// ppgen source syria_vol2-src.txt
// 20160406143400napier
// KD Weeks, Brian Coe and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
// first edit: 06-may-2017
.dt The War in Syria, Volume 2, by Commodore Sir Charles Napier
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Transcriber’s Note:
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.h1
THE | WAR IN SYRIA.
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BY
COMMODORE SIR CHARLES NAPIER, K.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.
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IN TWO VOLUMES.
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VOL. II.
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LONDON:
JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND.
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M.DCCC.XLII.
.bn 002.png
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London:
Harrison and Co., Printers,
St. Martin’s Lane.
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.bn 003.png
.pn iii
.sp 4
.h2
CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
.ta h:60 r:10
| PAGE
Chapter I.
Gale on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts—The Author’s\
return to Marmorice Bay—Letters from the Admiral,\
the General and the Ambassador regarding the Convention—The\
Author’s Replies—Letter of the Admiral\
to Mehemet Ali—Commotion occasioned by the Convention—Admiral’s\
Letter to the Admiralty—Instruction\
of the 14th November—Captain Fanshawe dispatched\
to Alexandria—Instruction to the Admiral | #1#
Chapter II.
Captain Fanshawe’s proceedings at Alexandria—Letter\
from Mehemet Ali to the Admiral—Official Report\
of Captain Fanshawe—Letter of Mehemet Ali to the\
Grand Vizier—English Ships again ordered to the\
Coast of Syria—Part of the Convention carried into\
effect by the Admiral | #20#
Chapter III.
Captain Fanshawe’s Arrival at Constantinople—Interview\
with the Grand Vizier—Conference of Ambassadors\
and Rechid Pacha—Conduct of Lord Ponsonby; his\
Letter to Lord Palmerston—The Porte accepts the\
submission of Mehemet Ali—Letter of Rechid Pacha\
to the Ambassador and of the Vizier to Mehemet Ali—Captain\
Fanshawe returns to Marmorice | #33#
.bn 004.png
.pn +1
Chapter IV.
Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary\
Pachalic on Mehemet Ali—Departure of the Turkish\
Commissioners—Their orders—Opposition of the Austrian,\
Prussian, and Russian Ministers to the views of\
Lord Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston’s opinion of his\
conduct—Rewards conferred on the Officers of the\
Squadron at Acre—News from England—Approval of\
the Convention—Instruction of the 15th of December—Lord\
Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Prince\
Metternich and Count Nesselrode, in approval of the\
Convention | #41#
Chapter V.
The Author ordered to Alexandria to carry the Convention\
into effect—Interviews with the Pacha and Boghos\
Bey—Letter from Boghos Bey explaining the Pacha’s\
Intentions—Lieut. Loring dispatched to see the Evacuation\
of Syria carried into effect; his Instructions—Letters\
to the Chief Officers in Syria—Arrival of the\
Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria-Surrender of\
the Turkish Fleet—Bad Faith of the Turks-Correspondence\
between the Author and Boghos Bey respecting\
the Cotton Crop—The Commercial Treaty | #61#
Chapter VI.
The Author visits Cairo—The Mahmoudieh Canal—Fire\
on board the Steamer—Voyage up the Nile—Appearance\
of the Country—Condition of the People—Arrival\
at Cairo—Visit to Abbas Pacha—Palace of Schoubrah—Establishments\
of the Pacha—Industry of the\
Arabs—Visit to the Pyramids—Quit Cairo | #76#
.bn 005.png
.pn +1
Chapter VII.
Letter from Captain Stewart—Apprehended Treachery of\
the Turkish Authorities—Question of the Syrian\
Troops—Double dealing of Mehemet Ali—The Author’s\
Letters to the chief British and Turkish Officers—Letter\
to the Admiral | #89#
Chapter VIII.
Affairs in Syria—Letters of Sir Charles Smith to Lord\
Palmerston—Course that ought to have been pursued\
after the Battle of Boharsof—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s\
Movements and Intentions—General Michell to Lord\
Palmerston—M. Steindl’s Report respecting the Advance\
upon Gaza—Captain Stewart to the Admiral—General\
Michell’s and Captain Stewart’s Opinion as to\
Lord Ponsonby’s Orders—Correspondence between\
Captain Stewart and General Jochmus | #97#
Chapter IX.
Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding\
Ibrahim Pacha’s Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford\
styled by him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied\
Forces—The General’s Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Unwillingness\
of the Admiral to prolong the\
War—Reported Destruction of the Egyptian Army—Advance\
upon Gaza—Colonel Alderson’s Narrative of\
the Skirmish of Medjdel | #119#
Chapter X.
General Jochmus’s farther Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Destruction\
of the Magazines at Maan—Ignorance\
as to Ibrahim’s movements—Ibrahim crosses the Jordan\
.bn 006.png
.pn +1
to Jericho, and menaces Jerusalem, while supposed\
to be wandering in the Desert—General Jochmus’s\
Account of the Movements of Ibrahim—Reported\
Destruction of his Infantry—Ibrahim did not intend\
to enter Palestine—His Statement to Colonel Napier | #134#
Chapter XI.
Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim\
Pacha—Arrival of part of the Egyptian Army at\
Gaza—Promised Neutrality of the Turks—The\
Egyptians informed of the Cessation of Hostilities\
by the English Officers—Terms recommended by Mr.\
Wood to be imposed upon Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel\
Napier’s Narrative of the Retreat of Ibrahim Pacha | #141#
Chapter XII.
Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His\
Advice disregarded by the British Officers—Mission\
of Colonel Alderson to Gaza—Colonel\
Rose’s Account of the State of Ibrahim’s Army—Colonel\
Alderson’s Character of Ibrahim Pacha—Death\
of General Michell | #157#
Chapter XIII.
Detail of the Retreat of the Egyptians—Treacherous\
Intentions of the Turkish Authorities—Decided Conduct\
of the British Officers—Guarantees exchanged—Fright\
of Rechid Pacha—Letter from Ibrahim to the\
Seraskier—The Author’s Letters to Lords Minto and\
Palmerston | #172#
.bn 007.png
.pn +1
Chapter XIV.
Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian\
Army—Reason for abiding by the Reports of the
British Officers—Colonel Alderson’s Detail of the Retreat—General\
Jochmus’s Statement—Lieut. Loring’s\
Mission | #182#
Chapter XV.
Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was\
conducted—Departure of Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of\
Souliman’s Division—Complete Evacuation of Syria—Letter\
of Lord Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish\
Fleet—Anxiety of Mehemet Ali for the safety of his\
Army—Letter from Boghos Bey to the Author on the\
subject | #191#
Chapter XVI.
Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at\
Constantinople—Lord Ponsonby’s Propositions regarding\
the Hereditary Government of Egypt—Approved\
by the other Allied Ministers, but on consideration\
rejected by them—Lord Palmerston’s Conversation\
with the Turkish Minister—Note of the Four Powers\
in favour of the Hereditary Tenure | #199#
Chapter XVII.
Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary\
Pachalic for Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between\
Baron Stunner and Lord Ponsonby—Decisive\
Instructions from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby—Conference\
of the Allied Ministers with Rechid\
.bn 008.png
.pn +1
Pacha—Project for settling the Egyptian Question—Lord\
Ponsonby’s Observations at the Conference—The\
Firmans decided on—Refusal of Lord Ponsonby to\
allow the English Consul-General to return to Egypt—Lord\
Ponsonby’s Letter to Rechid Pacha | #214#
Chapter XVIII.
Delay in forwarding the Firmans to Mehemet Ali—Instructions\
to the Commissioner—The Author’s Visit to\
the Egyptian Flag-ship—Substance of the Firmans—Objections\
of the Pacha—The Author’s Advice—Letter\
to Lord Palmerston—The Author’s last Interview\
with Mehemet Ali—Return to Malta—Correspondence\
with Sir Robert Stopford—Return to England | #226#
Chapter XIX.
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London—Protocol of\
the 5th March—Note of Chekib Effendi—Note of the\
13th of March—Lord Palmerston’s explanation of the\
Views of the Allies regarding the Hereditary Tenure—Conference\
of the 16th March—Protocol—Endeavour\
to include France in a Convention for closing the Straits\
of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus—False Position of\
the Porte—Views of Lord Ponsonby and of the other\
Ambassadors—Instructions of the Austrian and British\
Governments—Opinions of M. Guizot—Turkish Plan\
of Settlement—Note of the 10th May | #244#
Chapter XX.
Colonel Napier’s Account of his Missions to Egypt—Seizure\
of the Maronite and Druse Emirs and Sheikhs—Their\
Condition in Egypt—Their Return to Syria—False\
.bn 009.png
.pn +1
Assertions of the French—Mission for the Liberation\
of the Syrian Soldiers—Difficulty of ascertaining\
their Number—Bad Faith of the Pacha—Infamous\
Proposal of a Turkish Officer—Sudden termination of\
the Negotiation—Suspicious conduct of the Egyptians—Liberation\
of the Syrians | #259#
Chapter XXI.
Prince Metternich’s Orders to the Internuncio—Lord\
Ponsonby’s Correspondence with Baron Stürmer—Hesitation\
of the Porte—Message from Lord Ponsonby\
to Rifat Pacha—The new Firman granted—Accepted\
by Mehemet Ali—Termination of the Eastern Question | #267#
Chapter XXII.
Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali\
not the Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the Porte—Representations\
of the Allied Powers—What Interests\
affected by the Independence of Mehemet Ali—Views\
of France—Designs of Russia | #275#
Chapter XXIII.
Errors of the Pacha—His proper Course of Action—Mismanagement\
of Ibrahim Pacha in Syria—Gain or Loss\
of Turkey by the acquisition of Syria—Conduct of the\
Turks in Lebanon—Quarrels of the Mountaineers—Ill\
treatment of the Prince—Consequent hatred of Turkish\
rule—Conclusion | #285#
.bn 010.png
.pn +1
APPENDIX.
I. Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz Pacha,\
found at the Turkish Head-Quarters after the\
battle of Nizib | #299#
II. Translation of a Petition (in Copy) from the Nations\
and Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and\
Syria, to Sultan Abdul Medjid of Constantinople | #303#
Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount\
Lebanon to his Excellency the British Ambassador | #306#
Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount\
Lebanon to his Excellency the French Ambassador | #308#
III. Letter from Commodore Napier to Lieut.-Colonel\
Hodges | #310#
IV. Extract of Letter from Commodore Napier to\
Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B. | #313#
V. Instructions to Captain Fanshawe, on his Mission\
to Alexandria | #316#
VI. Protocol of the Conference held at the house of the\
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime\
Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between the\
Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and\
the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain,\
Prussia, and Russia, on the other | #318#
VII. Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Napier to Sir\
Charles Napier | #329#
VIII. Letter from Boghos Bey to Sir Charles Napier | #332#
.ta-
.bn 011.png
.pn +1
.h3 id='errata'
ERRATA.
.in 12
.ti -12
Vol. I., p. 88, line 16, for southward, close to the castle, read northward, close
to the castle.
.ti -12
Vol. II., p. 41, line 3, for 22nd November, read 11th December.
.ti -8
”\ \ \ \ \ \ p. 199, line 4, for Opposed, read Approved.
.in
.bn 012.png
.bn 013.png
.pn 1
.pb
.sp 4
.ce
THE WAR IN SYRIA.
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER I.
.pm start_summary
Gale on the Egyptian and Syrian Coasts—The Author’s
return to Marmorice Bay—Letters from the Admiral, the
General and the Ambassador regarding the Convention—The
Author’s Replies—Letter of the Admiral to Mehemet
Ali—Commotion occasioned by the Convention—Admiral’s
Letter to the Admiralty—Instruction of the 14th November—Captain
Fanshawe dispatched to Alexandria—Instruction
to the Admiral.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Among the reasons that induced me to enter into
negotiation with the Pacha of Egypt, it will be
recollected that I have mentioned the uncertain state
of the weather, which rendered it possible that the
British squadron might at any minute be blown off
the coast; and I found that I had concluded my
arrangements only just in time. For I had hardly
got the Prometheus away, on the 28th of November,
1840, when it began to blow, which freshened to a
gale in the night; the morning brought more moderate
weather, but towards dusk it came on with great
violence, and lasted thirty-six hours. The Powerful
.bn 014.png
.pn +1
was struck by a heavy sea, which started her fore-channels
and endangered the fore-mast; the new
rigging of the Rodney and Cambridge had given out
so much, that their masts became insecure, and
seeing no further necessity for keeping the squadron
at sea, I proceeded to Marmorice Bay, where I
anchored on the 8th of December, and was much
gratified to be received by the squadron with three
cheers, and the rigging manned, with the same
enthusiasm I had before experienced on joining the
squadron off Alexandria.
Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, first communicated
to me that my Convention had been
rejected by the Admiral, which I have reason to
believe he approved of in the first instance, but was
overruled by the authorities in Syria. Next morning
the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon arrived
from Beyrout. They had experienced the same
gale we did off Alexandria, and rode it out in St.
George’s Bay; the Bellerophon, driven from the
anchorage at Beyrout, was obliged to cut her
cable and make sail, and after scraping the land
as far down the coast as Latakia, was saved by
a miraculous shift of wind; great credit is due to
Captain Austin, and the officers and crew of the
.bn 015.png
.pn +1
Bellerophon, for saving the ship. The Pique was
obliged to cut away her masts to prevent her going
on shore at Caiffa; and the Zebra parted and was
thrown on the beach, with the loss of two men
only. The Austrian squadron quitted the coast of
Syria with the English, and the French vessels of
war remained.
On the Admiral’s arrival at Marmorice, letters
from himself, Sir Charles Smith, and Lord Ponsonby,
were put into my hand. I insert them here,
together with the replies.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“Princess Charlotte, St. George’s Bay,'\
' Beyrout, December 2, 1840.'
“I have received, by the Prometheus, your
letter and the Convention which you have entered
into with Boghos Bey, for the evacuation of
Syria.
“I am sorry to say that I cannot ratify, or
approve of this measure: setting aside the unauthorized
manner and the unnecessary haste with
which so important a document was executed, with
the Commander-in-Chief within two days’ sail of
you, the articles of that Convention, if carried into
execution, in the present state of affairs in Syria,
would be productive of much more evil than
good, and occasion much embarrassment. You
.bn 016.png
.pn +1
will immediately stop the Egyptian transports
from coming to this coast; and should any arrive,
I have given orders that they should return to
Alexandria.
.pm signature2\
' “I am, &c.,'\
'(Signed) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Robert Stopford, Admiral.'
.pm address2\
'“Commodore Napier, C. B., H.M.S. Powerful,'\
'Senior Officer off Alexandria.”'
.pm end_quote
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice Bay,'\
' December 14, 1840.'
“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 2nd of December, disapproving of the
Convention I had entered into with the Egyptian
Government for the evacuation of Syria and the
surrender of the fleet. I have only to regret, that
what I did with the best intentions, and believed to
be in accordance with the views of the Allies, should
not have met your approbation.
“I beg to assure you that, it was not from any
want of respect to you that I did not communicate
with you before signing it, but it was under the
impression that it was of the utmost importance to
seize the opportunity, when the Pacha was highly
incensed against France, to bring him, without loss
of time, to terms without the mediation of that
power.
“I have also to acknowledge the receipt of the
copy of a letter you have sent me from Lord Ponsonby,
the original of which, I presume, is gone to
.bn 017.png
.pn +1
Alexandria, and I beg to inclose you a copy of my
reply.
.pm signature2\
' “I have &c.,'\
'(Signed) \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “C. Napier, Commodore.”'
.pm address2\
' “The Hon. Sir R. Stopford,'\
'Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c., &c.”'
.pm end_quote
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“Head Quarters, Beyrout,'\
' 30th November, 1840.'
“Had you fortunately abstained from honouring
me with your letter of the 27th instant, I should
have been spared the pain of replying to it. I am
not aware that you have been invested with special
powers or authority to treat with Mehemet Ali as
to the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops;
and if you have such special powers and authority,
you have not taken the trouble of acquainting me
therewith.
“The Convention into which you have entered
has been, as relates to the advanced stage of military
events in Syria, more than attained by the retreat
of Ibrahim Pacha. If therefore, you have unknown
to me, had authority to treat, I must decline to be
a party to recommending the ratification of the said
Convention; and if unauthorised to treat, such Convention
is invalid, and is, by me, protested against
as being highly prejudicial to the Sultan’s cause, in
as far as it has, or may have, relation to the operations
of the army under my command. It is needless for
me to add that a copy of this protest shall be forwarded
.bn 018.png
.pn +1
to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
.pm signature3\
' “I have, &c.,'\
' “C. F. Smith, Major-General,'\
'“Commanding the Forces in Syria.”'
.pm address2\
'“Commodore Napier, C.B.,'\
' H.M.S. Powerful.”'
.pm end_quote
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice,'\
' January 6, 1841.'
“Had I unfortunately abstained from writing to
you, and the Admiral had quited the coast, you
would have had just cause to have complained of
my want of courtesy.
“When I left Beyrout, Sir Robert Stopford was
Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces by sea and
land, it was therefore unnecessary for me to communicate
to you what my powers were, as on him
alone devolved the duty of approving or disapproving
of my Convention. He disapproved of it, and
Ibrahim Pacha returned to Damascus. I quite
disagree with you that the Convention was prejudicial
to the interests of the Porte, and I am happy
to say it has been approved of (with the exception
of the guarantee) by Her Majesty’s Government,
and I am now going to Alexandria to see it carried
into execution.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'“Charles Napier, Commodore.”'
.pm address2\
'“To Sir Charles Smith, &c., &c.,'\
' Gibraltar.”'
.pm end_quote
.bn 019.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Sir,'\
'“Therapia, December 7, 1840.'
“I had the honour last night to receive your communication
of a Convention, dated Medea steamer,
Alexandria, 27th November, 1840, signed Charles
Napier, Commodore, and Boghos Bey.
“I immediately laid that Convention before the
Sublime Porte, and acquainted my colleagues, the
Austrian Internuncio, the Prussian Envoy, and the
Russian Chargé d’Affaires, with it. It is my duty to
acquaint you that the Sublime Porte has made a
formal protest against your acts, declaring you have
no power or authority whatever to justify what you
have done, and that the Convention is null and
void.
“My colleagues above-mentioned, and myself,
entirely concur with the Sublime Porte, and declare
that we are ignorant of your having the least right
to assume the powers you have exercised; and that
we consider the Convention null and void, ab initio.
“It is my duty to call upon you to abstain from
every attempt to carry your Convention into execution,
in any degree whatever, and to state that you
are bound by your duty to Her Majesty, to continue
to act with the ships under your command, as you
did act before you assumed the right to make the
aforesaid Convention, and as you would have acted
in conformity with your orders, if that Convention
had never been made by you.
“I have sent a copy of this dispatch to Admiral
.bn 020.png
.pn +1
the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, and also to Her
Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”'
.pm address '“To Commodore Napier.”'
.pm end_quote
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“My Lord,'\
'“H.M.S. Powerful, Marmorice Bay,'\
' Dec. 14, 1840.'
“The Commander-in-Chief has sent me a copy
of a letter addressed to me by your Lordship, the
original of which I presume has been sent to Alexandria;
this letter states that the Porte has made a
formal protest against my acts, and that the Convention
is null and void, in which your Lordship and
your colleagues entirely concur, and you call upon
me to abstain from carrying it into execution.
“In reply to which I beg leave to acquaint your
Lordship that I never had the least idea that the
Convention could be carried into execution without
the authority of the Porte and the Commander-in-Chief,
to whom the whole correspondence was addressed;
therefore I cannot see the necessity of the
formal protest of the Porte against my acts. The
Convention simply tied down Mehemet Ali to
abandon Syria immediately, and give up the Turkish
fleet when the Porte acknowledged his hereditary
title to govern Egypt; and on these conditions I
agreed to suspend hostilities.
“I was led to believe from Lord Palmerston’s
.bn 021.png
.pn +1
letter to your Lordship that I had followed up the
views of the Allied Powers; I was led to believe,
from letters I have received from different members
of the Government, that they were most anxious
to settle the Eastern Question speedily; I was led to
believe, from your Lordship’s correspondence, * * * * *
that Lord Palmerston was anxious to
finish everything; that he had not good information
about Egypt; but that your Lordship thought if I
was at liberty to act, Alexandria would not long be
in the possession of Mehemet Ali; and this opinion
your Lordship risked, though you had never seen
the place, and confessed yourself entirely ignorant
of the art of war. I saw clearly that your Lordship
had an erroneous impression about Alexandria, and
I was convinced that nothing could be done against
it without a military force, and at a proper season,
and my being driven off the coast has confirmed
that opinion.
“I further knew that the French Consul-General,
and other French agents at Alexandria, were doing all
they could to prevent Mehemet Ali from submitting,
still holding out hopes of assistance from France.
“Under all these circumstances I thought I was
serving my country, and the cause of the Sultan, in
tying down Mehemet Ali to immediately evacuate
Syria, and give up the Turkish fleet when acknowledged,
and I knew perfectly well that the Convention
did not tie down the Sultan; and I firmly
believe that if Thiers’ ministry had not fallen, all
.bn 022.png
.pn +1
I have done would have been approved, and I think
it still will be approved. I have thought it necessary
to make these explanations to your Lordship,
and I beg at the same time to observe, that it
appears to me that your Lordship has assumed a
tone, in the latter part of your letter, that you are
by no means authorized to do. I know my duty
to Her Majesty full as well as your Lordship, and
I have always done it, and it is the Commander-in-Chief
alone who has the right to point out to me
how I am to act, and I trust, should your Lordship
have any further occasion to address me, it will be
done in a different style.
“I have sent a copy of this to Admiral Sir
Robert Stopford, and I trust your Lordship will
send a copy to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Chas. Napier, Commodore.”'
.pm address '“The Right Hon. Lord Ponsonby.”'
.pm end_quote
I also insert the Admiral’s letter to Mehemet
Ali, acquainting him that he had disapproved the
Convention, couched in no very measured terms.
An admiral may disapprove of the acts of a junior
officer, even with severity if he pleases, but I believe
it is not usual in addressing a foreign prince, to
convey to him the opinion he has formed of his
second in command.
.bn 023.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Highness,'\
'“Princess Charlotte, St. George’s Bay, Beyrout,'\
' December 2, 1840.'
“I am sorry to find that Commodore Napier
should have entered into a Convention with your
Highness for the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian
troops, which he had no authority to do, and which
I cannot approve of, or ratify.
“Your Highness’s Envoy, Abdel Amen Bey,
has consulted with the General, commanding the
troops, as to his best manner of proceeding to
Ibrahim Pacha. The General having good reason
to suppose that Ibrahim Pacha had left Damascus, (a
great part of his army having left it a few days since
going to the southward, upon the Mecca road,)
could not guarantee a safe conduct for your Highness’s
Envoy further than Damascus. He therefore
returns to Alexandria, having done all in his power
to execute your Highness’s instructions.
“I hope this letter will reach your Highness in
time to stop the transports which Commodore
Napier writes me are coming to the coast of Syria
for the purpose of embarking part of the Egyptian
army. Should any of them arrive here, they will
be ordered to return to Alexandria.
“I hope this hasty and unauthorized Convention
will not occasion any embarrassment to your Highness.
It was no doubt done from an amicable
motive, though under a limited view of the state of
affairs in Syria; but it will not lessen my earnest
desire most readily to adopt any measure which may
.bn 024.png
.pn +1
tend to a renewal of that amity and good feeling
which I trust hereafter may subsist between England
and your Highness, the terms of which I am happy
to hear are now in a state of progress with the
Allied Powers.
.pm signature1 '“Robert Stopford, Admiral.”'
.pm address '“To his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha.”'
.pm end_quote
The Ambassador wrote also to the Admiral and to
the different authorities in Syria and Egypt, calling
upon them to repudiate my Convention, and in fact
no means were neglected by him to prevent the
settlement of the Eastern Question, and do as much
mischief to Mehemet Ali as possible.
The reader will allow this was tremendous odds
against me: the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Forces, the General commanding in Syria, Lord
Ponsonby, and the four Ambassadors, the Sultan
and all the Divan, against an Old Commodore. The
whole corps diplomatique, (for on this point even
the French minister agreed,) were up in arms—they
thought their trade was gone—nevertheless I was not
dismayed. I felt satisfied at Alexandria I was right,
and I felt still more satisfied at Marmorice, when I
found our squadron, with the exception of the
steamers, had abandoned the coast, and left Ibrahim
.bn 025.png
.pn +1
to himself. Why he did not take advantage of it
is not my affair—he ought to have done it. In the
fleet we had conventionalists and non-conventionalists:
the Captains who were off Alexandria were
satisfied I was right; those who were not, with few
exceptions, were satisfied I was wrong. For my
part I had only to wait patiently the first arrival
from England, to announce either that I was a
blockhead, or that I had taken a more correct view
of the affairs of the East, than either Admirals,
Generals, Ambassadors, Sultans, or Divans.
The letter of Sir Robert Stopford to the Admiralty,
acquainting their Lordships that he had
rejected my Convention, clearly shows that he was
not aware of Ibrahim’s movements. The Admiral
writes under date of the 1st of December, from
Beyrout.
