrier of the great frontier fortresses.
The whole of the war so far on the part of the invaders
has been a sustained and desperate attempt to get near
enough to this wall—against which the French had their
backs—to batter it down. On their left, on the Belfort-Epinal
section, they had failed, in a military sense, to
get anywhere near it. In the centre, from Epinal to
Toul, they had equally failed, thanks to the resistance
of Dubail and de Castelnau, to come within striking
distance. On the right, from Toul to Verdun, they had
for the third time failed, in so far that neither Toul,
which was protected by the armies in front of Nancy,
nor Verdun, which was defended twelve miles in advance
by the Third Army under General Sarrail, had ever
fired more than an occasional shot at the enemy even
from any of their outlying forts.
On the other hand, as the result of the advance of
the main German right before the Battle of the Marne,
the armies commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia
and the Duke of Wurtemburg had succeeded in turning
Verdun, so that although the Germans had never got
up to the wall of the fortresses, much less broken through
it, they had, on the Verdun-Toul section, got to the
farther side of it and the Meuse. There was a time,
before the point which we have now reached, and before
the Battle of the Marne, when, east and west of this
stretch of the Meuse, two French armies, part of General
Sarrail’s force and part of the left wing of the Second
Army, with the Toul garrison force to help them, were
actually fighting back to back, on opposite sides of the
.bn 268.png
.pn +1
river. But the more important part of this double
engagement—Sarrail against the Crown Prince of Prussia—was
on the west side of the Meuse, and does not therefore
belong, strictly speaking, to the scope of this book;
the fighting on the right bank, except that extending
a few miles south of Verdun on its east side, between
part of its garrison army and part of the garrison army
of Metz, was not at first very serious. There was, as
I have said, at that time a gap of some miles, across the
base of what afterwards became the St. Mihiel triangle,
in the otherwise continuous line of the two opposing
forces.
But in the period immediately following their defeat
at the Grand Couronné the enemy began to attack this
part of the barrier of fortresses with extraordinary
vigour; on the rest of the line, the part with which we
have already dealt, they confined themselves on the
whole to the task of maintaining the positions to which,
after their first advance, they had been driven back,
and it was the fighting which resulted in the formation
of the St. Mihiel wedge that became the really interesting
part of the eastern campaign.
Before, however, going on to talk about the St.
Mihiel business, and the attack on the northern half of
the fortress line, something, I think, ought to be said
about another fortified position, the only one between
the great Verdun-Belfort fine and the frontier, the
solitary fort of Manonviller, a few miles east of Lunéville,
which stood alone between it and the enemy. The
mystery of Manonviller also stands alone, or almost
alone, in the history of the war. I know very little about
.bn 269.png
.pn +1
it; no one, I fancy, knows much, except, perhaps, the
high authorities and some members of the garrison,
and these last are prisoners in Germany. It was supposed
to be immensely strong and considerably feared
by the Germans. There are many stories about its
fall which may or may not be true. Some people say
that the garrison only lost four or five killed and wounded,
that right at the beginning of the attack it was found that
the telephone communication with Toul had been cut
off, and even that its guns were never fired at all. But
in any case it is certain that the garrison of nine hundred
men surrendered on August 28th after a two days’
bombardment, probably carried out by two Austrian
305’s stationed on the frontier at Avricourt, and that
it was loudly whispered and widely believed that there
was something queer about the matter. Since Longwy
was able to hold out for three weeks there cannot, I am
afraid, be much doubt that there was something curious
about the surrender of its stronger sister-fort, which
was swept out of the way of the German advance like a
sand-castle by the waves of the sea.
After the Battle of the Grand Couronné the army of
the Crown Prince of Bavaria occupied a front extending
to the north-west from the frontier opposite Lunéville,
past Pont-à-Mousson and Thiaucourt in the direction of
Verdun, stopping some distance short of the point at
which the left of the Crown Prince of Prussia’s army
began. The left wing, as far as Thiaucourt, was
kept busy in preventing the French from advancing
on Saarburg and Metz; the right, reinforced by part of
the Metz army, began at this time a determined forward
.bn 270.png
.pn +1
movement across the plain of the Woevre to the wooded
Hauts de Meuse. They had two objects in view: to
break through the line of the fortresses between Verdun
and Toul, and to cross the river and join hands with
the right wing of the Crown Prince’s army so as to
encircle Verdun.
The fortress of Toul is almost exactly half-way
between Epinal and Verdun, about forty miles from
each. In the lower stretch of country, the Trouée de
Charmes, which had been so gallantly defended by the
75’s and Chasseurs-à-pied of the First Army, there
are no forts. Between Toul and Verdun the French
position was much stronger. East of the Meuse the
Hauts de Meuse slope gradually down to the river,
broken at intervals by a series of deep and precipitous
ravines, guarded by numerous forts, ancient and modern.
On the north the district is bounded by the Verdun-Metz
railway, below which is the plain of the Woevre,
and on the south by the quick-flowing Rupt de Mad,
which runs from near Commercy on the Meuse north-east
past Thiaucourt to Arnaville, where it falls into
the Moselle close to Metz. The chain of forts extends
all along the Meuse, on both sides of the stream. South
of the Rupt de Mad, between Commercy and the Moselle
(which here takes a sharp bend north-east from Toul,
almost parallel to the Rupt de Mad, till it is joined at
Frouard by the Meurthe) the forts of Liouville, Gironville,
Jouy, Lucey, Bruley, and St. Michel, point their
guns to the east and north, towards the German frontier.
Lower down, on the right bank of the river, the guns of
the Camp des Romains, a little south of St. Mihiel,
.bn 271.png
.bn 272.png
.bn 273.png
.pn +1
like those of Forts Genicourt and Troyon to the north
of the town, command much of the surrounding country
and are ready to dispute (or rather were ready to dispute)
the passage of the river, and still further north are the
southern defences of Verdun, facing up the channel of
the stream, on the further or left bank of which the
Fort des Paroches, close to St. Mihiel, looks across the
river to the east.
.il id=i222a fn=i_b_222afp.jpg w=450px ew=80%
.ca
Libert-Fernand, Nancy, phot.
Remereville—Meurthe et Moselle.
.ca-
.il id=i222b fn=i_b_222bfp.jpg w=450px ew=80%
.ca
Libert-Fernand, Nancy, phot.
Château de Haraucourt—Meurthe et Moselle.
.ca-
The real grand attack on this formidable position
began about September 19th, I suppose when there were
enough forces available. But before that there was a
determined assault on Fort Troyon—once again on
September 8th, the date which was to have been pregnant
with such glorious possibilities for the Kaiser, the day
of the most furious attack in front of Nancy, the last
day before the Germans began their retreat from the
Marne. It is worth going back to, for the defence of
Troyon during both of the two bombardments which
it suffered was one of the most gallant stands of the
campaign. Earlier still the Crown Prince had tried
to bombard it in a feeble sort of way, but apparently
without much effect, for on September 8th, after the
attack from the east had begun, an officer of the garrison
wrote to his wife, “Nous avons été tranquilles pendant
trente-sept jours,” that is to say, from the beginning
of the war.
Even the day before, so peaceful was the tranquillity,
this same officer had been out partridge-shooting. It
looks as if it might be a fairly good partridge country,
though to English eyes there is rather a lack of cover.
The fort stands fairly high, and far off to the south,
.bn 274.png
.pn +1
across the bare sweep of the down-like grass and stubbles,
you can see higher still the jagged outline of the Camp
des Romains, silhouetted against the sky like the sand
dunes at Sandwich on a slightly larger scale. (At that
time, of course, the Camp des Romains was still in the
hands of the French.) Troyon itself is not very large.
Outside it looks the most innocent thing in the world—a
more or less quadrangular collection of rounded gravel
banks, thickly covered with grass. Inside there are—or
were—deep wide ramparts and ditches and vaults
and walls of earth and solid masonry and iron—and the
guns (155’s) and the steel cupolas.
On the evening of the 7th the garrison received news
that a strong column coming from the direction of Metz
(through the gap between the French Second and Third
and the German Fifth and Sixth Armies) had reached
Mouilly and St. Remy in the Hauts de Meuse, a little
way south of Les Eparges, and five miles north-east of
Troyon, and the next morning they were at Seuzey,
nearly due east of the fort and only three miles away.
At eight o’clock the bombardment began, and by eleven
the German siege-mortars of 150 millimetres, concealed
in deep ravines where the French gunners could not
get at them, had dropped one hundred and eighty shells
into the fort, which, though they only killed one man and
wounded four, had knocked out seven of the French
guns. The garrison were clearly in a bad position.
All the French troops which had been on that side of
the Meuse had crossed the river to join the final stages
of the Battle of the Marne, so that they could count on
no immediate support, though they knew that a division
.bn 275.png
.pn +1
of cavalry and a regiment of artillery had left Toul early
that morning. But there was no chance of their arriving
till next day. The Governor of Verdun telephoned
soon after the bombardment began to tell them that
the success of the big battle on the other side of the
river depended on their holding out for forty-eight
hours; the commandant replied that they would—and
prayed that the gun cupolas might not be smashed.
Then Verdun telephoned again to say that they were
sending an aeroplane to spot the enemy’s gun positions
for them, but as they could not show themselves on the
parapets that was cold comfort. At three, by which
time four hundred shells had fallen, there was a short
breathing space of comparative quiet, and they were
able to take stock of the extensive damage done by the
shells, of which, fortunately, about one in four failed
to burst. Then came a third message to say that if
the worst came to the worst the men were to take shelter
in the ammunition cellars, but that the fall of the fort
would be a grave disaster, and, in fact, that they positively
must hold out for the success of the operations
across the Meuse.
From half-past four in the afternoon to half-past
seven there was another storm of shells, and then again
a lull, and more stock-taking. Even though the vaulted
shelters in the fort are immensely solid, the casualties
were surprisingly light. Only eight more men had
been wounded, so that the total number of deaths caused
by four hundred shells was only one. There had been
many hair-breadth escapes, but though the defences
were crumbling to pieces before their eyes—when they
.bn 276.png
.pn +1
could see for the blinding clouds of black smoke which
hung about for two or three minutes after each explosion—so
far they were not hopelessly broken in. In the
bombardment of modern forts that is the principal
factor—since on their standing depends the lives of the
gunners—that and the resisting powers of the gun
embrasures and cupolas, which cannot, however, last
for ever. Their destruction is only a matter of time.
With that prospect in front of them, and also the
practical certainty of a night attack, perhaps by infantry
as well, the garrison were quite remarkably calm and
resolute. Some of them even managed to snatch an
hour or two of sleep, and all were thirsty enough to
drink, though only one or two were able to eat anything.
During the night a brisk fusillade every twenty
minutes or half-hour up to three o’clock was all that
they had to put up with, except for several false alarms
raised by the sentries of imaginary enemies trying to
cross the barbed-wire protections, which kept everybody’s
nerves on edge. The besiegers had evidently concluded
that the fort was not yet sufficiently broken up to make
an infantry attack feasible. So at about five, just
after the fort of Les Paroches had rung up to say that
they could do nothing to help them, as their guns could
not reach the German positions, the 150’s began again,
and one of the first shots hit an ammunition store and
exploded about twenty 90-millimetre shrapnel shells.
Then came another message (they must have found
the telephone rather a comfort in their isolated position),
this time from Commercy, to say that the 2nd Cavalry
Division from Toul was well on the way to relieve them,
.bn 277.png
.pn +1
and had reached Buxerulles on the Commercy-Fresne
road, north-east of St. Mihiel, hardly more than twelve
miles off. But it was not till well on in the night, nearly
twenty-four hours later, that the Toul division at last
arrived, and before that time the garrison had gone
through a still more severe bombardment.
The day began with a white flag incident, or rather
with the appearance of two German cavalrymen accompanied
by a bugler, and carrying a large flag of truce.
The commandant went forward to speak to them—they
had stopped thirty yards the other side of the wire
entanglements—and three times they summoned him
to surrender the fort. To the first summons he answered
simply, “Never”; to the second, “France has given
me charge of the fort and I will blow it up sooner than
surrender it”; and to the last, “F.... moi le camp,
je vous ai assez vus ... A bientôt, à Metz!” So that
was the end of them and their mission.
Up to now the guns bombarding them, as far as the
garrison could make out, consisted of a battery of 150’s
at the edge of the wood of Lamorville, about five miles
to the east of the fort, and a field battery of 77’s, posted
between one and two miles away on the reverse side
of Hill 259, called La Gouffière. There were also
some infantry engaged in digging trenches on the
Signal of Troyon, close by, where the commandant
had shot his partridges on the 7th. (On the 8th, in
one of the lulls in the bombardment, he had two shots
himself with 90 shrapnel at the men on his partridge
ground, and rather spoilt their excavating work, but
then the 150’s began again.) On the second day,
.bn 278.png
.pn +1
after the white flag and its bearers had taken their
departure, the bombardment began again, with greatly
increased severity, as the enemy had now brought
up some 280’s and 305’s, but in spite of the extraordinary
havoc which they produced the plucky garrison
still continued to serve their guns as best they could
without any thought of surrender. When night fell
there was another alarm of an infantry attack. This
time there was no doubt about it. They could make out
a black mass of men advancing towards the south
cupola of the fort, and some of them were already busy
cutting the barbed wire in front of it. The commandant,
whose diary of the siege I have followed in
this account, got his men together, ordered most of them
under cover, and then opened fire on the swarm of
assailants with machine-guns. That was too much
for the Germans, and they broke and fled, leaving the
ground strewn with their dead and wounded. Still
later in the night he was knocked over and wounded
in several places by fragments of a 305 shell which
fell only a yard behind him. But as soon as his wounds
were dressed he was up again, commanding and
encouraging his men, and still the fort held out through
the dark night, continually lit by the explosion of the
bursting shells. And then, at last, the division from
Toul arrived (I presume that the cavalry had had to
wait at Buxerulles for the slower troops who were
following them), the enemy were forced to abandon the
bombardment not a moment too soon, and the commandant
was carried off to hospital at Verdun (where
he received the Croix de Guerre), but not before he had
.bn 279.png
.pn +1
left fluttering on the crumbling parapet the flag of
France. On the next day, and the next, and the next,
further fierce onslaughts on the fort by large numbers
of Germans were driven back with great slaughter by
the garrison, strongly reinforced by the cavalry division
and a Toul battery of 75’s, and the attack on Troyon
was finally abandoned on the 13th. The German losses
in front of the fort, as the result of the five days’ fighting
and a second unsuccessful attack which they made on it
a week later, were between seven and ten thousand men.
This splendid defence of Troyon was typical of what
happened in several of the Meuse forts when the enemy,
on September 20th, resumed their efforts, but with many
more troops, to force their way across the Hauts de Meuse
to the river. Having reoccupied Thiaucourt, on the
Rupt de Mad, eight miles north-west of Pont-à-Mousson,
they took up a position well to the west of it, with a
long front extending north and south in front of St.
Mihiel, through Heudicourt (eight miles north-east of
the town) along the Hauts de Meuse. The gap in the
line of the German front between the Fifth and Sixth
Armies was now at last permanently filled up, for the
first time during the war.
From this forward position they began a systematic
bombardment of Troyon, les Paroches, the Camp des
Romains, Liouville, and the other river forts. Their
base position behind this line reached from Thiaucourt
to Fresnes, on the edge of the Hauts de Meuse, seventeen
miles across the plain in the direction of Verdun, and
ten miles short of it. This position it is worth while
to notice with some care, because it forms the base of
.bn 280.png
.pn +1
the triangle of which St. Mihiel (of which we shall hear
something) forms the apex. Its strength lay in the
fact that it had Metz, with its big supplies of stores and
men, less than twenty miles behind it, with direct railway
communication; its weakness in its exposure to flank
attacks, on its right to the north by the garrison army
of Verdun, on its left by that of Toul and the left wing
of de Castelnau’s army. The driving force of the Metz
supplies of men and ammunition from the rear was
strong enough to enable the centre of the German line
to push forward like the point of a wedge to St. Mihiel
in the west. But the lateral pressure of the two French
forces on their right and left flanks was also strong and
compelled them, as the point of the wedge advanced,
to extend their forces on each side of it, facing outwards
in two almost opposite directions. And that was how
the original St. Mihiel triangle came to be formed, with
a seventeen-mile base from Thiaucourt to Fresnes,
and two equal sides, each fourteen miles long, from
Fresnes to St. Mihiel on the north-west, and from St.
Mihiel to Thiaucourt on the south-east. Nearly parallel
to this lower side of the triangle, and five or six miles
to the south of it, most of the road from Commercy to
Pont-à-Mousson, a distance of twenty-five miles, was
in the hands of the French. Their only railway ran
along the valley of the Meuse, from Commercy past
St. Mihiel to Troyon, and as a rule they were not able
to use it except at night.
The Germans were better off. They commanded,
to begin with, a line from Metz along the Moselle to
Arnaville, from which it turned westwards along the
.bn 281.png
.pn +1
Rupt de Mad to Thiaucourt. Half-way between these
two places it was joined by another line running due
south from Briey, and as their position was consolidated
at least one other light railway was constructed in the
direction of St. Mihiel. There was also another railway
(a section of the Verdun-Commercy line) which runs
south from Fresnes along the east edge of the Hauts de
Meuse to Heudicourt, half-way between St. Mihiel and
Thiaucourt, part of which was available for German
traffic, besides a fairly large supply of level roads all
through the district, and of these various facilities for
transport they made excellent use.
In the plain of the Woevre behind the Fresnes-Heudicourt
line everything worked with the precision
of a huge machine. During and after the bombardment
of the river forts the scene was more like the surroundings
of an immense centre of industrial activity than the
ordinary conception of a battlefield. From their emplacements
between the infantry lines German and
Austrian field-guns and siege artillery pounded away
incessantly at the forts with 8¼-inch, 12-inch, and
even 16½-inch shells. Observation balloons and
occasional aeroplanes swayed and hovered over the lines,
and ragged fan-shaped columns of brown or white smoke
shot up into the air here and there as the charges of
high explosives and shrapnel from French or German
guns fell and burst. But apart from these inevitable
and unconcealable signs of battle—noise and pillars
of smoke by day, noise and flashes of flame by night—all
the machinery of the fighting was hidden underground,
and as far as eye could see the plain looked
.bn 282.png
.pn +1
unpeopled and deserted. Only in the rear the supply
trains constantly rolling up from the German base and
the methodical work of the men loading and firing the
guns and recording the effect of the shots, like shifts of
artisans labouring round the furnaces of a gigantic
mill, spoke of life and energy. But in appearance
it was always the creative energy of a busy manufacturing
district rather than the destructive energy
of war.
Inside the forts, the direct object for the time being
of all this system and activity, there were no illusions
of this kind, nothing but grim reality and red ruin.