.pm start_quote
.ti 0
“Sir,
“I beg to transmit for their Lordships’ information
the copy of a Convention which Commodore
Napier has entered into with Mehemet Ali, the
correspondence leading thereto having been transmitted
by him from Alexandria.
I beg you will further acquaint their Lordships
that I do not feel myself authorized to enter into
.bn 026.png
.pn +1
this Convention; and the Egyptian troops being
already on their retreat by the Mecca road to
Egypt, I cannot consider this as a concession from
Mehemet, but the consequence of their late discomfitures,
and the inimical state of the country
towards them.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'“Robert Stopford.”'
.pm address '“R. More O’Ferrall, Esq.”'
.pm end_quote
Now, it is well known that Ibrahim did not
finally leave Damascus till the 29th of December;
so that it appears by the Admiral’s letter, that
nothing was known at Beyrout of Ibrahim’s movements;
and, after the squadron left the coast,
there was nothing to hinder him falling upon Beyrout;
I know that there were strong fears there
that he would do so, and General Michell, as will
hereafter appear, requested the Admiral would send
some ships of war back.
Before the Admiral arrived at Marmorice, he fell
in with the Megæra, bringing the Instruction of the
14th of November, which was given to satisfy Austrian
etiquette, Prince Metternich not entirely approving
of the instruction of the 15th of October,
his reasons for which he afterwards explained.
.bn 027.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading '' '“Foreign Office, Nov. 14, 1840.'
“The instruction addressed to Lord Ponsonby
on the 15th of October last, in consequence of a
deliberation which had taken place between the
Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia,
and Russia, recorded the propriety of the Representatives
of the Four Courts at Constantinople
being authorized to announce to the Sublime Porte,
‘that their respective Governments, in conformity
with the stipulations of the seventh paragraph of the
Separate Act annexed to the Convention of July 15,
deem it their duty strongly to recommend to the
Government of his Highness, that, in case Mehemet
Ali should submit without delay, and should consent
to restore the Ottoman fleet, to withdraw his troops
from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia,
Arabia, and the Holy Cities, his Highness should
be pleased not only to reinstate Mehemet Ali in his
functions as Pacha of Egypt, but at the same time
to grant him the hereditary investiture of the said
pachalic, according to the conditions laid down in
the Convention of July 15, it being well understood
that this hereditary title should be liable to revocation,
if Mehemet Ali, or one of his successors,
should infringe the aforesaid conditions.’
“The advantage of addressing the Sublime Porte
a communication couched in the sense above-mentioned,
was unanimously admitted by the Four
Courts.
“Nevertheless, in order to make still more
.bn 028.png
.pn +1
apparent the just respect which is due to the
rights of his Highness, the Cabinet of Vienna
was of opinion that the advice which the Representatives
of the Four Powers should be called
upon to address to the Divan, relative to the reinstatement
of Mehemet Ali in the pachalic of
Egypt, ought not to be put forth at Constantinople,
until after Mehemet Ali should have taken
the preliminary step of applying to his Sovereign
for pardon, submitting himself to the determination
of his Highness.
“Taking into consideration that this opinion of
the Cabinet of Vienna serves as a fresh proof of the
respect which the Courts, parties to the Convention
of July 15, entertain for the inviolability of the
Sultan’s rights of sovereignty and independence;
considering, moreover, the necessity of speedily
bringing the existing crisis in the Levant to a pacific
solution, in conformity with the true interests, as
likewise with the dignity of the Porte; the Plenipotentiaries
of the said Courts have unanimously
resolved to adopt the course above pointed out, in
order that Mehemet Air’s application for pardon and
his submission should precede the friendly measures
which the Allied Representatives will be instructed
to adopt, in order to incline the Porte to grant its
pardon to Mehemet Ali.
“With this view, the Plenipotentiaries of the
Four Powers being desirous of hastening as much
as possible the moment when it will be possible
.bn 029.png
.pn +1
for those measures to take place at Constantinople,
have judged it fitting to cause to be pointed out
without the least delay to Mehemet Ali, the way
which is still open to him to regain the pardon
of his Sovereign, and to obtain his reinstatement
in the pachalic of Egypt, notwithstanding
the decisive events which have declared themselves
against him.
“In consequence it was further agreed to communicate
to the Ambassador of the Sublime Porte,
Chekib Effendi, the present Memorandum, as likewise
the instruction thereunto annexed.
.ta r:50 l:5
(Initialed)| N.
| P.
| B.
| B.
.ta-
.pm end_quote
Upon the receipt of this document, and a
special instruction of the same date, the Admiral
immediately dispatched Captain Fanshawe, with
the following letter, to communicate with the
Pacha. His orders were, to proceed to Alexandria
and demand an interview with Mehemet Ali, in the
presence of Boghos Bey, and communicate the
instructions of Her Majesty’s Government. He
was not to refuse Mehemet Ali’s answer even if he
expressed a desire to obtain the hereditary government
of Egypt.
.bn 030.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Highness,'\
'“Princess Charlotte, at Sea, off Cyprus,'\
'December 6, 1840.'
“I have now the honour to transmit to your
Highness, by Captain Fanshawe, the Captain of my
flag-ship, the official authority from the British
Government, in the name of the four Allied Powers,
to maintain your Highness in the pachalic of Egypt,
upon condition, that within three days after the
communication made to you by Captain Fanshawe,
you agree to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan,
and finally evacuate Syria.
“Let me beseech your Highness to take these
terms into your serious consideration; and I implore
the Almighty God to impress upon your mind the
benefit you will bestow on a distracted country by
an early compliance with the decision of the four
Allied Powers.
“Captain Fanshawe is fully authorized to receive
your Highness’s final decision.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Robert Stopford, Admiral.”'
.pm address '“To his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha.”'
.pm end_quote
The further conduct of the Admiral was to be
guided by the following instruction, of November
14, from Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty.
.pm start_quote
“With further reference to my letters of this
day, I am to signify to your Lordships the Queen’s
.bn 031.png
.pn +1
commands that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should
be informed that he is not in any degree to suspend
his operations, or to relax his efforts, on account of
the communication which he is instructed to make
to Mehemet Ali; but, on the contrary, he should
continue to push on with vigour his operations for
the purpose of expelling the Egyptians from the
whole of Syria, and he should not slacken in his
exertions, till he learns from Constantinople that an
arrangement has been made with Mehemet Ali.”
.pm end_quote
The reader must bear in mind that, at the date
of these instructions, the capture of Acre was not
known at the Foreign Office, nor was my Convention
signed.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 032.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER II.
.pm start_summary
Captain Fanshawe’s proceedings at Alexandria—Letter from
Mehemet Ali to the Admiral—Official Report of Captain
Fanshawe—Letter of Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier—English
Ships again ordered to the Coast of Syria—Part of
the Convention carried into effect by the Admiral.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
The mode in which this new negotiation of points
which he naturally considered as already settled,
was received by the Pacha, will best appear from his
own letter, and Captain Fanshawe’s report.
.pm start_quote
.ti 0
“Most Honourable Admiral Sir Robert Stopford,
“I have received the two letters which you addressed
to me, the first by the channel of Hamid
Bey, who had been entrusted with a despatch for
my son Ibrahim Pacha, and the second by Captain
Fanshawe, of your flag-ship. I am delighted with
the friendship which you evince towards me, and I
hasten to act in the sense which you point out in
your official dispatch. I consequently address a
petition to the Sublime Porte under flying seal, and
in order that the contents thereof may be known to
you, I add a French translation to it. I hope that
my compliance will be appreciated by the Allied
.bn 033.png
.pn +1
Powers, and in asking a continuance of your friendship,
I flatter myself that your good offices will
ensure me their good will.
.rj
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Mehemet Ali.”
.pm end_quote
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“H.M. Steam-vessel Megæra, at Sea,'\
'December 12, 1840.'
“I have the honour to report to you my proceedings
in the service on which you ordered me.
“I arrived off Alexandria in this vessel early on
the morning of the 8th, and finding no English
man-of-war off the place, proceeded into the port,
and sent for Mr. Larking, Her Majesty’s Consul,
whom I requested to inform Mehemet Ali that I
was charged by you to make a communication to
him from Her Majesty’s Government, and for which
purpose I demanded an interview with him in the
presence of Boghos Bey.
“At noon I went to the palace with Mr. Larking,
and had an audience with Mehemet Ali: after delivering
your letter to him and passing a few compliments,
I read to him my extract from Lord Palmerston’s
instructions, which was interpreted to him by
his Dragoman, and then presented to him, expressing
my hope that his compliance with what it
required, would restore a good understanding between
the Sultan and himself. He alluded to the
recent Convention, and said he had promised all
this before to Commodore Napier, if Egypt was
.bn 034.png
.pn +1
guaranteed to him, and that he never departed from
his word.
“I replied, I had no guarantee to offer; but he
would perceive that, though you had not been able
to ratify that Convention, you had lost no time in
communicating the instructions received from your
Government, and in expressing your own disposition
to conciliate; and that I hoped he would merit the
wish which I knew you had expressed, and take
some immediate steps for the restitution of the
Turkish fleet, which I regretted to observe was
making no preparation for sea; that the words in
my note with reference to the fleet were ‘immediate,’
and ‘without delay;’ and I was sure his
giving directions for that part of it which could be
most expeditiously equipped proceeding to you at
Marmorice, would be regarded in a favourable light,
both at London and at Constantinople.
“Mehemet Ali said earnestly, he had always
wished to give the fleet up to his master; that I
might pledge myself that it should be ready to
deliver to me, or to any officer that might be sent
by the Porte to take charge of it, and that he would
send his own officers and men to assist in navigating
it, if he was reinstated in Egypt; adding, ‘If I give
up the fleet, what security have I, having already
given orders for the evacuation of all the places
referred to?’
“I told him he must look for his security in the
good faith and friendly disposition of the English
.bn 035.png
.pn +1
Government, and in the influence it might have
with the Sultan and the Allied Powers. He seemed
rather disposed to yield on this point, but gave no
positive answer. I then stated that my time was
limited; he said he had no wish for delay; the
documents which I had given him should be forthwith
translated, and brought again under his consideration,
and that I should have his answer in
French to take to you as soon as possible. I
replied, I was authorized to take his final answer
to Constantinople, and that I must be furnished
with his written engagement to convey thither; and
as I concluded it would be written in Turkish, I
must have a translation of it also, that I might
be satisfied it contained all that was required. This
was immediately assented to, Mehemet Ali saying,
he was always ready to make his submission to the
Sultan, and that he would promise all that was
asked, if he was allowed to remain quiet in Egypt.
This ended the conference.
“In the evening, Mr. Larking and myself had
an interview by appointment with Boghos Bey,
who said it was Mehemet Ali’s desire to meet the
views of the Allied Powers, and that he was pleased
with the English mediation, but that he considered
that he had already the promise of the hereditary
government of Egypt, and he was afraid there would
be difficulties raised at Constantinople, and that
there was one Power (Russia) not so well disposed
to see such a termination to the question. I told
.bn 036.png
.pn +1
Boghos Bey, that he must be aware the Allied
Powers could not regard Mehemet Ali since his
deposition by the Sultan in the same light as before,
and that he must make his submission; and that I
was sure, if he would without delay send such part
of the Turkish fleet as could be got ready to Marmorice,
it must tend to conciliate all parties, and
be a proof of the entire sincerity of his intentions.
“I then called his attention to the limit of my
stay at Alexandria, and to the necessity that the
written engagement I was to receive should be so
worded that I could not hesitate to convey it. Boghos
assured me he would use his influence to prevent
any obstacle; that he was to attend a Council
with Mehemet Ali directly, at which the translated
copies would be discussed and the answer decided
upon, which he thought would be quite satisfactory.
This Council, however, I learnt was not so harmonious
as Boghos Bey expected, and nothing was
then decided. On the following morning (Wednesday)
Mr. Larking received a summons, and had an
interview with Mehemet Ali and Boghos Bey, which
was more favourable; and I was informed I might
expect a translation of the engagement early on the
following day, and that it would contain all that was
asked; but Mr. Larking did not find Mehemet Ali
disposed to let any part of the fleet go first,—a
point which I had requested him to urge again,—saying,
they all came, and should all go together.
I did not, however, receive the translations of the
.bn 037.png
.pn +1
letters to the Vizier and yourself, which I now
inclose, until ten o’clock yesterday morning, but
then accompanied by a notice that Mehemet Ali
was ready to receive me. On perusing the letter to
the Vizier, it appeared to me to be so complete an
engagement, in all points required, without any
especial stipulation about Egypt, and that though
the terms of submission might be somewhat equivocal,
it came within the view of Lord Palmerston’s
instructions, and that I could not hesitate to be the
bearer of it. I therefore repaired to the palace with
Mr. Larking, and had, I consider, a satisfactory
interview with Mehemet Ali. I pointed out to him
that I did not feel that the expressions in his letter
to the Vizier, relating to the fleet, came up to the
promise which he had made me the other day, and
that I saw no appearance yet of preparation, and that
I or some one else might return very soon to claim
the fulfilment of that pledge. Mehemet Ali said he
had given orders already on the subject, and repeated
earnestly that the fleet should be ready to quit the
port, as far as he was concerned, five days after the
arrival of the officer to whom the Sultan wished it
to be delivered.
“I then remarked that on the subject of Candia
there might be some delay, as I understood the
Pacha there had not submitted to the Sultan; and
as I thought it probable the Porte might be prepared
to send troops immediately to take possession of
that island, I proposed that I should be the bearer
.bn 038.png
.pn +1
of a letter to the Pacha of Candia, directing him to
yield it to the Turkish authorities; to which Mehemet
Ali immediately assented, and ordered one to
be written. I hope these points, therefore, may be
taken as an earnest of his sincerity, though I am
quite of opinion, that unless the Sultan gives him
the hereditary pashalic of Egypt, he will be very
much disposed to fight for it—or, at any rate, to
give further trouble. This letter to the Pacha of
Candia being ready, I received it with those to the
Vizier and yourself (all which I herewith transmit),
all under flying seals, from Mehemet Ali’s hands,
and took my leave of him. Boghos Bey then requested
to speak with me on one or two subjects,
by Mehemet Ali’s desire, which were—1st. His
wish to be allowed to send some of his steam-vessels
to Gaza or El-Arish to receive the sick,
wounded, women and children, of Ibrahim Pacha’s
army who might be entering Egypt by that route,
and who would be thus spared a painful and tedious
march, saying that Commodore Napier’s Treaty
embraced that subject. I replied, that though you
had not been able to confirm the Commodore’s
Convention, you would, I was sure, for the cause of
humanity, be now ready to meet Mehemet Ali’s
wish, and that I would communicate with the senior
officer of our ships off the port on the subject,
who would allow vessels, going strictly for that
purpose, to pass freely. 2ndly. That in case of
any of our ships of war coming to the port, the
.bn 039.png
.pn +1
commanders should be desired to conform rigidly
to the quarantine regulations. I told him they
always had, and always would do so, and reminded
him of the quarantine you had passed yourself
in August, and said that whatever our Consul
told the captains was required by the regulations
of the port would be abided by; for Mr.
Larking had an idea that they might contemplate
some new regulations which might affect the
ships or officers to be sent down for the Turkish
fleet.
“At 1 P.M. yesterday we sailed from Alexandria,
and off the port communicated with Her Majesty’s
ship Carysfort, and I delivered to Captain Martin
two letters (copies of which I inclose) which I had
thought it right to address to the senior officer of
Her Majesty’s ships off Alexandria, and of which I
hope you will approve; we are now proceeding to
join your flag at Marmorice.
“I cannot close this report, without expressing
how much I benefited by Mr. Larking’s ready
and cordial assistance, and by the information I
was able to obtain from him, and also from the
zeal and attention of Mr. John Chumarian, the
Dragoman.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Arthur Fanshawe, Captain.'
“P.S.—We left the Ambuscade, small French
frigate, a corvette, and steam-vessel at Alexandria;
the latter, I understand, was to start for France
.bn 040.png
.pn +1
to-day; the Bourgainville, brig, sailed for Beyrout,
the day of our arrival.”
.pm address '“The Hon. Sir R. Stopford, G.C.B.”'
.pm end_quote
On the 13th of December Captain Fanshawe
returned from Alexandria, and after delivering the
Pacha’s reply to the Admiral, proceeded to Constantinople
with his answer to the Vizier, which,
like a clever diplomatist, he had taken care to base
on the Convention, and it does appear to me quite
astonishing that so determined a man as the Pacha
certainly is, and as he had shown himself, should
have listened at all to the Instruction of the 14th of
November, which had the material difference from
that of the 15th of October, of not containing the
hereditary title; the very fact of our appearing
to have changed our mind in so short a period,
ought to have awakened his suspicion, because
he could not know that that change originated
with Austria, who however, as will presently be
seen, got alarmed at the rejection of the Convention,
and distinctly stated that Mehemet Ali should
be confirmed, and that she would have nothing
to do with any attack that might be meditated on
Alexandria.
.bn 041.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“After the usual Titles.'\
'“17 Chewal, 1256.'\
' (Dec. 11, 1840.)'
“Commodore Napier, of the British fleet, informed
me by a despatch dated from before Alexandria,
the 22nd of November, N.S., that the Great
Allied Powers have requested the Sublime Porte to
grant me the hereditary Government of Egypt, on
the conditions laid down by them; that is, that I
shall give up the Imperial fleet which is in the Port
of Alexandria, and that the Egyptian troops shall
retire from Syria, and re-enter Egypt.
“The Commodore required that diligence should
be used in preparing the fleet, in order to its being
delivered up, and in withdrawing the troops from
Syria.
“After some correspondence and some discussions
with the Commodore on this matter, these
conditions were accepted, and an authentic Act,
manifesting that it is expected that the favour of
him who is the shadow of God should be granted,
and serving as a document to both parties, was concluded
and signed.
“In consequence, I wrote to my son, Ibrahim
Pacha, your servant, to come immediately to Egypt
with the Egyptian troops concentrated at Damascus,
and with the persons in his employment, and others,
and I even sent to him a person expressly for this
purpose, whom I despatched in a steam-vessel procured
by the Commodore.
“I have just received from Ibrahim Pacha,
.bn 042.png
.pn +1
overland, a despatch dated the 1st of Ramazan,
(October 27,) according to which, he was to set out,
with all his people, from Damascus, the 3rd or 4th
of Chewal (the 28th or 29th of November). Thus,
it may be looked upon as certain that he commenced
his march at the specified time.
“And now, in the meanwhile, I receive from
the Admiral of the British fleet, his Excellency Sir
Robert Stopford, an official despatch written off
Cyprus, on the 6th of December, and couched in
the sense mentioned below. The Admiral sent to
me, at the same time, a copy of the instructions
which he had received from his Excellency Lord
Palmerston. I see by this communication, that it
has been stipulated that I must renew my submission
to the Sublime Porte, restoring the Imperial
fleet, and causing Syria, Adana, Candia, the Hedjaz,
and the two Holy Cities, to be evacuated by the
Egyptian troops.
“I perceive that the obtaining my pardon, that
my re-admission into the good graces of my Sovereign
and master, to whose service I take this opportunity
of dedicating my fortune and my life, and the
gracious acceptance by His Imperial Majesty of my
most humble submission, are the effects of the noble
efforts of the high Allied Powers; and thoroughly
grateful for all this, I have taken measures for restoring
the Imperial fleet. People are actively employed
in putting the vessels into a good state; and
on the receipt of a firman, making known in what
.bn 043.png
.pn +1
manner it shall have pleased His Imperial Majesty
that the fleet shall be delivered up and despatched,
I will hasten to conform myself to the sovereign
will by carrying the said firman into execution.
“In like manner, as I am ready to withdraw all
the Egyptian authorities who are in the Island of
Candia, in the Hedjaz, and in the two Holy Cities,
on the arrival of His Imperial Majesty’s firman in
that respect, the above-mentioned places shall be
evacuated without delay by the Egyptian authorities.
“Thus, then, when your Excellency shall, if it
please God, have taken cognizance of my prompt
submission, carried into effect as above, you will be
pleased to lay it at the feet of the clemency of my
most august and most powerful Sovereign and
Master, of whom I am so proud to be the faithful
and submissive servant, and to employ your good
offices, in order to cause a man advanced in age, and
faithful, who has grown old in his service, to experience
without ceasing the effects of his sovereign
clemency.
“He who can ordain, will ordain.
.rj
(L.S.)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Mehemet Ali.”
.pm end_quote
The Admiral in the mean time, in consequence
of an application from General Michell, who now
commanded the English force in Syria, (Sir Charles
Smith having returned to England,) sent Captain
.bn 044.png
.pn +1
Stewart, in the Benbow, and several small ships, to
Beyrout, with instructions to suspend hostilities
until the result of Mehemet Ali’s submission was
known; and also authorized the Pacha to send
steamers to Caiffa to bring away the sick and
wounded; thus putting into execution a part of the
rejected Convention.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 045.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER III.
.pm start_summary
Captain Fanshawe’s Arrival at Constantinople—Interview
with the Grand Vizier—Conference of Ambassadors and
Rechid Pacha—Conduct of Lord Ponsonby; his Letter to
Lord Palmerston—The Porte accepts the submission of
Mehemet Ali—Letter of Rechid Pacha to the Ambassador
and of the Vizier to Mehemet Ali—Captain Fanshawe
returns to Marmorice.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
It has already been shown, that notwithstanding
the rejection of the Convention communicated to
Mehemet Ali by Captain Fanshawe, he, on the 11th
of December, in a letter to the Grand Vizier, sent
his unconditional submission; that letter reached
Constantinople on the 16th of the same month.
Captain Fanshawe, on his arrival, gave in a report
of his proceedings to the Ambassador, couched in
much the same terms as that to the Admiral already
given, and on the 18th he had an audience of the
Grand Vizier.[1] The Captain was accompanied
by Mr. Pisani, and by Captain Codrington and
Captain Williams, and he informed the Vizier
that he had been ordered by the Admiral to convey
to Alexandria a summons to Mehemet Ali to make
.bn 046.png
.pn +1
his submission; this submission he now conveyed
to him in an open letter, which he begged to deliver.
The Grand Vizier, after having read Mehemet Ali’s
letter, said, “The Porte is already aware of these
conditions, as is known; but I can tell you nothing
upon this great question which the Sublime Porte
is treating with the Allied Courts, and which consequently
has become a question of foreign policy,
belonging entirely to the department of Foreign
Affairs, which is acquainted with all the circumstances
relating to it better than I am. The Porte
will take this question into consideration with the
representatives of the Allied Courts, and his Excellency
the Minister for Foreign Affairs will make
known the intentions of the Porte to the Allies; I
beg you, M. le Capitaine, in the mean time, not to
consider my acceptance of this letter from you as an
acceptance of its contents.” Captain Fanshawe replied
that he also was in nowise authorized to enter
into the details of this affair, and that he would learn
the result from Lord Ponsonby. The Captain said
that Mehemet Ali had given him his word that he
would deliver over the Turkish fleet to whatever
officer the Porte shall direct to conduct it hither.
The Vizier replied, “The fleet is ours; Alexandria is
.bn 047.png
.pn +1
our country; we are perfectly sure of having the fleet
sooner or later.” The Captain took the opportunity
of speaking of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet
Ali. The Grand Vizier replied, “Peace is made
between two governments, and not between a sovereign
and one of his rebel subjects.”
.fn 1
See p. #22#. The report is given in the Levant Papers,
Part III., p. 138.
.fn-
The letters given clearly show that Mehemet Ali
could do no more. He promised to deliver up the
fleet, Candia, Syria, and the Holy Cities. The
Grand Vizier replied, as has been shown: “The
fleet is ours; Alexandria is ours;” and when
Captain Fanshawe talks to him about peace, he
said, “Peace is made between two Governments;
and not between a sovereign and one of his rebel
subjects.” This indeed was talking big; the Grand
Vizier forgot that Mehemet Ali had twice nearly
knocked at the gates of Constantinople, and had
he not been interfered with, would have dethroned
his Master.
What does the Ambassador do? Though he
was quite aware that every hour the Eastern Question
remained unsettled, a European war was
imminent—though he knew that France had intimated
that we were not to touch Egypt—though
he knew the British fleet had left the coast of Syria
.bn 048.png
.pn +1
and Egypt in consequence of bad weather—yet the
Ambassador, acting on his own responsibility, to
gratify his dislike of Mehemet Ali, did all he could
to keep the question open, though he must have
known the Allies were anxious to bring it to a
close; and if he had had the power, I know, would
have risked the whole British fleet to ensure the
Pacha’s destruction. Annexed is his letter to Lord
Palmerston, furnishing an account of the Conference
which the arrival of Mehemet Ali’s letter
gave rise to.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading '“My Lord,' '“Therapia, December 28, 1840.'
“I received this afternoon the Protocol of the
conference held at the house of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, on the 20th instant, at which were
present Rechid Pacha, and the Representatives of
the Four Allies, and the dragomans of Austria and
England, and M. Francheschi, who made the Protocol
which I have now the honour to inclose[2].
“I have little need to explain to your Lordship
the grounds upon which I acted; submission is the
first mentioned of the conditions, upon which I am
ordered to give advice to the Sublime Porte, and it
is also the most important, the others being insignificant,
as things have turned out. My duty is to
.bn 049.png
.pn +1
see that submission has been made by Mehemet
Ali—real submission, and there are many things to
make it very doubtful if Mehemet Ali has submitted,
and has not taken this matter as concessions forced
upon the Sultan by the Allies for the purpose of
establishing him in Egypt with indefinite power.
Your Lordship’s instructions would not authorize
me to say that such a submission is the submission
contemplated by Her Majesty’s Government, and as
I do not think it proper for me, under the circumstances
in which I am placed, to declare that it is
not a submission, I have declined giving any opinion
at all on the point, and said I would await the
decision of it by the Sublime Porte, having stated
what counsel I shall have to offer in the name of
my Government, if the Sublime Porte accept the
submission.
“Your Lordship has always declared that the
Sultan is the sole judge and arbiter of his own
interests; and you will see, in the Protocol, that the
Representatives united cordially in disavowing intentions
to act upon the Sultan except by counsel alone.
I saw this with satisfaction, because endeavours
have not been wanting to inspire the Ottoman
Ministers with some jealousy of the prepotency of
the Four Powers.
“It will appear, I think, in the Protocol, that I
am not alone in thinking the submission may be
subject to doubt, for the Internuncio says that
Mehemet Ali has made a commencement of submission.
.bn 050.png
.pn +1
This may be so, for the interest of Mehemet
Ali is to accept the boon offered him, as he
gives nothing for it in return; but my orders from
my Government are not subject to be modified by
me, and I cannot take upon myself the responsibility
of acting without the most positive authority
in a question like the present.
“I will send a messenger to acquaint your Lordship
with the determination of the Sublime Porte
whenever I am informed of it.
“I send the copy of the Protocol which was sent
to me by his Excellency the Internuncio.
“The Protocol is substantially correct in statement
of what passed, but there are errors in its
report of expressions.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”'
.pm end_quote
.fn 2
See #Protocol:app06# in the Appendix.
.fn-
The reader will observe, without my pointing
it out, from his own letter, and still more from the
Protocol, with what diplomatic art the British Ambassador,
in opposition to the opinion of the other
Ministers, endeavours to gain time. Had he been
instructed so to do, he would have shown himself
a good diplomatist; but the contrary was the case.
Rechid Pasha writes from Constantinople, under
date of the 26th of November, to Chekib Effendi
at Paris, “That Lord Palmerston was favourable
.bn 051.png
.pn +1
to the reinstatement of Mehemet Ali, and that
instructions had been sent to the Ambassador at
Constantinople on the subject.” Besides that, he
knew of the instructions that Captain Fanshawe
had communicated to Mehemet Ali, and which he
accepted.
And no Minister of Foreign Affairs could have
shown his want of confidence in his Ambassador
more distinctly than Lord Palmerston did, by
sending his instruction of the 14th of November
direct to Sir Robert Stopford, thus completely
throwing the Ambassador overboard. And well
he did; for he decidedly would have found some
means of putting it aside, as he did my Convention.
In fact, his Lordship was the cleverest of Ambassadors
for evading orders, and, indeed, managed to
transfer Downing-street to Constantinople.
The Sultan, however, appeared to be satisfied
with Mehemet Ali’s submission; and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Lord Ponsonby,
thus:
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Monsieur l’Ambassador,'\
'“The Sublime Porte,'\
' December 27, 1840.'
“I have lost no time in laying before the Sultan
the Protocol of the Conference of the 20th of this
.bn 052.png
.pn +1
month; and I am commanded to acquaint your
Excellency, that His Imperial Majesty, wishing to
prove by a fresh act the moderation of his sentiments,
is disposed to the submission of
Mehemet Ali, and only awaits the fulfilment of the
conditions imposed upon him by the Memorandum
of the 14th of November, to consider that submission
as complete, and to confirm Mehemet Ali in
the Pachalic of Egypt.
“With the view of hastening that fulfilment, and
of thus proving more clearly his desire to lend
himself, as far as is in his power, to the views of
his august Allies, the Sultan has decided that Yaver
Pacha (Admiral Walker) and Mazloum Bey shall
proceed immediately to Egypt as his Commissioners
to receive the Ottoman fleet, and to ascertain that
the places described in the Memorandum of the
14th of November are evacuated by the troops of
Mehemet Ali.
“I am commanded at the same time to request
your Excellency will have the goodness to instruct
Her Britannic Majesty’s Admiral to assist according
to the 4th paragraph of the Separate Act of the
Convention of the 15th of July, at the restoration of
the fleet to the said Commissioners.
.pm signature3\
' “Receive, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Rechid,'\
'“Minister for Foreign Affairs.”'
.pm end_quote
The Vizier, too, at the same time, wrote as
follows to Mehemet Ali:
.bn 053.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
“I have taken cognizance of the contents of
the good despatch which you addressed to me dated
the 17th Chewal, (the ,) and
which has also been laid before His Imperial
Majesty.
“It appears, from your Highness’s communication,
that you intend really to make your submission
to his Highness, and that in proof of this
you have decided immediately to restore the Imperial
fleet, and to surrender, without delay, certain
places situated out of Egypt.
“The intentions and good disposition which you
have thus evinced, being a happy omen that the
good system and the good proceedings which are
desired, will be adopted and carried into execution,
his Highness has duly appreciated them.
“In all its affairs, in all its proceedings, the
Sublime Porte, guided by feelings of justice, makes
it a rule never to exceed the bounds of moderation.
“On this account his Highness is disposed to
accept your submission with favour, and to grant
your Highness his full pardon.
“As soon then as, in conformity with your
engagements, the Imperial fleet shall have left the
harbour of Alexandria, and shall be despatched with
all its officers and crews, some well-known persons
excepted, and with all its equipments and stores,
and the places already known shall have been made
over without delay to the Commissioners of the
Sublime Porte, and when these acts shall be accomplished,
.bn 054.png
.pn +1
that is to say, when positive intelligence of
this shall have arrived here, it is decidedly resolved
that then his Imperial Majesty will deign to reinstate
your Highness in the Government of Egypt.
These views of his Highness, and the pacific and
benevolent opinions of the Great Powers, being quite
in accordance upon this point, this resolution has
been officially made known to the representatives of
the Allied Courts.
“His Excellency Mazloum Bey, one of the
principal servants of the Sublime Porte, Member of
the Council of Justice, and formerly Mousteshar
of the Admiralty, is charged with the execution of
the necessary instructions; and the Ferik of the
Imperial navy, the most distinguished Yaver Pacha,
is charged to receive the Imperial fleet and bring
it here.
“We leave to your wisdom to do what is necessary.”
.pm end_quote
On the 30th of December Captain Fanshawe
wrote as follows to the Admiral from on board the
Stromboli, off Tenedos, and soon after joined him
at Marmorice.
.pm start_quote
.ti 0
“Sir,
“With reference to your orders to me to proceed
to Constantinople, and to my letter to you of the
18th instant, I have now the honour to acquaint you
.bn 055.png
.pn +1
that I had no communication from his Excellency
Lord Ponsonby from that date until the 27th, when
I received a letter from him, relative to the conveyance
of Turkish Commissioners in this vessel to
Alexandria; and I beg to inclose you copies of the
correspondence that in consequence passed between
his Lordship and myself, through Mr. Doyle, on the
subject; and also to state, that, in pursuance of the
intimation from his Lordship, that he was ‘not
aware of anything within his competency’ which
could be the cause of my detention at Constantinople,
and having yesterday afternoon received the
accompanying despatch from him for you, I quitted
the Golden Horn in the Stromboli, at 9 P.M. yesterday,
and am proceeding in her to rejoin you at Marmorice.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ “Arthur Fanshawe, Captain.”'
.pm end_quote
The despatch referred to inclosed a copy of the
official note from the Porte[3], announcing the appointment
of the Commissioners, and requesting the
assistance of the British ships to bring home the
Ottoman fleet from Alexandria.
.fn 3
See page #39#.
.fn-
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 056.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER IV.
.pm start_summary
Disinclination of the Porte to confer the Hereditary Pachalic
on Mehemet Ali—Departure of the Turkish Commissioners—Their
orders—Opposition of the Austrian, Prussian, and
Russian Ministers to the views of Lord Ponsonby—Lord
Palmerston’s opinion of his conduct—Rewards conferred
on the Officers of the Squadron at Acre—News from
England—Approval of the Convention—Instruction of the
15th of December—Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Prince
Metternich and Count Nesselrode, in approval
of the Convention.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Though the Porte accepted the submission of
Mehemet Ali, it was in no hurry to act, and when
it did get in motion, it was far from doing what, I
presume, three out of the four Representatives
wished and expected.
The Commissioners did not leave Constantinople
till the 6th of January, and they had no power to
confer the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali;
and instead of carrying orders to General Jochmus
to suspend hostilities, they brought orders to demand
the arms and guns of Ibrahim’s army; which demand
was supported by Mr. Wood, the emissary of
the Ambassador, and also by General Jochmus[4].
.fn 4
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 274, 276.
.fn-
The Austrian Internuncio saw through this
.bn 057.png
.pn +1
intrigue; and on the 7th of January, in an interview
with Rechid Pacha, announced to him that
the four Powers had decided on applying for the
hereditary succession for Mehemet Ali. This produced
a correspondence—far too long for me to
give here, but which may be seen in the Government
volume of Levant Papers.
From this correspondence it appears that the Austrian,
Russian, and Prussian Ministers decided to act
without Lord Ponsonby, in consequence of directions
from the Ministers in London, based upon the Convention
they had previously rejected. The English
Ambassador does not appear to have received his instructions
till the 10th of January, though they were
dated the 17th of December. I should like to see
the reply Lord Palmerston made to the Ambassador
on learning that he had rejected the Convention;
why it is suppressed, is easily accounted for. It
ought to be explained how, on the 7th of January,
the Internuncio received his dispatches which must
have passed through the hands of Prince Metternich
at Vienna, whilst the English Ambassador only
received his on the 10th. The delay might have
caused great embarrassment, and indeed at such
a critical moment it was not desirable that a
.bn 058.png
.pn +1
disagreement even for three days should have
existed between Lord Ponsonby and the other
Ministers.
The Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia,
as well as their Ambassadors at Constantinople, saw
how things were going on in the East. They
wrote peremptorily to those personages to settle
the question; and Prince Metternich requested
Lord Beauvale to state to Lord Palmerston that,
in case the Porte should hesitate to accede to
the recommendation of the Allied Powers to
confer the hereditary government on Mehemet
Ali, his court could not be compromised by such
hesitation[5].
.fn 5
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 151.
.fn-
Lord Beauvale also wrote to Lord Palmerston
on the 17th of January[6], that the Turkish Commissioners
going to Alexandria were not empowered
to grant the hereditary pachalic, and in consequence,
Austria would withdraw her support from
the Sultan, and would disavow any attack on
Ibrahim Pacha.
.fn 6
Ibid., p. 159.
.fn-
Lord Palmerston, in a letter to the Ambassador,
of the 26th of January[7], does not exactly find
.bn 059.png
.pn +1
fault with his Excellency for not taking Mehemet
Ali’s offer as a complete submission, but he tells
him the advice in his Lordship’s instructions of
the 15th of October[8] might have been given.
This appears a pretty broad hint, and I suppose
diplomatic etiquette did not admit of any thing
stronger.
.fn 7
Ibid., p. 159.
.fn-
.fn 8
See Vol. I., p. #vol1_249#.
.fn-
On the 17th of December despatches were received
in Marmorice Bay from England. The
Commander-in-Chief was appointed Governor of
Greenwich Hospital; I was directed to hoist a
red broad pennant, and was made a Commander
of the Bath; the Captains commanding ships at
Acre were made Companions; and a large promotion
went through all classes of officers who
were fortunately present at the bombardment. On
the 27th a new Pacha arrived from Constantinople
on his way to Syria, with orders to send to
Adrianople Izzet Pacha, who had created so much
discontent throughout the country, and to report
on the state and condition of Ibrahim’s army. This
Pacha was the bearer of letters of thanks to the
Admiral and others employed in Syria, with the
exception of myself, who have never received any
.bn 060.png
.pn +1
acknowledgment from the Turkish Government up
to the present day. The Admiral strongly recommended
this new Pacha to suspend hostilities, and
I also advised him to control General Jochmus,
who was a young man ambitious of military glory,
and more likely to make war than peace.
On the 5th of January, 1841, the Megæra arrived
from England. I was aware she must either bring
my sentence of acquittal or condemnation, and
having been already denounced by the wise men of
the East, I felt it was not impossible that their
opinion might have influenced the judgment of the
Ministers of the West, if unfortunately their protests
had arrived in London before my despatches
from Alexandria. I had, however, taken precautions
to prevent this, which fortunately succeeded, and
they were left to their own calm judgment, which
decided in my favour.
I had a party dining with me that day, when
numerous letters, public and private, were put into
my hand by the officer of the watch. I laid them
on the table, determined not to run the risk of
spoiling my dinner by bad news, and not requiring
good to give me an appetite. After the inward man
had been well fortified, I ventured to open a letter
.bn 061.png
.pn +1
from Lord Minto, which, to my great satisfaction,
announced to me that the Government were satisfied
with what I had done, with the exception of the
Guarantee. I received also letters from various
members of the Government, and an official one
from the Admiral, inclosing an instruction from
Lord Palmerston to the Admiralty, bearing date
Dec. 15, 1840, some extracts from which I subjoin[9]:
.fn 9
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 87.
.fn-
“I have to request your Lordships to convey to
Commodore Napier the approval of Her Majesty’s
Government of the steps taken by him on this
occasion, though without any instructions to that
effect, and upon his own responsibility, to carry
into execution the arrangements contemplated by
the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to put an end to
the contest in the Levant.
“But the instruction given by your Lordships
to Sir Robert Stopford in pursuance of my letter of
the 14th of November[10], will have reached Sir Robert
Stopford a few days after he received from Commodore
Napier a report of the result of his negociation
at Alexandria; and it is uncertain whether
Sir Robert Stopford will have considered the instruction
.bn 062.png
.pn +1
of the 14th of November as superseding
Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or whether he
will have looked upon Commodore Napier’s arrangement
as superseding that instruction.
.fn 10
See page #15#.
.fn-
“In this state of things, Her Majesty’s Government
must postpone a final communication with
respect to the arrangement made by Commodore
Napier, till they learn, as they probably will in a
few days’ time, what course Sir Robert Stopford
took upon the receipt of the instruction of the 14th
of November. But there is one part of the Articles
signed by Commodore Napier and Boghos Bey,
upon which it is necessary that an instruction should
immediately be sent to Sir Robert Stopford.
“In the first Article, Boghos Bey, on the part
of Mehemet Ali, takes two engagements: the one
is to order the Egyptian troops to evacuate Syria;
the other is to restore the Turkish fleet. The first
engagement was to be fulfilled immediately, and
was to be conditional only upon the promise of
Commodore Napier that he would, in his capacity
of commander of the British fleet before Alexandria,
suspend hostilities against Alexandria, and every
other part of the Egyptian territory. The other
engagement was eventual, and was to be fulfilled as
.bn 063.png
.pn +1
soon as Mehemet Ali should have received an official
notification that the Porte grants him the hereditary
government of Egypt, and that this concession is,
and shall continue to be, under the guarantee of the
Four Powers. Now it is necessary that Sir Robert
Stopford should lose no time in making known to
Mehemet Ali that this last demand of his, that the
Four Powers should guarantee to him the grant of
the hereditary government of Egypt, if that grant
should be made to him by the Sultan, cannot be
complied with.
“That which the Four Powers will do, is to
recommend to the Porte to make the concessions
specified in the communication which Sir Robert
Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehemet
Ali.”
A despatch of the same tendency was addressed
(Dec. 17) by Viscount Palmerston to the Ambassador[11],
in which he remarks,—
“A doubt may have been felt by your Excellency
and your colleagues what steps you should
take in pursuance of the instructions contained in
my despatch of the 15th of October, and in the
corresponding instructions sent from Vienna, Petersburgh,
.bn 064.png
.pn +1
and Berlin; because those instructions, modified
by the subsequent letter to the Admiralty of
November 14, contemplated the unconditional submission
of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, as a preliminary
to the advice to be given to the Porte to
reinstate Mehemet Ali in the Government of Egypt;
and, on the contrary, Mehemet Ali, in the demands
which he sets forth in the first Article of the Agreement,
signed on the 27th of November, engages to
restore the fleet only on two conditions,—the one
being, that the Sultan should grant him hereditary
tenure in the Government of Egypt,—and the other
being, that such grant on the part of the Sultan
should be placed under the guarantee of the Four
Powers.
.fn 11
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 88.
.fn-
“It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that
the fact that Mehemet Ali attached the first of these
conditions to his restoration of the fleet, need not
prevent the Porte from making to him that concession.
For, in fact, those Articles of Agreement
were substantially a complete surrender on the part
of Mehemet Ali; and he was led to suppose, that
in asking for hereditary tenure, he was only asking
that which the Porte was willing to give. But the
second condition, namely, the guarantee of the Four
.bn 065.png
.pn +1
Powers, is one which cannot be complied with; and
your Excellency should, on this point, give to the
Porte the same explanations which Sir Robert Stopford
has been instructed, in pursuance of my letter
to the Admiralty of the 15th instant, to give to
Mehemet Ali.
“It has been reported, but upon what authority
is not known, that the Porte was, towards the end
of November, but before it had heard of the submission
of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the
decree which had deprived him of the Government
of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a feeling
should have existed at that time in the mind of the
Turkish Government, but Her Majesty’s Government
hope that subsequent events, and the unanimous
advice of the Four Powers, will have removed
these objections on the part of the Porte, and will
have led the Porte to accept the settlement effected
by Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or by the subsequent
more ample submission of Mehemet Ali.”
Lord Palmerston’s letter to Lord Ponsonby,
acknowledging the receipt of the Ambassador’s
letter announcing the rejection of the Convention,
as I have before said, has never been published;
it would be a curious document, and I dare say
.bn 066.png
.pn +1
will come to light some day or other; but Lord
Palmerston’s despatch to Lord Ponsonby after receiving
my despatches, is clear enough; he tells
the Ambassador plainly, that it does not signify
whether Sir Robert Stopford adopted my Convention
or his subsequent instruction of the 14th of November;
that the articles of agreement were substantially
a complete surrender on the part of Mehemet
Ali; and he was led to suppose, on asking for the
hereditary tenure, he was only asking that which
the Porte was willing to give; but that the guarantee
could not be complied with.
Prince Metternich also agreed with Lord Palmerston,
and directed the Internuncio to co-operate
with Lord Ponsonby in carrying out the instructions
of the 17th; and moreover tells Lord Beauvale very
plainly that in case the Porte hesitates to confer the
hereditary Pachalic on Mehemet Ali, his Court will
not admit that the Allies could be compromised by
such hesitation. Count Nesselrode also states to
Lord Clanricarde, that it is unfortunate that the
Sultan had not been disposed, or advised, to concede
the hereditary government to Mehemet Ali.
Shortly before this (December 22,) Count Nesselrode
wrote to Baron Brunnow at London, in
.bn 067.png
.pn +1
terms that show his full approval of the Convention,
except the guarantee[12].
.fn 12
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 121.
.fn-
“I hasten to reply to the despatch which your
Excellency has done me the honour to address to
me under date of the 27th November (9th Dec.),
and the arrival of which was almost immediately
preceded by that of the reports which you entrusted
to the Marquis of Clanricarde. Before entering
further into detail upon the principal subject of that
despatch, my first desire, M. le Baron, is to communicate
to you the lively satisfaction with which
the Emperor received the happy intelligence of the
submission of Mehemet Ali. The Treaty of London
has at last been executed in spite of all opposition.
It has been so to its fullest extent, and that without
having cost the Powers who were parties to it any
compromise, or any concession to be regretted.
There is nothing, even including the armed demonstration
with which the British squadron accompanied
its summons at Alexandria, which has not
stamped its result with a character still more favourable
to the consideration of the alliance. Have the
goodness, M. le Baron, to offer our sincere congratulations
.bn 068.png
.pn +1
to Lord Palmerston upon this result,
which we consider as a common triumph of his and
of our policy.
“The Eastern Question thus settled, it now
remains to record and confirm the solution thereof
by a final transaction in which France should concur.
You have already, in anticipation of this event, been
put in possession of the views and intentions which
our august Master entertains upon this subject.
Much more will the Emperor be disposed to accede
to the plan which Lord Palmerston has proposed to
you, because it simplifies still further the transaction
which is to be concluded. His Majesty, then, could
not but approve the motive which leads Lord Palmerston
to desire that the details of the special
arrangement, by virtue of which the Sultan shall
grant to Mehemet Ali the investiture of Egypt,
should not be embodied in the text of the agreement.
Accordingly, M. le Baron, if the bases of
the proposed agreement should be such as have been
stated to you by the Principal Secretary of State,
and if the French Government should decide upon
accepting it, the Emperor would authorize you to
concur in it.”
.bn 069.png
.pn +1
The Count also wrote as follows, under date of
4th January, 1841, to M. Titow, at Constantinople[13]:—
.fn 13
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 152.
.fn-
“I lost no time in laying before the Emperor
your despatch of the 28th of November, in which
you reported to us the late events which have taken
place at Alexandria, as well as the determination of
the Porte to refuse its sanction to the arrangement
concluded by Commodore Napier.
“It certainly belongs to his Highness alone to
determine finally the extent of the sacrifices which
it is expedient for him to make, in order to secure
the pacification of his empire, and that Sovereign
ought not to doubt that the Emperor desires sincerely
that that pacification may be effected upon
conditions as little unfavourable as possible to the
Porte.
“But, the more our august Master has at heart
the defence of the interests of the Sultan, the more
would His Imperial Majesty consider himself as
failing in the friendship which he bears to his Highness,
if he did not seriously recommend him, at this
decisive moment, to consider with calmness and
moderation the present posture of affairs, and to be
.bn 070.png
.pn +1
on his guard against illusions and hopes which in
the end may never be realized.
“But a few months since, even at the period of
the signature of the Convention of July 15, the Porte
could not have hoped in so short a time to have
reduced Mehemet Ali to the powerless state to
which he is now reduced; and it is hardly to be
doubted, that it would a little while ago have granted
to him the hereditary succession, if it had been
possible for it by that means to hasten a definitive
arrangement, in the interests of general peace.
“The military operations of the Allies in Syria
have, since, been crowned with the most decided
success. Nevertheless, when the Porte in a moment
of irritation, determined to pronounce the deprivation
of Mehemet Ali, the Powers did not hesitate to
declare their opinion upon the subject, and to make
known the conditions upon which it appeared to
them that the Sultan should not hesitate to reinstate
the Pacha in the hereditary administration
of Egypt.
“It is certainly true that the Porte has never
hitherto received an official communication of the
advice which the Allied Powers thought it their
duty to tender to it, but the Porte is perfectly aware
.bn 071.png
.pn +1
of the nature and tendency of the instructions of
the 15th of October, which have acquired European
publicity; it is equally acquainted with the measures
determined upon on the 14th of November in London,
and with the step which Sir Robert Stopford
was instructed to take, and the only object of which
was to secure the execution of the preceding instructions.
“It would now be impossible for the Four Allied
Powers to retract their former declarations. Already
the British Cabinet has not hesitated an instant to
declare itself in favour of the advantages which
result from the cessation of hostilities between the
Porte and Mehemet Ali; but while it fully appreciates
the object which Commodore Napier had in
view, in undertaking upon his own responsibility to
hasten the submission of the Pacha; while it fully
approves of all the conditions which that officer has
imposed upon him; the Cabinet of London has not
thought fit to take upon itself a formal guarantee
with respect to the right of hereditary succession
which the Sultan might confer upon Mehemet Ali.
“We are firmly convinced that the other Powers
will readily adhere to this opinion of England; not
one of them will, in fact, take upon itself a guarantee,
.bn 072.png
.pn +1
which would become as burdensome for
those Powers, as it would be incompatible with His
Highness’s rights of Sovereignty.
.tb
“The Cabinet of London appears to be more
than ever impressed with the necessity of furthering,
by all possible means, the pacification of the East,
and of putting an end to the doubts which the
Divan appears to entertain with respect to the real
intentions of the Allies. Have the goodness then,
Sir, to unite with Lord Ponsonby, in holding to the
Ministers of the Porte the language which Lord
Palmerston has lately prescribed to the English
Ambassador, and which, we have no doubt, will be
equally supported by the Representatives of Austria
and Prussia.”
Nothing could be more gratifying to me than
that my first essay at diplomacy should have received
the sanction of the great powers of Europe,
and I presume such a sanction was not very palatable
to the gentlemen who took a different view of
Eastern affairs.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 073.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER V.
.pm start_summary
The Author ordered to Alexandria to carry the Convention
into effect—Interviews with the Pacha and Boghos Bey—Letter
from Boghos Bey explaining the Pacha’s Intentions—Lieut.
Loring dispatched to see the Evacuation of Syria
carried into effect; his Instructions—Letters to the Chief
Officers in Syria—Arrival of the Turkish Commissioners at
Alexandria—Surrender of the Turkish Fleet—Bad Faith of
the Turks—Correspondence between the Author and Boghos
Bey respecting the Cotton Crop—The Commercial Treaty.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
The day after the arrival of the Megæra, I waited
on the Commander-in-Chief, who directed me to
proceed to Alexandria, and see the Convention
carried out. I arrived there in the Stromboli on
the 8th January, when the Pacha sent one of
his officers to compliment me, and invite me to the
Palace.