Troyon was hotly bombarded for the second time till
it had only four guns left capable of firing a shot, and
still the plucky garrison refused either to retire or
surrender. The storm of high explosives had only done
part of its work. It had reduced Troyon and Les
Paroches and Liouville and some of the other forts to
a shapeless melancholy desolation of crumbling mounds
and yawning pits, littered with tons of rusty steel and
shattered blocks of scattered masonry and concrete,
till they looked like discarded gravel-pits half buried
under scrap-heaps of iron waste. But, though their
existence as forts was at an end, the remains of them,
with one exception, were still in the hands of the French,
protected no longer by their bastions and the guns in
their dismantled cupolas, but by the rifles of the men
in the trenches, the real flesh and blood rampart of the
Republic.
Unfortunately, the one fort in which the enemy
did set foot—the Camp des Romains—was the most
.bn 283.png
.pn +1
important of them all. It lies on a ridge nine hundred
feet high, barely a mile to the south of St. Mihiel, and
therefore at the apex of the triangular position occupied
by the opposing lines of trenches, and commands the
whole of the surrounding country except parts of the
loops of the river immediately to the west and north
of it. Its capture, after a heroic resistance on the part
of the garrison, was finally brought about by the
occupation of St. Mihiel by the army of Metz.
Why that occupation—a particularly disastrous blow
for our Allies—was effected as easily as it was, it is not
easy to understand. St. Mihiel, or at least the Camp
des Romains, was the crucial point of the Meuse position.
It was by this time quite obvious that the main object
of the Germans was almost at any cost to break through
the fortress barrier and cross the river so as to effect
a junction with the Crown Prince’s army, which now
occupied a position in the Argonne between the Aire and
the Aisne, to the west of Verdun, extending eastwards
to the north of that fortress. If this scheme had succeeded
it would have had the double effect of completing
the investment of Verdun with a ring instead of only a
horse-shoe of hostile armies, and at the same time of
relieving the pressure brought to bear on the Crown
Prince’s army by the French troops in the Argonne
between St. Ménéhould and Clermont. It might even
have compelled these and the armies on their left to
retire once more in the direction of the Marne. Consequently
it was of vital importance for the French to
concentrate every man they could spare at the point
where the German thrust was likely to be most vigorous,
.bn 284.png
.pn +1
and to hold on to St. Mihiel and the Camp des Romains
like grim death.
Left to itself, the garrison could do next to nothing.
It could account, and did account, for a large number
of the enemy in front of its earthen ramparts. But
sooner or later its doom was certain. Its fall was only
a question of days, or even of hours. Like all fixed forts,
ancient or modern, exposed to the fire of modern siege
artillery, it was, in itself, about as impregnable as an
umbrella. It lay on the extreme left of the French
fine from the Meuse to Pont-à-Mousson. To the north
it was protected to a certain extent by St. Mihiel, supposing
that St. Mihiel contained any troops. But its real
defences, on which the French had spent a considerable
sum of money before the war, consisted of a large number
of trenches, strengthened with concrete, some miles in
advance of it on the farther side of the Hauts de Meuse,
between Les Eparges and Thiaucourt. They occupied,
that is to say, practically the whole of the space which
I have spoken of as the gap in the lines of the armies,
and which was partly accounted for by the fact that
as the German Fifth Army inclined slightly westwards,
to keep in touch with the others which had Paris as
their principal objective, the French Third Army was to
a certain extent obliged to follow it, besides which for
the time being the French Second and the German Sixth
Army were too much occupied with their own affairs
round Nancy to be able to extend very far in the direction
of Verdun. But the carefully prepared trenches
were there all the time, and, as far as it is possible to
judge without knowing all the circumstances, might
.bn 285.png
.pn +1
and should have been held almost indefinitely, instead
of which the chief purpose they seem to have served was
to act as a shelter for the advancing Germans. By
some further mischance or miscalculation, at this
particularly critical moment, two or three days after the
Germans had begun the general bombardment of the
river forts, St. Mihiel was suddenly left almost wholly
denuded of troops, with the result that on August 24th
the enemy’s advance-guard walked into it practically
unopposed.
There are two or three possible explanations of the
way in which this regrettable mistake was brought about,
in all of which there is probably a certain amount of
truth. The French may have made up their minds that
the enemy had for the moment given up the idea of
making a determined effort to cross the river. Or they
may have still clung to the mistaken belief that the
fort on the height, chosen centuries ago by the Romans
as the most commanding strategic position of the
district, was strong enough to defend itself and look after
the river as well. Or, thirdly, they may have concluded
that they had no choice in the matter, and that the
pressure nearer Metz, on the right flank of their line
forming the south side of the St. Mihiel triangle, was for
the moment more dangerous than that on their left,
and that it was safe to move part of their force on the
Meuse across to the Moselle.
That, at all events, is what they did, on or near
September 22nd. The line in the south of the Woevre
had already been considerably thinned by the despatch
of a certain number of troops westwards across the
.bn 286.png
.pn +1
Meuse to strengthen the right wing of the army in the
Argonne during the Battle of the Marne and the operations
which followed it. The effect of the removal of
several additional battalions in the opposite direction,
to the north of Nancy (where they found that their
presence was urgently needed) was that St. Mihiel and
the Camp des Romains were left almost isolated,
with practically no soldiers at all to guard the
town.
The news was quickly carried to the enemy (not by
journalists, since there were none anywhere near, but
by the spies who were particularly thickly planted in
that district of France) and while the French troops
which had moved eastwards were engaged to the north
of Nancy, and the Toul force from the south was pushing
back the main body of the XIVth German Army Corps
in the direction of the Rupt de Mad, the extreme right
of the Army of Metz, as the result of a bold flank-march
along the left or north bank of the Mad, were able to
advance nearly as far as St. Mihiel.
The presence of their advance-guard was first observed
on the 23rd by a small patrol of French dragoons, who
were attacked by a company of German infantry lying
in ambush in a little wood by the side of the road about
a mile from the town, and fell back on St. Mihiel after a
slight skirmish. The news of the approach of the enemy
created a panic in the town, and a large number of the
inhabitants fled in the direction of Commercy. Next
morning a squadron of Uhlans rode in and took possession
of the place, cutting the telegraph and telephone wires,
and carrying off as “hostages” some forty of the
.bn 287.png
.pn +1
inhabitants, who must have bitterly regretted not having
joined in the general exodus of the day before.
(Three months later M. Lamure received a letter on
the subject of these hostages from a sergeant attached
to the Bureau de Police of one of the eastern armies,
who was anxious about some relations of his who were
among them, as nothing was known up till then of their
fate. He was a stranger to us, but he had heard of our
existence, and had a pathetic though gratifying belief
that the correspondents of The Times might be able to
give him the information which his own intelligence
office could not.)
The Uhlans were followed, some hours later, by the
main body of the German army, which turned off from
the Vigneulles-St. Mihiel road somewhere near Chaillon
and made its appearance on the Meuse to the north of
St. Mihiel at a point where by the natural lie of the
ground and the intervening hills it was protected from
the fire of the guns both of Les Paroches and the Camp
des Romains, which were in any case busy fighting their
own battles.
The Germans, or at least a part of them, had now
penetrated as far as the line which it had been the object
of all their forces operating on the eastern frontier to
reach. Their first appearance on the Meuse, which the
other armies had crossed lower down to the north
of Verdun weeks before, should have been one of the
dramatic moments of the war. It had, however, been
brought about so tamely and with so little opposition
at the last moment that it rather lost that character,
and it was not till an attempt to cross the river was
.bn 288.png
.pn +1
made that the position became really exciting. It was
still about as unfavourable as it could be for the French.
Only a single battalion of Territorials, with no guns and
even no mitrailleuses, guarded the river at that point,
against a line of probably ten times their own number.
The bridges had been hastily destroyed as the enemy
advanced, and from the left bank the Territorials did
their best to keep them from crossing the river, and during
the night of the 25th, by the light of their one searchlight,
successfully dealt with the persistent efforts of
the German engineers to build a But the
next morning the enemy opened fire on them with some
heavy batteries which they had brought up from Thiaucourt,
and, as the heights of the river prevented the
guns in the Camp des Romains from giving them any
help, the Territorials were forced to retire under a hot
fire, picking up and carrying with them their killed and
wounded.
By midday the Germans were across the river,
marching in the direction of the valley of the Aire, a
tributary of the Aisne, between it and the Meuse, with
the object of crossing it to attack General Sarrail in the
Forest of the Argonne. The position was critical, and
for the French airmen, who could see what was happening
and gave due warning in different directions, must
have been intensely interesting. There seemed a good
chance that the Germans might really carry out the
complete investment of Verdun, which their newspapers
had already announced as an accomplished fact, and
join hands at last with the army of the Crown Prince.
Driven northwards by General Sarrail after the Battle
.bn 289.png
.pn +1
of the Marne, past St. Menehould on the Aisne and
Clermont on the Aire, left and right of the Forest of the
Argonne, that army, which consisted of the XVIth,
XVIIIth, and XXIst Army Corps, now occupied a
position extending from Varennes (also on the Aire
and the east side of the forest) eastwards in a flattened
arc rather less than a semicircle which passed about
ten miles north of Verdun and then curved down to the
east of it in the direction of Fresnes. Opposite to the
Crown Prince across the forest from the Aisne towards
the Meuse was General Sarrail with the VIth and VIIIth
Army Corps. Behind him, falling back from the Meuse
on his protection, was the Territorial battalion, which
during the night had prevented the Metz army from
crossing the river below St. Mihiel, and behind them
again, hot on their heels, the pursuing Germans, with
a body of cavalry, detached by General Sarrail to head
them off, advancing to meet them, and, though at a
considerable distance, another French force, the XXth
Army Corps, hurrying as fast as they could from the
Moselle to overtake them from behind. Meanwhile,
the Toul garrison army, which had advanced from the
fortress, was keeping up the lateral pressure on the
stationary German force along the Rupt de Mad.
In contrast with the state of comparative immobility
to which the campaign was shortly afterwards reduced,
the man[oe]uvres of the two forces were for the moment
particularly lively. Looked at as a war game played on
a chess-board, the position was more or less as follows:
The French (White) had moved most of their pieces of
value up towards the top left-hand corner of the board,
.bn 290.png
.pn +1
where they had the Germans (Black) pretty well penned
in front of them along the two back rows. Black,
however, was still able to threaten an attack on White’s
King (Verdun) at about the centre of their fourth row,
though it was defended by a few white pawns (its garrison
army). Two rows lower down in the centre a black
castle (the Metz army at St. Mihiel) was only prevented
from checking White’s King by some white pawns (the
southern forts of Verdun) and, at the same time,
threatened a move across the board to the left in order
to get behind the main mass of White’s pieces. To
remove this danger, and to guard a pawn (the Territorial
battalion) to the left of Black’s castle, White moved
back one of his knights (Sarrail’s cavalry) from the left-hand
top corner, moved up one of his castles (the Toul
garrison force) from his back row, and brought across
his Queen (the XXth Army Corps) from the lower right-hand
corner of the board, where it had been trying to
check Black’s King (Metz). As the result of these three
moves he was able to force Black’s castle back to its
original position near the centre of the board.
When the news of the occupation of St. Mihiel reached
Lorraine the XXth Army Corps, which had barely
finished its work there of checking a German advance
from the direction of Metz, were at once ordered back
to the Meuse, and the advanced guard of their cavalry
by a forced night march managed to cross it at Lérouville
just below Commercy, only five hours behind the German
army, and got in touch with them shortly afterwards in
the valley of the Aire. The dragoons at once engaged
them with machine-guns, and held them till first the
.bn 291.png
.pn +1
artillery and then the infantry of the corps came up and
the battle became general. The Metz force made three
separate attacks on the position which the French had
taken up on the heights of the Aire, but were repulsed
each time with heavy losses, and during the night they
fell back on the Meuse, still, however, retaining a footing
on the left bank of the river in the western suburb of
St. Mihiel and the barracks of Chauvoncourt. After
their battle of the day before in Lorraine the forced night
march of the XXth Corps and their successful engagement
on the Heights of the Aire were a magnificent
performance, which had the satisfactory effect of putting
an end to the bold effort of the right wing of the Metz
army to effect the longed-for junction with the Crown
Prince. What it unfortunately did not do was to relieve
St. Mihiel. As soon as the Germans got back there
they proceeded to entrench themselves strongly, and
from a position near the town began to bombard the
French forts in the Camp des Romains with their Austrian
mammoths.
Concerning this artillery position M. Lamure was told
an instructive little story on one of the rather adventurous
expeditions which he made to the neighbourhood
of St. Mihiel some weeks after the German occupation
had begun. So many stories of the same kind (including
one, I believe, about a tennis-court at Tooting) were
published in the first part of the war that one became
rather shy of believing them, but I have my reasons
for thinking that this one is probably true. Anyhow,
here it is.
Two years before the war a German company, formed
.bn 292.png
.pn +1
for the manufacture of chemical produce, rented a large
plot of ground close to St. Mihiel for a term of thirty
years. It was a big company and it had need of big
buildings with solid foundations. So a floor about
two hundred and fifty feet long by thirty wide was laid
down in reinforced concrete. Then the company, after
announcing that its money had come to an end, and that
it could not proceed to put up the proposed buildings,
was dissolved. But the plot of ground and the concrete
floor, which, before the workmen left, was tidily covered
up with a loose coating of earth, still belonged to it.
When the army of Metz arrived on the scene some one
had the curiosity or the intelligence to inquire what
might be hidden under this covering of earth, which
was accordingly removed. And there, by the greatest
good luck in the world, they discovered not only the
concrete floor, but a number of holes in it which proved
to be admirably adapted for emplacements for the
Austrian guns.
On the whole, I am inclined to back the story of the
St. Mihiel concrete floor against the Tooting tennis-court,
though in any case it would only add one more to the
long list of undoubted cases in which German settlers
were planted in the Woevre district in order to render
valuable services to the Fatherland either before or during
the war. The main point is that from some position
near St. Mihiel, whether prepared beforehand or not,
the big Austrian howitzers in a very short time silenced
the guns and smashed up the turrets and bastions of the
Camp des Romains fort, until at last the plucky garrison
had no guns left to shoot with, and were finally smoked
.bn 293.png
.pn +1
out after trenches had been pushed up close to the fort.
When the asphyxiated survivors had recovered enough
to march out the Germans presented arms in recognition
of the fine courage they had shown in the defence, and
though they were naturally made prisoners the officers
were allowed to keep their swords. The destruction of
Troyon, les Paroches, and the Camp des Romains was
followed, a day or two later, by that of Liouville, where
the damage done was particularly extensive. The holes
ploughed by the big shells were the largest I have seen,
and for acres round the fort almost every square yard of
ground is littered with scraps of shell casing and rusty
iron.
As for the Camp des Romains, it was so badly
hammered that the Germans could not use it, even when
they had taken it, and were obliged to construct a new
fort close to it. From that time all the subsequent
efforts of the French to dislodge them have been unavailing.
Although with St. Mihiel it is the only point
which they have captured in the line of the river forts
between Toul and Verdun, and although since the end
of September, 1914, they have never advanced one foot
beyond it, its possession has been extremely useful to
them, and a nasty thorn in the side of the French. For
though in position the Camp des Romains fort is only the
apex of the St. Mihiel triangle, it is in effect its base and
sides and area, since, without it, the triangle would not
exist.
.bn 294.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XIX | THE “SOIXANTE-QUINZE”
.sp 2
The capture of St. Mihiel and the Camp des Romains
was the last real triumph—I had almost said the only
real triumph—that the Germans won in the east of
France. For the scene of their other great positive
success was not in France but in the annexed part of
Lorraine, even though as the result of it they still hold
one corner of the Department of the Vosges. But
there, as everywhere else, since the end of September,
1914, they have not only made no progress, but have
been on the whole driven further back. That is an
obvious fact, but it is one which no one who studies
the course and the probabilities of the war can afford
to overlook. It is true that the French in all that time
have made very little appreciable advance. Measured
by distance the ground they have recovered is nothing
in comparison with the number of lives that it has cost.
But the sacrifice of lives must be made. It is the only
way of deliverance, and every yard of blood-drenched
soil that France has won back from the invader brings
one step nearer the victory of freedom over oppression
and of right over wrong.
Also it must never be forgotten that few though the
.bn 295.png
.pn +1
steps have been every one of them has been away from
Paris and towards Berlin. The Germans began the
war. For more than forty years they had been preparing
for it. In spite of all the warnings they gave us
of what we had to expect, England and France and
Russia were not prepared. From one point of view
that is a good thing. It throws the onus of the crime
against humanity on to the right shoulders, and at the
same time exposes the grotesque absurdity of the
German fiction, intended chiefly for home and neutral
consumption, that it was merely the instinct of self-preservation
which forced them against their will to
take up arms, and that they attacked their neighbours
only to secure themselves against annihilation.
Of all the people whom the annihilation lie was
intended to influence—and did influence—by far the
most important was the Emperor William himself.
Englishmen must always remember that he is the son
of an English mother, and that at heart he is a pacifist
and a Christian, even though the God in whom he quite
sincerely believes is the God of the Old Testament.
But he is also a hegemonist. He constantly sees (or
saw) himself and his country and his army playing the
big rôle on the world’s stage, and the cunning and
unscrupulous advisers by whom he is surrounded took
advantage of that weakness in his nature to make him
believe that Germany’s salvation could only be secured
by Germany’s domination of Europe. Themselves they
never made any secret of their determination to bring
about the war, nor of their object in doing so. Wretched
creatures like Bernhardi and Tannenberg frankly
.bn 296.png
.pn +1
proclaimed that they were out for plunder—the plunder
of the world; that they could only secure it by crushing
the rest of Europe in a world’s war; and that in order
to bring about and win that war Germany would
deliberately refuse to fetter her actions by the universally
accepted canons of right and wrong. The whole scheme
was so monstrous that in spite of the nakedness of these
threats—and God knows they were numerous enough—very
few Englishmen or Frenchmen could bring themselves
to believe that they were made in earnest, and the
result was that, sheltered behind the prevailing feeling
of incredulity excited in other countries by the utterances
of the Pan-Germanist extremists, the rest of the war-party
were able to go on quietly with their preparations
for war without calling into being any corresponding
activity on our part. And then, when at last the
moment for which they had all been waiting had arrived—as
soon, that is to say, as the men appointed for the
task had convinced the Kaiser that Germany was in
mortal danger—the war was declared.
After that only one more step was necessary to
complete his downfall. Being a man of humane instincts
and not a degraded savage like some of his advisers,
he had to be persuaded—and he has allowed himself
to be persuaded—that the surest means of shortening
the war, and therefore of curtailing as far as was possible
its inevitable horrors, was to make it more horrible
still by instituting the Hunnish system of terrorism—of
which the examples given in this book can convey only
the very feeblest impression.