Between seven and eight in the evening I waited
on Boghos Bey, and delivered the Admiral’s and
Rechid Pacha’s letters[14], and an extract of Lord Palmerston’s
instruction, dated the 15th of December,
beginning with the words, “Now it is necessary
that Sir Robert Stopford[15].” Boghos Bey did not
seem much disappointed at the refusal of the Allies
.bn 074.png
.pn +1
to give a guarantee, but expressed his dissatisfaction
at the word “hereditary” not appearing in the letter
of Rechid Pacha to the British Ambassador, and
expressed his fears that there would be some difficulty
with the Pacha, who fully expected on his
submission, the hereditary Pachalic of Egypt would
be conferred on him.
.fn 14
See page #39#.
.fn-
.fn 15
See page #51#.
.fn-
I was now introduced to the Pacha, who was far
from being in good humour, and evidently disappointed
at the communication Boghos Bey had previously
made to him; he nevertheless invited me to
sit on the divan beside him, and gave me a pipe.
I acquainted his Highness that I was authorized
to allow vessels to proceed to Caiffa, to embark
the sick, wounded, women, children, and any part
of the Egyptian army, and that I should send a
British officer with the person to whom he entrusted
his instructions to Ibrahim to evacuate Syria. I
also told him that I should give every assistance to
fit out the Turkish fleet, which I was sorry to
observe was in the same state I had left them.
He replied it was not his fault; that after the
agreement I had made with him the officer had been
sent back from Syria, and the agreement disallowed.
I remarked that that difficulty was now obviated,
.bn 075.png
.pn +1
that the Convention had been approved of in
London, with the exception of the guarantee.
To this he observed that he did not care so much
about the guarantee, but that the word “hereditary”
had been left out, whereas in Lord Palmerston’s
dispatch to Lord Ponsonby, dated the 15th of
October, and which had been made public, it was
distinctly stated that the Porte would be strongly
recommended to confer on him the hereditary
Pachalic, and that in M. Guizot’s speech to the
French Chambers he had declared that the Allies
would recommend it; and finally, that the agreement
signed by Boghos Bey and myself stipulated
that the fleet should be delivered up on receiving
the official account that the Sublime Porte would
confer on him the hereditary government of Egypt;
that notwithstanding this, in Lord Palmerston’s
instructions of the 14th of November, communicated
to him by Captain Fanshawe, the word “hereditary”
had been left out; but nevertheless he had
entirely submitted himself to the will of the Sultan,
and asked for no terms, being convinced he would
be confirmed in the fullest sense.
There was so much truth in these observations
that I did not endeavour to controvert them, and
.bn 076.png
.pn +1
soon after took my leave, promising to call on
Boghos Bey next morning, when the papers were
translated.
In my next interview with Boghos Bey he again
spoke of the disappointment and dissatisfaction of
the Pacha. He said he had done everything to
gain the good will of England; that the interests of
Great Britain and Egypt were identified; that at
one time England had encouraged him, and even
permitted Egyptians to enter her dockyards and
ships to gain instruction, and that now she wanted
to put him down altogether. All this he very naturally
attributed to Lord Ponsonby, and Mehemet
Ali often said, he was not at war with either Turkey
or England, but with the English Ambassador.
I told him I was not without hopes that the
British Government would still use their influence
with the Porte to obtain that point, and that I
should do everything in my power to forward the
Pacha’s wishes, and I had reason to believe they
would be complied with.
He requested me to read the part of Lord
Palmerston’s letter, approving of the Convention[16],
which I consented to do, but he must consider it a
.bn 077.png
.pn +1
private communication; he listened to this with
much satisfaction, and said, if I would communicate
it to the Pacha, it would go a great way to tranquillize
his mind.
.fn 16
See page #49#.
.fn-
In the morning I waited on the old man, and
read to him the other part of Lord Palmerston’s
instructions, which had some effect in putting him
in good humour; he talked a good deal about the
difficulty of quitting Syria till the spring without a
great loss of life and stores, and was anxious that
the women, children, and sick should be allowed to
embark at Beyrout, Sidon, or the most convenient
place, should the army be still at Damascus.
There is no doubt whatever that he had sent
orders to Ibrahim to withdraw, but was probably
afraid that he would not obey them when he heard
of his fathers submission without being certain of
the hereditary pachalic being conferred, and he was
anxious, in the event of his staying at Damascus, to
free him of his incumbrances.
I observed that the weather was now better than
when the Convention was signed, and was improving
every day; that I had no authority to allow any
embarkation either at Beyrout or Sidon, but that I
should write to the officer in command to give every
.bn 078.png
.pn +1
facility in his power, and that I felt satisfied the
best way to insure the British Government pressing
the point of the hereditary pachalic was, by
throwing no difficulties in the way; that, whether
or no, his son must succeed him, and as to a
guarantee, he had shown it was more necessary to
guarantee the Porte against him, than him against
the Porte. The old man was tickled at this observation,
and consented to all I asked, and next morning
Boghos gave it me in writing, as follows:
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Commodore,'\
'“Alexandria, Jan. 10, 1841.'
“The object of the letter which I have the
honour to address to you, is to recapitulate, according
to the desire which you have expressed to
me, the words which you heard from the mouth of
the Viceroy, my master, himself, in your conversation
yesterday evening.
“The delay which has occurred in the evacuation
of Syria is not dependent on the will of his Highness.
In consequence of the Convention concluded
with you on the 27th of November last, Hamid Bey
was sent to Syria, to carry the Viceroy’s orders to
Ibrahim Pacha. You know, Commodore, the reasons
which hindered that superior officer from
fulfilling his mission, and you are acquainted with
the nature of the obstacles which prevented the
despatches of his Highness from reaching their
destination.
.bn 079.png
.pn +1
“The Viceroy, always desirous to give you a
fresh proof of his readiness to fulfil his engagements,
proposes to dispatch a steam-vessel this very day to
take back to Syria Hamid Bey, who will be charged,
in conjunction with the English officer appointed by
you, to deliver the orders to the General-in-Chief of
Egyptian army. As soon as Ibrahim Pacha shall be
made acquainted with them, he will immediately
effect the evacuation of Syria, despatching, if it is in
his power to do so, the women, children, and sick,
towards Caiffa, and marching himself towards
Egypt, should he not be already in motion with his
army to effect his retreat in that direction. Immediately
on our being made acquainted, by the return
of Hamid Bey, with the measures taken by Ibrahim
Pacha in execution of the orders of his Highness,
and as soon as we shall have acquired the certainty
that the sick, women, and children, belonging to the
Egyptian army have been able to proceed to Caiffa,
his Highness will send transports to that port to
secure their return to Egypt.
“With respect to the Ottoman fleet, I can only
confirm what I had formerly the honour of writing
to you, Commodore; it is ready to put to sea.
“Such is the substance of the terms in which
the Viceroy expressed himself to you, Commodore.
His Highness, in thus giving you a fresh proof of
his deference to the decisions of the Allied Powers,
is convinced that they will hasten the execution
of the Treaty of the 15th of July, by obtaining in his
.bn 080.png
.pn +1
favour the hereditary government of Egypt; and
that they will show their intention of securing the
pacification of the East, by placing it on an imperishable
foundation.”
.pm end_quote
The Egyptian steamer Generoso started on the
second day after my arrival, with one of the Pacha’s
officers and Lieutenant Loring, to whom I gave the
following instructions:—
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“H.M.S. Carysfort,'\
' January 10, 1841.'
“Pursuant to directions from the Commander-in-Chief,
you will accompany Hamid Bey in the
Egyptian steam-boat Generoso, to the coast of Syria.
“You will recommend him first to proceed to
Acre, and you will deliver the accompanying letter
to the officer commanding the Allied troops.
“You will consult with him on the best way of
proceeding to Ibrahim Pacha’s head-quarters, and
you will demand a proper escort (if necessary) for
your own protection and that of the Egyptian officer
who accompanies you. The object of your mission
is to see the evacuation of Syria carried into effect,
and you will remain with Ibrahim Pacha as long
as you think it necessary, and then return to Alexandria.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
' “Chas. Napier.”'
.pm address '“Lieutenant Loring, H.M.S. Carysfort.”'
.pm end_quote
.bn 081.png
.pn +1
I wrote also to the senior Naval and Military
officers in Syria.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“H.M.S. Carysfort,'\
' January 10, 1841.'
“The bearer of this letter is charged by me,
(agreeably to the orders of Sir Robert Stopford, in
consequence of directions of Lord Palmerston, to
carry my Convention into effect,) to proceed with
Hamid Bey to Ibrahim Pacha’s head-quarters, and
deliver to him the order of Mehemet Ali, for the
immediate evacuation of Syria.
“It is Sir Robert Stopford’s directions that every
facility is given for the embarkation of the sick, the
wounded, the women and children, and others of
the Egyptian army, at Caiffa.
“But it appears to me, (if there be no objection,
of which I cannot be a judge,) they may
be permitted to embark at any other place if more
convenient.
“The officer charged with the despatches to
Ibrahim Pacha, will necessarily concert with him
and with you on this point, as will also do the
officer charged to see the evacuation carried into
effect.
“It is needless to observe, that as Mehemet Ali
has made his submission to the Porte, and is reinstated
in the Pachalic of Egypt, it is of the
utmost importance that Ibrahim should not be disturbed
in his evacuation, but should be protected
.bn 082.png
.pn +1
and assisted in every manner, so as to cause as little
loss of life as possible.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
'“Chas. Napier.”'
.pm address2\
'“To the Officer commanding the'\
' Allied Forces in Syria.”'
.pm end_quote
.pm start_quote
.ti 0
“Sir,
“I have the honour to inform you that I am
directed by the Commander-in-Chief to permit the
women, children, sick, wounded, and others of the
Egyptian army, to embark at Caiffa, and that Lieut.
Loring is charged to see the evacuation of Syria
carried into effect, and is accompanied by Hamid
Bey, who is the bearer of orders to Ibrahim Pacha
to evacuate Syria forthwith.
“It is possible there may be other places on the
coast of Syria more convenient for the embarkation
than Caiffa, (of which I cannot be a judge, not
knowing the position of Ibrahim’s army;) in that
case you will concert with the officer commanding
the Allied army, and act accordingly.
“As soon as it is ascertained where the embarkation
will take place, the steamer will return here,
and transports will be sent to receive them.
“I need not observe, that as Mehemet Ali
has sent his submission to the Porte, which has
been accepted, and is now reinstated in the
Pachalic of Egypt, every facility should be given
to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate Syria, in order
.bn 083.png
.pn +1
that it may be done with as little loss of life as
possible.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
' “Chas. Napier.”'
.pm address2\
'“To the Senior Naval Officer'\
' at Acre or Ascalon.”'
.pm end_quote
The Turkish Commissioners, Yaver Pacha (Admiral
Walker,) and Mazloum Bey, arrived at Alexandria
on the 10th January, and were graciously received
by Mehemet Ali, who gave directions that the
fleet should be immediately given up, and Admiral
Walker hoisted his flag on the 11th at noon, under a
salute from the batteries at Alexandria, and the
Egyptian men-of-war and steamers were put at their
disposal, and they were ordered to be entertained at
the Pacha’s expense. My friend, Admiral Walker,
took up his residence with me, and in the morning
of the 13th I visited him on board the Mahomedie,
and afterwards waited on all the Turkish and Egyptian
Admirals, when as much powder was burnt as
would have fought a good action.
I dispatched the Stromboli with the important
intelligence of the delivery of the Turkish fleet, to
Sir Robert Stopford, at Marmorice Bay, on the 11th
of January, supposing that the Eastern Question
.bn 084.png
.pn +1
was brought to a close, but the sequel will show
that it was not yet over.
I shall here make a comparison between the
conduct of Sir Robert Stopford and Lord Ponsonby.
Both rejected my Convention, and I believe it was
the first time they ever agreed. When Captain
Fanshawe returned from Alexandria, the Admiral,
I think, saw his error, because he wrote to Syria to
order a suspension of hostilities, and permitted the
embarkation of the sick and wounded. Lord Ponsonby,
on the other hand, did every thing he possibly
could to gain time, and more than that, the British
Ambassador wrote to General Jochmus, a Turkish
officer, and desired him not to suspend hostilities,
as is positively stated in General Michell’s letter
to Lord Palmerston, dated December 31, 1840, and
as we shall shortly see, he gave the same directions
to his emissary, Mr. Wood; and the very steamer
that brought the Commissioners to Alexandria, as I
shall show hereafter, was the bearer of orders to, if
possible, destroy Ibrahim’s army: so much for the
good faith of the Turks[17]. Admiral Walker was
quite ignorant of this as well as myself, and thinking
.bn 085.png
.pn +1
every thing was settled with Turkey, I very naturally
turned my attention to English interests at
Alexandria.
.fn 17
See Chapters #XI:chap11#. and #XII:chap12#.; and also Levant Papers,
Part III., pp. 203, 268, 275.
.fn-
Boghos Bey had announced his intention of
selling the crop of cotton on the 20th of February,
and continuing the sale the first of every succeeding
month. The British merchants complained of the
difficulty they had in becoming purchasers under
this arrangement; they alleged that if they imported
cash to purchase the cotton, it might be put up at
such a price that they would either be obliged to
take it at a loss, or re-export their specie, and they
requested I would use my influence with Boghos
Bey to get him to put it up at public sale. I thought
their request so reasonable, that I immediately went
to Boghos Bey, and suggested to him, that the
cotton in question should be put up at public sale,
when it is sure to fetch its real value, and the merchants
would then have a fair chance of becoming
purchasers; that this system was invariably followed
by the East India Company, and they found
it to answer their purpose and satisfy the public.
I also took the opportunity of asking Boghos
Bey whether the Pacha intended to execute the
Commercial Treaty of the 16th of August, 1839,
.bn 086.png
.pn +1
which, I assured him, the British Government
would insist upon; and that I felt certain, if the
Pacha would allow it to take its course, he would
not only gain many friends in England, but it would
engage Lord Palmerston more strongly to push the
point of the hereditary government. I told him
that as I had signed the Convention of the 27th of
November, which had been approved of, I felt bound
in honour to do all in my power to carry it out, and
that no argument I could make use of would weigh
more than being able to write to Lord Palmerston
that the Commercial Convention was in full operation.
I also expressed to his Excellency my satisfaction
at the loyal manner in which His Highness had
acted throughout the whole affair of the evacuation
of Syria, and the delivery of the fleet, and I trusted
it would have its due weight at Constantinople.
The substance of this I put in writing, and requested
Boghos Bey to give me a reply, which he did next
morning.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Commodore,'\
'“Alexandria, Jan. 15, 1841.'
“After having informed you, Commodore, that I
had made known to the Viceroy, my master, the
friendly letter which you wrote to me on the 14th
.bn 087.png
.pn +1
of this month, I had the honour to accompany you
this morning to his Highness, and in the conversation
which ensued, you have been enabled to convince
yourself, Commodore, of the sincerity of his
sentiments and conduct. All the means which we
possess have been placed at the disposal of the
Admiral Yaver Pacha to facilitate the departure
of the Ottoman fleet, which is ready to put to sea;
the retreat of the Egyptian troops is being carried
into effect in Syria; the garrisons in Candia, Arabia,
and the Holy Cities, only wait the arrival of the
forces to replace them, in order to maintain the
tranquillity of those countries.
“With regard to commerce, his Highness, who
is desirous to dedicate to it all his care, in conformity
with the desire which has been expressed, has been
hitherto prevented from doing so by the occupation
of the war. In a few days he will proceed to the
provinces to complete such arrangements as may,
without a violent shock to the administration of the
country, put him in a position to fulfil the conditions
of the Treaty to which he has given his acquiescence.
The Viceroy trusts that the time will be
granted him, which is indispensable to work this
change, to be effected to the satisfaction of all.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
' “Boghos Joussouf.”'
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 088.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER VI.
.pm start_summary
The Author visits Cairo—The Mahmoudieh Canal—Fire on
board the Steamer—Voyage up the Nile—Appearance of
the Country—Condition of the People—Arrival at Cairo—Visit
to Abbas Pacha—Palace of Schoubrah—Establishments
of the Pacha—Industry of the Arabs—Visit to the
Pyramids—Quit Cairo.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Things appeared to go on so smoothly at Alexandria,
and anticipating no further difficulty in
Syria, I took this opportunity of proceeding to
Cairo, to gain as much information as I could relative
to the interior of the country. The Pacha put
his own steam-boat at my disposal, and sent one of
his officers as interpreter; and who, I afterwards
found, was likewise charged with paying the expenses
of my journey. A palace in the neighbourhood
of Cairo was also put at my disposition, both
of which civilities I declined.
We embarked in a very tolerable boat on the
24th of January, and proceeded by the Mahmoudieh
Canal to Atfeh, where it joins the Nile. The boat
was dragged by horses at a good pace, and the distance,
forty-eight miles, was accomplished in about
.bn 089.png
.pn +1
seven hours. At Atfeh there is a tolerable inn,
where we stopped.
According to a statement in Russell’s Egypt,
this canal was begun by Mehemet Ali in October,
1819, and finished early in December of the same
year. It is forty-eight miles long, eighteen feet
deep, and ninety feet broad. It is said that 250,000
persons were employed in cutting it, and that 30,000
men, women, and children perished in the undertaking;
but I believe this number to be much exaggerated.
Before the construction of this canal, the
produce of Upper Egypt was brought down the Nile
in boats to Damietta, and there transhipped into
sailing vessels; and, in fine weather, even open boats
frequently undertook the voyage to Alexandria.
This occasioned much loss of time; and as they
were frequently wrecked, much destruction of life
and property; for which reasons Mehemet Ali decided
on undertaking the construction of this Grand
Canal. Unfortunately for the inhabitants, the Pacha
was anxious to see his work completed in a short
space of time, and the poor Fellahs were driven in
from the country like a flock of sheep, and set to
work,—the greater part unprovided with tools, and all
ill-fed, and unpaid; exposed on a scanty allowance
.bn 090.png
.pn +1
of water to the heat of a broiling sun by day, and with
little or no shelter from the noxious dews at night.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be wondered
that the destruction of human life was immense;
but the Pacha troubled himself little about
their sufferings. He saw his work rapidly progressing;
and the first boat started just two months after
its commencement. The Mahmoudieh Canal, though
certainly a grand undertaking, is, nevertheless, incomplete;
there are no locks at either end to communicate
with the Nile and the harbour of Alexandria;
the goods are landed at the latter place,
and carried by railroad to the canal close by; and
when they arrive at Atfeh, are again disembarked,
and transported to the Nile, which is shut out by
a badly constructed barage. The Nile, in the lowest
season, is below the canal; and the canal is several
feet above the sea in the harbour of Alexandria.
It makes a considerable circuit round the eastern
end of the lake Mareotis; and, I believe, had a
skilful engineer been employed, it might have been
greatly shortened.
At daylight on the morning of the 25th we
embarked in one of the Pacha’s steamers. I
was accompanied by Mr. Larking, the English
.bn 091.png
.pn +1
Consul, and his lady,—the former in very bad
health,—by Captain Martin, Mr. Waghorn,—the
active agent for the transport of goods and passengers
(and indeed the first projector of the enterprise)
up the Nile and across the Isthmus,—and several
officers of the Carysfort. Mr. Larking has the
management of a farm belonging to a relation of his,
on the banks of the canal, which he conducts as
nearly after the English method as the difference of
the country will allow. There was a very good house
on the estate, besides other extensive buildings.
Mrs. Larking was a capital caterer; and we owe
to that amiable lady the good cheer we met with
in our passage up the Nile. The steamer was none
of the best as to speed; but her accommodations
were good.
We had not proceeded many miles when she was
discovered to be on fire in the coal-bunkers. We ran
her alongside the bank; and Mr. Larking, who was
ill, and could hardly walk, was with difficulty got on
shore, together with Mrs. Larking and his child.
The decks were ript up; and, notwithstanding the
noise and confusion amongst the Arab crew, with
the assistance of the officers, we managed to get the
fire under, without materially injuring the boat.
.bn 092.png
.pn +1
On examination, we found the beams of the vessel
were too close to the chimney; and after being
completely charred, they took fire, and ignited
the coals. This was not a good beginning; but
was attended with no other consequence than the
delay of a few hours. The current was running
down between two and three miles an hour; and,
although the wind was generally in our favour,
we made little progress, and were easily passed
by the light country boats, notwithstanding their
miserable equipments. The Nile in most parts
is about a quarter of a mile wide; and the
water not being low, was easily navigated. Boats
of all sizes crowd the river, conveying to Alexandria,
corn, chopped straw, cotton, and various
other products of the upper country. Most of
these boats were the property of the Pacha, for
he monopolized the greater part of the trade, as
well as most of the produce of the country; and
if I may judge by their appearance, Mehemet Ali
was as bad a ship’s husband, as he was an agriculturist;
but he has a mania of doing every thing
himself. He was rapidly making himself owner
of all the land in Egypt, as well as of all the
trade. It is a common custom with him, when
.bn 093.png
.pn +1
his crops are ready, to force the Fellahs to leave
their own villages to work on his property. At the
same time, he seizes all the boats on the river to
bring down his produce, caring very little what
becomes of the property of others. This becomes
peculiarly oppressive when the Nile is rapidly
rising, as it often happens that the whole of their
produce is swept away during the time they are
employed to save the Pacha’s.
When the wind blows down the river, the passage
of the boats is very slow. There is no towing path;
no horses or mules; the crew land, and they manage
to tug their boats along from ten to twenty miles
a day, varying according to the size of the boat.
The descent down, owing to the current, unless
the wind is very strong, may be about fifty or sixty
miles in the twenty-four hours; and considerably
more when the wind is fair.
Egypt in the Delta is about 160 miles wide;
but when you ascend the river, and are clear of the
Delta, it narrows to from 11 to 20 miles, and is shut
in by sand-hills and mountains on each side. The
country is richly cultivated, and well irrigated, but
in a very primitive manner. The villages are raised
considerably above the plain; but, nevertheless, are
.bn 094.png
.pn +1
sometimes much inconvenienced by a high Nile,
and are of the most miserable description. The
people are poorly dressed in coarse blue cotton shirts
and petticoats; but their wants seemed few; and I
saw no appearance of discontent or unhappiness
amongst them.
At sunset on the second day, in passing round a
point where there was a considerable bend in the
river, the Pyramids opened to our view, apparently
only a few miles off; their gigantic size gave them
this appearance, though their distance could not
have been less than thirty miles. We continued
our route during the night, and at daylight we
stopped considerably below Boulac, the Wapping,
it may be called, of Cairo. From thence we decided
to prosecute our journey on foot. As the vapour
that hung over the river became dissipated by a
brilliant sun rising over the Mokhattan hills, on
one hand appeared the spires, mosques, and
minarets of the City of Victory, whilst on the
other its beams gilded that part of the seven wonders
of the world, the gigantic relics of antiquity, the
Pyramids. About an hour’s pleasant walk, under
the shade of a fine avenue of sycamore trees,
brought us to the comfortable hotel of Mr. Waghorn,
.bn 095.png
.pn +1
to whose perseverance and activity we owe
the comparatively easy traject across the isthmus to
Suez. By the time we had dressed and breakfasted,
our guide returned from the Citadel, where I had
sent him to announce our arrival to Abbas Pacha,
the grandson of Mehemet Ali, and the Governor
of Cairo. Eleven was the hour appointed to wait
upon his Excellency, who sent a brilliant cavalcade
to conduct us to his palace, consisting of splendid
Arab horses, proudly champing their golden bits,
under a profusion of crimson velvet trappings, each
led by a sais, or groom, and a tolerable coach dragged
by four cream-coloured horses; the coach we consigned
to the junior of the party, Captain Martin;
Captain Williams and myself preferred the horses.
In this manner we entered the Citadel, the scene of
so many brilliant achievements, and of so many
bloody deeds. Memory failed not to recall one of
the most appalling of the latter that tyranny ever
planned or perfidy carried into effect. The foul
murder of the Mamelukes will for ever be a deep
stain on the character of Mehemet Ali. It is true
they were troublesome gentlemen, and had they
lived would, in all probability, have destroyed the
Pacha; but nothing can excuse the treacherous
manner in which he accomplished his object.
.bn 096.png
.pn +1
Such were our feelings as we passed the gates so
securely closed on that fearful occasion, and as we
cast a glance on these, on the appalling height of
these once blood-stained battlements, we could not
help admiring the bold spirit which ventured on
such a leap, and wondering how he survived to tell
the tale. The place known as the Mameluke’s Leap
is near the gateway, the fall between thirty and forty
feet. The horse was crushed on the spot, but,
strange to say, the bold rider escaped unhurt, and
lived for many years afterwards at Constantinople.
Abbas Pacha, the grandson of Mehemet Ali, has
long been known for his hatred to anything having
the resemblance of a Frank, and this is little to be
wondered at, considering the education he has
received. His character is none of the best; he is
devoid of talent, and much more feared than either
loved or respected. However, all things considered,
he received us with tolerable politeness. Pipes and
coffee were produced, and we were invited to take
seats on the Divan. His appearance is not much in
his favour, being a dull heavy man, much more resembling
a butcher than a Pacha. After a short conversation
on indifferent subjects we took our leave,
and were conducted through the different apartments
.bn 097.png
.pn +1
of the Palace, which were both elegant and
comfortable. From the Citadel we proceeded to the
country palace and gardens of Schoubrah, which we
approached under the shadow of a noble avenue of
Egyptian sycamore, whose thick foliage rendered it
quite impervious to the rays of the sun. The palace
of Schoubrah, built a few years back by the Pacha,
cost an immense sum of money, and as we strolled
through the delightful gardens, and inspected the
fountains and kiosks, constructed at immense expense,
we could not repress a feeling of sorrow
that the ruler who had raised such a structure for
his own ease and convenience, had not turned
more of his attention to the comforts of the poor
Arabs, who are lodged in the most miserable mud
huts at the very gates of the palace.
During the short period of our stay at Cairo,
time did not hang heavily on our hands. The
crowded and covered bazaars, the mosques, the
tombs of the Caliphs and Mamelukes, together with
the numerous manufactories and institutions established
by the Pacha, successively occupied much
of our time, and fully engaged our attention.
Had the Pacha shown a little more judgment
and a little more nature in the establishment of
.bn 098.png
.pn +1
these institutions he would have deserved more
credit, but he has a mania of going ahead, and
thinks that Egypt should have manufactories of her
own of all sorts, and be independent of other
nations; and really when we look at his founderies
for cannon, his manufactory for arms, and the industry
with which the Arabs work, it is quite surprising.
Most of his establishments are directed by
English or French men; in the musket manufactory
there is an Englishman, and he assured me that the
industrious manner in which the Arabs were working
on the day we inspected the establishment was
their usual habit; if so, I certainly never saw so
much activity in any manufactory in my life. The
Pacha has begun to find out that the cotton and
cloth manufactories, &c., are far from profitable, and
many of these establishments were shut up, and the
workmen discharged.
Amongst the scientific institutions, which are
nearly all under the management of Frenchmen,
may be reckoned the hospital, with the schools of
surgery and medicine attached to them, under the
superintendence of Clot Bey; the academy of drawing,
and that of mathematics; the students being all
taken from the class of common Fellahs, and, like
.bn 099.png
.pn +1
the rest of the Pacha’s subjects, compelled to work
at whatever he thought fit, and toil they do from
morning to night, in hopes of being one day employed
as civil engineers, or draughtsmen.
The second day following our arrival we devoted
to a pilgrimage, which we could not but fulfil: a
visit to the Pyramids.
After traversing the fine olive grounds and gardens
planted by Ibrahim, on what were formerly
unsightly and huge heaps of rubbish, we crossed the
Nile at the Island of Rhoda, where he has likewise
carried cultivation to great perfection, and landed on
the western bank, at Gezeh, famed for the action
that took place between the French and the Mamelukes;
the conquerors thought perhaps it would be
more grand if dignified as La Bataille des Pyramids,
of which it is certainly in view. Each of our party
being duly accommodated with that most useful of
all animals in Egypt, a little jackass, after traversing
fields waving with the richest luxuriance of cultivation,
we in due time reached the foot of the first of
those stupendous monuments the “Pyramids,” that
of Cheops; then, and not till then, were we aware of
the huge mass at the foot of which we stood. But
descriptions without end have been written of these
.bn 100.png
.pn +1
stupendous works, and they rise as a memento of
the folly of those who consumed so much labour
and time in raising such useless fabrics. As numberless
conjectures as to their purposes have been
ventured by various writers, I shall not increase the
list, but refer the reader to Belzoni, Wilkinson,
Vyse, or fifty others.
On my return to Cairo I learned by telegraph that
intelligence of importance had arrived at Alexandria,
which required my immediate presence; this put an
end to all the projects we had formed of further
exploring this interesting country, and next morning
we bad adieu to Cairo and its wonders, and soon
found ourselves steaming down the broad Nile, with
the current in our favour, but a strong northerly wind
right in our teeth.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 101.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER VII.
.pm start_summary
Letter from Captain Stewart—Apprehended Treachery of the
Turkish Authorities—Question of the Syrian Troops—Double
dealing of Mehemet Ali—The Author’s Letters to
the chief British and Turkish Officers—Letter to the
Admiral.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Halfway down the river I met Colonel Napier,
with the following letter from Captain Stewart, who
had come to Gaza to prevent, if possible, a collision
between the Turks and the Egyptians.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“Gaza, January 25, 1841,'\
'Monday, 1½h., P.M.'\
'“My dear Commodore,'
“I arrived here with Colonel Rose and Rechid
Pacha about an hour ago, in the Hecate.
“We have been induced to come, from the suspicions
and jealousies entertained by the Turks,
* * * of the intentions of Ibrahim
Pacha, in concentrating such a formidable force
in this place.
“The Turks have advanced all their forces on
Jerusalem, Hebron, and Medjdel, and we become
somewhat anxious that * * would bring on a
collision.
“They assure us here, that the retirement shall
be commenced to-morrow morning, by two regiments
.bn 102.png
.pn +1
of cavalry and two more in the afternoon;
and we send this news back to Jaffa, which will keep
all right and safe.
“But the point of the Syrian conscripts being
allowed to remain in their own country, is one of
great difficulty and great importance, inasmuch as
the Turks have received positive and late instructions
to insist upon it. Achmet Pacha, (who commands
here,) says, he will restore them the moment
he receives the order. Meantime a list of those who
may be in the first retiring regiments is to be given
to me, and so soon as leave for the Syrians to
remain arrives, every one of them shall be returned.
“Rechid Pacha assures us that Mehemet Ali
gave his word of honour to the Turkish Commissioners
at Alexandria, that they should all be permitted
to leave the Egyptian ranks previous to
passing the frontiers; and it is to obtain this order,
without a moment’s loss of time, that I send off the
steamers. I beg of you to return the authority by
the quickest possible , be it Hecate or any
other already coaled. The Turks attach great importance
to this article. They are now in force as
well of cavalry as of infantry, all the cavalry from
the north having joined, * * *
.pm tbstars
“I have now no fears but all will go well.
Ibrahim Pacha is expected here to-morrow, and I
shall wait here to see him, and, indeed, until I hear
from Alexandria.
.bn 103.png
.pn +1
“Poor gallant, excellent, General Michell died
at Jaffa yesterday of fever and ague, caught by
exposure and fatigue. Colonel Bridgeman now
commands, and will do everything well. * * * *
.pm tbstars
.pm signature3\
' “In haste,'\
' “Yours very faithfully,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Houston Stewart.”'
.pm address2\
'“To Commodore'\
'Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”'
.pm end_quote
The Turks, not aware of the strength of the
Egyptians, seemed to await a good excuse to attack
them, and this I feared would be afforded them, by
the fact that many of the Syrians had accompanied
the Egyptian army; the Turks had orders to demand
them, and it was stoutly refused by the Egyptians,
who had no orders on the subject.
I had before spoken to Mehemet Ali about these
people, and he objected, under the plea that it
would disorganize Ibrahim’s army even more than
the retreat, and if they were allowed to join the
Turks they might be turned against him. This
was much more than probable, and I in consequence
consented that they should be delivered up
at Gaza. Mehemet Ali in this case did not keep
his word.
.bn 104.png
.pn +1
Colonel Napier, accompanied by Capt. Ward,
had seen Boghos Bey and also the Pacha, on the
subject of these despatches. Mehemet Ali declared
to them that he had settled with Masloum Bey that
they were to come into Egypt, and be sent back
from thence. This was not true. I do not believe
any such arrangement was entered into with Masloum:
on the contrary, he demanded them, and on
the Pacha appealing to me I consented to their
coming as far as Gaza. The Turks had shown so
little good faith since the commencement of the
retreat that I am not at all surprised that Ibrahim
should put no confidence in them.
On my return to Alexandria I brought the
subject of the Syrian troops before the Pacha, who
expressed a great unwillingness to leave them
behind; and as there was no way of obliging
Ibrahim to do this but by violence, and as it
is more than probable the Turks would have had
the worst of it, I thought it much better, under all
circumstances, not to proceed to this extremity,
and I wrote as follows to Captain Stewart, and
General Jochmus, inclosing a copy of the Convention,
in order that the Turks might have no
pretext whatever to use force; which I have
.bn 105.png
.pn +1
no doubt they would have done when Ibrahim’s
army was weakened by the detachments that were
embarked, and sent across the Desert, had it not
been for the presence of the British officers, who,
however, though with difficulty enough, managed
to keep them quiet till the evacuation was completed.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,'\
' Feb. 2, 1841.'\
'“Sir,'
“I beg to inclose you the copy of a Convention
entered into by myself and the Egyptian Government,
which Convention has been approved of by
the British Government and the Allies, and I have
been sent by Sir Robert Stopford to carry it into
execution.
“I have authorized his Highness the Pacha to
send frigates and transports to Gaza, to embark any
part of the Egyptian army he thinks fit, and it is
my direction that you afford them every facility in
your power to accomplish this, as well as to facilitate
their retreat by land.
“You will call upon the Turkish authorities to
support you in this, and should you find any impediment
thrown in the way, you will, in the name of
the Allied Powers, protest against it in the most
solemn manner, as contrary to the existing treaties,
as contrary to the custom of civilized nations, as
.bn 106.png
.pn +1
contrary to the laws of humanity, and contrary even
to the interests of the Porte.
“The Syrian troops are not to be embarked
against their own free will, but if you have any
suspicion that General Jochmus will use them
against the Egyptians they had better be disarmed,
or even be allowed to go into Egypt; in fact, do
any thing to avoid a collision.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'“Chas. Napier, Commodore.'
“P.S. I have written this to avoid any misunderstanding,
though my letter of the 11th, delivered
to you by Lieut. Loring, appears sufficiently explicit.
The Stromboli is to be sent back immediately.”
.pm address3\
' “Captain Houston Stewart, C.B.,'\
' H.M.S. Benbow,'\
'Or, the Senior Naval Officer, Gaza.”'
.pm end_quote
.hr 10%
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,'\
' Feb. 2, 1841.'\
'“Sir,'
“I have the honour of inclosing you the copy
of a Convention entered into by myself and the
Egyptian Government, which has been approved of
by the Allies, and I have been directed to see it
carried into execution.
“I send you this Convention, because I understand
the Turkish authorities, (notwithstanding my
letter to you on the 11th of January, sent by Lieut.
Loring,) have put difficulties in the way of carrying
.bn 107.png
.pn +1
it into execution, and have even meditated an attack
on the Egyptian army.
“I have authorized Mehemet Ali to send frigates
or transports to Gaza to embark any portion of the
Egyptian army he sees fit, and I have directed
Captain Stewart to give them every facility; and I
call upon your Excellency, in the name of the Allied
Powers, to desist from any hostile measure.
“Relative to the question of the Syrians, I have
directed Captain Stewart not to embark them against
their will.
“Should the Turkish authorities, (at the head of
which I believe you are,) impede in any way the
retreat of the Egyptian army, I have directed
Captain Stewart to protest against it in the most
solemn manner, in the name of the Allies, as contrary
to the existing treaties, as contrary to the
custom of civilized nations, as contrary to the laws
of humanity, and contrary even to the interests of
the Porte.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
'“Charles Napier, Commodore.”'
.pm address2\
'“His Excellency Jochmus Pacha,'\
' Commander-in-Chief, Forces, Syria.”'
.pm end_quote
I wrote a short letter to the same purport to
Colonel Bridgeman, and also communicated the
state of affairs to the Admiral, then at Malta:—
.bn 108.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“H.M.S. Carysfort, Alexandria,'\
'Feb. 4, 1841.'\
'Sir,'
“In my letter to you of the 23rd of January I
informed you of the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at
Gaza, which I find was a mistake; he marched with
the rear-guard, and arrived at Gaza on the 31st.
“I received a private letter from Captain Stewart,
dated the 23rd January, informing me he was very
apprehensive that the Turkish authorities would
seize any opportunity to bring on a collision between
the Turks and Egyptians, and in fact the former
had advanced, and skirmished with the outposts,
and then made rather a precipitate retreat.
“I inclose copies of letters I wrote to Captain
Stewart, General Jochmus, and Colonel Bridgeman.
“Yesterday I again heard from Captain Stewart,
announcing the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at Gaza,
and his intention of immediately retiring again into
Egypt; he had collected at Gaza 25,000 men, including
about 6000 cavalry, in good order; this
formidable force will, I have no doubt, keep the
Turks quiet.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ Chas. Napier, Commodore.”'
.pm address2\
'“The Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, &c.,'\
' Malta.”'
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 109.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER VIII.
.pm start_summary
Affairs in Syria—Letters of Sir Charles Smith to Lord Palmerston—Course
that ought to have been pursued after the
Battle of Boharsof—Ignorance as to Ibrahim’s Movements
and Intentions—General Michell to Lord Palmerston—M.
Steindl’s Report respecting the Advance upon Gaza—Capt.
Stewart to the Admiral—General Michell’s and Captain
Stewart’s Opinion as to Lord Ponsonby’s Orders—Correspondence
between Captain Stewart and General Jochmus.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
It will now be necessary to go back to Syria, and
give an account of what took place there after the
rejection of the Convention.
It appears, by Sir Charles Smith’s letter to Lord
Palmerston, dated November 24th, 1840[18], that
.bn 110.png
.pn +1
Ibrahim retired from Zachle and Malaka on the 21st
of that month.
.fn 18
.ce
Major-General Sir C. F. Smith to Viscount Palmerston.
.pm heading\
'My Lord,'\
'Head-quarters, Beyrout, Nov. 24, 1840.'
I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that
a prudent adherence to my instructions from the Foreign Office
has struck a heavier blow on the army of Ibrahim Pacha than
a series of general actions could have achieved. Each succeeding
victory could only have withdrawn us so much farther
from our resources, without advancing, in any degree, the
cause we have in hand. I take not merit to myself, unless it
be for my forbearance. For the number and the nature of the
troops under my command, and the extended line of coast I
have to guard, compelled me to be strictly on the defensive in
the towns already in our possession, whilst a forward movement
would have been unmilitary and unmeaning.
Wearied in waiting for an opportunity of practising his
well-disciplined cavalry and artillery upon a detachment of
Turkish infantry, Ibrahim, on the 21st instant, broke up from
Zachle and Malaka in full retreat on Damascus, where he now
is with 30,000 men, including 7000 cavalry and artillery. He
has pushed a corps of 3000 irregular cavalry to El Mezereib, on
the road towards Mecca,—the only route now open to him for
a final retreat into Egypt,—whither I calculate on his going
the moment he receives from Alexandria the political news
brought by the Oriental.
In as far as regards the sway of Mehemet Ali in Syria, I
look upon the military part of the question as determined.
.pm signature2\
' I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ C. F. Smith, Major-Gen. Commanding.'
P.S. The Emir Effendi and other chiefs who left Ibrahim
near Damascus, report his force to exceed 50,000, of whom
40,000 are said to be effective.
.rj
C.F.S.
.fn-
Without at all putting my experience in comparison
with Sir Charles Smith’s, I must differ in
opinion from him about the propriety of attacking
Ibrahim Pacha. When Sir Charles Smith took
command of the troops, Ibrahim had lost Sidon,
been beat on the heights of Ornagacuan and
Boharsof, and been forced to evacuate Beyrout,
Tripoli, and the passes of the Taurus, and retire
on Zachle. My opinion at the time was for a
.bn 111.png
.pn +1
forward movement. Ibrahim ought not to have
been allowed to concentrate at Zachle and Malaka.
He ought not to have been allowed breathing-time,
and most probably the greater part of
his army would have deserted or been captured.
I cannot say the Turkish troops were well organized,
but, nevertheless, they had done very well;
their wants were few, and after getting possession
of Beyrout, the means of transport was not wanting,
and they were capital marchers. I do not say
that we ought to have followed them across the
plain of the Bekaa without cavalry, but we ought
to have followed him up to Zachle and Malaka,
and afterwards been guided by circumstances. It
appears that he was enabled to collect 50,000 men
at Damascus, of which 30,000 were effective. Such
a force being collected, there was a very good reason
for accepting a Convention, but a very bad one for
rejecting it.
Sir Charles Smith further writes, under date of
the 29th of November[19], that the troops from Aleppo
had commenced their retreat from Damascus on
El Mezereib on the 26th instant, and that Ibrahim
Pacha had ordered his secretaries to be ready to
.bn 112.png
.pn +1
depart with him by the same route, and the whole
of the force under his command had moved, or was
in order of march. On comparing dates, it is impossible
that Ibrahim’s army could have moved from
Damascus on the 26th, as he only left Zachle on the
21st, the distance from thence to Damascus being
three days’ march, and it surely would have
required more than two days to put in motion
an army of 50,000. I am disposed to think the
intelligence was incorrect. It is not impossible that
a division might have gone to El Mezereib, but I do
not believe that Ibrahim began his final retreat till
the 29th of December.
.fn 19
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 119.
.fn-
Sir Charles further writes from Beyrout, under
date of the 6th of December[20], that a courier from
Alexandria had stopped the progress of the Egyptian
army in retreat, and that Ibrahim Pacha, by intelligence
of the 2nd from Damascus, “had returned to
the city, with the intention of quartering his whole
force within the walls, wisely preferring, to the
hazard of a retreat through the Desert, the guarantee
of the Convention for embarking all he possesses,
(plunder as well as military stores,) at the points we
hold on the coast; such stipulation having been
.bn 113.png
.pn +1
made clear to his understanding, as being binding
on the Allies. The contrary, however, being the
fact, he will now find himself, (accidentally as it
were,) master of a stronghold in the heart of Syria,
of which he had been virtually, if not totally,
bereaved.”
.fn 20
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 119.
.fn-
How a courier could stop the progress of the
Egyptian army I cannot comprehend. The Convention
was signed on the 27th of November; on
the 28th Mehemet Ali sent an officer to Beyrout by
a British steamer, with orders to Ibrahim to commence
his retreat; the Egyptian was to be accompanied
by a British officer to see it carried into execution.
What object, then, could Mehemet Ali have
in sending a courier, even if it was possible, which
he declared it was not, in consequence of the distracted
state of the country, to order them to return?
It will be seen, by my correspondence with Boghos
Bey, that Mehemet Ali always objected to embarking
his troops. I proposed that he should do
so, thinking it much better for the peace and happiness
of the country, that they should proceed by
sea to Alexandria in preference to marching through
a country where the inhabitants would be exposed
to all the devastations of a retiring army. I never
.bn 114.png
.pn +1
contemplated that his army should be destroyed
after signing a Convention; quite the contrary. The
moment the Convention was signed, Mehemet Ali
could only be considered the Sultan’s servant, and
the Egyptian troops the Sultan’s army, and not a
hair of their heads ought to have been touched; and
as to embarking plunder, no part of the Convention
sanctioned that, and if it had been permitted, the
blame would have rested with our own officers.
I cannot either understand how Ibrahim Pacha
could have known of the Convention which only left
Alexandria on the 28th in the afternoon, so as to have
allowed him time, had he quitted Damascus on the
27th, to return on the 2nd of December; nor can I
understand how he could suppose the Convention
should be binding on the Allies, when it was immediately
rejected by the authorities in Syria, and his
officer sent back without, I believe, landing at
Beyrout; nor do I see how he had either been
virtually or totally bereaved of his stronghold in
Syria, seeing that if he had ever quitted Damascus
and returned, it was his own act and deed.
Sir Robert Stopford received the intelligence
of Ibrahim’s retreat at Marmorice Bay on the
13th of January, which he communicated to the
.bn 115.png
.pn +1
Admiralty, adding, “my orders to Commodore Sir
Charles Napier may by this time have been the
means of facilitating his retreat[21].”
.fn 21
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 163.
.fn-
Captain Stewart writes to the Admiral from
Jaffa, January the 10th[22]: “General Jochmus reached
this from Jerusalem yesterday morning early; and we
find that he has given such orders as will complete a
line of twenty-eight battalions betwixt this place
and Jerusalem, and that all will be in position by
sunset this evening. The chief object of this advance
seems to be to induce Ibrahim Pacha to
retire by the Desert, and not by the coast. We
have been somewhat in doubt and suspense as to
which road he would retire by; but news reached
the Seraskier last night, which is believed to be
authentic, stating, that Ibrahim’s vanguard was
already thirteen hours’ march to the south-east of
El-Mezereib, and that, consequently, there was no
longer any doubt of his taking the Desert route. It
is very difficult to get information, and still more so
to know how much to believe; but my own opinion,
and (what is of much more importance,) General
Michell’s opinion is, that Ibrahim is positively
evacuating Syria. General Michell and I are both
.bn 116.png
.pn +1
determined to confine ourselves strictly to precautionary
and defensive measures; and we shall use
every endeavour to prevail on our allies to do the same,
and not to obstruct, but rather to facilitate, Ibrahim’s
retreat.” By this it appears that Captain Stewart
and General Michell had also orders to facilitate
Ibrahim’s retreat; and with the exception of the
irregulars and mountaineers harassing, and occasioning
some losses, unavoidable in a retreating
army, but very much exaggerated by the officers
sent by General Jochmus, who reports them to
have lost 10,000 or 15,000 men, on the 5th of
January nothing had been done by the Turkish
army who occupied Acre, Jerusalem, defiles of
D’Jenin, Jaffa, and Ramla.
.fn 22
Ibid., p. 164.
.fn-
General Michell writes to Lord Palmerston,
dated Acre, December 31, 1840[23]:—
“On the departure of Sir Charles Smith, the
Sultan’s commission was delivered to General
Jochmus, and a few days afterwards he left Beyrout
for Sidon, and proceeded thence with some light
cavalry to Hasbeyah in the hill country on the
Upper Jordan, for the purpose of giving encouragement
and direction to the mountaineers, and of
.bn 117.png
.pn +1
obtaining accurate intelligence concerning the Egyptian
army.
.fn 23
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 202.
.fn-
“The most vague and conflicting accounts were
arriving daily as to the intentions of Ibrahim Pacha.
He had concentrated his forces about Damascus,
and the general belief was that he would immediately
commence his retreat to Egypt.
“General Jochmus, notwithstanding his nearer
approach to Damascus, has been still kept in doubt
as to what is going on there; but he seems to
be fully of opinion that Ibrahim Pacha is about
to move, and that he will, if possible, retreat on
Gaza. His proposal, therefore, is to cause the
Egyptian Army to be harassed on its flanks and
rear by the mountain levies, and having assembled
the regular Turkish troops at points along the coast,
to operate with them as occasions may offer, in the
defiles between the Jordan and the coast. In the
mean time General Jochmus has been very desirous
of attacking Gaza, and of capturing or destroying
the provisions which are said to be in store there
for the Egyptian army, and he has repeatedly urged
my co-operation for this purpose with men-of-war
or steamers on the coast. There have been, however,
and are still, many difficulties opposed to such
.bn 118.png
.pn +1
an undertaking. The whole of the fleet had taken
shelter at Marmorice, leaving only one steamer to
watch the wreck of the Zebra in the Bay of Acre,
besides the Hecate, which brought me to Beyrout;
yet three French vessels, a corvette, and two brigs
of war, remained upon the coast and were generally
at anchor near Beyrout. I took the earliest opportunity
of making this known to the Admiral, Sir
Robert Stopford, and he most kindly and promptly
sent Captain Houston Stewart with the Benbow,
seventy-two, and the Hazard sloop. They arrived
on the 24th of December, but the heavy surf prevented
their communication with the shore, and it
was not until the 27th that I could get the detachments
of artillery and sappers, which came from
England in the Hecate, disembarked at Acre. In
the mean time, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Colquhoun
of the Artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Alderson of the Engineers, had made a visit to that
fortress, and likewise to Tyre and Sidon.
“The Admiral, while he sent me this naval aid,
expressed a great unwillingness to have it employed
against Gaza or in any offensive operations; first,
on account of the storms prevailing at this season;
secondly, because the negotiations opened by Captain
.bn 119.png
.pn +1
Fanshawe were still pending, and he had
consented to a request, made by the Pacha of
Egypt, Mehemet Ali, that Egyptian steamers
might go off Gaza to embark the sick, the women,
and the children, of Ibrahim Pacha’s army, for
Alexandria.
“Captain Houston Stewart had instructions
from the Admiral based upon these reasons; and
they of course weighed also with me as to any
operations against Gaza; besides I had received
information of the Egyptian force there, and at
El-Arish, having been largely reinforced.
“Nothing has been seen of the Egyptian
steamers from Alexandria, to receive the sick of
Ibrahim Pacha’s army. When that permission was
given by Captain Fanshawe, it was supposed the
army was already on its march to Gaza, and not
likely to linger at Damascus. Probably Ibrahim
Pacha delays his movement from that city, now,
in consequence of the Convention commenced with
his father by Captain Fanshawe. Our situation
will be very embarrassing until the negotiations are
terminated, since any act of hostility on our part
may be construed into a breach of faith, and may
disturb arrangements half concluded. I am, therefore,
.bn 120.png
.pn +1
anxiously expecting orders from Lord Ponsonby
upon the subject. In the meantime his Excellency’s
latest instructions to General Jochmus, and upon
which he is prepared and resolved to act with
energy, dictate a continuance of offensive operations.”