There is nothing immoral in a fight between an
.bn 297.png
.pn +1
elephant and a tiger, or even in a leopard’s pursuit of
goats and other small deer—the neutral states and the
helpless villagers of the jungle. The lions roaring after
their prey do seek their meat from God. Attila and the
Huns, whose methods the Kaiser ordered his soldiers
to imitate in the war in China—even then the poison
was working in his mind—were not, like the Emperor
William and the Germans, an enlightened and semi-civilized
state. The cruel ferocity of the modern Huns
is infinitely more cruel and criminal than theirs was,
because they call themselves Christians and have undoubtedly
got a kind of Kultur. Every vile thing that
they have done they have done deliberately and with
their eyes open, and for that reason sooner or later their
punishment is sure. For nations, like men and women,
cannot for ever continue to sin with impunity against
the light.
Still, at the beginning, because they were ready and
also unscrupulous and we were neither, they scored a
great advantage over us, and it was only because we
and the French had the enormous moral stimulus that
we were fighting for the right that we were able to throw
them back from the Marne and the Grand Couronné.
For the inequality of men and material—but especially
material—was still great, and I take it that if the
positions had been reversed, if the Allies had been the
aggressors and Germany the object of our iniquitous
invasion, we could not have made nearly as good a
showing as they did. The positions being, however, as
they were, we were the better men, and, with the single
exception that they were allowed to push forward the
.bn 298.png
.pn +1
St. Mihiel salient through the gap between the armies
in the Woevre, everywhere in the west we drove them
many miles back from the advanced positions which
they had reached at the end of their first irresistible
rush.
Then, along the whole line, including the two sides
of the St. Mihiel triangle, we were brought up short
by far the strongest and most elaborate system of earth
entrenchments that the world had ever seen. It was
a perfectly legitimate means of making war, and although,
like every other step in the campaign, it had been devised
by the enemy as part of their grand plan for destroying
the French, from a military point of view they deserved
every credit for having thought it out. They were the
first people to see that no soldiers could stand up for
any length of time in the open, or with only the protection
of the shallow ditches which used to be called
trenches, against modern weapons. Thanks to their
foresight they had invented or perfected a simple means
of defence infinitely stronger than the strongest and
most modern fortress. We all know now that compared
to a properly constructed trench with well-disposed
shell-proof shelters the bastions and casemates and
cupolas of such places as Toul and Verdun, which
till the war was well under way were considered the
dernier cri in fortifications, are as flimsy as a Gladstone
bag compared to a fire-proof safe. But it was the
Germans who taught us, and all that we could do—but
we did it—was to set to work resolutely to play them
at their own game.
Not, unfortunately, to fight them with their own
.bn 299.png
.pn +1
weapons, or at least with their own shells. It took us
all, especially our own country, which has always borne
a strong family resemblance to its ancient King Ethelred,
a very long time to learn that particular lesson. The
French were quicker and more adaptable. Their main
difficulty, thanks to shortsighted and ignoble political
squabbles before the war, was that when war began they
were very short of big guns, as a consequence of which
in the earlier engagements their pieces were constantly
outranged, sometimes by as much as two miles, by those
opposed to them. But they had, and still have, one
gun which, for its size, was far superior to any possessed
by Germany, though they had produced a colourable
imitation of it.
To every French civilian, and to every French soldier,
no matter to what arm of the service he belongs, the
Soixante-Quinze is the real hero of the war. And in
one sense they are not far wrong. For without it not
the most splendid courage and most dashing exploits
of the chasseurs-alpins, chasseurs-à-pied, and all the
splendid French and African regiments of their armies
could have held out against the German advance, much
less have rolled it back.
In the year 1894, in the month of July, the then
German Military Attaché in Paris, Colonel Schwartz
Koppen, was for some time considerably worried and
puzzled during his morning rides in the Bois de Boulogne
by the frequency of the reports of artillery fire, which
he heard coming from the direction of Mont Valérien.
He would have been still more worried if he could have
looked into the future and seen what those sounds
.bn 300.png
.pn +1
betokened for his countrymen twenty years ahead.
They were due to the experimental firing of the new gun
invented by Colonel Duport (who, like most inventors,
got nothing for his trouble), which was being put through
its paces under the auspices of General Mercier, the
Minister of War, largely owing to the public-spirited
action of another Minister, now President of the Republic.
For it was M. Raymond Poincaré, at that time Minister
of Finance, who proposed in the Chamber a vote of
credit for “Repairs to artillery material,” which really
meant (as the members of the Chamber were well aware)
the construction of twenty-four guns of 75 millimetres
calibre, the first of their race, and the actual disturbers
of Colonel Schwartz Koppen’s morning peace of mind.
How long it was before he found out that his ears,
though not his eyes, had assisted at a first appearance of
some military and historical importance, I do not know,
but at all events the Germans were at the time so much
occupied with the subject of their own new 77 mm.
field-gun that the genesis of its slightly smaller rival
apparently escaped their notice.
After that, in spite of the efforts of General Deltoye,
nothing further was done about the Soixante-Quinze
for two or three years, when General Billot, Minister
for War in the cabinet of M. Méline, took the matter
in hand, and enough money was voted for their manufacture
on a large scale. But once that was done no
time was lost, and in 1897 the first Soixante-Quinzes,
considerably improved by Colonel Sainte-Claire Deville
and Colonel Rimailho, the inventor of the 155, were
served out to the artillery of the army corps of the
.bn 301.png
.pn +1
north-east. Apparently the moment chosen for their
début could not have been more happily timed: the
revival of the Dreyfus case had just suggested to the
minds of the war-party in Germany that the golden
opportunity for declaring war, while France was torn by
internal strife, had arrived, and it is said that it was
only the reports of the foreign military attachés on the
great superiority of the 75 mm. to the 77 mm. in stability
and rapidity and precision of fire that caused them to
change their minds. Since then they have been able to
introduce certain improvements into their own gun,
modelled on the chief features of the Soixante-Quinze,
but it still remains an inferior weapon.
I need not go into technical details about the French
gun, though naturally all its secrets, including that of
the famous liquid substance in its hydropneumatic
brake, are well known to the Germans. For English
readers it is enough to say that its muzzle diameter
(75 mm.) is a trifle more than 3 inches, or one-thirty-third
of its length, which is therefore just under 9 feet,
that it fires two kinds of shells, a shrapnel shell of about
16 pounds, containing 300 balls, with a muzzle velocity
of 1735 feet, and a high explosive shell of 11 pounds,
containing 30 ounces of melinite, with a muzzle velocity
of 1915 feet. These shells can be fired at the rate of
thirty a minute, or about twice the rate possible for the
77 mm.
Its further superiority over the German gun the
Soixante-Quinze owes, partly to the excellence of its
débouchoir (the instrument by which the bursting point
of the fuse is automatically regulated before the shell
.bn 302.png
.pn +1
is put into the breech) and partly to the control of its
liquid brake, which causes the gun to return after the
recoil as nearly as possible to its exact original position.
The Germans use a hand-débouchoir, which takes longer
to manipulate and gives less accurate results, and
because of its less powerful brake the aim of the 77 mm.
has constantly to be readjusted.
The other chief French field guns are the 155 court,
called the Rimailho after its inventor; the 120 long,
a siege gun converted into a field gun; the 120 court;
the 105, which is like a larger 75, and fires a shell of
thirty-six pounds; and the 65, a mountain gun, which
can be carried in four pieces on the backs of mules, and
has done excellent work in the fighting in the Vosges.
In English measurements the diameters of the shells
fired by these different pieces are approximately:
65 mm., 2½ inches; 75 mm., 3 inches; 105 mm., 4¼
inches; 120 mm., 4¾ inches; and 155 mm., 6 inches.
Before they knew by actual experience what the
Soixante-Quinze could do the Germans nicknamed it
“the cigar-holder.” Now it has become (it was what they
called it in Lorraine when we were there) “a barbarous
and disgusting engine of war,” and the French artillerymen
“the black devils.” Learn a lesson from the German
gunner. Whereas he complains of “barbarous engines”
and “black devils,” the French soldier greets his various
projectiles as la grosse or la petite marmite, or “the slow-coach,”
or “the whistler,” or “the train,” just as our
own men talk of Black Marias and Jack Johnsons.
The contrast is significant. For it means that the
Germans fear the French shells more than the French
.bn 303.png
.pn +1
fear theirs. If the difference in the mental attitude is
well founded, hardly anything could augur better for
our eventual success. And it is. The ideal of Krupp,
as of all Greater-Germanists, is the Kolossal. But the
Frenchman is the better gunner. He not only has in
the Soixante-Quinze a finer weapon, with better-regulated
fuses, but he is incomparably quicker in serving it, and
has a disconcerting way in hot actions of placing his
battery in position (in an incredibly short space of time),
firing the appointed number of rounds of spreading or
direct fire, and then limbering up and departing to fresh
woods and pastures new before the Germans have discovered
where he is.
It is not a bad thing to have a gun which hits as
hard and as quick as Bombardier Wells, and battery
commanders as elusive as the Scarlet Pimpernel. For
the combination means that the Soixante-Quinze and
its sister field guns do the maximum of damage to the
enemy with the minimum risk of destruction for themselves.
No wonder the French people are proud of their
artillery and work for it with unbounded enthusiasm.
And no wonder—for a different reason—that the British
Mission which went to France towards the end of 1915
to study the production of ammunition were greatly
impressed by the state of things which they found in
the French workshops. There was, they reported, no
loss of time, no trade-union restrictions, no limitation
of profits, no objections raised by the workpeople, no
difficulties created by the introduction, in practically
all cases, of female labour, and no restrictions on the
women working the same hours as the men “with a
.bn 304.png
.pn +1
good-will which is most impressive,” and, in short,
everything done to increase production. “As the war
has proceeded,” says the report of the Mission, “the
French nation has settled down with determination and
a feeling of set purpose to the fulfilment of the task
allotted to it. There is no question but that the nation
is at war, and the dominant sentiment, not only of the
men but also of the women, is to carry the war to a
successful termination. Everything else is subordinated
to this determination.”
In that spirit the French nation and the armies of
the east settled down to the second period of the war—the
struggle of the trenches. It was not so picturesque
as what had gone before, not so pregnant with possibilities
of thrilling victories or saddening but stimulating
defeats, not so anxious, not so inspiring. It was utterly
foreign to the genius of the French soldier. Morning
after morning the official communiqués hardly ever
varied. Rien de nouveau sur le front occidental.
And yet, though there was nothing new there was
always the same thing—always suffering and exposure
and wounds and death, and always fresh names added
to the roll of honour. And sometimes, though one
never knew any of the glorious details till even the
men who had taken part in them had almost forgotten
about them, there were more decided efforts to make
headway and bloodier encounters than the minor
struggles to gain a hundred yards of trench, wasting
and deadly as that daily routine was bound to be. When
the historians get to work they will give us, I suppose,
a real record of all this trench warfare. They will tell
.bn 305.png
.pn +1
us how the different battalions and regiments fared
on different parts of the line, how one charged brilliantly
across fifty yards of open ground and barbed wire and
drove the enemy out of the opposite trench, only to be
enfiladed by a murderous fire of mitrailleuses and
forced to retire to their old trench, leaving half their
men behind them, and all for nothing. They will tell
of how another repelled a night attack with such gallantry
and vigour that they drove the enemy helter-skelter
before them and occupied after half an hour’s work a
position which they had been sitting in front of for
months, harassed all the time by the daily wastage
caused by snipers, gas attacks, hand-grenades, bombs of
all kinds, trench mortars, Minenwerfers, and all the
other improved prehistoric death-dealing devices which
have sprung into being from the mud and chalk and
solid rock of the trenches. Then we shall know the
names of the gallant living and the gallant dead, and
many other details of intense interest which at present
it is impossible to know and still more to realize.
But for a general description I doubt if any of them
will give us anything much better than the following
account, written by a German journalist, of the wearing
monotony of the life of the men at the front. I give
it partly for that reason, but chiefly because I think
it is useful for all of us to realize that French and English
soldiers are not the only ones who, however brave and
however cheerful they are, must sometimes be appalled
by the unendingness of the struggle. There are two
sides to the nightmare of the trenches, just as there are
to the moral effect of shell-fire and the horror of the
.bn 306.png
.pn +1
horizon. And sometimes non-combatants—I do not
say the soldiers—are apt to forget the way in which it
may be and must be affecting the enemy. Let them
listen to this German, writing from the other side of
the line:—
.ce
*\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *
“And the siege goes on.
“Along the whole front, hundreds of miles long,
from the North Sea to Switzerland, the faithful soldiers
are posted in the trenches.
“In Flanders the water reaches to their knees.
The pumps are working, but without much success.
In spite of cement and joists and props, the trenches
fall in every day, and the sandbags have to be renewed
with infinite trouble every minute. When they leave
the trenches the soldiers march through water for miles.
In Champagne they are white with chalk, in the Argonne
and the Vosges they are coated with mud up to their
forage-caps. There, too, the pumps are working to
get the mastery over the water.
“It pours with rain, it snows, the wind blows.
When our soldiers go to their quarters to rest, many of
them support themselves with sticks; for the water and
the cold have stiffened their legs. No army of ancient
days could have shown such energy as this. Even
Napoleon would never have dared to ask of his armies,
though they were used to hardship, such prodigious
efforts. At the present time the willingness of the men
is tenfold. The soldier marches in blood up to his
ankles, the blood of the enemy, and the blood of the
comrade he loved; but his brow is crowned with laurels.
.bn 307.png
.pn +1
“The soldier stands there, in the mud and the water,
among the wet sandbags pierced with bullets, in the
narrow labyrinths of the trenches, behind crumbling
walls and among shattered tree-trunks. And that is
seen from the seashore where the waves break on the
beach to the Swiss frontier where the mountains rise.
A hundred thousand men, at this moment, are there,
every ten paces, searching the horizon. Behind the
sandbags machine-guns are on the watch day and night.
In these damp shelters their comrades are sleeping curled
up, but ready to dash out and risk their lives at the
sentinel’s first alarm, as they have done for seventeen
months. Water oozes from the walls. They are silent;
their eyes are looking for the Fatherland. They are
lying down in their dirty overcoats, they are asleep or
thinking of nothing. When the sentinel calls them,
they start. They eat their soup while the water trickles
down between the sacks, and they are wet through with
rain.
“Rusting iron covered with mud, shell-holes filled
with slimy water, scattered bundles of clothes, half
buried in the earth, dead bodies which have lain there
for weeks, and which it has been impossible to bury,
and just over there, thirty or forty or a hundred yards
away, the enemy.... That is all that the soldiers see,
that is their horizon, that is their world. Hundreds of
thousands of vigorous men are perishing there, though
their destiny was to perpetuate the human race. Death
has done good business this year. Already the rats
are coming from the destroyed villages and hunting
about in the ground. Near Souchez, a prisoner tells me,
.bn 308.png
.pn +1
they are arriving in formidable swarms. The crows are
croaking greedily. But there is no fear and no giving
way. No soldier who is at the front, right at this point,
has not the right to tremble. The war is pitiless. For,
by God, it is not demanding too much to ask people
who are in safety to look death in the face! A dead
man is a dead man, and at this moment there are much
more horrible things than death. Many French and
English, whose nerves have given way, have jumped on
the sandbags and asked death to set them free.
“And death is everywhere. It is everywhere, the
whole length of the front, from the sea to the
snow-mountains. Bullets whistle, mines and hand-grenades
fly about, shells fired a long distance off
plough into the ground with terrific explosions, a bit
of trench trembles and flies into the air. Death takes
officer and man without distinction. It is in the
destroyed villages where the soldier is trying to rest,
in the forests, in the thickets, and in the shelters where
the cannons thunder, above in the air, below under the
earth, everywhere.
“Honour to the brave men who fall in these days.
“Death, which stalks across Belgium, France, Alsace,
has its special quarters, its craters which are always
boiling over, to burst out every now and then and vomit
blood and fire. The Yser canal, Souchez and Vimy,
Berry-au-Bac, Tahure, the hills of Champagne, the
Argonne, the heights of Vauquois, which have swallowed
up thousands and thousands of men, Bois le Prêtre and
Hartmannsweilerkopf—all these places and others still
are the craters which boil without ceasing. All of a
.bn 309.png
.bn 310.png
.bn 311.png
.pn +1
sudden the air shrieks and shells arrive in swarms.
Like heavy hammers in a smithy for hours at a time they
hammer violently on the trenches and reduce everything
to fire and blood.
.il id=i258 fn=i_b_258fp.jpg w=500px ew=90%
.ca
French Attack from Cemetery of Rehainviller near Lunéville.
From “En Plein Feu.” By kind permission of M. Vermot, Rue Duguay-Trouin, Paris.
.ca-
“An attack. The trench is turned inside out and left
defenceless. The enemy comes. The air shrieks again
as our shells soar off towards the enemy, leaving behind
them a curtain of smoke, gases, and scraps of iron which
cover the lost trench. No one can cross that zone.
“It is impossible for the enemy to bring up reinforcements.
A counter-attack. The reserves advance, the
enemy falls exhausted, and the trench is ours again.
It is always the same thing, always as savage and always
as heroic. France is besieged, and she keeps trying and
trying to burst the girdle that surrounds her. The
insignificant breach that her shells have made is closed
again at once. It was like this in the month of May
and in June on the heights of Lorette. This is just
what happened, too, in September near Loos and Vimy
and in Champagne. The French launched asphyxiating
gases and bombs and millions and millions of shells
against the ramparts of their besiegers, but it was in
vain. Her regiments, though they were heroic and
daring, broke themselves up without gaining any success.
Our rampart resisted. Joffre and French, who had tried
everything, recognized the impossibility of destroying
this rampart, and retired despairing and worn out from
the theatre of the war. Will Castelnau be able to discover
the secret which Joffre and French have not been able
to discover?...
“Telephones, automobiles, railways, long-range guns,
.bn 312.png
.pn +1
and incalculable supplies of munitions have completely
changed the methods of attack and defence. This war
is less a war of men against men and courage against
courage than a war between two industries. It is iron-mines,
coal, chemical factories, huge furnaces, that
conduct the war, and also the brains of inventors and
manufacturers. The soldier of to-day is a courageous
and intelligent machine who, with the life that he risks,
works for this giant industry of the nations. Newer and
more ingenious methods would be needed to destroy
these dreadful engines. The enemy have not discovered
them so far....
“A trench is taken and lost again, and that is all.
Nothing important in the west. And the siege goes on.
The rifles crack in the trenches, the revealing Bengal
lights soar up into the thick night, the search-lights
explore the darkness. The sentinels are crouching in
the saps and look-outs. The aeroplanes fly and the
batteries destroy each other. The pioneers work underground
and the mines explode.
“The German soldier will stay at his post in spite of
it all, faithful and magnificent. He will stay there as
long as his country has need of him, or till he falls for
her. Never, at any hour of the day or night, must we
forget our valiant and wonderful soldiers.”
I think we most of us have an idea by now of what
trench-life is like, even though we may not have seen it.
Even if we have seen it we should find it difficult to
better that description of the sameness and the horrors
of it. There are points in it which are naturally coloured
by the imagination and predisposition of the writer.
.bn 313.png
.pn +1
Joffre and French have not retired, despairing and worn
out, from the theatre of the war. Nor is France besieged.
That is the grand mistake that he makes. By rights
it should be, since Germany was the attacking party.
But with the one exception of the abortive attempt to
attack Calais, which was foiled by French’s contemptible
little army, ever since the Germans were driven back
to their trenches from the Marne to the Aisne, and from
Nancy to the Seille, it is the Allies who have been the
assailants. They have been met by a marvellous defence.
There have been countless desperate sallies. But
gradually, steadily, little by little, line upon line, trench
by trench, they are sapping their way up to the earthen
walls defended by the beleaguered garrison.
And the end is sure. The German garrison, for all
their brave deeds and all the brave words of their
Xenophon, are obviously getting downhearted. When
you have spent a few hours in the trenches, with your
head always below the level of the ground, with nothing
above you but the sky and nothing in front of you or
behind you but endless lines of mud or chalk, like the
earth thrown up by the side of a newly-made grave,
you can understand the wonderful descriptive truth of
those four words, “That is their horizon.” To live for
days and nights at a time—to live for long months with
scanty intervals of cave-dwelling in holes scooped out
in the sides of hills—down there in the newly made grave,
on a floor of mud between walls of mud, with tiny loopholes
for your only windows, through which you see a
narrow segment of the landscape (always with another
mud-bank in front of you) between the stalks of the
.bn 314.png
.pn +1
grasses, with your eye on a level with their roots—that,
quite apart from the question of shells and fighting, has
been the life and the outlook of our men and the French
soldiers at the front, ever since they began fifteen weary
months ago to be a besieging force. But, as I have tried
to show earlier in this book, the French do not think about
their life as this German and his compatriots in the
trenches obviously do—for the simple but all-sufficient
reason that they are the besiegers and not the besieged.
For the French and the English, though for them,
too, “that is their horizon,” can see beyond it, not
perhaps the Angles of Mons, but decidedly the Angel
of Victory.
.bn 315.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XX | SIEGE WARFARE
.sp 2
The kind of modern siege in which the Allies are engaged,
unlike the bombardment of a modern fortress, but like
the sieges of old times, is bound to be a protracted affair.
Still it is not likely that Germany will hold out as long
as Troy did. From her geographical position, nearly
surrounded by the host of enemies that her arrogance
and self-seeking have arrayed against her, she was bound
sooner or later to be the besieged party, unless she
succeeded in crushing one or more of them by her first
impetuous rush. It was not enough to drive them
back. She had to annihilate them or at least to bring
them to terms at the outset, and that she failed to do.
Now, for the time being, she has created troublesome
diversions in the Balkans and other parts of the world
outside the main field of action, and has even opened
a sally-port in the direction of Constantinople. But
everywhere else her exits, and to a certain extent her
entrances, are barred, north and south by the fleets of
the Allies and the hitherto no-man’s land of two neutral
states, on the east by the armies of Russia, and on the
west by lines of trenches every bit as strong as her own.
It is on this side that the pressure of the siege bears
.bn 316.png
.pn +1
most heavily upon her, and that in all probability the
breach in her defences will be made. But, as has been
ably pointed out in The Times by Colonel Repington,
whose military judgment carries more weight in France
than that of any other English writer on the war, that
breach will only be made by an even and continuous
distribution of the pressure exerted along the whole of
the western line, simultaneously with a sustained attack
on the eastern front. It will not be effected by local
offensives, however carefully prepared and however
gallantly carried out. The day of brilliant cavalry
charges on a grand scale is over. Even combined
advances of infantry are a form of tactics that must be
used as sparingly as possible, because of the enormous
waste of life which under present conditions they
necessarily entail. The slight advantage gained by the
English last September at Loos and the French in
Champagne was far too dearly earned. It was magnificent,
but it was not siege tactics, and it is only by
acting on the principle that the war, more particularly
in the west, is not a series of battles but a siege, that it
can be won. The time has come when it must be
realized that partial offensives of this kind, carried
on over a minute section of the front, are not worth
the cost. The advance must be made by continuous
sapping, that is to say by hammering away with artillery,
and, so far as is possible, with nothing but artillery,
along the whole line of the enemy’s trenches at the same
time, without giving them any rest or any chance of
shifting reinforcements from one part of the line or from
one front to another.
.bn 317.png
.pn +1
During the months of comparative stagnation which
are now, it may be hoped, drawing to a close, this policy
has not been adopted, partly, no doubt, because it
could not be. There were not enough guns and not
enough high explosive shells. Once or twice they have
been massed in huge quantities at some given point, as
on those twenty-five miles between Auberives and
Massiges in the Champagne country, and they have
shown what can be done—provided that too much is
not attempted. Our one object is to drive the enemy
back. We have to oust them from the ground which
they now occupy. That is what is going finally to break
the morale of Germany and the German army. We
shall never do it, except at a prohibitive cost, as long
as in our attacks we sacrifice length to depth. It is
far more valuable to us, and far surer and less costly,
to gain say one hundred square miles of ground by
advancing a quarter of a mile along a front of four
hundred miles than to win back the same acreage by
pushing the enemy back five miles along a front of
twenty.
But all this is in the future, and is the business of
strategists and generals, and not of a newspaper correspondent,
who may, after all, be completely wrong in
his ideas. All that he can usefully do is to try to give
his personal impressions of the way in which the present
(or the old) plan has worked. Up till now it has in all
probability been the only method that could be adopted,
because of the lack of the guns and munitions necessary
for a more comprehensive plan of action. It is commonly
supposed that in this respect the French have been better
.bn 318.png
.pn +1
off than the English. But in any case they, too, have
been hampered in their general scheme of attack by
a similar necessity for a sparing use of artillery ammunition,
and it is this shortage which has principally
dictated their conduct of the war of the trenches ever
since it began.
At certain points all along the line, from the Channel
to Verdun and from Verdun to the Vosges, there are
what the German journalist quoted in the last chapter
called “Craters of Death,” where, as the siege has
progressed, both French and English have, so to speak,
brought their battering-rams to bear on the defences.
These points have not been chosen because they are the
weakest, for there are no weakest points in continuous
lines of trenches. One part of the system is as strong
as another. But there are, though it sounds paradoxical
to say so, strongest points, where the enemy, either
because he is particularly well served by lines of communication
behind, or because he is particularly anxious
for strategical reasons to break through in front, has for
months past concentrated greater numbers of guns and
men. And since these strongest points have no
“weakest” points on either side of them by which they
might be turned, it is precisely there that the besiegers
have been obliged to concentrate their attack. At the
same time any attempt to rush the less thickly manned
lines of trenches in between them has been rendered
practically impossible by the fact that owing to aeroplanes
and telephones and motor-traction any given part of
the line can be very quickly strengthened, even to the
extent of bringing fresh bodies of troops halfway across
.bn 319.png
.pn +1
Europe for the purpose. Under these conditions the
position of stalemate to which both besiegers and
besieged have very nearly been reduced was practically
unavoidable.
This second stage of the war, that is to say the whole
wearisome period of the fighting in the trenches, I do
not propose to follow at all closely. Even in the struggles
round the “craters of death” there was, except on
rare occasions, a sameness and a lack of dramatic
incident which would be bound to depress the spirits of
the general reader. As regards its bearing on the final
issue, by far its most important feature is that it has not
depressed the spirits of the French soldiers. Even more
remarkable than the heroism which from time to time
they have shown in making or repelling attacks on a
more or less extended scale is the extraordinary cheerfulness
with which they have accepted the dreary
monotony as well as the wearing daily attrition imposed
upon them by the stagnant immobility of the trenches.
I have spoken already of this remarkable buoyancy of
spirits, which so far as I have seen is characteristic of the
whole of the French armies, and need not enlarge upon
it again, except to remark that it is one of the most
valuable assets upon which the Allies are able to count.
But there is one special aspect of it about which I
should like to say a word or two, though it deserves a
whole volume to itself. Because the Army of the
Republic is a national army, there is no trade or calling
or profession which is not represented in its ranks.
France not only expects but requires that every able-bodied
man of military age shall do his duty in the
.bn 320.png
.pn +1
defence of his country, unless she has other work to
put into his hands. Amongst the rest she calls upon the
clergy, and with one consent these men of peace, instead
of beginning to make excuse, have answered to the call
with a fervour of patriotism which is excelled by no single
class of their fellow-countrymen. Before the divorce
between Church and State, garrison chaplains, bearing
duly specified military grades, were part of the regular
equipment of the army. When the State refused to
recognize them any longer as functionaries, all priests
became at once liable along with the laymen of their own
year to ordinary military service. Consequently in the
present war, either as men on the active list or as reservists
or territorials, thousands of abbés and curés,
besides monks, novices, choristers, lay brothers, and
other servants of the Church, are now serving with
the colours.
As far as possible they are employed in the non-combatant
ranks, but large numbers of them, both as
officers and privates, serve shoulder to shoulder in the
trenches and on the field of battle with the other fighting-men.
As a body they seem to be inspired, even more
than most soldiers, by the courage which springs from
contempt of death. In nearly all the countless stories
that are told of their heroism the dominant note is the
same. Having once, in the pronouncement of their
clerical vows, laid down their lives in the service of God,
they are always ready to lay them down again in the
service of their fellow-soldiers, whenever and wherever
the need arises, without for one moment counting the
cost. Time after time, like the many humble village
.bn 321.png
.pn +1
curés, too old or too weak to serve their country in arms,
who have nevertheless gone to meet the barbarians and
death without flinching, they have shown to the enemy
and to all the world that France has no more gallant
sons and soldiers than her priests.
But they have done something more than that.
Though they have become the soldiers of France they
have remained the soldiers of Christ. Here is one of
many instances that come crowding into my mind. A
private soldier, badly wounded, was lying in one of the
military hospitals, and, believing that he was on the
point of death, asked anxiously for the services of a
priest. At the moment none was to be found. The man
in the next bed, with his thigh hideously shattered by
a shell, was lying almost unconscious in a state of partial
coma. Gradually, however, he realized what the doctor
and the nurses of the ward were talking about. Weak
and exhausted as he was, he managed to make one of
them understand that he was himself a priest, and would
pronounce the absolution of his fellow-soldier if she would
hold up his hand; and then, as he whispered the words
that brought to the other the comfort that he wanted,
his own soul passed away.
That story is typical of the kind of lives which
numbers of these men in their double capacity have led
and are leading at the present moment. In out-of-the-way
corners of the field, far from any church or chaplain,
it is an everyday occurrence for some private soldier,
with his clerical robes hastily thrown over his uniform,
to celebrate mass for the men and officers of his regiment
before the battle begins; or, when it is over, with the
.bn 322.png
.pn +1
grime and the blood of it still thick upon him, to hear
the confessions of the dying and give them the last consolations
of their faith. Undoubtedly the influence of
these soldier-priests and the influence of the religion for
which they stand have had a large share in maintaining
the wonderful morale of the French troops. Even the
franc maçons, consciously or unconsciously, are affected
by it. The war has brought the whole nation as well
as the armies face to face with the realities of life and
death. They have this enormous advantage over the
Germans, that for them the war they are engaged in is
a holy war. They are not fighting for what they can
get. They are fighting to defend and to free their
homes, and therefore they feel and know that they are
on the side of freedom and justice and right. In their
trouble and peril they have turned instinctively to
the consolations and the sustaining strength of what
through long ages was their national as well as their
personal religion. They have returned to the faith of
their fathers. Not only individual soldiers and civilians
but the authorities of the State themselves have awakened
to the fact that in the great crises of life men and women
have a natural craving for something spiritual, something
outside of and higher than themselves.
Right at the beginning of the war the official rulers
of the State and the Army did a wonderful thing. They
took the step of reappointing regular aumoniers, or
military chaplains, to the troops of the Republic; that
is to say, they had the courage to undo their own work
by deliberately revoking part of the anti-clerical legislation
which, some years before, the Government had
.bn 323.png
.pn +1
imposed on the country. In the autumn of 1914 I saw
in a town near the eastern frontier a remarkable example
of this same disposition on the part of the officials of
the State to close, at all events to some extent, the breach
between State and Church. In the cathedral of the
town (a favourite target for the bombs of German aeroplanes),
a solemn service was being celebrated in memory
of the soldiers who had fallen during the war. And
inside the rails of the chancel, on a chair placed opposite
to the throne of the Archbishop and by the side of the
General commanding the district, was seated the Prefect
of the Department. It was the first time for fifteen years
that a Prefect of France, acting in his official capacity
and wearing his official uniform, had attended any form
of public religious service. To the congregation, therefore,
his presence at that solemn moment, while the
thunder of Beethoven’s funeral march on the cathedral
organ was almost drowned by the thunder of the guns on
the heights outside the town, was a fact of the deepest
significance. It was the outward and visible sign of
the spirit of national unity and brotherly love which
sprang into life all over France at the moment when
war was declared. It was one of many proofs that for
France and her highest interests the war has not been
fought and the dead have not died in vain.
.ce
*\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *
Before I was carried away into this digression by
the admiration which every one must feel for these brave
soldier-priests of France, I was talking of the way in
which, on the eastern half of the front, the chief energy
of the war of the trenches has been concentrated at certain
.bn 324.png
.pn +1
definite points or “craters of death.” West of the
Vosges these points are all in the plain of the Woevre and
the Hauts de Meuse, that is to say, along the sides of
the St. Mihiel salient. The chief of them are at Les
Eparges, on the north side of the angle, in the Forest of
Apremont at the angle itself, and near Pont-à-Mousson
at the eastern extremity of its southern side. At, and
to a lesser extent between, these points the French and
the Germans have now been at it, hammer and tongs,
for more than a year. I use the expression “hammer
and tongs” designedly, because I can think of no other
that so well expresses the position. St. Mihiel and
the Camp des Romains are situated at the hinge of the
tongs, Les Eparges and Pont-à-Mousson towards the
extremities of the two legs. With the object of squeezing
the legs closer and closer together, so as to crush the
German forces between them or at least to force them
to retire on Metz, the French have been hammering
away at these places for months past, in accordance
with sound dynamic principles. At the same time from
the Forest of Apremont they have pounded even more
vigorously at the Camp des Romains. Dynamically
the process of applying the force of the hammer at the
St. Mihiel end of the tongs is not so advantageous, but
it is, as I have tried to show, necessary. Force must
be met by an equivalent force if it is desired to prevent
motion in a particular direction, and they have at least
so far succeeded in their object as to produce a state of
equilibrium.
.il id=i272 fn=i_b_272fp.jpg w=500px ew=90% link=i_b_272fplarge.jpg
.ca La Woevre.
The position is one of great interest. What the
Germans were trying to do at the end of September,
.bn 325.png
.bn 326.png
.bn 327.png
.pn +1
1914, they were still aiming at a year later, and, for
all that one can foresee, the situation may be unchanged
up to the time when this book is published, or even later.
They wanted, and they still want, to cross the Meuse
at St. Mihiel and in a sense complete the investment of
Verdun. At any time since their first attempt at this
man[oe]uvre failed they might have repeated it, or would
have repeated it if they could. If they had succeeded
the consequences for the French and the whole of the
Allies’ line would have been just as serious as at the
beginning. Never was there a clearer case of “As you
were,” and the fact that the point of danger for the
French and the point of opportunity for the Germans
was at the angle of the salient has made the situation
there more pregnant with possibilities than at almost
any other part of the front. The unsatisfactory side
of it for our Allies is that because of their failure to turn
the enemy out of the Camp des Romains they have not
been able to put an end to the occupation of the Woevre,
and that to a certain extent the menace of a forward
movement still exists. On the other hand, the menace
has always been held well in check, and the legs of the
tongs are sensibly nearer to each other than they were
fifteen months ago.
Through the closing months of 1914 and the whole
of the following year a steady pressure was kept up
on both sides of the salient by part of the Verdun
garrison force and of the Third Army on the north side,
that is to say, from the Meuse eastwards, and by part
of the Toul garrison and of the Second Army operating
from the south towards the Rupt de Mad. As the result
.bn 328.png
.pn +1
of this general pressure, supplemented by occasional
offensive movements in greater force, the enemy were
driven back slightly on both their fronts.
The first of these offensive movements was made
directly on St. Mihiel from the west. An attack was
made on the German troops occupying the left bank of
the river, and at first it had every appearance of being
successful. The enemy were driven out of the suburb
and barracks of Chauvoncourt and retired across the
Meuse. Following in hot pursuit, the leading French
troops took possession of the barracks—and fell into a
trap. The ground had been mined by the Germans
before their retreat, and the French paid the consequences
of their impetuous advance. Practically the whole
of the force that had entered the barracks was destroyed,
and in the confusion the enemy successfully counter-attacked
and remained masters of Chauvoncourt, which
they still hold.
The next attack, a much bigger and brilliantly successful
affair, was made at Les Eparges, twelve or thirteen
miles north of St. Mihiel and the same distance south-east
of Verdun. One of its objects was to defeat the
enemy’s project of investing Verdun by driving him
further back in the direction of Vigneulles, which lies
about mid-way between the two fronts of the salient,
and at the same time to threaten his position in the
Forest of La Mortagne, to the west of the road from
Vigneulles to Les Eparges. The operations, which
began on February 17th and lasted till April 10th, were
carried out with great determination by the French,
and in the end they not only pushed their trenches
.bn 329.png
.pn +1
forward a considerable distance, but were able to occupy
a much safer and more commanding position. Before
the advance was made the Germans had constructed a
very strong redoubt, to the east of the village of Les
Eparges, which was the main objective of the
After a careful preparation first by saps and mines, and
then by sustained artillery fire, it was gallantly stormed
and then evacuated and finally retaken, after a fierce
hand-to-hand struggle, on February 19th. For the next
six or seven weeks there was continual fighting on more
or less the same ground till, at the beginning of April,
the Crown Prince, who had returned from one of his
prolonged and mysterious absences to the command of
the Fifth Army, had the mortification of adding yet
another to the list of his failures, and the French finally
and conclusively gained the upper hand. They had
fought with extraordinary dash and courage, and had
suffered severely. But the result was well worth the
cost. The position which they now hold commands
a wide view northwards and eastwards over the plain
of the Woevre. From the east side of the Forest of
Amblonville, in which they have their main cantonments,
the ground falls with a fairly steep descent till
it rises again to the long bare spur of Les Eparges, over
a thousand feet high, looking out over the plain. They
are no longer exposed to the risk of an unexpected attack,
as it is impossible for the enemy to concentrate troops
in the ravines and behind the slopes which separate
the forest from Les Eparges without being seen. The
other main advantages which the French have gained
on this side of the wedge are that they have made some
.bn 330.png
.pn +1
advance on the two main roads, six or seven miles apart,
which run between Verdun and Metz, one along the
valley of the Orne past Etain, the other from Fresnes
in the direction of Mars-la-Tour. They have also made
a slight move forward on the centre of the German
line at Lamorville, a few miles to the north of St.
Mihiel.