As I have before stated, we now see the Commander-in-Chief
of the allied force by sea and land
giving directions to his officers to facilitate the
retreat of Ibrahim Pacha, and the Austrian Ambassador
declaring he would disavow any attack upon
him, thereby maintaining good faith with Mehemet
Ali; and the Ambassador at Constantinople giving
orders to his general to continue offensive operations,
thereby compromising not only the honour
of England but of the Allied Powers.
M. Steindl, in a letter to Baron Stürmer, dated
the 10th of January, writes from Jaffa[24],—
.fn 24
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 204.
.fn-
“General Jochmus, escorted by 100 Turkish
cavalry, continued in the mean time to traverse the
mountains of the Naplouse and the districts situated
between the Jordan and the Haouran, in order to
assemble as many mountaineers as possible. He
formed several corps of them, the command of
.bn 121.png
.pn +1
which he entrusted to M. Dumont and Count
Szechenyi, his aides-de-camp, for the purpose of
harassing Ibrahim Pacha during his retreat, whilst
he ordered Omar Pacha, who was stationed at
Ramla, with 2500 men, to form a junction with a
portion of the garrisons of Jaffa and of Jerusalem,
and to attempt a sudden attack upon Gaza, in order
there to burn the considerable magazines of provisions
which Mehemet Ali had caused to be transported
thither to facilitate the retreat of his son’s
army by that road.
“The English loudly disavowed this attack, less,
as it appears, because they despaired of success,
than because Admiral Stopford had indicated to
Mehemet Ali that town as the place where the
Egyptians should concentrate themselves to be embarked
for Alexandria, in case an arrangement could
be brought about between the Sultan and his vassal.
For this purpose, Rechid Mehemed Pacha, appointed
Chief of the Staff at head-quarters, was sent
on the 5th instant from St. Jean d’Acre to Tiberias
to General Jochmus, with orders to invite him to
proceed to Jaffa to be present at a great council of
war, whilst the same order was sent by Tatar to
Omar Pacha, with a prohibition against attacking
.bn 122.png
.pn +1
Gaza. General Jochmus arrived here in the course
of yesterday, still leaving his aides-de-camp at the
head of the armed peasantry.”
On the 17th of January Captain Stewart again
writes to the Commander-in-Chief from Jaffa[25]:—
.fn 25
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 265.
.fn-
“My letter of the 10th instant[26], forwarded by
Gorgon, would inform you of General Michell’s
and my own determination to confine ourselves
strictly to precautionary and defensive measures.
It will be therefore necessary to explain the circumstances
attending a late advance of the Turkish
troops upon Gaza, and for this purpose I transmit
herewith copies of a letter I addressed to General
Jochmus, immediately after our last conference on
the 12th instant, also of a note which I received
from General Michell, after he had reached Ramla,
and my reply to that note, sent by a staff officer to
General Michell, at Ashdod.
.fn 26
See p. 103.
.fn-
“General Michell expressed, in the most decided
and unequivocal terms, his disapprobation of the
expedition. We both appealed to the Seraskier,
who refused to put his written veto on the advance,
without which General Jochmus declared he would
persevere, and accordingly he left Jaffa for Ramla
.bn 123.png
.pn +1
within an hour. General Michell then felt that he
was in a peculiarly awkward position, but with the
true spirit of an English soldier determined to accompany
and render every assistance to the Turkish
generals.
“I also felt myself bound, notwithstanding my
protest, to go down with the Vesuvius and Hecate,
and make a demonstration on the coast, especially
as I thought I might render material assistance, by
either threatening a descent on the Egyptians’ rear
to the southward of Gaza, by which their retreat on
El-Arish would be endangered, or in case of the
Turks retreating, protecting with the great guns that
hazardous operation.
“At 4 A.M. of Friday the 15th, we weighed in the
Vesuvius and Hecate, and proceeded as far as Ascalon,
when the weather became so thick, and blew so
hard, with a heavy increasing sea, that after showing
ourselves again off Jaffa, I requested Captain Henderson
to run out fifteen or twenty miles for an
offing, bank up the fires, and put the vessels under
canvass. At 2 A.M. on the 16th, it being then more
moderate, we bore up, and at daylight we put the
steam on and steered towards Ascalon, but on
getting sight of the beach, the surf was so excessive
.bn 124.png
.pn +1
as to preclude all hope of being able to communicate
with the shore for many hours to come.
We therefore unwillingly returned off Jaffa, where
we were not able to effect a landing until sunset,
when I found General Michell just returned, having
preceded the returning Turkish troops. The Seraskier
had reached Jaffa about two hours previous
to General Michell.
“I ought to have stated, that by General
Michell’s desire, twenty-five marines were embarked
on board the Vesuvius under command of
Lieutenant Anderson, and a like number on board
the Hecate; these have all since been disembarked
here.”
General Michell writes to Capt. Stewart[27], “Mr.
Wood is prepared to give us in writing very
powerful arguments in favour of a continuation of
active offensive operations; his letter from Lord
Ponsonby, after Captain Fanshawe’s arrival at Constantinople,
is strong upon the subject.” To which
Stewart replies[28], “We know Lord Palmerston’s and
the British Government’s wishes and orders. Lord
Ponsonby’s orders must with us be subordinate to
.bn 125.png
.pn +1
Lord Palmerston’s; we have promised the Admiral
that we will act strictly on precautionary and defensive
principles.”
.fn 27
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 268.
.fn-
.fn 28
Ibid., p. 268.
.fn-
Captain Stewart’s letter to General Jochmus,
above referred to, and the reply, were as follow:
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“British Head-quarters, Jaffa,'\
' January 12, 1841, 3 P.M.'\
'“Sir,'
“In order that there may be no misapprehension
on the subject of our conferences yesterday and
to-day, I think it right to put the particulars into
writing.
“When Rechid Pacha came to General Michell
and myself yesterday morning, he stated that Ibrahim
Pacha’s army being now fairly entered on the Desert,
there could be no reason for the 3000 Egyptian men
quartered at Gaza being permitted to remain there,
and asked us if we would concur in an advance which
should have the effect of ridding the Syrian country
of the plunderers. General Michell and I both said
that our instructions being to facilitate the evacuation
of Syria by the Egyptians, there could be no
political reason to prevent our co-operation, and
that, provided the forces advanced were so great as
to make resistance hopeless, and certain information
received of Ibrahim Pacha having advanced south of
any road by which he could march upon Gaza, there
appeared to be none of a military nature.
“Very shortly after this, Rechid Pacha returned
.bn 126.png
.pn +1
with your Excellency, when the same points were
distinctly stated, and you expressed your conviction
of the impossibility of Ibrahim’s coming upon Gaza;
that we should advance close to it, and you would
send notice to the Egyptian troops, that they might
have twenty-four hours to retreat, after which would attack and occupy Gaza. Rechid Pacha
said he would go immediately to Jerusalem, from
whence he would write positive information, upon
which we might safely rely; that we should not
move from this place until we received his communications.
After his departure, General Michell and
I paid your Excellency two visits, in which we found
out, on examination of maps and Egyptian officers
who had deserted from Gaza, that it was not only
possible but very probable that Ibrahim might come
on Gaza by the end of the Dead Sea, and that he
might reach it within two days of the time in which
your troops could. You then avowed that your aim
was not to facilitate his retreat, but to annihilate his
army, and prevent a single Egyptian getting back to
his own country.
“The Seraskier Zacharias Pacha, your Excellency,
General Michell, and myself had a meeting this
forenoon, at which you stated it to be your determination
to advance; that you had ordered the
troops at Jerusalem to make a combined movement
on Gaza with those from Ramla; and that 6000 men
and 1400 cavalry (900 of them being irregular),
with twenty-four guns, would attack Gaza, destroy
.bn 127.png
.pn +1
the provisions, and immediately retire, leaving two
battalions in the place; that if Ibrahim Pacha appeared
you would retire, and that, if he pressed you,
you could retreat on the mountains near Jerusalem.
There appeared to General Michell and to me such
an evident and imminent hazard in this operation,
and so inadequate an object to be gained, so much
evil would result from a retrograde movement,
such disaster from defeat, that I declared I could
be no party to it, and that so long as it was not
ascertained beyond doubt that Ibrahim Pacha was
not coming on Gaza, I could not afford any naval
co-operation.
“It is with sincere pain that I have come to this
resolution; your Excellency has had no reason to
doubt the hearty co-operation hitherto of Her
Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in promoting the
Sultan’s cause; but I should be betraying my trust,
and acting in direct opposition to my orders, if I
concurred in any operations which had for their
object the prevention or suspension of Ibrahim
Pacha’s evacuation of Syria.
.pm signature4\
' “I have, &c.,'\
' (Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Houston Stewart,'\
' “Captain and Senior Officer commanding'\
'H.B.M. ships and vessels on the Coast of Syria.”'
.pm end_quote
.sp 2
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“Head-quarters, Jerusalem,'\
' “January 25, 1841.'\
'“Sir,'
“I had the honour to receive your letter of
the 12th of January only on the 17th, and active
.bn 128.png
.pn +1
operations have prevented my answering this
before.
“It would be superfluous to enter now into any
details on its varied contents, since fortune and victory
have declared on all sides for me by the total rout of
the Egyptians, thus consoling me, in a certain degree,
for that want of confidence in my judgment which it
is evident you entertain, with respect to my operations
in the field. Unskilful as I may be deemed as
a military commander, it must at least be confessed,
from the recent march of events, that I am certainly
a very fortunate one. I must, however, most distinctly
advert to, and refute two points upon which
a great part of the critical acumen, contained in the
letter in question, appears to be erroneously based;
stating first, that I am not aware of any person in
Syria being in the secret of my operations, and
cognizant of all my plans, until after their execution,
since I consider secresy the mainspring of success;
and secondly, that I do not admit the right of any
naval officer, on a special station, to attempt to control
those operations, in the way you have thought
proper to assume, upon the same principle, as I
suppose would guide you, were I to presume to give
you a lesson on the best mode of managing your
ship. At the same time I am, and have always
been, most happy to receive any opinion or explanation,
provided they be given with the courtesy and
respect due to the General intrusted with the operations
of the army.
.bn 129.png
.pn +1
“It is to me a matter of regret, that after the
transcendant services rendered by the British fleet
in the very last operation, you should have thought
proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected
movements on Gaza, but it certainly is to me
much more a cause of surprise, that you should have
thought proper to write an official letter, on an occasion
where naval co-operation could not even make
any serious impression on the inland position of the
enemy, and where the sole column of Ramleh was
more than doubly sufficient to attain my object. It
is well known, that after the defeat of part of the
Egyptian cavalry at El-Maishdell on the 15th instant,
the enemy never ventured again to meet our troops
beyond the river Ascalon, although I advanced our
cavalry, which was not half his in number, on the
following day, and left it encamped within an hour
and a half’s march of Gaza, whilst, at the same
time, I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa,
on account of the inclement weather and impracticable
state of the roads. Under these circumstances,
it would, in my opinion, have been perfectly
consistent with your responsibility, not to have
given any naval assistance in this operation, but
without officially declining it after my return to
Jaffa, the more so, as I fully agreed with you on
the impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate
use; but it seems to have been your particular
desire to have made the whole transaction
a matter of official correspondence, which, although
.bn 130.png
.pn +1
I do not decline, I would fain hope is now brought
to a close.
.pm signature3\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “A. Jochmus, Lieut.-General,'\
'“Commanding the Army of Operation.”'
.pm address2\
' “To Capt. Houston Stewart, R.N.,'\
'Commanding the Naval Forces off Jaffa.”'
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 131.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER IX.
.pm start_summary
Examination of the Conduct of General Jochmus regarding
Ibrahim Pacha’s Retreat—Sir Robert Stopford styled by
him Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces—The
General’s Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Unwillingness
of the Admiral to prolong the War—Reported Destruction
of the Egyptian Army—Advance upon Gaza—Colonel
Alderson’s Narrative of the Skirmish of Medjdel.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Whether Sir Robert Stopford, as commanding
the allies by sea and land, wrote also to General
Jochmus, as well as to General Michell and Captain
Stewart, I am not aware. In the official correspondence
laid before Parliament Sir Robert Stopford’s
orders to these officers do not appear, and we only
learn the fact from General Michell and Captain
Stewart’s letters, but it is evident though General
Jochmus commanded the army of operation he
still considered himself under Sir Robert Stopford’s
orders, for he writes to him officially from Jaffa, on
the 13th of January, 1841[29], sending him the details
of his operations, in which he styles him Commander-in-Chief
of the Allied Forces. It appears by his
letter that he took charge of the army of operation
.bn 132.png
.pn +1
on the 16th of December, 1840; at that period he
could not have known of the submission of Mehemet
Ali, and therefore he was quite right to make his
arrangements for driving Ibrahim from Damascus,
particularly after the rejection of the Convention, but
he must have been quite aware of his submission by
the 22nd, the day he shifted his head-quarters to
Hasbeya. In one paragraph of the General’s letter
he says Ibrahim had resolved to maintain himself
as long as he could in Damascus; in another he
states, that should circumstances force him to retire
he had determined to march by El Mezereib, the
bridge of Moïadjumah on the Jordan, D’Jenin,
Ramla, and Gaza, to El-Arish, and this was corroborated
by the Admiral having authorized the
embarkation of the sick, wounded, and women
at Gaza, and the Carysfort frigate being then in the
harbour of Alexandria. What does this prove?
Why that General Jochmus must have known of
the Pacha’s submission, and of the unwillingness of
the Admiral to prolong the war.
.fn 29
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 288.
.fn-
In the next paragraph he writes (remember this
is to his Commander-in-Chief, who disapproved
of carrying on hostilities), “Under such circumstances
I considered it a most positive duty on my
.bn 133.png
.pn +1
part to defeat the intention of the Egyptian commander,
and oblige him to quit Damascus, and follow
the route of the Desert; for if a Convention had
actually been signed while Ibrahim Pacha remained
at Damascus, the military question remained undecided,
and the complete conquest of Syria by the
allied arms could be denied on the ground of our
inability of driving a much superior force from its
capital; while, if the Egyptian army made forcibly
its way through Palestine to El Arish, its losses and
sufferings would be small, the country being rich in
every resource, and large government stores existing
still at Safed, Tiberias, Ramla, and Gaza.” Now
what does this mean? that neither General Jochmus
nor Lord Ponsonby, under whose orders it appears,
by General Michell’s letter, he was acting[31], cared
one straw about conventions or submission, but were
.bn 134.png
.pn +1
determined, if they could, to destroy as many human
beings as possible to give éclat to themselves, and
please the Sultan or his ministers. After describing
what his plans were, the General writes, “It was at
this time, and it remains still, my firm conviction[30],
that victory would have crowned the Sultan’s arms
in a few hours, and that the whole of Ibrahim’s
army would have been annihilated, or obliged to
surrender; the only force of his still in some state
of organization being his cavalry, and they would
have been of no use in the rocky grounds of
D’Jenin.”
.fn 30
.ce
General Michell to Viscount Palmerston.
.rj
December 31, 1840.
Our situation will be very embarrassing until the negotiations
are terminated, since any act of hostility on our part may
be construed into a breach of faith, and may disturb arrangements
half concluded. I am, therefore, anxiously expecting
orders from Lord Ponsonby upon the subject. In the meantime
his Excellency’s latest instructions to General Jochmus,
and upon which he is prepared and resolved to act with energy,
dictate a continuance of offensive operations.
.fn-
.fn 31
Alluding to the probability of his retiring by D’Jenin.
.fn-
Here the General reckoned without his host, for
there was no necessity for Ibrahim passing by
D’Jenin at all. He might have kept through the
extensive plains of Esdraelon, until he arrived at
the defiles of Kakoun between Mount Carmel and
the Naplouse range, which he must have traversed
to gain the sea shore; at this point he might have
been attacked advantageously. But it appears that
Ibrahim had no intention of taking that route; his
apparent hesitation at El Mezereib for three days was
probably, as General Jochmus says, to reconnoitre
the Jordan, but he had another object in view, and
.bn 135.png
.pn +1
which it will be seen he executed with great skill.
By General Jochmus’s account he appears to have
arrived at Remtha on the 7th or 8th of January,
1841; and on the 9th a foraging party was repulsed
near Es-Salt.
“The Egyptian army,” says the General, “fairly
launched into the Desert[32], has not since been authentically
heard of. When last seen, between El
Mezereib and Kalat Mefrek, its infantry was reduced
to 15,000 disorderly men; its artillery, though still
numerous, was utterly disorganized, principally by
desertion.”... We shall shortly see where this
wandering, disorganized army next makes its appearance.
.fn 32
He does not give the date.
.fn-
Ibrahim, the reader already knows, quitted Damascus
on the 29th of December, 1840; General
Jochmus says he left in consequence of his military
dispositions, and being blocked up within the
walls of Damascus; but surely irregular troops
only, without either pay or commissariat, were not
capable of blocking up an army of upwards of
50,000 men, including about 8000 cavalry, known
to be in splendid order, 150 pieces of artillery,
together with 4000 or 5000 irregulars, for he does
.bn 136.png
.pn +1
not acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that there
were any regular Turkish troops near Damascus.
The fact is, Ibrahim had received orders from Mehemet
Ali to return to Egypt, he knew of the
enemy’s army advancing by land, and it would have
been imprudent, even if he had not received orders,
any longer to have delayed his retreat. Captain
De l’Or reports that in three days he lost 10,000
men and 20 guns. “The hail and intense cold,”
writes the General, “caused numerous deaths
amongst the nearly naked soldiery, in summer
clothing, and the sword of the fierce and revengeful
Haouranees, the victims of Ibrahim’s abominable
oppression, was unmerciful to small detachments
of straggling deserters.” All this reputed loss of
life took place after Mehemet Ali’s submission, and
after that submission was known, and the unfortunate
wretches destroyed, if they were destroyed,
were the Sultan’s own subjects.
General Jochmus also tells the Commander-in-Chief
the valour of the Imperial and Allied troops
had done much in the conquest of a vast country
like Syria, in a short period of glory and success.
How he makes this out I am at a loss to know, for
up to this time the Allied and Imperial troops had
.bn 137.png
.pn +1
not fired a shot since the capture of Acre, so if the
reports sent to General Jochmus were correct the
whole mischief was done by the mountaineers and
irregular cavalry.
“The God of battle,” says the General, “may
lead Ibrahim and his shattered forces through the
desert, and bring some troops back to the banks of
the Nile.” (We shall shortly see how many he
brought to the banks of the Nile.) “I have taken,
as in duty bound, such means as may as much as
possible delay his march or diminish his chance of
escape.” And again, “It is to me an agreeable
duty to state to your Excellency the perfect unanimity
which has actuated all the men of the
Turkish and allied forces during these late and
extensive operations[33], which by mere strategic
combinations and movements, and with very
little loss of life, have produced great and important
results; the clear proof of Ibrahim’s
having lost Syria by force of arms, and without
negotiations, the salvation of Palestine from pillage
and destruction, and finally, the enormous loss of
the Egyptian General, only as far as El-Mezereib,
.bn 138.png
.pn +1
since he left Damascus, without calculating
those reserved for him by the sufferings of the
Desert.”
.fn 33
Captain Stewart and General Michell do not confirm
this.
.fn-
By this dispatch one would suppose that the
gallant General had been destroying the Russians,
the natural foes of the Porte, and not the Egyptians,
who had submitted to Turkish sway, and who ought
to have been preserved instead of destroyed. What
could have been the use of all this boasted destruction
of human life? Syria would have been evacuated,
the country would have suffered less, and
humanity would not have been outraged, had not a
single Turkish soldier quitted his cantonments, or at
least, had they confined themselves to precautionary
and defensive measures, so strongly recommended
by General Michell and Captain Stewart.
We now come to General Jochmus’ report of the
affair of Gaza[34], against which it has already been
.bn 139.png
.pn +1
shown that both General Michell and Captain
Stewart protested so strongly. It appears the division
intended for the attack arrived at El-Medjdel
on the 15th of January, where it halted. Here the
General changed his mind, and decided on returning
to Jaffa, and against this movement General Michell
protested as strongly as he had before done against
the advance: the first he thought quite unnecessary,
and the last he thought quite improper.
.fn 34
.ce
General Jochmus to Admiral Stopford.
.pm heading3a\
'Head-quarters, Jaffa,'\
' Jan. 17, 1841.'\
'Sir,'
I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the
14th instant I directed a division of ten battalions of infantry,
1800 irregular and Tatar horse, 150 regular cavalry, and 14
pieces of artillery, to march from Ramla towards Gaza.
This latter village is abandoned by the enemy, who has a
flying camp of 1200 regular and 1800 irregular horse, with
eight pieces of horse artillery, at three-quarters of an hour’s
march south of Gaza, whence he draws his forage and provisions:
but ravages, at the same time, the country, carrying off
cattle and mules to a great extent from most of the villages
south of Ramla.
The object of my movement was the protection of these
villages, but principally the destruction of the enemy’s provisions
at Gaza, in case Ibrahim Pacha, distressed in the Desert,
should have struck off south of the Dead Sea towards Gaza.
On the 14th of January the division encamped at Ashdod;
on the 15th it could only make a march of three hours to El-Meshdel
on account of the incessant heavy rain, which poured
down ever since it left Ramla.
Towards the afternoon, a reconnoitring party of the enemy
of 500 horse approached the camp; but the commanding
officer making a very silly man[oe]uvre was taken in flank and
rear by about 400 or 500 of our cavalry, who pursued him for
two hours, taking between forty and fifty prisoners, and killing
and wounding as many. Our loss was about four killed and
twelve wounded.
Hearing nothing positive about Ibrahim’s immediate approach,
and the low country towards Gaza having become a
complete marsh by the continued floods of rain up to the 16th
in the evening, and the troops having been completely drenched
day and night in the bivouacs, I suspended the movement, and
sent the infantry and guns to Jaffa, advancing, at the same
time, the cavalry detachments to the neighbourhood of Ascalon
and some villages towards the river of that name, with their
head-quarters at El-Mesde, intending to resume the operations
the moment the ground had become practicable; but on my
arrival here, informed officially of the complete submission of
Mehemet Ali Pacha, and the consequent cessation of the state
of rebellion of his army, our troops have been ordered to cease
offensive hostilities. His Excellency the Seraskier Ahmed
Zacharias Pacha commanded in person since we left Ramla.
.nf r
I have, &c.,
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ A. Jochmus, Lieut.-Gen.
.nf-
.fn-
Before the General retired, a party of the enemy’s
irregular horse reconnoitred his position, and were
fired upon by several field-pieces planted in an open
.bn 140.png
.pn +1
grove, in advance of Medjdel. At this moment
Colonel Rose, who had been in search of some
stray baggage with a small party of irregular horse,
accidentally coming up, charged them in the most
gallant style, and beat them; this being observed
by Captains Harvey and Wilbraham from the
Turkish camp, they sallied out with a few horse,
joined Rose, and pursued the enemy for a considerable
time, until the Colonel was severely wounded,
when the pursuit ended. Whether it is to this
that the General alludes I do not know, but it
.bn 141.png
.pn +1
appears strange that no mention is made of the
British officers in the dispatch to Sir Robert
Stopford.
The account of this affair, by Colonel Alderson,
of the Royal Engineers, one of the British officers
engaged, is so graphic that it cannot fail to be highly
interesting to the reader. I give it at length:
.pm start_quote
“We selected an encampment at the outskirts of
the village of Medjdel, but whilst the tents were being
pitched, the assembly sounded, and it was understood
the enemy were advancing to attack our position.
“It appeared that Colonel Rose, not being able
to find his servant and baggage mule, had taken the
Gaza road, to ascertain if they were in advance, and
in doing this fell in with one of our picquets patroling
the outskirts of the village; and, whilst in their
company, perceived some cavalry advancing, the
main body of which appeared to consist of several
hundred men, with a picquet like our own in front.
Having therefore sent to inform the Commander-in-Chief
of the advance of the enemy, and finding
that our troops were forming, he induced the
Turkish picquet to charge that of the enemy.
Whilst Colonel Rose, who was gallantly leading
them on, was in the act of cutting down one of the
enemy, he received two slight wounds,—one in the
breast and the other in the back.
“By this time the whole of the Turkish force
.bn 142.png
.pn +1
had got under arms, and the light artillery were
placed in position, and opened fire on the main body
of cavalry, now within cannon-shot. The fire of the
artillery took effect, and, as we afterwards learned,
killed their colonel. They retired immediately, and
our irregular cavalry commenced the pursuit.
“I had, with two other officers, gone to Ascalon
to ascertain if it were possible to communicate with
the steamers, and finding it not so, owing to the
heavy sea and thick state of the weather, was returning
with them, when we heard the report of the
artillery, and putting spurs to our horses, and gaining
the summit of the high sandy ridge separating
the sea shore from the plain of Medjdel, (or possibly
those of Ascalon, the scene of the encounter of
Richard C[oe]ur-de-Leon and Saladin, at the end of
the twelfth century,) perceived our regular cavalry
at the caravanserai forming, and several other horsemen,
apparently flying or pursuing.