On the southern side of the wedge the chief French
efforts have been made at the two extremities of the
line, at the Bois d’Ailly and the Bois Brulé, in the Forest
of Apremont, and, fourteen and twenty-one miles further
east, at the Bois de Mort-Mare, directly south of
Thiaucourt, and the Bois le Prêtre, a little to the
west of Pont-à-Mousson. The approach to the Forest
of Apremont from the Meuse is one of the many places
on this part of the front where the French side of the
low hills behind the trenches are for miles honeycombed
with cave-dwellings. They have been there so long
now that they have become part of the landscape and
look as if they had always belonged to it. I suppose
when the war is over they will still be left for the edification
of the cheap trippers and tourists of the world.
What will not be left for them to see, for it is gone
already, is the Bois Brulé. In the height of summer
you can walk for hours along the trenches, through
acres of what was once a green forest, and see never a
leaf. Nothing is left of the trees but shattered stumps,
cut clean off by the shells close to the ground. That
gives one some idea of the severity of the endless duel
of the guns. At the east end of the wood the hill on
which it stands drops down sharply into the plain, and
.bn 331.png
.pn +1
through the loopholes in the front trenches (where you
do not linger for more than a few seconds at a time) you
look down on the brown roofs of the village of Apremont,
three or four hundred feet below you. It is full of
Germans, though they never show themselves. But
their advanced trenches are much closer than that,
on the top of the reverse slope of the hill, in some places
at the regulation nearest distance of about fifteen yards.
Behind the hill, that is to say, on the south or French
side of it, and as far as one can see to the east, the plain
stretches out flat and unbroken (except by the lines
of French and German trenches cut across it), backed on
the south by a series of long, straight, level-topped hills,
écheloned one behind the other, and ending far away to
the right in the blue haze where the heights of the
Moselle begin. That is where Pont-à-Mousson lies,
and Bois le Prêtre, the greater part of it another dreary
forest of stumps, through which the battle raged backwards
and forwards again and again for months—or is
it centuries?—till at last the whole of it was won and
kept for France by her splendid soldiers.
And that is what they are doing all along the line.
The progress is slow, but what changes there are in the
position of the trenches are in favour of the French.
Foot by foot they are winning back the land which was
ravished from them at the beginning, and the longer
the struggle for the possession of the Woevre goes on
the surer it becomes that the occasional offensive movements
of the French are assaults and those of the German
attempts at sallies. The St. Mihiel salient is still a
nuisance, but it has almost, if not quite, ceased to be
.bn 332.png
.pn +1
a danger, and sooner or later it is practically certain
that the prolonged attempt to cross the Meuse will have
to be abandoned, and that not a single German will be
left in France from Verdun to the Vosges.
In the Vosges themselves and in the Sundgau, ever
since the retirement from Mulhouse, there has been continual
fighting, sometimes of the most violent description,
in which the Chasseurs Alpins and the Chasseurs-à-pied,
splendidly supported by the French field artillery
(supplemented during the latter part of last year with
guns of heavier calibre), have done wonderfully fine work.
They have not only successfully carried out their main
task, which was to prevent the enemy from setting foot
on the western slopes of the Vosges, but in the valleys
of the Thur and the Doller and at other points along the
line have gained a considerable amount of valuable
ground. Further north, in the district of Senones,
though they have not succeeded in penetrating again
into the valley of the Bruche, they have kept the enemy
well in check, and at the extreme right of the line,
towards the Swiss frontier, have established themselves
in a very strong position from which they are able to
keep a watchful eye on Altkirch and Mulhouse, and at
the same time to guard effectively against any attempt
at either a straightforward or a roundabout attack on
Belfort.
The main fighting has centred round Thann, Hartmannsweilerkopf,
Cernay, Steinbach, the Ballon of
Guebweiler, the valley of the Fecht, Reichackerkopf,
and the valley of Münster, but from the Donon to
Pfetterhausen on the Swiss frontier, especially on the
.bn 333.png
.pn +1
southern section of this front, there is hardly any ground
that has not been the scene of repeated combats, the
net result of which is that the French have almost everywhere
made slight advances. The summit of Hartmannsweilerkopf
in particular, because it guards the
entrance to the valley of St. Amarin, has been bathed
in blood over and over again. Four or five times it has
been taken and retaken, with dogged perseverance and
extraordinary heroism, first by the French and then by
the Germans, and the struggle for its possession still
continues, though at present it is in the hands of the
French. For both sides this famous mountain-top has
been one of the most deadly of all those terrible “craters
of death.”
Beyond this short general statement I shall not for
the present attempt to follow the ins and outs of the
campaign on this part of the line. Its strategical importance
has been far greater than has appeared, and,
once the weather conditions permit, there is always a
chance of its developing into an attempt at a big offensive
movement by one side or the other. But as regards
the story of those heroic struggles we have had, I think,
our fill of fighting. In the daily engagements on the
plain of Alsace and among the fir-clad mountains of the
Vosges the men of the armies of the east have shown
the same enthusiastic devotion to their country, the same
quiet disregard of danger and death, and the same cheerful
endurance and unfailing confidence in the final
triumph of right as their brother-soldiers who fought
and died for the safety of Epinal and Nancy and Verdun
and Toul. Higher praise than that they cannot have.
.bn 334.png
.pn +1
The soldiers of France are the fearless sons of a great-hearted
nation.
As I draw near to the end of this imperfect attempt
to show the greatness of the debt which England owes
to France, one other thought about them comes to me
with increasing force. The French have played the
game: they have fought the good fight like knights
and gentlemen. That, more than almost anything
else, is the reason why Englishmen have come to look
upon them as something much more than Allies. Because
of it they have forged a bond with us and our children’s
children which Time itself will hardly be able to weaken.
They are our brothers, not only in arms, but in all that
civilization stands for. The Germans are—different.
They are our enemies, not only because they are fighting
against us, but much more because of the way in which
they have fought. As a state, and, in cases that cannot
be numbered, as individuals they have turned their
backs upon principles and ideals by which all honourable
nations and men must strive to rule their lives. Their
scutcheon is blackened with arson and murder and
pillage and rape. Their hands are red with the blood
of the innocent. To the ends of the earth and of time
they have made their name a byword and a reproach.
But—worse than all this—they glory in their shame.
They claim that their dishonour is honour and their
wrong the right. Their eyes are holden that they cannot
see. Some day they will be opened and they will
see themselves and their crimes in all their revolting ugliness.
For it is unbelievable that a whole nation of ordinary
men and women can continue to allow themselves
.bn 335.png
.pn +1
to be blinded by the false and cruel and iniquitous
standards of a few devils in human form. But for the
present all their sense of right and wrong is being eaten
away by a foul and malignant cancer. Till that cancer
has been cut out of their being by the sword they are a
deadly danger to the whole world, for their success would
infallibly spread its poison into every country on which,
in their present condition, they were able to lay their
hand. Till the sword has done its work, as firmly and
as thoroughly as the surgeon’s scalpel, there is not one
of the allied nations which can or will think of peace.
Then and then only will come the end of the war.
.bn 336.png
.pn +1
CHAPTER THE LAST
GERMANY AND THE ALLIES
Once upon a time, in the careless, happy days before
the war, a Royal Scotch Princess was married one fine
morning to a Royal Irish Prince in a Royal English
chapel. The chapel was ancient and small, and the
young pair had so many friends that though not nearly
all of them could be invited to the ceremony, they filled
it to overflowing. Besides the Sovereign Head of both
their houses and the State, there were present two Queens
(I had almost said two fairy Godmothers) who walked
down the chapel hand-in-hand looking as sweet and
almost as young as the bride herself, I forget how many
other princes and princesses, and scores and scores of
the great lights of the land and especially of the legal
profession (for where the country-to-be-ruled is there
will the lawyers be gathered together). There were
not many young people—the occasion was too important
and the seats too few—and, except for the brothers and
sisters and cousins of the two principals nearly all the
guests were married and arrived in couples (like the
animals coming into the ark out of the rain) dressed in
their finest and full of their own or their ancestors’
importance. For to be there at all, you understand,
.bn 337.png
.pn +1
you had to be SOMEBODY, or at least to the third and fourth
generation SOMEBODY’S offspring, unless you belonged
to that mischievous but necessary profession the British
Press, the representatives of which, the only blot on this
brilliant assembly, were crowded together in a narrow
position of vantage so close to the highest and furthest
back row of the seats of the mighty that the shadows of
the aigrettes in front quivered and danced upon their
note-books.
To the strains of the organ, appropriately tender and
jubilant by turns, the chapel gradually filled with its
distinguished audience, and almost the last to arrive
before the Royal party were an old old servant of the
State and his matronly spouse, who took their places
on two of the gilded chairs immediately below the Press
box. Before she shook out the folds of her dress for
the last time the lady turned round and, staring straight
into the face of the newspaper man behind her, at a
range of about two feet, said to her husband in a loud,
clear voice (he is rather deaf), “Oh, it’s only reporters.”
Until you have tried it you have no idea of the
degree of polite contempt which can be put into that
last word. And even when you have tried, and tried
your hardest, you will still, if you are only an amateur
at the game, fall far short of the dizzy height of scorn
reached by this professional expert without any conscious
effort at all. For pride of rank and contempt of her
inferiors had become to her second nature.
Once upon a time the same great lady (or perhaps it
was another) was on her way to the gilded chamber to
which her husband had been raised, chiefly by his own
.bn 338.png
.pn +1
forensic skill, but partly by the nimble pencils of the
men who recorded his eloquent speeches for the public
press. In the square outside there was a large and excited
crowd, some sympathetic, some jeering and hostile,
and for a moment her carriage was stopped while the
police arrested a pale-faced, elderly woman who had
been trying to exercise what she believed to be her legal
right of asking for an audience with the representatives
of her sovereign. Once more in the same high-pitched
voice and with an even deeper tinge of scorn, she explained
the situation to her companion: “It’s only one
of those wretched suffragettes.”
This book is not a suffragist or anti-suffragist
pamphlet. It is an attempt to describe a single phase
of the war, and at the same time to consider some of its
actual and possible effects. Still, it seems to me worth
saying that in England before the war there was in all
classes far too much of the spirit expressed in the thoughtless
and belittling “only” of these simple little true
stories, and that is why I have told them. We were
much too fond of using such phrases as “only a woman”
or “only a parson.” There were cases before the war
when the keepers of public restaurants refused to serve
a fellow-subject with food and drink because he was
only a soldier—wearing the King’s uniform. That
sounds odd to-day. There have been times in our history,
and not so very long ago either, when “only a Frenchman”
(with or without a qualifying adjective) was the
regulation way of speaking of our present Allies and tried
and trusty friends, not only because they wore the
wrong collars and hats, but because we were generally
.bn 339.png
.pn +1
inclined to believe that an Englishman could tackle at
least three of them with his left hand.
The unwholesome part of this particular form of
national pride has, we may hope, left us for good. (It
has now, incidentally, infected the Bulgarians, who say
to-day that the Western nations can only fight in the
trenches, and that in the open field one Bulgar is equal
to five French or English.) We began to learn the folly
of it even before the war. Sous-lieutenant Carpentier,
of the French air-service, taught us a few lessons.
So did Jack Johnson—though he was only a nigger.
So did the football teams from Africa and New Zealand,
though they were only Colonials, and so did our competitors
in the Olympic Games, though they were only
foreigners. But more than anything else, it is the
war that has been and must be still our tutor. It is
teaching us the lesson which cock-sure St. Peter (who
must surely have had English blood in his veins) learnt
long ago at Joppa—that nothing is common or unclean.
It is teaching us that we must get rid of the kind of
Lucifer pride that goes before a fall. It is teaching us
to respect not only our Allies and our foes, but each
other. We have found out that the whole of Europe can
fight. As a body of soldiers, General French’s contemptible
little army, which was sent to fill the gap at
Mons, was probably the finest fighting force, regimental
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, that ever
stepped on to a field of battle. But it was we non-combatants
who wore most of their laurels. At the
beginning of this war and in all previous wars, in our
complacent English way, we have always thought and
.bn 340.png
.pn +1
talked of our regular army (when any part of it was at
war) as though it were actually the nation, instead of
only a minute fraction of it, as though it was we ourselves
who were doing the fighting. We have a better right
to our national pride now that the Government of the
nation has decided and the nation (or most of it) has
willingly agreed that at least all its unmarried men of
military age shall be trained not only to defend their
country but to take their stand beside the other allied
nations in their battle for something that is far greater
and more sacred and more important than the very
greatest of them.
.il id=i286 fn=i_b_286fp.jpg w=500px ew=90%
.ca
Photograph by Libert-Fernand, Nancy.
Church at Drouville—Meurthe et Moselle
.ca-
I take back nothing of what I have written earlier
in this book about our refusal as a nation to bring ourselves
in this respect in a line with our Allies. Our
consent is not even now completely whole-hearted.
For seventeen months we did so refuse, and during
that time not all the magnificence of our unparalleled
voluntary effort was magnificent enough to banish from
the minds of our Allies the consciousness, however politely
they might conceal it, that we were lagging behind in
the struggle for the freedom of the world. But while
we lagged behind—great as our contribution was even
then to the common cause—we were learning. Outside
our own country we have seen the splendid courage of
tiny states like Belgium and Serbia, as well as the
wonderful soldier-like qualities of the huge national
armies of France and Russia and Italy and Germany.
From our own people (and from those others as well)
we have learnt that priests and parsons and men of
every profession and trade and class and condition,
.bn 341.png
.bn 342.png
.bn 343.png
.pn +1
however insignificant we used to think them, can endure
hardness as good soldiers, and that women, if they
cannot fight, can (besides knitting socks, which was all
that they were supposed to be good for before the war
began) do almost everything else connected with the
war which is commonly regarded as men’s work. Now
that we have mastered these elementary principles we
shall, if we let the war teach us all that it can, go on to
the obvious corollary that no nation and no man and
no woman has the right to despise another, and that pride
and prejudice are the root of nearly all evil.
The war itself is the strongest possible evidence of
that truth. For it was the pride of Germany that made
the war—not her fear of being strangled by the surrounding
nations, not her need of finding colonies for
her surplus population, not her desire for a place under
the sun, not her passionate longing to ensure for the
world the liberty of the seas, not even her jealousy of
England, but her overweening pride.
Between the pride of England and the pride of France
there are certain well-marked differences. But both,
because of their ancient histories, have pride of race,
wholesomely tempered by the consciousness that noblesse
oblige. Germany has the much more aggressive pride
of the successful parvenu. Having made herself, within
the memory of people now living, she looked upon her
work with all the pride of the self-made man, and saw
that it was good—after its kind—and straightway
aspired to re-make the whole world after her own image
and according to her own material conceptions. To do
that she thought, quite wrongly, that it was necessary
.bn 344.png
.pn +1
first to subdue it by the sword. She would have been
wiser to keep it in its sheath. Her peaceful invasion
was far more penetrating and far more likely to compass
the end she had in view of making her the dominating
nation of the earth. All the world takes her Kultur
now at its proper value. But long before the war, up
to the very eve of its declaration, German influence,
and above all German finance and commerce, had been
permeating all the nations now at war with her, as well
as all the neutral states, like bindweed and Virginia
Creeper running riot in a suburban garden. If the war
had not come the independent existence of some of
them—Switzerland, for example—would certainly have
been choked. Even the larger countries were beginning
to suffer. In England the phrase, “Made in Germany,”
first an economic measure of self-protection, then a
rather feeble joke, and then a byword, was fast becoming
a serious menace—if one accepts as just the principle of
England for the English—to the real interests of the
country. In France, in England, and in other countries
there were too many commercial houses and too many
people and too many opinions made in Germany, if
those countries were to retain their national characteristics
and national liberty of thought and action.
The seriousness of the mischief in its gravest form all
the world has seen lately in the United States, where the
Government have had to struggle hard, and not always
with success, against the crippling influence of the
fear of the German vote, even though, happier than the
neutral states of Europe, they were entirely free from
the parallel influence—the fear of the German sword.
.bn 345.png
.pn +1
The process of Germanization was, in fact, as events
move in history, rapid and almost universal. But,
fortunately for the world, it was not rapid enough for
German pride. So the war was made by the rulers of
Germany to hurry forward the spread of German Kultur
and all that the word implies, or—was permitted by the
higher forces or Powers that rule the evolution of the
world, in order to check it. To the Allies, who did not
begin the war, but did everything in their power to
prevent it, the only possible view is that the Powers
or rather the Power that rules the evolution not of
Germany alone nor of France nor of England, but of
the whole world, is a greater and higher power than
the rulers of Germany. That is the confidence in which
we are fighting. We do not look upon ourselves as the
Chosen People, with a special claim on the mercy of
God. We have no special form of culture which we
think or pretend it is our duty to impose on the rest of
the world. We have no need and no right because our
cause is a holy one to invent a special unholy code of
the rules of war, and of might and right, in order to secure
its triumph. These are forged credentials and counterfeit
excuses, and not all the ingenuity of the false prophets
who plunged deluded Germany into this war can
make them pass as genuine. The prophets and the
professors prophesied falsely, and the people, whether
they loved to have it so or not, must suffer the consequences.
As for ourselves, we believe, rulers and people, that
we went into this war with clean hands and clear consciences.
But that is no proof that we are right. The
.bn 346.png
.pn +1
Germans, or the majority of them, no doubt think the
same of themselves and their country. At the bar
of the nations we must be judged, when the war is
over. But meanwhile, while it is still in progress,
we can get some idea of the way in which the
other nations regard us from the opinion of the neutral
states and even of our Allies. Fas est et ab amicis
doceri.
Since the war began I have watched it and England’s
share in it from Belgium, Holland, France, Italy, and
German and French Switzerland, and have talked about
it with the inhabitants of various other countries,
including Serbs, Greeks, Russians, Swedes, Montenegrins,
and Americans. Never once have I heard it said, though
I have seen it hinted in print—in German print—that
we came into the war from anything but disinterested
motives. And that is the one thing that matters. I
was once called upon, when the war was less than a year
old, to speak about it at a large meeting of French and
German Swiss, specially arranged as a meeting of neutrals.
Strictly speaking, it was neutral only in name and on
the surface, in the sense that the men composing it were
persuaded that their highest duty was to stand together
for a United Switzerland, and to sink their differences
and individual opinions for the sake of their common
country. But the differences and individual opinions
were there. Every man in the room, whatever his
politics (they were mostly Socialists), consciously and
strongly wanted one side or the other, France or Germany,
to win. But the very fact that as individual jurymen
they were not impartial made their verdict, provided
.bn 347.png
.pn +1
that it was unanimous, all the more convincing. It
was in the days when every one in Switzerland was still
discussing the rights and wrongs of the war—and before
a German airman had dropped bombs on that particular
Swiss town. Having explained that I personally was
not a neutral (an obvious remark which was greeted
with loud laughter, as a characteristic specimen of
English humour), I went on to the further statement,
not necessarily quite so obvious to the whole of that
particular audience, that England had come into the
war because Germany had been guilty of the violation
of Belgium’s neutrality, and that if we had not done so
we could never have looked the other nations in the
face again. Before the words were out of my mouth
they had given their verdict in a unanimous burst of
applause. Every man of them, and not only those
who naturally sympathized with the Allies, showed as
clearly as possible that on that point they needed no
persuasion. Germany was guilty, and England had
done the one thing possible. And that, as far as my
observation goes, is the general opinion abroad, not only
in Switzerland (in spite of the natural predisposition of
many of the inhabitants to think well of Germany as
well as to fear her) but in Holland, the Americas,
Sweden, and practically the whole of the neutral
world.