“We were not long in coming up with them, and
found Colonel Bridgeman and Major Wilbraham
encouraging the irregular cavalry to pursue and
attack the flying foe. We joined them, and for
upwards of an hour continued the pursuit, the regular
cavalry bringing up the rear, though at a slower
pace.
“As it may never be my lot to witness so extraordinary
a sight again, as the one which now took
place, I will endeavour in a few words to explain
the affair of Medjdel. The irregular cavalry, on both
.bn 143.png
.pn +1
sides, appeared to consist of several tribes; each
tribe had its standard bearer, and little drums or
tom-toms[35]. The standard-bearer is, I suppose,
selected for his bravery; as he gallops in advance,
shouting with all his might, when his followers rush
up to defend the standard. If the enemy is too
strong, and he has to retire, they cover his retreat;
the object appearing, in each case, to out-man[oe]uvre
each other, principally by feats of horsemanship.
If the retiring party are under-horsed, their pursuers
seldom fail to do execution. If, on the other hand,
they have a superiority, the retreat is a feint only to
separate a portion from the main body, when they
suddenly wheel round and become in turn the
assailants, cutting down those in advance before
they can rejoin their companions.
.fn 35
“Very small kettle-drums, or basins, about six inches in
diameter, covered with a parchment, and fixed on each side of
the pommel of the saddle as holster-pieces are, and beat with
pieces of leather straps. They make a monotonous noise, and
always accompany Arab cavalry.”
.fn-
“There did not appear, as far as I could see,
any desire to cross spears or weapons. Their dress
was of the most picturesque description, from the
embroidered mushalla to the simple sheepskin; nor
were their arms less various,—the musket with the
bayonet fixed, the lance, blunderbuss, pistol, sabre,
dagger, and crease; and I confess the danger appeared
to me greater from our own troops in our
rear, who were firing over our heads, than from the
.bn 144.png
.pn +1
retiring foe, who had to turn half-round to discharge
his piece, whilst his horse was at speed. Our pursuit
lasted for upwards of an hour, during which time
about twenty-five of the enemy were killed, and
twenty-seven taken prisoners; when, finding General
Jochmus did not advance from his position, and the
regular cavalry had halted on a high sand-hill, some
distance in the rear, we counselled our motley
brothers in arms, with whom we were enabled to
communicate through Major Wilbraham, to call
together their separate tribes, and return to the
camp, as the enemy had now joined their main
body, and we were no match for them.
“We returned by the Gaza road, our pursuit
having been on the sandy hills, partially covered
with grass, between it and the sea.
“The rain fell in torrents, and we returned to as
wretched an encampment as I ever remember to
have witnessed. Late that night General Michell,
having received no communication from General
Jochmus, sent a staff officer to ask for the orders.
They were, to march at daylight,—not, however, to
our surprise, on the road to Gaza, but back to Jaffa,
General Jochmus assigning as a reason, that the
heavy rains had rendered the roads impassable for
artillery.
“General Michell had not been consulted, nor
had any questions been asked of Colonel Bridgeman,
Majors Robe and Wilbraham, or myself, as to the
state of the Gaza road, although we had been nearly
.bn 145.png
.pn +1
halfway to that place. I will merely add, (having,
since that period, twice travelled the road by daylight,)
that nearly the whole of it is a sandy soil,
and I should say the rain which had fallen had rather
been beneficial than otherwise.
“If we had disapproved of the expedition in the
first instance, how much greater was our mortification
at having to abandon it after having come
in contact with the enemy.
“We learned afterwards that the Egyptian
cavalry, with whom we had been engaged at
Medjdel, was making its customary reconnoissance
to ascertain if any movement had been made on the
part of the Turks, as well as to forage: and that, in
all probability, the action had been brought on by
the dashing conduct of Colonel Rose in charging
their advanced picquet.”
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 146.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER X.
.pm start_summary
General Jochmus’s further Reports to Sir Robert Stopford—Destruction
of the Magazines at Maan—Ignorance as to
Ibrahim’s movements—Ibrahim crosses the Jordan to
Jericho, and menaces Jerusalem, while supposed to be
wandering in the Desert—General Jochmus’s Account of
the Movements of Ibrahim—Reported Destruction of his
Infantry—Ibrahim did not intend to enter Palestine—his
Statement to Colonel Napier.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
To proceed with General Jochmus, I may remark
that a letter of his to the Admiral, of the 20th
of January[36], clearly shows what little reliance
could be placed in the reports that were made to
him, of the state of Ibrahim’s army from all quarters.
After giving an account of the destruction
of 230 camel-loads of grain by the Baron Dumont,
at Maan, after Souliman Pacha had provisioned
himself, and marched on Suez, with the greatest
part of the artillery, women, and children, he states,
“The army itself, of which the second column
was to sleep at Maan on the 11th, seeing its provisions
burnt, had been obliged to countermarch,
and is now wandering in the Desert harassed on all
.bn 147.png
.pn +1
sides by Bedouin tribes. Its state seems to be
dreadful, and all over the country through which the
Baron Dumont came back to Kerek, he saw the
bodies of small detachments which had been cut off
by the Bedouins.”
.fn 36
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 294.
.fn-
We look in vain for a confirmation of this
in Baron Dumont’s report[37]. The Baron talks of
the quantity of grain he destroyed, of the forty-four
camels he captured, and forty he found dead,
which are included in the eighty-four taken
in one night, but not one word of dead bodies
destroyed by the Bedouins, or of Ibrahim’s army
wandering in the Desert; and so far were they from
wandering in the Desert pursued by the Arabs, that
on the very day that the magazines at Maan were
said to be destroyed, Ibrahim, hearing of the movement
on Gaza, crossed the Jordan at Jericho,
menaced Jerusalem, and forced Hussein Pacha to
return to Abugosh. Having succeeded in this point,
he recrossed the Jordan, passed to the south of the
Dead Sea, and arrived at Gaza without any person
knowing what had in the meantime become of him,
as will shortly be seen by Lieut. Loring’s report.
.fn 37
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 295.
.fn-
In another report to the Admiral, dated from
.bn 148.png
.pn +1
Jerusalem, January 28[38], the General, in giving an
account of the passage of the Jordan by the Egyptians,
says: “On the 14th a corps was reported to
have crossed the Jordan, and bivouacked (near
Jericho) at Reyha. Hassan Pacha, encamped at
Abugosh, three hours south-west of Jerusalem,
marched, towards the evening, on the 15th instant;
but the Egyptian division, hearing of his approach,
immediately recrossed the Jordan, with a heavy loss
in drowned and killed, the waters of that river
having risen more than a foot during the incessant
rains of the 14th and 15th of January; and the
Arabs falling upon the troops during the passage,
and in the nearly impracticable passes of the Dead
Sea.
.fn 38
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 295.
.fn-
“The enemy’s column above-mentioned proved
to be the shattered remains of the corps, called by
Mehemet Ali ‘The Guards,’ amounting to from
4000 to 5000 men, and two cavalry regiments, with
a battery of artillery, forming the rear-guard of the
army, under the personal command of Ibrahim
Pacha. The artillery, and one of the regiments,
had remained at some distance on the left bank
of the river, and the movement was evidently a
.bn 149.png
.pn +1
desperate attempt to march by any way on Gaza or
El Arish.
“The forlorn situation of this corps,” adds the
General, “will be seen from the two inclosed reports
of Mehemed Rechid Pacha, Chief of the Staff, and
of Riza Pacha, commanding the cavalry[39]. I do not
estimate the loss of this army so great as the latter;
but certainly, after comparing all the reports, it
amounts to 1,000 or more men, and eight pieces of
artillery, which latter, although with the column at
Es-Salt, were unquestionably not at Kerek on the
19th instant, whither Ibrahim had retired after continual
skirmishes with the Arabs. The Governor
of Jerusalem had sent his son, Hadgi Hafiz, to
ascertain whether the artillery had been buried in
the desert mountain or not.
.fn 39
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 295. Tahir Bey reports
that after Ibrahim re-crossed the Jordan, he lost all his infantry,
and arrived at Kerek with his cavalry only.
.fn-
“Such was the isolated position of this last
corps of the Egyptian army, that its Commander-in-Chief
had lost all means of communication with
his remaining forces, and that, although Hamid Bey
and the Commissioners from Egypt were from the
19th to the 23rd at El-Chalil, trying by all means to
.bn 150.png
.pn +1
establish a communication with Ibrahim either by
the north or south of the Dead Sea, it proved
a vain attempt, notwithstanding that, during the
same days, the above column under the Pacha was
at Kerek, surrounded by the Arabs of the country,
who had been reinforced by the tribes of Beni
Sackr and Beni Hennedy, arrived from the depths
of the Desert in consequence of the orders sent
them from Jerusalem on the 8th of January, through
Baron Dumont.
“The distance from El-Mezereib to Kerek is, at
the utmost, five days’ march. Ibrahim Pasha left
the former place on the 6th or 7th of January, and
after fifteen days was still at Kerek, having continually
marched and counter-marched in the desert
mountains in search of food, or from having been
stopped in the mountain defiles. According to the
statement of the son of the Chieftain of Abugosh, a
Captain in the Guards, who deserted on the 21st
instant from Kerek, and had been with the column
ever since it quitted Damascus and El-Mezerib,
Ibrahim marched from the latter place to Bilka,
thence back north to Es-Salt, again south to Kerek
and back to Jericho; obliged to recross the Jordan,
he for a second time returned to Kerek, having lost
.bn 151.png
.pn +1
his guns, ammunition, and stores, during the continued
and very harassing attacks, day and night, of
the Arab bands intent on plunder.
“My last reports from El-Chalil of the 28th of
January (twenty-two days after Ibrahim’s leaving
El-Mezereib, and thirty-one after his retreat from
Damascus) state that Hamid Bey, despairing of
communicating with Ibrahim Pacha, had resolved to
return to Gaza, and thence to Egypt.”
Here it appears that General Jochmus himself
began to doubt the reports that were made him.
We have before seen[40] that Captain De l’Or reported
Ibrahim to have lost 10,000 men on his march to
El-Mezereib, though he had 10,000 cavalry to cover
his retreat, and was only followed by 3000 or 4000
irregulars, who must have been ill provisioned.
.fn 40
See page #124#.
.fn-
It never could have been Ibrahim’s intention to
have taken the Jaffa road to Gaza, unless he intended
to fight a battle, which he hardly would have
risked, with his rear guard only, and after having
detached Souliman to Suez; moreover he must
have known of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and
would certainly not have provoked the hostility of
the European Powers by a breach of faith, and it is
.bn 152.png
.pn +1
well for the Turks he did not, for by all accounts
his army was not in the state they supposed it
was, and his cavalry was in excellent order.
Colonel Napier was with the corps of Hassan
Pacha, who, although he had an opportunity of
attacking Ibrahim, was too wise to attempt it.
The Colonel saw Ibrahim Pacha afterwards at
Alexandria, and he declared to him that the passage
of the Jordan was a mere feint, which completely
succeeded; and, moreover, that had he been attacked
by the Turkish army, they would have been cut to
pieces by his cavalry.
.bn 153.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2 id='chap11'
CHAPTER XI.
.pm start_summary
Fruitless Journey of the Envoys sent in quest of Ibrahim
Pacha—Arrival of part of the Egyptian Army at Gaza—Promised
Neutrality of the Turks—The Egyptians informed
of the Cessation of Hostilities by the English
Officers—Terms recommended by Mr. Wood to be imposed
upon Ibrahim Pacha—Colonel Napier’s Narrative of the
Retreat of Ibrahim Pacha.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
On the 30th January, General Jochmus writes
from Jaffa to the Admiral: “Hamid Bey, Major
Wilbraham, and Selim Bey (the Turkish Commissioner,)
after fruitless attempts to communicate with
the Pacha (Ibrahim), have returned to Gaza[41].”
.fn 41
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 298.
.fn-
This is not to be wondered at: no assistance was
given them, as will be seen hereafter by Lieutenant
Loring’s report, and they were reluctantly obliged to
return to Gaza on the 22nd of January. Ahmed
Menikli Pacha had arrived there the day before with
the main body of the cavalry, and Ibrahim himself
came in on the 31st, with the rest of the army,
the greater part of whom must have been resurrection
men, as we have seen they had been destroyed
in the retreat.
.bn 154.png
.pn +1
It has been seen that General Jochmus’s report
of the 17th of January, to the Admiral, of the affair
of Gaza[42], affirms that he intended to resume his operations
when the ground became practicable, but on
his arrival at Jaffa he was officially informed of the
complete submission of Mehemet Ali, and the consequent
cessation of the state of rebellion of his
army; “our troops,” he adds, “have been ordered
to cease offensive hostilities. His Excellency, the
Seraskier Ahmed Zacharias Pacha, commanded in
person since we left Ramla.” I presume General
Jochmus means that Lieutenant Loring arrived with
my despatches to the authorities in Syria.
.fn 42
See page #128#.
.fn-
These despatches were certainly sufficient authority
for the Allies to suspend all hostilities
against Ibrahim Pacha, but we shall see that notwithstanding
the opinion of the British officers,
difficulties were endeavoured to be thrown in the
way, both by General Jochmus and Mr. Wood. It
has before been shown that both General Michell
and Captain Stewart, in consequence of the submission
of Mehemet Ali, and the instructions from
Sir Robert Stopford, had decided on taking only
precautionary measures, and the Turkish authorities,
.bn 155.png
.pn +1
acting under the Admirals orders, were bound to
follow the same course, notwithstanding any directions
to the contrary they might have received from
the Ambassador at Constantinople, whose orders,
Captain Stewart justly remarks, must be subordinate
to those of Lord Palmerston.
Two days after my despatches arrived at Jaffa
the Seraskier received his instructions from Constantinople;
the nature of them will appear in Mr.
Wood’s Protest, at which I shall presently arrive:
nevertheless the Seraskier, after holding a council,
gave General Michell and Captain Stewart a
positive assurance that no further act of hostility
should take place, and that he had no wish to
deprive Ibrahim Pacha of either his arms, baggage,
or guns[43]. The Seraskier was a wise man, he
knew very well he had not the power to deprive him
of either the one or the other. Captain Stewart
and General Michell most properly wrote to
Ibrahim Pacha and the Egyptian officer in command
at Gaza, to inform them of the cessation of
hostilities[44], and of their intention to give every possible
facility for the evacuation of Syria, and the
.bn 156.png
.pn +1
embarkation of the women, children, and sick at
Caiffa, or any other more convenient port; and
Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel Colquhoun were
despatched with the letters to Ibrahim Pacha and
the Egyptian officer commanding at Gaza, and they
were instructed to protest against any act of hostility
the Turks might commit[45].
.fn 43
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 270.
.fn-
.fn 44
Ibid., pp. 271, 272.
.fn-
.fn 45
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 272.
.fn-
So ignorant were the Turkish authorities of the
movements of Ibrahim, who they fancied was wandering
in the Desert, without an army, that on the
very day on which Captain Stewart signed the
instructions to Captain Arbuthnot and Colonel
Colquhoun, to insist on Ibrahim retiring by Gaza
in successive columns of 3000 men each, Ahmed
Menikli Pacha arrived at Gaza with the main body
of Ibrahim’s cavalry in excellent order, and the
infantry in three columns. Ibrahim himself bringing
up the rear was shortly expected: and on that day
also General Jochmus and Mr. Wood, the emissary
of Lord Ponsonby, wrote to the Seraskier[46] to inform
him that the Baron Dumont having destroyed the
magazine at Maan, Ibrahim’s army being cut in two,
and gone back in thorough disorder, and his 150
.bn 157.png
.pn +1
guns being already in their power, according to
the official orders read at the council of the preceding
day Ibrahim would only be allowed the
choice of two conditions,—viz.
.fn 46
Ibid., p. 276.
.fn-
“1. To march upon El-Arish by the south of the
Dead Sea, also upon Suez, with the men, arms, and
conveyance which he now possesses.
“2. To come in detachments of 3000 men by
Gaza upon El-Arish, leaving his cannon in our
hands, in consideration of the power which is
granted to him of being permitted to follow this
road, provided that he leaves all the Syrians in their
country.”
The march of Ibrahim on Gaza, by the south of
the Dead Sea, shows very clearly that he never had
the intention of entering Palestine, and that his
crossing the Jordan was a man[oe]uvre to mislead the
Turks, in which he completely succeeded, and arrived
safe at Gaza, without having encountered a single
outpost of the Turkish army.
Colonel Napier was attached to the Turkish
division that Ibrahim forced to return to Jerusalem:
the following is the Colonel’s account of their movements,
as well as of what he knew of Ibrahim’s
retreat.
.bn 158.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3 ''\
'“Junior United Service Club,'\
' December, 1841.'
“You wish me to give you some information as
to the retreat of Ibrahim Pacha from Damascus.
All the notes I took at the time being with my
baggage at Gibraltar, I cannot be very accurate in
dates; but will furnish whatever I remember on
the subject from the time you left me at Beyrout in
November 1840, until my embarkation at Gaza for
Egypt, in January 1841.
“When the Powerful left St. George’s Bay, I
think the Princess Charlotte, the Benbow, and
Bellerophon remained off Beyrout, with a steamer
and a couple of Austrian vessels.
“From the time of your driving back Ibrahim,—in
the action of the 10th of October,—from the
heights of Boharsof, nothing certain had been
known at Beyrout relative to his movements, and
we,—to all appearance,—remained in a state of
complete inactivity.
“We continued quietly in our quarters all
November, which leisure I employed in learning
Arabic, in visiting the neighbouring parts of Lebanon,
and keeping up the acquaintance I had been
enabled to form,—through your introductions,—with
the principal Emirs and Sheikhs of the mountain,
with several of whom I became very intimate.
“About the latter end of November, I was sent
with Colonel Bridgeman to make a reconnoissance on
the enemy, who was supposed to be still at Zachle.
.bn 159.png
.pn +1
On arriving there we found he had retired across
the Boccah two days before. Next morning,
Colonel Bridgeman and myself, each accompanied
by some fifty or sixty irregular horse, pushed on in
different directions towards them. The Colonel
fell in with a body of 300 or 400 cavalry deserters
from the Egyptian army, whom he brought back to
Zachle;—whilst I traversed the range of the Anti-Lebanon,
and descending into the plain of Damascus
reached the village of Zebdeni,—a few hours’ distant
from that city,—on which the Egyptians had fallen
back; the last of their rear-guard having left that
place on the previous day.
“It was now certain that Ibrahim occupied
Damascus, but whether or not he intended to make
it his winter quarters was still unknown. However,
the good people of Beyrout considered his
presence even at the holy city of ‘El Sham,’ as much
too near to be pleasant; and when the gale of wind
of the 2nd of December drove all our vessels from
the coast, serious apprehensions were entertained,
that some fine morning he would walk quietly into
the town;—which undertaking he might have accomplished
with little or no opposition.
“Things continued in this state at Beyrout, till the
beginning of December, at which period I received
written instructions to the following effect from Sir
Charles Smith: ‘That I was in the first instance to
proceed to the head-quarters of the Emir Bechir with
certain communications, and then to go, without loss
.bn 160.png
.pn +1
of time, to Naplouse; that Selim Pacha would have
orders notifying my official employment within his
pachalic, and requiring him to attend to any requisition
I might make (with the exception of troops,) on
the garrison of Acre.
arrived at Naplouse, I was to order
Soulyman Abdul Hadi, the Governor of that place,
to levy 1500 men within his district, and with these
I was to do my best to guard the passes of Agiloun,
Djebail Khalil (Hebron), or Khan Younus[47]; directing
my movements according to the intelligence I
should receive of the enemy.
.fn 47
“The latter,—by the bye,—being no pass at all, but an
open place in the plains to the eastward of Gaza.”
.fn-
“I was further instructed to ‘investigate and
inquire into the conduct of the said Governor of Naplouse;—he
being suspected of adhering to the Egyptian
interests,—and to ascertain whether there was
any foundation for the numerous complaints preferred
against him from different quarters.’
“In the execution of this ‘important trust[48],’ I
was left to the guidance of my own military judgment.
In fact, I had a sort of independent roving
commission, which pleased me much, and I lost no
time in proceeding to take up my command.
.fn 48
Although these instructions from Sir Charles Smith were
so termed,—and Colonel Napier has documents from his successor,
General Michell, to prove that they were satisfactorily
executed,—it appears strange that this mission of the Colonel’s
should never have been publicly made known.
.fn-
.bn 161.png
.pn +1
“It was evident, from the nature of these
instructions, that we were still completely in the dark
as to the line of retreat which Ibrahim Pacha might
eventually fix on.
“I was surprised to find, on arriving at my
destination, that,—contrary to the tenor of my instructions,—no
notification had been received by the
authorities, as to the nature of the mission on which
I was about to be employed; and had it not been for
the kindness of Selim Pacha, I should have found
myself placed in an extremely awkward predicament.
“Not to lose time, whilst my ‘forces’ were being
assembled, I went to Jerusalem, to ascertain the
state of the Turkish garrison there,—and had an
interview with Sheikh Abderrahman, the chief of
the Bedouin tribes about Hebron, who was said to
be able to bring into the field 10,000 men. After
strongly urging on him the necessity of assembling
his people to be ready to strike a blow,—as I had still
some days to spare,—I determined, with 100 horsemen,
to push across the river Jordan and the Agiloun
hills, in order to gain some positive intelligence
of the enemy, about whom the most contradictory
reports were now afloat.
“Amongst other things, it was however positively
said that he was making El Mezerib his head-quarters,
preparatory to passing the Jordan at the
bridge of Moïadjumah[49], a few miles south of Lake
.bn 162.png
.pn +1
Tiberias; for this point, I therefore, in the first
instance proceeded, and having carefully reconnoitred
the neighbouring ground, I sent from thence
a report to General Michell[50], and also to Selim
Pacha, requesting that some barrels of gunpowder
might be immediately forwarded from Acre for the
destruction of the old Roman arch, which here
singly spanned the river.
.fn 49
“Moïadjumah, literally meaning the ‘meeting of the
waters.’”
.fn-
.fn 50
“He had lately succeeded Sir Charles Smith.”
.fn-
“Crossing the Jordan on the 31st December,—accompanied
by Captain Laué, Count Tchezeni, and
Mr. Hunter,—the following day we pushed on to
Hareemi, a small village on the elevated plateau
overlooking the fortress of El Mezerib. The
greatest consternation prevailed here amongst the
inhabitants, who were flying in every direction, as
it was reported the Egyptian advanced guard
was already at Mezerib, and would push on the
next day to Hareemi, which was only a few miles
distant.
“Having come thus far, I was determined to
obtain all the information in my power,—and accordingly,
at daylight on the morning of the 2nd
January 1841, I got my troop in their saddles, with
the design of making a forward movement,—but, as
soon as I had expressed my intention of proceeding
direct to El Mezerib, the greater part positively
refused to advance, and the remainder only followed
with the utmost reluctance. After proceeding thus
for two or three miles, we observed, on the opposite
.bn 163.png
.pn +1
side of a ravine, a number of horsemen,—probably a
vidette of the enemy, whom we could easily have
driven in;—but this sight was quite enough for my
brave troops; with the exception of the European
party and my dragoman, one and all took to their
heels; I returned alone to Naplouse; nor did I ever
again behold my valiant cavalry[51]!
.fn 51
“Mr. Wood, in one of his official reports, gives General
Jochmus the credit of this reconnoissance, whereas I am
not aware that the latter was, at this period, ever across the
Jordan.”
.fn-
“However, appearances strongly leading to the
supposition that the Moïadjumah bridge was the
point on which Ibrahim was directing his army, I
lost no time in hurrying thither the mountaineers
who had been already assembled at Naplouse;
and, on the 5th of January, I marched off my
first detachment of a few hundreds,—certainly not
the most soldierlike-looking fellows in the world,—to
Jennin, which I had fixed on as the point of
assembly.
“After despatching as many of these ragamuffins
as could be gathered together, I myself proceeded to
Jennin, and arriving there late at night, found
General Jochmus and his aide-de-camp, Captain
De l’Or; the latter very much elated at the wonderful
exploits he said he had recently been performing
on the rear of the Egyptian army.
“To my surprise, however, I learnt that the
General had given orders for my Naplousians to
.bn 164.png
.pn +1
return, in consequence, as he said, of the positive
intelligence received, that Ibrahim no longer intended
taking the route of Jennin. This was all
very well; but having been placed in command by
the British General, I did not at all consider myself
under the orders of Jochmus Pasha; and accordingly
told him, that since he had divested me of my
command, he might do what he pleased with the
mountaineers, of whom I washed my hands; and
immediately mounting my horse, I made the best of
my way to Jaffa, not sorry at having an opportunity
of going to what was now likely to become the scene
of active operations before Gaza.