As for our Allies the French, we have fought side by
side for a year and a half, and each of us knows by now
of what mettle the other is made. They started the war
with two fixed ideas about us—that we were not a
military nation (which, if you compare the relative size
.bn 348.png
.pn +1
of our two armies at the beginning, was, from their
point of view, perfectly true), and that, conscious of
the might of our fleet and lulled to a state of careless
repose by the sense of our island security, it would take
us a long time to wake up to the real seriousness of the
war. Looking back on what has passed, it is not easy
to say that they were wrong. Some of us—millions of
us—realized it from the first. But very many did not.
Long after the war had begun there were people in
England who held that we were doing more than our
share and more than enough, because, as was true, we
were doing far more than we had promised. There were
even some so foolish and so selfish as to say that our
soldiers in Flanders were fighting the battles of France,
and not the battles of England, since England had not
been and never could be attacked. The French were
more generous than these narrow-minded myoptics
(who, after all, were only a small minority), and at the
same time more clear-sighted. Frankly and with deep
gratitude they owned that but for the help of England
France must have been crushed. But they also believed
that when that had happened our turn would inevitably
have come next, and that the only hope for England and
the world was that France and England should face the
foe together with every ounce of their united strength.
Small blame to them, then, if they were seriously concerned
when they saw that in England alone of all the
combatant nations—Germany excepted—the enervating
evil of strikes and labour threats could still exist. Small
blame to them if they sometimes wondered how long it
would be before, for our own security, we overcame
.bn 349.png
.pn +1
our timid objections to the principle of national
service.
But they always felt sure, I think, that the time
would come—as it has come, in the last days of 1915—when
England would face the necessity of putting her
whole strength into the field in order to bring the
war to a triumphant conclusion, and to complete
what a friend of mine, a high official of France, spoke
of in a letter which he wrote to me last May, as
“le grand [oe]uvre de la guerre, c’est à dire la
Rédemption.”
“C’est bien en effet de rédemption qu’il s’agit,” he
went on, “la rédemption du monde. L’humanité voit
aujourd’hui, elle voit de ses yeux, ce qu’elle serait devenue
si les Boches avaient triomphé, imposant au monde leur
loi morale. Pour moi je suis tenté parfois de remercier
les Boches d’avoir complété ma vie morale: ils m’ont
appris la Haine, la haine forte comme l’Amour, qui
emplit le c[oe]ur, le réchauffe, le brûle parfois, qui décuple
les forces, qui tranforme la vie. C’est le rôle que les
Boches joueront désormais dans le monde civilisé; ils
auront pour fonction d’être un objet de haine. A cette
idée l’Angleterre vient peu à peu. Elle n’est pas encore
au point, puisque les ouvriers de tramways de Londres
ont fait grève: j’ai vu à l’hôpital un petit chasseur-à-pied,
amputé du bras droit, qui en lisant cette nouvelle
dans le journal s’est mis à pleurer. Mais le Boche
commetra bien encore quelques infamies nouvelles, et
l’Angleterre tout entière ‘haïra’ d’une haine active et
féconde.”
I doubt myself whether we shall ever quite reach that
.bn 350.png
.pn +1
point. The very sound of the phrase, “Redemption
by Hate,” is rather strong meat for English minds. We
have not got that Latin fervour of expression, and we
have not seen a tithe or anything like a tithe of what
the French have seen of the abominable works of the
Boche, especially in the eastern provinces. I have heard
it rumoured that the British soldier—the British Tommy,
that is to say—is by way of thinking and saying that
brother Boche is not such a bad fellow after all, and that
he would not mind making friends with him. At the
present moment and until the war is won anything
approaching that frame of mind, if it were at all widespread,
would be a calamitous and fatal mistake. The
British soldier, especially the British soldier of the new
armies, has seen, or at least has fought against, the
Germans on the fields of battle and in the trenches,
where they are at their best. For no one can deny their
fighting qualities. He has not seen “with his eyes”
what they did behind the present lines of trenches,
when they had to deal not with soldiers, but with
defenceless civilians. He is a light-hearted and forgiving
individual, and does not realize that what they did then
they will do again in this war if ever they get the chance.
He cannot be expected in the trenches to grasp the far
graver general danger of the poisonous influence which
was being exercised on the world and on Germany
before the war by the whole rotten system of German
Militarism and German Kultur, bolstered up by German
pride. He has no time while he is fighting our battles
to reflect that that influence will infallibly begin its
corrupting and deadening work again after the war,
.bn 351.png
.pn +1
and will spread with far greater rapidity, unless the
Militarist party is beaten to its knees.
But, even admitting that here and there in the ranks
there may be some of this quasi-friendly feeling towards
“brother Boche,” the fact, if it is a fact, need disturb
no one. We may not have in England the Latin quickness
and fervour of the French, but what we have got is
the bulldog grip. Once we have taken hold, though we
may be slow in starting, we do not let go. Now that
our teeth are set we will hold on to the end—and God
defend the right!
But what is the right? The proud German dream of
a Greater Germany? I think not. I doubt if even
the Germans themselves can think so, if they look at
it dispassionately as it was presented—three years before
the war began—by the Pan-Germanist prophet, Otto
Richard Tannenberg. We certainly cannot complain
that they did not give us fair warning.
The gist of his country’s dream can be given quite
shortly in his own words. “Greater Germany,” he
wrote, “can only be made possible by a struggle with
Europe. Russia, France, and England will oppose the
establishment of Greater Germany. Austria, feeble
as she is, will not weigh heavily in the balance. The
Germans will not march against Germany. The basis
of our enterprise must be the Pan-Germanist principle.
“Some one must make room, either the Slavs of the
West or of the South, or else we ourselves! As we are
the strongest the choice will not be difficult. We must
give up our attitude of modest expectation. There can
be no question of remaining without stirring at the
.bn 352.png
.pn +1
point where we stand to-day.... Since 1871 our
neighbours have often enough given us chances of appealing
to the decision of the sword. Only the wish has been
lacking to us. After all, every war can be avoided.
But it is also easy to find motives, when one wants to....
As for us, there is no need to hunt for one in the
vicissitudes of the relations between the various Courts;
one fact is enough for us, that since the foundation,
the consolidation, and the expansion of our empire the
Germans are being harassed and oppressed in all
countries. In Russia, in Austria, in England, in
America we have seen a feeling of hatred against Germany
develop which we cannot tolerate much longer without
losing our standing in those countries.”
That was written, remember, not during the war,
nor on the eve of it, but in 1911. We have seen since
then how the Pan-Germanist principle that “after all,
every war can be avoided, but it is also easy to find
motives, if one wants to” was carried out. What we
will not see and will not tolerate is the establishment
of Greater Germany. For it means amongst other
things, according to the prophet Tannenberg, not only
that Ireland will become independent of England, and
that Austria-Hungary will be incorporated in the German
Empire, but that the neutral states of Holland, Luxembourg,
Switzerland, and Belgium, neutral no longer,
will disappear completely from the map of Europe
and lose their identity and their freedom in the
maw of the same all-embracing and all-devouring
organization.
What need have we of further witness? Out of their
.bn 353.png
.pn +1
own mouths the Germans are condemned, for the
thousandth time. The war was deliberately provoked,
though “like any war,” it might have been avoided.
The excuse for it, invented long beforehand, that it
was to put an end to the alleged oppression of Germans
in Russia, Austria, England, America, and all other
countries, was as false as the pretence that any such
oppression existed. The real object, the aggrandizement
of Germany, not only by the oppression but by the
suppression of all the weaker Latin and German races
of Europe, was exhibited naked and unashamed, for
all the world to see, long before the would-be oppressor
drew the sword. It remains to-day more than ever
the real object of the war, now that it is unsheathed.
No possible special pleading can maintain, much less
prove, that the suppression of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg,
and Switzerland (to say nothing of the partial
suppression of France, England, Russia, Italy, and
Servia), is right. The mere suggestion of such an idea
is an abominable wrong, which God will not defend, and
because of it Great Britain will not tolerate, in any
shape or form, the establishment of a Greater Germany.
We are going to win this war. But let every man of
the Allies and above all every Englishman, reflect on
this undoubted fact. Because it is a war between right
and wrong, between the powers of light and the powers
of darkness, we shall not win it until we have learnt
its great lesson, until we know as a nation—and we do
not know it yet—that its particular message to our own
country is the duty of self-sacrifice.
.ce
*\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *\ \ \ \ \ \ \ *
.bn 354.png
.pn +1
It is the first day of the New Year. Last
night the Old Year, the saddest and most terrible
that the world has ever seen, came to its appointed
end.
Five or six miles from where I am writing French and
Germans were facing each other in unwonted silence under
the dark night in the unending vigil of the trenches.
A few days and nights ago the roar of the guns at
Hartmannsweilerkopf, at Thann, at Altkirch, at Pfetterhausen,
at Moos, was more violent and more continuous
than anything that has been heard here since the war
began. Now there was not a sound. Only in the last
few minutes of 1915 a sudden squall of wind and rain
swooped down from a cloudless sky. Moaning and
weeping like a suffering child that cannot sleep, like a
broken-hearted old man worn out by the anguish of
life, the Old Year passed away to make room for the
New. To-day in a glorious burst of sunshine, the
New has come—and every second the air quivers to
the shock of the heavy guns. For the weary fight has
begun again. The end is not yet. Perhaps even here,
through this peaceful valley, so little removed from the
actual field of battle, the German hosts may make their
last despairing unavailing effort to reach the heart of
France. But they will never reach it. The way is barred
by the dead, the uncounted glorious dead whose graves
stretch from here to the English Channel in an unbroken
line. For their sakes, and the sake of all they fought
and died for, France and England can never put up
the sword till the victory is won. “Then shall be
brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is
.bn 355.png
.pn +1
swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting?
O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin,
and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God,
which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus
Christ.”
.nf l
Delémont,
January 1st, 1916.
.nf-
.bn 356.png
.bn 357.png
.pn +2
.sp 4
.h2
EPILOGUE
.nf c
By Monsieur Léon Mirman,
Prefect of the Department of Meurthe et Moselle.
.nf-
[M. L. Mirman, who is a Fellow of the University of
Paris and was a Mathematical Lecturer at the Lycée of
Reims, was elected Deputy for Reims in 1893. He
represented the city in Parliament till 1905, when he
resigned his post as Deputy to become Directeur de
l’Assistance et de l’Hygiène Publiques. Interesting as this
office was in time of peace, it did not agree in time of
war with his ideas of active work, and at the beginning
of the month of August, 1914, he was appointed, at his
own request, to the frontier post of Prefect of Nancy.—G.
F. C.]
.ll 68
.rj
Nancy, February 2nd, 1916.
.ll
My dear Campbell,
.ti 6
You wrote the last words of your book on
the 1st of January, 1916, at Delémont. I am very sorry
that you did not open the year 1916 where you began the
year 1915, among your friends at Nancy. You would
have witnessed there a fresh crime, bearing the unmistakable
hall-mark of “Kultur.”
Nancy—as you proved for yourself de visu, and as
.bn 358.png
.pn +1
you state in the course of your book—is a ville ouverte,
without any fortifications. It does not contain a single
military establishment. The barracks, which are full
of soldiers in time of peace, were emptied on the first
day of the war, and were all converted either into
hospitals or else into homes of refuge for women and
children, refugees whom I gathered in from the destroyed
communes. Not one cannon, not one shell, not one
soldier is housed in the town. And yet, by means of a
long-range gun, mounted at a distance of about 33
kilometres, the Boches are sending us shells of 800 kilos.,
which fall from a height of 8000 metres and crush a
house like a walnut. They have no military objective.
What, then, is their purpose? Their intention is twofold.
In the first place they wish to “terrorize”; these
people are fools, they will never understand that they
inspire not fear but horror, and that by acts of this kind
they are sowing not terror but hatred. In the second
place, they hope to kill, in this great industrial town, a
few women and children. This object they can obviously
attain more easily than the other; it lies within the
reach of every artilleryman, however poor a gunner he
may be, who takes a large town as his target.
So far this statement tells you nothing that you did
not know before. It is a long time since the Boches
gave us their first samples. Every one is acquainted
with their methods. To-day it is only of set purpose
that it is possible to ignore them. The bombardment,
without any military reason, of open towns with no
garrison, has become, on the part of the Germans, an
everyday affair. But these last bombardments of
.bn 359.png
.pn +1
Nancy show a particularly studied nicety, full of the most
delicate refinement.
These heavy guns began to fire on our beloved city
of Lorraine in the dawn of the new year, on the sunny
morning of the 1st of January, 1916. Picture to yourself,
cher ami, on the evening of that 1st of January,
the family hearth of a German intellectual, a chemist,
a philosopher, a historian, or an artist. Herr Doktor
is surrounded by his children, they are celebrating the
feast of the New Year by eating sausages and jam, or
black puddings and sugar. The evening paper arrives.
The family stop talking. Herr Doktor unfolds the
sheet, and reads aloud the stop-press news: “To-day,
January 1, twelve shells of 800 kilos, were fired on Nancy.
Several houses were reduced to dust. Two old men were
buried under the ruins of one of them. The explosion
of a shell killed a child of fifteen months in the arms of
its grandmother....” Herr Doktor exclaims: “Wife,
children, stand up! We must celebrate this victory on
our feet. Hoch! Hoch! Hoch! The children of Nancy
have received some New Year’s presents, some kolossal
presents, explosive sugar-plums weighing 800 kilos.
The year 1916 has opened magnificently. This victory
of Nancy will fill with pride and enthusiasm all the sons
of Great Germany. Let us thank our old German God
for having granted it to us. Let us praise our mighty
Emperor. Hoch! Hoch! Hoch!”
As for us we buried our dead, poor innocent victims,
in silence. We washed the pavement red with blood.
We put down this new crime in the list of accounts
that has to be settled. And we set ourselves again to
.bn 360.png
.pn +1
our work, with our spirits not cast down but invigorated
by the ordeal.
German crimes! You have seen some of them, my
dear Campbell, in Lorraine. A day will come when we
shall have to make a complete list of them, for the
instruction of future generations. There will be some
of us, I hope, who will devote ourselves to this task. It
would be too monstrous that the veil of oblivion should
be drawn over all these crimes.
It is imperative that we should know, that the whole
world shall recognize, that our school-children shall learn
all the evil that the German has done to mankind. At the
head of these plain statements—all the more terrible
indictments for the dryness of the official reports—we
will place the following declarations, the authors of
which are classed amongst the most notorious German
writers:
“There is nothing in common between them (Kultur
and Civilization). The war which is being waged is
that of Kultur against Civilization. Kultur, the spiritual
(!) organization of the world, which does not exclude
bloody savagery—Kultur which is above morals, reason,
science; Kultur, die Sublimerung des Dämonischen.”
This unforgettable profession of faith appeared under
the signature of Thomas Mann in the Neue Rundschau,
in the number of November, 1914.[A]
.fm rend=th
.fn A
This quotation is second-hand; I have taken it from the de
la Mélée of Romain Rolland. We know that he belongs to the small
number of those men, if I may dare call them so, who at the moment when
their family is massacred, their house set on fire, their old father shot,
their sister violated, isolate themselves in a tower of ivory, from the top of
which, looking on at these crimes, and striving to hold an even balance
between the assassins and the victims, they proclaim themselves “Above
the conflict.”... This state of mind is at least a guarantee to us of the
accuracy of the expressions which he quotes from the profession of faith of
his “brother” Thomas Mann.
.fn-
.fm rend=th
And this criticism, addressed by Maximilian Harden
.bn 361.png
.pn +1
to the German Government, after having treated as lies
their distracted efforts to excuse the violation of Belgium
neutrality:—
“What is the use of all this fuss?... Might creates
right for us. Does a strong man ever submit to the
foolish pretensions or the sentimentality of a band of
weaklings?”
You know, my dear Campbell, the spirit in which we
began this war—the same spirit as that of our English
friends. For our part we were governed by respect for
treaties, for international agreements, for the laws of
war, for the rights of nations, for everything by which
men, in their bloody struggles one against the other,
had tried to raise themselves little by little above the
level of wild beasts. Since the war had come, since it
had been forced upon us by the enemy—who, after an
elaborate preparation, had chosen his own time—we
wished, while engaging in it and carrying it through, to
minimize its calamities as much as possible, by strictly
observing the articles of agreement by which the nations
had mutually bound themselves to consider the wounded
as res sacra, not to maltreat civilians, not to bombard
open towns, and so on. We have paid dearly for the
chivalrous illusions which we had at the outset.
Let me give you two examples of the state of mind
which prevailed in France at that moment.
The Boches—I say it not to justify but to explain
.bn 362.png
.pn +1
their acts of murder—pretended, as you remind us in
the course of your book, that civilians had fired upon
them. It is a cynical falsehood. Since the beginning of
August, 1914, I have administered the Department of
Meurthe et Moselle, and I have made a searching investigation
in all my communes. I affirm that no non-combatant,
no man not regularly classed in the ranks
of the army, has ever fired on the enemy. Never? I
exaggerate. There has been one case. One day, in
1914, a German aeroplane flew over the plains of Lorraine;
it dropped murderous bombs at random on the peaceable
population of certain rural communes. On seeing
this, the Mayor of one of these communes, close to Nancy,
lost his sangfroid, armed himself with an old fowling-piece,
and began to fire at the aeroplane. There was
certainly some excuse for him, was there not? But I
considered that he was at fault. Assassins must not
be killed by passers-by; it is the business of the gendarmes
to arrest them. In war it is the army’s business—it
is strong enough for the job—to punish the enemy.
Consequently the action of this mayor called for censure.
I did not hesitate to make an order against this honest
but over-strung magistrate; in virtue of the powers
conferred upon me by the law, I suspended him from his
functions. This order was universally approved; it
interpreted the unanimous wish of all civilians not to
provide any pretext for German brutality.
I take another example of our standard of behaviour
from the story of Badonviller. This Lorraine commune
was one of the first that suffered the horrors of Kultur.
It was entered by the Germans at the beginning of the
.bn 363.png
.pn +1
month of August. Because our troops had met them
with a stubborn resistance which cost them dear, they
were mad with fury when they entered the little town;
it was there that they first used the special implements
with which their soldiers had been supplied for methodical
and “scientific” house-burnings; they destroyed, with
fire applied by hand, half the commune. That was not
enough for them; they shot down the people in the
streets like rabbits, they killed women and children on
the threshold of their doors. The mayor, M. Benoit, a
much-respected business man, saw his young wife assassinated
before his eyes; he saw his house burnt, and was
himself the object of the worst forms of violence. These
scenes of outrage only lasted for a short time. On the
next day the French troops retook Badonviller by a
vigorous effort, and, after a hot pursuit, made a number
of prisoners. These prisoners were brought to the square
in front of the Mairie. They were some of the brute-beasts
with human faces, who, a few hours before, had
burnt the commune and bathed it in blood. The
houses to which they had set fire were still smoking.
The bodies of their innocent victims were not yet buried.
A crowd of infuriated peasants gathered round them,
shaking their fists at them, and abusing them with
angry cries. The situation was becoming awkward,
when the mayor arrived. M. Benoit had just seen his
poor wife placed in her coffin. He had no longer a home.
His house was a mass of smoking ashes. He was ruined.
His heart was broken. He drew near the scene. The
prisoners thought that their last hour had come, and
turned livid with terror.
.bn 364.png
.pn +1
But M. Benoit is a Mayor of France. He knows the
traditions of our country. He respects the law. He
forced a way through the crowd. With a single gesture
he called for silence. He reminded them that these
men were prisoners, that prisoners were protected by
international agreements, and that no one had a right
to lay a finger on them—no, not even on them. He
put himself in front of them. He made a rampart for
them with his body. He declared that while he lived
not a hair of the head of one of these prisoners of war
should be touched. And the peasants, mastered by
their sense of duty, stifled their cries of anger, unclenched
their fists, and respectfully moved away and went into
their houses.
The Bavarian assassins were decorated by the Kaiser,
for their crimes, with the Iron Cross. The French
Government at my request granted to M. Benoit the
Cross of the Legion of Honour, and a few days later I
presented it to him with my own hands.
Those are the principles with which, on one side and
the other, we began the war, and these two incidents,
taken at random from a hundred of the same kind, seem
to me to show accurately the difference between the
two methods, the difference between the Civilization on
which Thomas Mann heaps his contempt, jeering at its
“reason, its gentleness, and its emancipation,” and the
Kultur which, according to him, is “above morality,
reason, and science,” the Kultur which he hails as “die
Subliemerung des Dämonischen.”
.tb
Have these principles been modified? Those of the
.bn 365.png
.pn +1
Germans, no; our own, yes. The Germans have
systematically continued the practical application of
their gentlemanly instincts. After the crimes of Lorraine
and Belgium came the unpardonable outrage of the
Lusitania, followed by others so numerous and so varied
that I must give up the idea of finding room for them
in this letter; a whole volume would not be long enough
to give a full list of them.
If the principles of the Boches have remained the
same and have incited them every day to the commission
of fresh outrages, ours—I say it frankly—have
changed.
We want three things—to-day reprisals of defence—to-morrow
compensations—finally, to save the future,
punishment.
Reprisals? Most certainly. There are two kinds
of reprisals, those of vengeance and those of defence.
The first I reject; the second I demand. I should be
proud if French soldiers and their brothers-in-arms kept
their hands clean when they penetrate into Germany. I
swear that no violence could have stained them if the
Boches had not been piling up provocations for months
and months. In any case I am quite sure that if, contrary
to my hopes, they were to give way to these
provocations, our dear soldiers would never commit a
tenth part of the acts of violence which have been
suffered by our unhappy populations; they would
dismiss with horror the idea of setting fire to ambulances,
or of massacring old men and women and
children.
But there are reprisals of defence. These I hope for,
.bn 366.png
.pn +1
and our Nations demand them. We have got to defend
our soldiers and our civilians. To reply, in the trenches,
to grenades with oranges, to gases which kill with gases
which make the eyes smart, to liquid fire with cold water,
would not only be idiotic, it would be criminal. In
battle, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Abel
must fight with the same weapons as Cain. However
varied the forms of human folly may be, I imagine that
no one will dispute this necessity. If, however, any
soft-hearted philanthropists raise a protest and entreat
us not to answer gas by gas and fire by fire, it would be
easy to form a few gangs of them and place them in
the front-line trenches, with instructions, when asphyxiating
gases of the enemy arrive, to disperse the clouds
by blowing upon them, and to put out the flames of the
liquid fire with their gentle tears.
We have also got to defend civilians. Intoxicated
by their philosophers the Boches can only understand
the arguments of force. They laugh ponderously at our
protests in the name of right. Blows are the only things
that they can feel. We ought thoroughly to convince
them that every time that one of our open towns is
bombarded by cannon, by Zeppelin, or by aeroplanes,
one of our aeroplanes, while we are waiting for something
better, will bombard one of theirs. An excellent effect
was produced by the operations at Carlsruhe and Stuttgart.
Let us equip hundreds of aeroplanes for purposes
of bombardment, and let each outrage of the Boches on
our towns be followed by an immediate riposte, frankly
announced in the newspapers to the whole world. Is
that cruelty? I would accept that reproach from no
.bn 367.png
.pn +1
one. I have immense pity in my heart—pity for our
children and our women who are the victims of German
assassins, pity for our children and our women whom it
is our duty to protect, and whom we can protect in this
way only! That, I repeat, is not a reprisal of vengeance,
but a reprisal of defence. The people who protest
against the use of such means ought not to remain far
from the danger zone. Let them go—not alone, that
would be too easy, but with their family, their old
mothers, their wives, their children—let them go and
take up their abode in the open towns which serve most
often as targets, to Reims, to Pont-à-Mousson, to Nancy,
to Dunkerque; let them go and live there in the houses
of the poor, which are crushed like walnuts by big shells
and split from top to bottom by Zeppelin bombs, or
else let them take a berth for a few months on a
transatlantic steamer; when they have been there
long enough, when they have observed at close quarters
the acts of the Boches, when they have seen some loved
one fall by their side, when they have felt on their own
brow the wind of a Camarde, then, if they still demand
that the Allies should not engage in reprisals of defence,
their advice, though it may not be wise, will at least be
worthy of respect. In the meantime, in the name of the
women and children already assassinated, and that the
list of these pitiable victims may not be lengthened,
those people had better be silent who, from the asylum
of their safe and comfortable homes, invite us to reply
to crime by diplomatic notes or by prayers, and to
counter actions that kill with words that lull to sleep!
I said that from to-day our wish is for reprisals of
.bn 368.png
.pn +1
defence, and that to-morrow we shall want compensation
and punishment.
One word only about compensations. It is not enough
that everything which has been destroyed and can be
paid for shall be paid for. Those who have wilfully set
our villages on fire must be compelled to rebuild them;
we shall, I hope, requisition in “Boche”-land enough
manual labour to repair all that can be repaired of their
crimes. When they have not destroyed our manufactories
they have pillaged them, stealing raw material,
manufactured articles, and machines; I sincerely hope
that they will be compelled to restore our plant to us
in good condition, that in case of need, while we wait for
better, we shall not hesitate to take theirs in place of
our own, which they have no doubt broken up, and
that we shall have the sense to impose upon them a
whole category of economic measures calculated to
restore those of our industries which they have deliberately
ruined.
And I imagine also that in the domain of art, compensations
will be put down in settling up the accounts.
We will leave them all their own public monuments, in
the clumsy bad taste of which they take such pride.
But there are in the German and Austrian museums
masterpieces of art—not of German art, but of Flemish
or Italian, Dutch or French, Russian or English. The
Boches will entertain profound respect for us if we
collect all these works, which in any case they do not
understand, and form with them in beautiful maltreated
towns such as Louvain, Ypres, Reims, and
Arras, museums of the Great War. If we do not act
.bn 369.png
.pn +1
in this way they would feel no gratitude towards us,
but would treat us simply as imbeciles, and for once I
should be of their opinion.
But to come to a graver question: the necessity for
punishment. It will not be enough that the material
and economic damage which they have done shall be
repaired, it will not be enough that the Monster which
has steeped the whole world in blood shall be struck
down and rent limb from limb, and placed for ever in a
condition in which it can do no harm. The outraged
conscience of humanity demands personal decrees
against the assassins.
Ah! If the sponge were to be passed over all the
crimes that have been committed, over all the outrages
and all the violations of the rights of nations, if this
war were to be ended by an ordinary treaty modifying
the frontiers, and stipulating for financial and economic
conditions and nothing more, and if, after this treaty,
wearied of hating and giving in to a great craving for
moral peace, the hostile Nations were to blot from their
memories the recollection of the Evil accomplished, and
were to throw themselves into each other’s arms and
exchange a mighty kiss of concord and of love—let us
take every precaution against such a possibility! A
misfortune would overtake humanity far more serious
for it than all the catastrophes which it has suffered in
the course of its sorrowful history. I say that if we do
not strike at the head of the most exalted, the most
powerful among the responsible authors of these crimes—those
who let loose the war, those who gloried in
tearing up treaties like “scraps of paper,” those who
.bn 370.png
.pn +1
ordered the sinking of the Lusitania and the Persia and
their thousands of passengers, those who first bombarded
open towns, those who for the first time
launched aeroplanes and Zeppelins over our industrial
cities on both sides of the Channel (to speak only of our
own front) those who burnt Louvain, who murdered
the Cathedral of Reims, those who gave the order for
the first acts of incendiarism and pillage and assassination,
those who splashed the statue of Charity with the
noble blood of Miss Cavell, those who started the régime
of asphyxiating gases and liquid fire, and all who have
placed themselves beyond the pale of the law, and of
humanity—if the sword of the law does not fall on all
these men personally, this is what will happen: man
will no longer believe in honour, he will no longer
believe in right, he will no longer believe in justice,
he will no longer believe in anything. His faith in a
better future will vanish and be dispelled for ever, along
with the beautiful dreams which—whether they were
realizable or not—were our joy, our hope, and our
pride, in which we were constructing, on the foundation
of Law and of Right, better national and international
organizations than those by which man up to our day
had protected himself. If the criminals do not bear
the punishment of their crimes the principle of responsibility
gives way, carrying with it all our codes and laws.
It will remain a settled principle that only Force counts.
The force of Germany will not have triumphed this time,
but its hateful doctrine will remain all-powerful, and
that would be for humanity a terrible moral relapse.
The Germans have taught us to hate—and perhaps
.bn 371.png
.pn +1
that is their greatest moral crime. To this new passion,
but lately still unknown to us, we had for long ages closed
our hearts. We should not have allowed it to enter
them, if, whether as conquerors or conquered, we had
been challenged by our enemies to an honourable combat.
Under the repeated blows of their outrages our hearts
ended by giving it admittance; hatred has entered into
them, it has settled itself there, and taken up its abode.
It will stay there till justice has been done. Our soul
will not be freed from hatred till the day when the
expiation of the chief culprits has been carried out.
Then, and then only, humanity will be able to resume
its enthusiastic and yet halting march in the direction
of Progress.
These are not the extravagant visions of a solitary
dreamer. You recognize these sentiments, friend Campbell.
You have felt how strongly they were imposed
upon upright consciences, however enamoured of the
ideal, by the stern contact with realities. No one can
remain a stranger to that fact who has made the melancholy
pilgrimages which you have in the murdered lands,—for
example, in the wasted fields of Lorraine or
Champagne—if, in the cities of Reims or of Pont-à-Mousson,
in Sermaize or Clermont en Argonne, in
Nomeny or Gerbéviller—and all the other places, alas!
where innocent blood has flowed—he can hear and
remember with a brotherly heart the cries of the
martyrs, as he passes through the midst of the ruins.
.tb
Is it impossible to realize these projects? Is it an
idle fancy to talk of such conditions and to demand such
.bn 372.png
.pn +1
punishments, while the enemy is still burrowing in
trenches dug in our soil? No! No! Whatever trials
we may still have to submit to, whatever long sufferings
we may still have to endure, in France, as in England, in
Russia, in Italy, in Belgium, and in Servia, we all
know perfectly well—as the rest of the world is beginning
to know—that absolute victory, with the conditions
dictated by us, will without any doubt be the prize of
our efforts, if we pursue those efforts with enough
resolution and method, that is to say if we are determined
to have it, if our determination and our actions are in
proportion to the importance of the object we have to
attain. And you, friend Campbell, will have the honour
of being of the number of those who, from the first hour,
have had a clear vision of the future, of those who have
taught your noble Nation to understand and to be
determined. And so with all my heart I give you my
hand.
.ll 68
.nf r
Yours truly,
LÉON MIRMAN.
.nf-
.ll
.sp 4
.hr 100%
.ce
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND DECCLES.
.bn 373.png
.pn a1
.pb
.ta c:27 c:15 c:27
Telegrams: | |41 and 43 Maddox Street,
“Scholarly, Reg. London.” | |Bond Street, London, W.
Telephone: | |October, 1916.
No. 1883 Mayfair. | |
.ta-
.nf c
Mr. Edward Arnold’s
AUTUMN
ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1916.
.nf-
.hr 20%
.nf c
CHAPTERS FROM MY OFFICIAL
LIFE.
By Sir C. RIVERS WILSON, G.C.M.G.
Edited by E. MacALISTER.
One Volume. With Portraits. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 12s. 6d. net.
.nf-
The autobiography of Sir C. Rivers Wilson covers a long
period and touches on many interesting historical events. Sir
Rivers, who was born in 1831 and died in 1916, passed the greater
part of his life in the service of his country. While still a young
man at the Treasury, he was for some time private secretary to
Mr. Disraeli, of whom he has some good stories to tell, and he has
much to say about the celebrated “Bob Lowe,” whose notorious
“match tax” has lately been passed by Mr. McKenna. For over
twenty years Sir Rivers Wilson was the head of the National
Debt Office, but his most interesting work during that time was
when he was specially detached for financial diplomacy in Egypt,
and his account of his difficult dealings with the Khedive Ismail
Pasha brings much that is new to light. It is particularly
relevant at the present time, when Prince Hussein, the son of
Ismail Pasha, has been established as independent Sultan of
Egypt under the British Protectorate. Sir Rivers gives us most
entertaining chapters on Ferdinand de Lesseps, le Grand
Français, whom he knew intimately, and on many other Parisian
celebrities of later days. At the age of sixty-four Sir Rivers
became connected with America, first through C. P. Huntington
and the Central Pacific Railway, then as President of the Grand
Trunk Railway, which he raised to a position of great prosperity.
All this he tells in a modest and unassuming way, with many
touches of humour. His style is “chatty” and genial, and it is
obvious that Sir Rivers Wilson was a man of few enemies and
many friends.
.hr 50%
LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET, W.
.bn 374.png
.pn a2
.pb
.nf c
FROM SAIL TO STEAM.
NAVAL RECOLLECTIONS, 1878-1905.
By ADMIRAL C. C. PENROSE FITZGERALD,
Author of “Memories of the Sea.”
With numerous full-page Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net.
.nf-
Admiral Fitzgerald’s life has been an exceptionally full and
varied one, and whether he was afloat or ashore, engaged in his
professional duties, or enjoying a strenuous sporting holiday, he
is always interesting, because whatever he turned his hand
to—work or play—he did it with all his might. Of the active
work at sea which is comprised in the present volume, perhaps
the most remarkable portion is the cruise with the squadron
which accompanied the Bacchante when King George and his
brother made their memorable voyage—not round the world.
If any tour was likely to be carried out according to prearranged
plans, one would have said it was this one, and the story of the
vicissitudes in its progress and programme is curious and highly
instructive.
On shore, Admiral Fitzgerald was at one time in charge of the
Royal Naval College, and for two years Superintendent of the
Pembroke Dockyard, entertaining in the latter capacity a number
of distinguished visitors, among them the ill-fated Admiral
Rosjesvenski. He was more than once stationed in the
Mediterranean in circumstances which enabled him to take ample
advantage of the wonderful sporting opportunities then available.
Among his most attractive chapters are those which describe the
shooting—woodcock, duck, wild-boar, etc.—in Albania, Syria,
and Turkey; and he has a rare knack of conveying much of his
own whole-hearted enjoyment to the reader.
He is almost apologetic with regard to his passion for sport,
and, indeed, admits that in the eighties the navy suffered somewhat
from a tendency to rest on its laurels and take things easily.
Much more did this tendency affect those in charge of affairs at
home, the politicians—a class whom the Admiral, quite irrespective
of party, holds in very low esteem. The remaining principal
section of the book describes the stages in the struggle against
this tendency, initiated by Admiral Fitzgerald and a few other
far-seeing men, fortunately not too late.
.bn 375.png
.pn a3
.sp 2
.nf c
THE REMINISCENCES OF THE
RT. HON. LORD O’BRIEN,
LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF IRELAND.
Edited by his Daughter, Hon. GEORGINA O’BRIEN.
One Volume. With Portrait. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.
.nf-
Not many bodies of men have a more distinguished tradition
than the Irish Bench and Bar, and among the legal luminaries of
Ireland in recent years there was no more representative and
characteristic figure than Lord Chief Justice O’Brien. After his
retirement he occupied his leisure in putting together his
reminiscences. They were unfortunately left unfinished at his
death, but have been edited and completed with the fullest knowledge
and sympathy by his daughter, the Hon. Georgina O’Brien.
He has much to say of sport, of youthful frolics, and of
prominent figures in the social life of Dublin, but the main
interest of the book lies, as was to be expected, in his professional
recollections. These include the trials arising out of the Ph[oe]nix
Park murders, and those which followed another no less sombre
tragedy—the Maamstrasna massacre; but for the most part they
are of a more cheerful character. The impress of a vigorous and
intensely independent personality is stamped on every page, and
few people could attain to the detached serenity with which he
records the bestowal of the once well-known sobriquet of “Peter
the Packer.”
.sp 2
.nf c
A NEW NOVEL BY FORREST REID.
THE SPRING SONG,
By FORREST REID.
Author of “At the Door of the Gate,” “The Gentle Lover,” etc.
One Volume. Crown 8vo. 6s.
.nf-
Griffith Weston is a child with a temperament. With his
rather ordinary but quite nice relations he lives in the ordinary
world on the usual footing. On his own account he lives another
life in a world of his own. Hence minor escapades which alarm
and exasperate his governess and his kind but conventional aunt,
and which are told with an insight and sympathy that invest their
details with indefinable charm. Into this happy young life enters
.bn 376.png
.pn a4
the sinister figure of the Parish Organist. In him, too, ordinary
folk see nothing but a queer-tempered old musician, but he, like
Grif, lives in a world of his own, though a very different one,
it would seem, from that of the gentle, dreamy boy. The tragedy
which ensues may be baldly summarized as follows: The
Organist, a homicidal maniac, supposed to be cured, gives form
and substance to Grif’s other world, and instils into his mind,
enfeebled by illness, the suggestion that in it there is another
boy, summoning him with a call which is not to be resisted.
The maniac’s lurid death fails to break the spell which grips the
child, and the relief of telling his story to an understanding
listener comes too late. To the real nature of the tragedy
Grif’s own people remain blind to the end. The doctor
knows more, but he only sees when he has been enlightened by
the third of the outstanding figures in the story, a friend of
Grif’s elder brother, and a delightful study of the school-boy
turned Sherlock Holmes. These two are helplessly aware that
the sensitive child has been scared into his grave. Does this
exhaust the matter, or is there still more behind? Throughout
the story the reader is haunted by a feeling that there is another,
more elemental, world, peopled by powers both kindly and
malign, with which both the dreamy boy and the mad musician
have kinship, and by virtue of which the currents of their lives
are intermingled. It is this sense of mystery and doom which
gives the book its glamour and distinction, and provides scope
for Mr. Forrest Reid’s elusive and delicate art.
.sp 2
.nf c
ARBOREAL MAN.
By F. WOOD JONES, M.B., D.Sc.,
Professor of Anatomy in the University of London (London School of
Medicine for Women).
With 81 Illustrations and Diagrams. One Volume. Demy 8vo.
8s. 6d. net.
.nf-
Put as concisely as possible, the theme of Dr. Wood Jones’s
book is a demonstration of the fact that Man, the supreme product
of Evolution, could only have been developed from animals which
had their homes and spent much of their lives in trees; the main
point in the argument being that the descendants of primitive
animals living on the ground were inevitably doomed to become
quadrupeds, and so missed the chance of acquiring the upright
posture which is one of Man’s distinctive attributes, at the same
time paying for more immediate advantages by losing for ever
that invaluable organ, the hand.
Stated in these crude terms, the matter might at first sight seem
.bn 377.png
.pn a5
to be only a chapter, though an important one, in the story of
Human Evolution; but before the reader has progressed very far,
he will begin to realize that the arboreal habitat is not merely one
of the conditions, but the central and dominating factor in the
whole process. Not that living in trees was in itself sufficient to
determine the line of progress in an upward direction. Many
classes of animals lived, as many still live, mainly in trees. Mr.
Wood Jones, reasoning on lines which would delight the heart of
M. Henri Bergson, shows how and why only one of these classes
continuously achieved “the successful minimum of specialization,”
and moved slowly but surely in a direction which ended in Man,
and not in a Lemur or a Sloth.
There is much more in the matter than this, but the whole
argument of the book does not admit of being summarized briefly.
Much of it is based on data supplied by Comparative Anatomy, of
a character which only experts can appreciate, but the author
has skilfully and considerately marshalled his material in such a
way that the successive steps in the development which he proves
to have taken place can be followed and understood by any
intelligent layman.
.sp 2
.nf c
LOVE, WORSHIP, AND DEATH.
SOME RENDERINGS FROM THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY.
By Sir RENNELL RODD, G.C.M.G.,
British Ambassador at Rome.
Author of “Ballads of the Fleet,” “The Violet Crown,” etc.
Small Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net.
.nf-
The poems of which some renderings are here offered to those
who cannot read the originals cover a period of about a thousand
years. The poets of the elegy and the melos appear in due
succession after those of the epic. A little gem from Mimnermus
(seventh century B.C.) is the first in the collection, and some lines
from Macedonius (sixth century A.D.) mark the close. The interpretation
of these lyrics has been the author’s sole and grateful distraction
during a period of ceaseless work and intense anxiety in
the tragic years of 1914 and 1915—“yet another proof,” says a
review in the Morning Post, “of the worth of true poetry as manna
for the soul in these dread and inexorable days.... The little
book is like a vase of rose-leaves, faded yet fragrant, which, as you
pour them out, whisper sympathy from the dead to the living.”
.bn 378.png
.pn a6
.sp 2
.nf c
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
BALLADS OF THE FLEET.
By Sir RENNELL RODD.
A New Popular Edition. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net.
.nf-
In this edition a new poem, entitled “Inter Arma Silent,” is
printed as an introduction, and all matter has been eliminated
which has not strictly to do with the sea. The volume appears
during a struggle even more stern and momentous than that recorded
in the Ballads. But the chivalries of the sea and the test
of high endurance are the same as in the days of our fathers, and
while the Island race endures the spirit of Drake, who sleeps
“’neath some great wave,” will never call to them in vain.
.sp 2
.nf c
THE SOUL AND ITS STORY.
By NORMAN PEARSON,
Author of “Some Problems of Existence,” etc.
One Volume. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 10s. 6d. net.
.nf-
The underlying principle of this book is that the Soul, no less
than the body, is a product of evolution, though, unlike the body
which perishes, it has a destiny which will endure. The Soul,
which has its origin in the dim sentience which accompanies even
the lowest forms of life, is identified with the human Self-consciousness.
It is carefully distinguished, however, from the
Self, which is only one of its partial manifestations. The theory
of Materialism is examined and found wanting, and the nature of
Matter itself investigated. Following upon this, the book deals
with the conditions necessary for the appearance of life and the
mode of its appearance. A chapter is devoted to the controversy
of the Spontaneous Generation of Life, and the curious process of
Heterogenesis. The relations of physical to mental structure are
dwelt upon, and the intimate connections of the two orders of
development. The difficulties which beset the transition from a
subhuman to a human consciousness, and the activities of consciousnesses
in a subhuman condition, are discussed at some
length. Speech is the distinctive mark of man, but it is shown
to be connected with anatomical development and motor activity.
Considerable attention is given to Weismann’s theory of the non-transmission
by heredity of acquired characters, and the theory in
its extreme form is rejected as improbable and unproved. This
disposes of one of the chief obstacles raised by the Weismann
.bn 379.png
.pn a7
school to the permanent value of education and the independent
evolution of the Soul. There are chapters dealing with Personal
Identity, the Relation of the Soul to the Self, the Unity of the
Soul—in spite of the marvellous phenomena of multiple personality,
and a very interesting discussion on the possible permanency
of sex, even in the more spiritual stages of the Soul’s future
development. The book concludes with some philosophical
disquisitions on the nature and method of creation, and the place
of the Soul in, and in relation to, the Universe of which it forms
part. The author, regarding evolution as a process whose operation
extends both to body and mind, repeatedly turns to the
facts of physical evolution for hints towards elucidating the
obscure course of mental evolution.
.sp 2
.nf c
THE DAYS OF ALKIBIADES.
By C. E. ROBINSON, M.A.
With a foreword by Professor C. W. OMAN, Oxford University.
With 16 full-page Illustrations from the Author’s Sketches.
One Volume. Crown 8vo. 5s. net.
.nf-
This book gives a series of sketches, in narrative form, illustrating
the life of an Athenian citizen during the Peloponnesian
War. Nearly all the incidents of both public and private life
are covered. Besides witnessing a wedding, a funeral, a dinner-party,
and the usual scenes of domestic life in town and country,
the reader is introduced to a “Parliament” on the Pnyx, a
dramatic festival in the Theatre, a trial in the Law Courts; he
may visit a Gymnasium with Sokrates, journey with a pilgrim
to Delphi, make the Mystery March to Eleusis, witness a
sea-fight with Phormio, and take a hand in the Battle of Delion.
A sojourn at Sparta, a celebration of the Olympic Games, and a
scene at the Port of Athens, complete the picture.
The thread of the story is woven upon a more or less historical
foundation; but the main purpose of the book is rather to give an
insight into Athenian manners and customs, and to introduce
among the characters types of every sort—the conservative
farmer, the smart young aristocrat, the rich merchant, the
Spartan, the slave and the philosopher. Local colour is imparted
not merely by detail gathered from the Classics and archæological
research, but also by descriptions taken from Greek scenery as it
is to-day.
In short, the book is intended to give to general readers and to
all who are interested in Greece and its history a clear and vivid
picture of Hellenic life and culture in the Great Age of Pericles.
.bn 380.png
.pn a8
.sp 2
.nf c
LIGHT AND SHADE IN WAR.
By Capt. MALCOLM ROSS,
War Correspondent with the New Zealand Forces.
Author of “A Climber in New Zealand,” etc.
AND
NOEL ROSS
of “The Times” Literary Staff
(Lately Lance-Corporal with the Anzacs, and Lieut. Territorial Artillery).
Crown 8vo. Cloth. 5s. net.
.nf-
The Authors of this book have seen, during the past two years,
a great deal of the light and shade of war, the one as a War
Correspondent, the other as a soldier, and, latterly, a Correspondent
of The Times. Some of the war pictures which they
give are classics in their way, and such articles as “The Men
from the Glen” and “The Last Load” are real literature, and
as such worthy of being preserved in the records of the Great War.
Captain Malcolm Ross is well known, not only in his own
country, but also in the United Kingdom, as a writer of note, as a
keen student of Nature, and as a daring explorer and climber in
the Alps of his native land. As a War Correspondent on
Gallipoli, in Egypt, and in France, he has earned further distinction
by his graphic accounts of events from the battle-fields.
His articles have attained a wide popularity in the English and
Colonial Press and have in some instances been translated and
republished in the French journals.
Mr. Noel Ross was wounded in the historic landing on Gallipoli
after having taken part in the fight against the Turks on the Suez
Canal. Discharged as unfit for further service, he again enlisted
in England, passed a course at Shoeburyness, and received a
commission in the Artillery. As a result of continued trouble
from shell shock he had to relinquish his commission. After a
few weeks he was taken on the staff of The Times, for which
journal he has done, and is still doing, brilliant work. He is also
a contributor to Punch.
.sp 2
.nf c
A FRENCH MOTHER IN
WAR TIME.
By Madame E. DRUMONT.
Translated by Miss G. BEVIR.
Crown 8vo.\ \ \ \ Cloth.\ \ \ \ 3s. 6d. net.
.nf-
The writer of this frank and simple narrative is the wife of the
famous anti-Semite, but the young airman son, to whom she is
devotedly attached, is the child of a first marriage. The volume
.bn 381.png
.pn a9
consists of her diary from July, 1914, to August, 1915. This
anxious French mother makes no attempt to represent herself as
more heroic than she was or is, and her honesty gives a special
value to her picture of the central and really fine figure in the
book—that of her son Paul, many of whose letters to her during
the war are here given. Among other interesting passages in the
book is a description of the scene at the Paris Cabinet Council,
when General Gallieni was asked by the Ministry if he would
defend Paris.
.sp 2
.nf c
A YEAR AGO.
BEING “EYE-WITNESS’S” NARRATIVE OF THE WAR
FROM MARCH 30TH TO JULY 18TH, 1915.
By Lieut.-Col. E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E.,
and Capt. THE EARL PERCY.
Paper Covers, 2s. net.\ \ \ \ \ \ Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.
.nf-
This volume contains the conclusion of the famous “Eye-Witness’s”
Narrative from the front, which has now been
discontinued. It is reprinted in full from the reports issued by
the Press Bureau, and has not hitherto been accessible in a
consecutive and complete form. Taken in conjunction with the
previous volume published last year by Mr. Edward Arnold, this
instalment of “Eye-Witness’s” Narrative provides the most
valuable current commentary on the events of the war in
Flanders which has yet appeared. As time goes on, its accurate
and graphic story of the fighting will inevitably be appealed to as
the most reliable evidence of what actually occurred whenever
diverse theories are at issue.
.sp 2
.nf c
THE MOTOR-CAR.
WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO DRIVE IT.
By T. O. A. LAWTON and Prof. R. J. HARVEY GIBSON.
Limp cloth, 1s. net.
.nf-
This book is written by an expert and a novice, and designed
for readers who approach the subject in a condition of complete
ignorance; accordingly, nothing is taken for granted. Only rudimentary
instruction is imparted, but this is given with absolute
simplicity and clearness.
.bn 382.png
.pn a10
.sp 2
.nf c
THE MIGRATIONS OF FISH.
By ALEXANDER MEEK, M.Sc.,
Professor of Biology, Armstrong College, in the University of Durham,
and Director of the Dove Marine Laboratory, Cullercoats.
With 12 Plates and 128 Diagrams and Maps.\ \ \ xvi + 416 pages.
Demy 8vo. 16s. net.
.nf-
This work deals with a very interesting and important subject,
which appeals no less to the layman than to the scientific student.
The habits of sea-fish have only recently begun to be investigated
seriously, but their importance in connection with our great
fishing industries can hardly be overestimated. A great deal of
information relating to the migrations of fish has already been
accumulated, but it is scattered in books and periodicals frequently
difficult to obtain. The author has aimed at giving a
systematic account of the knowledge acquired, developing at the
same time a theory of migrations based upon the various stages in
the growth of fish in connection with currents. The book contains
descriptions of the spawning habits, the eggs and the young,
the passive drift to the feeding grounds, and the distribution of
the species due to migrations. Practically all families of fish
have been considered, but the important food fishes of the Northern
Hemisphere have received specially detailed treatment.
.sp 2
.nf c
THE PRINCIPLES OF ELECTRICAL
ENGINEERING AND THEIR
APPLICATION.
By Dr. GISBERT KAPP.
Professor of Electrical Engineering in the University of Birmingham;
Past President of the Institution of Electrical Engineers.
In Two Volumes, fully illustrated.
Volume I.: Principles. Demy 8vo. 15s. net. [Ready.
⁂ Volume II. is almost completed, and will be ready shortly.
.nf-
.bn 383.png
.pn a11
.sp 2
.nf c
Recent Books on the War.
Second Impression now ready.
VERDUN TO THE VOSGES.
IMPRESSIONS OF THE WAR ON THE FORTRESS
FRONTIER OF FRANCE.
By GERALD CAMPBELL.
Special Correspondent of “The Times” in the East of France.
With Illustrations and Maps.\ \ \ \ Demy 8vo.\ \ \ 10s. 6d. net.
.nf-
“If Mr. Gerald Campbell had only written about such experiences as other
visitors to the front have had, his remarkably readable book would have
deserved high praise on its merits. But he has done much more than that;
he has written of experiences which no other English Correspondent has had,
and his book must be placed among the few which are really informing, even
to those who are familiar with the facts of the war.”—Spectator.
“A deeply impressive, well-informed book. Mr. Campbell’s book will well
repay careful and patient study. It penetrates beneath the surface of the
fighting.”—Daily Telegraph.
“This book contains, so far as we know, the only careful and trustworthy
account of those months of intense fighting which has yet been published.
Historians will have to turn to these pages for information in regard to many
details of the confused events of the early days in this theatre.”—The Times.
.sp 2
.nf c
A SURGEON IN KHAKI.
By A. A. MARTIN, M.D., F.R.C.S. Eng.
Sixth Impression.\ \ \ With Illustrations.\ \ \ 10s. 6d. net.
.nf-
“A superlatively interesting book.”—Graphic.
“A book full of life and human feeling. ‘A Surgeon in Khaki’ will
certainly live as a first-class description of a portion of the great war.”—Field.
“A book of extraordinary interest. There are many stories, grave and gay,
in this book, which should be widely read. It is quite a remarkable book and
gives a wonderful vision of what war is.”—Birmingham Daily Post.
.sp 2
.nf c
WITH OUR ARMY IN FLANDERS.
By G. VALENTINE WILLIAMS.
Second Impression.\ \ Illustrated.\ \ 12s. 6d. net.
.nf-
“Mr. Williams has written an excellent book, one of the most vivid and
informing accounts that have yet been produced of our men in the field.
Like all good correspondents, he has an eye for significant detail. His
knowledge of Germany helps him to many instructive comparisons. He is
the master of an easy, vigorous style, which occasionally reaches real
eloquence. Above all, he has a great gift of enthusiasm. The book is
written in a fine spirit, not captious, or egotistical, or flamboyant, but honest
and understanding.”—Spectator.
“This book is no mere compilation of the day-to-day dispatches from
Mr. Williams, but a complete study of the army at work and at play, touched
by many a scene of pathos, enlivened by many a page of vivacious anecdote,
and marked throughout by keen study of all the phases and problems of the
war.”—Daily Mail.
.bn 384.png
.pn a12
.sp 2
.nf c
A SURGEON IN BELGIUM.
By H. S. SOUTTAR, F.R.C.S.,
Late Surgeon-in-Chief of the Belgian Field Hospital.
Popular Edition, Paper Cover, 2s. net. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.
.nf-
“In place of the average piece of journalistic hack-work, we have here a
live book, a book with a character and a soul, a book whose literary skill and
deep human feeling justify the prediction that it will be found among the few
elect records which survive their hour, and are still remembered and consulted
in years to come.”—Daily Telegraph.
“Admirably written and readable from beginning to end.”—Morning Post.
“Mr. Souttar is a surgeon with a gift for vivid writing. His book is a quite
fascinating record of his experience.”—Daily News.
.sp 2
.nf c
EYE-WITNESS’S NARRATIVE OF
THE WAR.
FROM THE MARNE TO NEUVE CHAPELLE,
SEPTEMBER, 1914, TO MARCH, 1915.
By Lieut.-Col. E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E.,
and Capt. THE EARL PERCY.
312 pages. Crown 8vo. Paper, 1s. net. Cloth, 2s. net.
(Particulars of the later volume will be found on page 9.)
.nf-
“Pending the time when a full history of the European conflict will be
possible, there can be nothing better in the way of a brief general survey of
the British operations than ‘Eye-Witness’s Narrative.’”—Illustrated London
News.
.sp 2
.nf c
A RUSSIAN CLASSIC OF ENTRANCING INTEREST
AND GREAT HISTORICAL VALUE.
YEARS OF CHILDHOOD.
By SERGE AKSAKOFF.
Translated, for the first time, from the Russian by J. D. DUFF,
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.
Demy 8vo.\ \ \ \ 10s. 6d. net.
.nf-
“‘Years of Childhood’ becomes the more fascinating the more one reads
and thinks about it. Aksakoff read a new and ecstatic meaning into things
which are banal and tame to most men and women, and the eager eye of his
mind scanned deep into the lives and loves of the people round about him.”—Morning
Post.
“A charming Russian book. At this time when so many translations from
the Russian are appearing, well advised and ill advised, it is good to be able
to put the hand on one superlatively good book. Here is a refreshment for
tired eyes and tired souls. It is put into beautiful English.”—Country Life.
“English readers may well be grateful to Mr. J. D. Duff for his translation
of a very unusual book. He promises us a translation of ‘A Family History,’
which carries on the narrative of Aksakoff’s life and gives some account of his
family. In the original the two make one book, and all who read this first
instalment will welcome the completion of it.”—Spectator.
.hr 100%
.ce
LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET, W.
.pb
.dv class='tnotes'
.ce
Transcriber’s Note
Hyphens occuring at a line break are either retained or removed based
on other occurences in the text. Midline inconsistencies
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
.ta l:8 l:46 l:12 w=90%
| on our way to the frontier[./,] | Replaced.
| instead of in the r[ó/ô]le which French| Replaced.
| not a soldier was left in the town[.] | Added.
| vont contribuer à l’héro[i/ï]que défen[c/s]e de la trouée | Replaced.
| the Sous-Préf[é/e]t, M. Mequillet | Replaced.
| comme al[l]ongé> sur la table. | Inserted.
| ‘Etude de M. X. Notaire[’]. | Added.
| un coup de fe[n/u] | Replaced.
| to build a pontoon-bridge[.] | Added.
| the main objective of the attack[,/.] | Replaced.
| I have taken it from the Au[-]dessus de la Mélée | Inserted.
.ta-
.dv-