“Shortly after reaching Jaffa, I was sent by
General Michell, along with Reschid Pacha, to
accompany and advise the movements of the left
column of the Turkish army, consisting of twelve
battalions, and a dozen field-pieces. This body was
then concentrated at Jerusalem, and instructed to
join the main force in a contemplated advance on
Gaza. The whole Turkish army, including 3000 of
the Emir Beschir’s cavalry, might have amounted
to between 22,000 and 25,000 men, distributed as
follows:
“At Jerusalem, near Jaffa and Ramlah, 21
battalions of regular infantry,—each battalion consisting
of about 500 men,—with 18 field pieces.—At
Medjdel (to the south of Jaffa) 3500 regular
cavalry.—At Hebron 3000 irregular cavalry, composed
of the Desert tribes. These, together with
.bn 165.png
.pn +1
the Emir Beschir’s people, were now to the number
of 20,000 men concentrated on the southern frontier
of Syria. The garrisons of Beyrout and Acre being
added, will make up the Turkish force to the above
amount.
“On the 13th of January, the column moved
from Jerusalem, but had scarcely proceeded half a
dozen miles when intelligence arrived that Ibrahim
had crossed the Jordan at Jericho, and was advancing
in our rear on Jerusalem.
“It was resolved to halt for the night at Abou
Hosh, and should this intelligence be confirmed,
to return at daybreak to Jerusalem. The news
proved correct; and we accordingly fell back on
the Holy City, which we re-occupied on the following
day.
“Ibrahim Pacha had positively crossed the
river; but from the incessant rain, which for the
last three days had fallen,—as I concluded he
could not possibly have got over a larger number
than our own force,—as his men were, moreover,
wearied and starved, whilst our’s were fresh,—I
proposed, that after giving our people a few hours’
rest, we should immediately advance and strike a
blow, whilst his army was yet separated by a deep
and rapid torrent; and I wrote as follows to Reschid
Pacha, who, from having been educated in France,
spoke and wrote the French language with the
greatest fluency:
.bn 166.png
.pn +1
.pm heading3a\
'“Jérusalem, ce 15 Janvier,'\
'à 7 heures du soir.'\
'“Mon Général,'
“Cette pluie continue aura tellement grossi le
Jourdan, qu’il sera maintenant impossible d’y faire
passer des troupes. Il n’est pas probable que le
nombre de l’ennemi qui si trouve maintenant sur
la rive droite, excède de beaucoup nos propres
forces.
“Marchons demain matin une heure avant le jour,
avec dix battaillons, et fions nous à la fortune de la
guerre et de nos bonnes épeés. Il me sera superflu
d’obsérver que nous ne pouvons pas éspérer que
cette pluie dure beaucoup plus long temps.
.pm signature3\
'“‘Tout à vous.'\
' “‘E. E. Napier,'\
' ‘Asst. Adjt.-Gén.”'
.pm address2\
' “‘A Son Excellence Reschid Pasha,'\
'Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée Ottomane, &c.'
“Reschid Pasha’s reply was:
.sp 1
.ti 0
“'Mon cher Napier,
“‘Après que vous m’avez quitté j’ai vu un Arabe
qui a été à Reyha (Jericho) qui a causé avec Ibrahim,
cet Arabe m’a dit qu’il pouvait avoir à peu près trois
mille hommes d’infantérie; et qu’il n’avoit point de
canons; cet homme pretend qu’ Ibrahim est parti
de Reyha ce matin de bonne heure en prenant le
chemin de Chalil, ce qui indiquerait de la part de
l’ennemi l’intention de se rendu à Gaza; si cette
.bn 167.png
.pn +1
nouvelle est réelle, il ne faudrait pas hésiter un instant
d’attaquer l’ennemi; puisque nous avons plus
d’infantérie que lui, nous avons des canons, et si cette
coquette qu’on appelle la ‘Fortune’ n’est pas avec
nous: c’est le Diable.
.pm signature2\
'“‘Tout à vous,'\
' “‘Mehmed Reschid Pasha.”'
.pm address2\
'“‘Au Major-Général[52] Napier,'\
' &c. &c. &c.’'
.fn 52
This title was conferred in consequence of a promise made
by the Sultan, through Lord Ponsonby, that Colonel Napier
should receive the nishan or order of that rank—which promise
has as yet been kept with true “Turkish faith.”
.fn-
“Now, although the feasibleness of an attack on
the Egyptians was hereby fully allowed;—although
Reschid Pasha at the time imagined that Ibrahim
was exposing his right flank in this rumoured
advance on Hebron (Chalil);—and although I not
only urged, but entreated them to make the attempt,
the Turks were afraid to try the experiment; and it
was decided that the following day we should make
a reconnoissance, which accordingly took place,
when we found Jericho in flames, and that Ibrahim,
after its destruction, had just recrossed the Jordan,
and thus slipped through our fingers!
“His object had evidently been to delay our
junction with head-quarters, and having effected this
purpose, he was at present retiring unmolested by
the south of the Dead Sea.
.bn 168.png
.pn +1
“I now proposed to make a diagonal movement
by Mount Hebron to try and cut him off in that
direction, as we heard that General Jochmus had
already advanced on Gaza, which, ere this, we concluded
must have been captured.
“Notwithstanding my urgent entreaties for expedition,
two days elapsed ere we reached Hebron, a
distance of about twenty-two miles!
“The Osmanlis, I plainly saw, still feared their
old conqueror; and, on our arrival at Hebron,—meeting
there Major Wilbraham and Lieutenant
Loring, R.N., the bearers of your Convention to
Ibrahim Pacha,—the exuberant joy of the Turkish
Chiefs, at the termination of hostilities, led them, in
some slight degree, to infringe the injunction of the
Prophet.
.rj
“E. Napier.”
.pm address '“To Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”'
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 169.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2 id='chap12'
CHAPTER XII.
.pm start_summary
Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His
Advice disregarded by the British Officers—Mission
of Colonel Alderson to Gaza—Colonel Rose’s Account of
the State of Ibrahim’s Army—Colonel Alderson’s Character
of Ibrahim Pacha—Death of General Michell.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
I do not think blame can be attached to General
Jochmus for having done all he could to cripple
Ibrahim, if he was acting under proper authority;
but whether his orders were from the English Ambassador
or the Sultan is not clear: both General
Michell and Captain Stewart speak of the Ambassador’s
orders[53]. If so, I do not think he was justified
in obeying them; on the other hand, if his
orders were from the Sultan’s minister, or from the
the Seraskier, he was quite right. I think, however,
he put too much reliance in the reports that were
made to him of numerous loss inflicted on the
Egyptian army, which he speaks of with much complacency,
and which I hope and believe was very
much exaggerated.
.fn 53
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 203, 268.
.fn-
As to Mr. Wood, he was quite in a different
capacity, and what right he had, as a British subject,
.bn 170.png
.pn +1
to put the interpretation he did on Sir Robert
Stopford’s orders, I do not know.
In the first paragraph of his letter[54], he says the
women and sick were to be embarked, and that
Ibrahim Pacha must provide other means of withdrawing
his army; now the despatches say, women,
sick, and others of the Egyptian army, which meant
any portion that Ibrahim thought proper; but even
if the term was not clear, as Syria was to be evacuated
without delay, why was Mr. Wood to take upon
himself to point out the way in which it ought to be
done?
.fn 54
Letter to the Seraskier and Hussein Pacha, dated January
21, 1841. Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 275, 276.
.fn-
In the second paragraph he says that it is
“understood that Ibrahim must re-enter Egypt by
the Desert, or by El Arish, which is the direct road,
and the easiest; and by leaving the road free, we act
in conformity with the desire of Mazloum Bey and of
the Commodore, to offer every facility for his retreat
without compromising our military position.”
Mazloum Bey, in his letter to the Seraskier,
read before the council, according to Mr. Wood,
says the impression at Constantinople was that
the Egyptian army was disorganized; but that Commodore
.bn 171.png
.pn +1
Napier undeceived him, and pretended that
it was in a situation to resist the Imperial army, and
that he did not venture to insist on Mehemet Ali
giving up the Syrian conscripts, and his arms, guns,
and military stores, agreeably to the orders of the
Porte; but as they were on the spot, they must be
the best judges whether or no they ought to insist on
these two conditions. I do Mazloum Bey the justice
of saying that he was much wiser than the
Divan, for had he proposed those terms, Mehemet
Ali would not have given up one ship.
Mr. Wood then goes on to advise, that in
consequence of the complete disorganization of the
Egyptian army, the want of provisions, and the
small number of men capable of resistance, the
destruction of Maan, the passage over the Desert of
Souliman, and the retrograde movement of Ibrahim
Pacha with a handful of men without artillery, and
as there was now nothing to fear from their antagonist,
he should be obliged to ask permission to come
to Gaza, which should only be granted on condition
of giving up the Syrian troops, his guns, stores, and
arms.
According to Mr. Wood’s reasoning, this would
be, affording him “the facilities required by Mazloum
.bn 172.png
.pn +1
Bey and Commodore Napier;” and “if he persisted
in coming to Gaza without those conditions, he
would be the aggressor, and must trust to the
consequences.”
He finishes by saying, this is his humble opinion,
founded on mature reflection; and he cannot
conceal from himself the danger of Ibrahim coming
to Gaza, where he might recruit his army, and allow
his father to negotiate more advantageously. “Even
now,” he adds, “his General at Gaza has instructions
not to attack us, but to deliver up Gaza only
with his life. From such facts, your Excellency may
judge of the bad faith of the vassal who refuses to
surrender his arms on the demand of his Sovereign,
which renders his submission incomplete, and even
doubtful.” Really, Mr. Wood is a true disciple of
the Ambassador’s school; he does not perceive that
not the Egyptians, but the Turks, were guilty of bad
faith from beginning to end; and that, if the officer
at Gaza had delivered it up, Ibrahim’s army would
have been compromised.
Fortunately for the honour of the Porte there
were wiser men on the spot who decided to follow
neither the advice of the General nor that of the
Diplomatist, and I should like to have seen the
.bn 173.png
.pn +1
faces of these latter when they heard of the arrival
of Ibrahim’s cavalry, and the near approach of the
infantry.
Next day the accounts came in of the arrival of
the Egyptians, and Captain Stewart most wisely sent
Colonel Alderson, at the desire of General Michell,
with instructions[56], very properly saying nothing
.bn 174.png
.pn +1
about the advance by columns of 3000 men. The
mode in which Colonel Alderson acquitted himself
of his delicate mission may be best told in his own
words[55]:—
.fn 55
.ce
Memorandum for Colonel Alderson’s guidance.
.rj
Jaffa, January 22, 1841.
Accounts having been received by the Seraskier that a considerable
number of Egyptian troops have advanced towards
Gaza, his Excellency has requested that an English officer of
rank and discretion should proceed to the quarters of the
Egyptian officer commanding the troops in that neighbourhood,
to act as Conservator of the Peace. In all probability the
Egyptian Commandant will not feel himself authorized to
order any of these troops to retire until he shall receive directions
from Ibrahim Pacha; but you will point out to him the
evident necessity that exists for the avoidance of any the
smallest act of hostility or plunder, if he would not break the
Convention and renew the war. So long as you are satisfied
that he is acting in good faith, and doing everything possible to
maintain order and peace towards the Turkish troops and inhabitants
of the neighbourhood, you will remain with him,
taking occasion at all times to point out and to urge upon him
the propriety of hastening, by any means in his power, the
evacuation of Syria, in the terms of Mehemet Ali Pacha’s
order to his son Ibrahim Pacha. Should you have reason to
object to any of his proceedings, you will at once remonstrate
and protest: should he persist, you will formally take your
leave, and immediately return to the British head-quarters,
giving notice that you have done so to the officer commanding
the nearest post of the Ottoman troops, and putting him on his
guard. You will communicate with head-quarters as frequently
as possible, and notify as exactly as you can the number
and state of the Egyptian troops in that district.
You will have with you copies of the letters which have
been forwarded to Ibrahim Pacha, and of Commodore Sir
Charles Napier’s letters from Alexandria to General Michell
and to Captain Stewart. The Seraskier Pacha has declared
that he has no design to deprive the Egyptians of their arms,
baggage, or guns; and that he wishes, by every fair and safe
means, to facilitate the retirement from Syria of the Egyptian
forces. Copies of the instructions given to the officers sent to
Ibrahim Pacha, and to accompany General Jochmus, will also
be furnished to you: and you will observe that the immediate
evacuation of Syria is the principal object to which all others
are to be considered as secondary.
.nf r
By desire of General Michell,
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ Houston Stewart.
.nf-
.fn-
.fn 56
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 307.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
“Being selected for this duty, I left Jaffa on
the afternoon of the 22nd, with my instructions,
and arrived the following day at Gaza. I immediately
waited on the commanding officer, Achmet
Menekli Pacha, the General of Cavalry, who had
arrived two days previous, with eight regiments of
.bn 175.png
.pn +1
cavalry, after much fatigue and suffering, and annoyance
also from the attacks of the Arabs in the
interest of the Turkish authorities.
“On my first interview with the Egyptian General,
I urged the necessity of their immediately commencing
their retreat, so as not to assemble a large
force in Gaza. At first this was stated to be impossible
till the arrival of Ibrahim, or orders from him
to that effect, but the following morning, on going
to see the General at the camp, he agreed to commence
the retreat on the 26th, if Ibrahim did not in
the mean time arrive, and that a brigade of cavalry,
(two regiments) should march daily.
“On the 25th, five regiments of infantry arrived,
and on the day following, five more, each consisting
of four battalions; they were evidently much fatigued
and reduced in numbers, and stated that they had
not had rations for the last seven, nor water for the
last three days.
“This day Captain Houston Stewart arrived in
the Hecate, with Colonel Rose, who came to go in
search of Ibrahim, Rechid Pacha, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Napier. We all went to the General
Achmet Menekli Pacha’s quarters, to urge the propriety
of not obliging the Syrians to return to
Egypt, but, as he said he had no powers to interfere,
it was determined on sending off a letter to
Commodore Napier[57], for an order from Mehemet
Ali to this effect, as well as to order Ibrahim to
.bn 176.png
.pn +1
retire in columns of 3000 men, and not assemble a
large force at Gaza.
.fn 57
See page #89#.
.fn-
“On the 28th a council was held, at which
Captain Stewart and myself attended.
“We requested that a pledge should be given
that Ibrahim would, on his arrival, carry into execution
the orders of his father, Mehemet Ali, for
the evacuation of Syria. This was at once done
without the slightest hesitation. Indeed Hourschid
Pacha, a fine old man, with a magnificent white
beard, who commanded the irregular force, stated
he had been forty years in Mehemet Ali’s service,
and during the whole of that period had never once
known Ibrahim to refuse to obey his father’s orders.
“On receiving this guarantee we, in the name of
the united forces of Great Britain, pledged ourselves
that no molestation or obstacle should be put in the
way of such evacuation, nor any advance of the
Turkish troops at Medjdel take place, until I had
reported the evacuation complete.
“This pledge was approved and confirmed by
the Seraskier at Jaffa[58], and the evacuation went on
afterwards with confidence.
.fn 58
See these documents in pages #176-178:Page_176#.
.fn-
“This measure had become absolutely necessary
from the Egyptians’ evident want of confidence in
the Turks; they feared that as soon as they had so
far weakened their force at Gaza as to be incapable
of resistance, the Turks might attack them.
“Colonel Rose having been also sent in search
.bn 177.png
.pn +1
of Ibrahim, with a copy of the Convention, and a
letter from General Michell and Captain Stewart,
after much disappointment, arising from the determination
on the part of the Arabs not to conduct
any one to Ibrahim, if indeed they knew where to
find him, fell in with him on the 31st (January), in
the Desert, about four hours from Gaza, which town
he entered with him between 4 and 5 P.M. the same
afternoon.
“The General-in-Chief appeared much fatigued,
and very unwell, and had no doubt suffered much
on the journey round the east and south sides of
the Dead Sea. He brought with him about 5000
troops.”
.pm end_quote
Colonel Rose, soon after this, went to Constantinople,
and upon his arrival at Therapia, made a
report to Lord Ponsonby on the state of Ibrahim’s
army, which differs a good deal from that of the
other officers. I give a short extract from the
document[59].
.fn 59
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 329.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
“When I came up with Ibrahim Pacha’s column,
there were two lines of videttes flanking it towards
the Syrian side,—mounted and dismounted cavalry—to
prevent desertion. I rode for several miles along
the column, which was in great disorder—in fact it
was quite broken up; groups of men in twos and
.bn 178.png
.pn +1
threes, some armed, some not, others hardly able to
walk. I saw two standards, one without any escort,
the other with a guard of two men: they must have
belonged to battalions which had been broken up on
account of their casualties. Ibrahim Pacha’s own
horses had had no barley that day; the troops had
been three days without water, and had subsisted
chiefly on mule and donkey flesh, which sold at a
high price: 200 determined cavalry might have
swept away all that part of the column which I saw
(I entered it at about two-thirds of its length,) with
great ease.
“Ibrahim Pacha did not appear pleased when I
gave him Mehemet Ali’s letter. He was agitated,
and it took him five minutes to read it, although it
only consisted of four lines. Whilst he was thus
employed, his camel-rider and chief groom were
also endeavouring to read it over his shoulder. I
rode with him for about four hours, and accompanied
him to Gaza; he spoke with considerable bitterness
of the Turks. He said, ‘Why have you turned
out the Seraskier[60]?’ I said that the Turkish
Government had, I believed, recalled him, because
they were not satisfied with his conduct. He answered,
‘Oh! they are all alike; they smoke all
day, and have people to wash their hands.’ I said,
‘The present Seraskier is a very good man and
soldier.’ ‘Oh yes,’ he replied, ‘as long as he is in
the saddle; as soon as he sits down he will rob like
.bn 179.png
.pn +1
the rest’—on which he laughed very much. ‘I
am the only man,’ he said, ‘to manage the Arabs
and Bedouins, who never had any master before me.
I could and did cut off their heads, which the Turks
never will do. Lord Palmerston from London, and
Lord Ponsonby from Constantinople, will have to
come here to manage Syria.’ I said, that certainly
they had done so much without coming to the
country, that there was no knowing what they might
effect, were they actually to do so. He did not look
pleased. It appeared to me that he was either
affecting high spirits, or that he had been drinking
too much. He drank frequently from a bottle which
hung in front of his saddle, and I was informed by
an Egyptian Colonel of Artillery that it was filled
with claret. He talked and laughed constantly with
his servants. He is now suffering under a very bad
attack of the jaundice, his eyes and head being quite
yellow.
.fn 60
“Izzet Pacha.”
.fn-
“His reception at Gaza was remarkable: the
people flocked from curiosity to see him, but his
entry formed a singular contrast to that of the
Turkish troops into the different towns and villages
which they had occupied for the first time. In the
latter case, the reception was enthusiastic, the men
lining the roads and saluting us with all the varieties
of an Eastern welcome, and the women crowding the
house-tops and making with their tongues that
extraordinary noise which is meant to denote extreme
pleasure; but with Ibrahim Pacha there was
.bn 180.png
.pn +1
a look of deep-rooted dislike on the faces of the
people, which even their dread of him could not
conceal. He, contrary to the Eastern fashion,
saluted no one,—not one saluted him; certainly, as
an inhabitant afterwards said to me, ‘Not a tongue
nor a heart blessed him.’”
.pm end_quote
Colonel Alderson had necessarily some intercourse
with Ibrahim Pacha, and his character of
that renowned personage is well worth quoting.
.pm start_quote
“From the frequent opportunities I had of seeing
and conversing with Ibrahim Pacha, (if asking questions
through an interpreter deserve that name,) it
may be expected of me to give some description of
this extraordinary man. His appearance fully corresponds
with his known character, a voluptuous
despot; one who, to all the vices of the East, adds
that of great indulgence in the table.
“He is considerably past his prime, being I
believe fifty-six or fifty-seven years old, and very fat,
with a large full projecting eye, a handsome nose,
(like all natives of the East,) a broad forehead projecting
over the eyes, then suddenly retiring very
much, strongly-marked eyebrows, and a thin gray
moustache.
“He is evidently a man of considerable talent,
and when called for, of great energy, and appeared
to have the most unbounded control over those by
whom he was surrounded, partly from fear, partly
.bn 181.png
.pn +1
from the known energy and cruelty of his character,
and the confidence they had in his succeeding in
what he undertakes.
“His smile was anything but agreeable, and
would, I think, have sat on his features, whether
ordering an execution or welcoming a guest.
“When amongst his generals, if in a good
humour, he showed it by practical jokes, pulling the
beard of one, hitting another with his fist, or pushing
them about; they seemed to bear it as you would the
fondling of a tamed lion or tiger whelp which his
master assured you was quite safe, but which you
felt might end in something less agreeable if you
resented any of his rough jokes.
“He has, however, the character of possessing
considerable personal courage, and is counted a good
soldier, though many think he owes much of his
success to the talents of Souliman Pacha.
“I did not pay him many gossiping visits,
because he was deficient in the usual forms of
Eastern courtesy, seldom offering coffee, never
pipes; besides, having been so lately in arms against
him, I felt I had no right to intrude myself excepting
when required to do so in the execution of my
duty. This he remarked, and sent his German
physician to me to complain of my avoiding him,
with some flattering compliments about me as a
soldier, and the regard he had for the profession.
“I consequently waited on him next day with
Lieutenant Loring, R.N.; he received us with loud
.bn 182.png
.pn +1
expressions of joy, made us sit down, ordered coffee,
and, asking if we liked music, sent for an Arab
band, consisting of a violin, like a tenor, but with
five strings, a dulcimer, and guitar, with two men
who sang; the music itself was bearable, but when
the men commenced singing at the top of their
voices it was anything but harmonious. His Highness
certainly has no very refined taste in music.
“He was, when we entered, surrounded by his
generals playing vingt-un for handfuls of gazees
(dollars); he showed his character here too, always
ready to back his own play, and was loud in his
expressions of delight when successful. He apologized
for being found so employed, but said, they
had nothing else to do there, but that when at
Cairo they had their farms to attend to and plenty
of business to occupy their time.”
.pm end_quote
The second day after the departure of Colonel
Alderson, that good and gallant officer General
Michell fell a sacrifice to the climate and the fatigue
he suffered on the Gaza expedition, and Colonel
Bridgeman succeeded to the command.
Colonel Alderson remarks, “The cold caught by
General Michell, that wretched night of incessant
rain, that followed the affair of Medjdel, under
single canvass, acting on a delicate frame, arising
from repeated wounds received in an hundred fights,
.bn 183.png
.pn +1
together with, I firmly believe, the mortification he
felt at the result of the movement on Gaza, brought
on a fever, under which poor Michell sank in a
few days. He died at Jaffa on the 24th of January,
at noon.
“It falls to the lot of few soldiers to earn so high
a reputation in the profession as Brigadier-General
Michell had done; fewer still, who to these high
military acquirements have united a mind so highly
cultivated. He was too well known in the military
world to enable me to add anything to his well-earned
reputation. I may, however, be permitted,
as a friend, to say that, having been his constant
companion since we left Spain together, I deeply felt
and deplored his loss; and that a life so valuable
to his country should have been thus so prematurely
cut off.
“His remains were deposited in a vault hastily
constructed by the British sappers, in what is called
the English, or South-Eastern Bastion, at Jaffa, for
which a marble slab is now preparing at Malta, as a
slight memorial of the great respect and esteem in
which he was held by his brother officers.”
.fm lz=t rend=y rendafter=y
.bn 184.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XIII.
.pm start_summary
Detail of the Retreat of the Egyptians—Treacherous Intentions
of the Turkish Authorities—Decided Conduct of the
British Officers—Guarantees exchanged—Fright of Rechid
Pacha—Letter from Ibrahim to the Seraskier—The Author’s
Letters to Lords Minto and Palmerston.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
On the 22nd of January General Jochmus wrote to
the Seraskier from Jerusalem[61] that as Ibrahim had
passed to the south of the Dead Sea, with his
disorganized army, there was no necessity for negociation,
.bn 185.png
.pn +1
and that Baron Dumont corroborated the
complete defeat of the Egyptians. (I suppose he
means the taking of Maan, defended by twenty
men, for we have had no account of any action,
therefore there could not be a defeat.) The Baron
appears to have been within gun-shot of Ibrahim’s
columns and did not see the artillery; it was therefore
concluded that the guns were buried in the
Desert, but I believe it will be found that they all
arrived safe at Cairo; at all events we have not
heard of their having been dug up.
.fn 61
.ce
General Jochmus to the Seraskier.
.pm heading3a\
'Head-quarters, Jerusalem,'\
'27 Zilkadé, 1257, (Jan. 22, 1841,) 11 A.M.'\
''
I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived
here yesterday evening. Lieutenant-General Hassan Pacha
also returned here yesterday from Chalil-Rachman; and Selim
Pacha, with the brigade of Chalid Pacha, will be here to-day,
so that this evening a force of twenty-one battalions, and
eighteen guns will be assembled at Jerusalem. The cavalry of
Riza Pacha will this evening or to-morrow morning join that
of the Murchardsou, who must have arrived yesterday evening
at El-Chalil. The forces, in the central positions in which
they are, ought to be more than sufficient to support our negotiations
with Ibrahim, if they should have taken place; but
as the latter must be, according to the statements of all the
deserters, to the south of the Dead Sea, there is no longer any
occasion for negotiation. His army is in complete disorder, for
want of provisions, owing to the capture of Maan: and all the
deserters state, that even before reaching the magazines (now
burnt), the whole infantry subsisted for four or six days upon
camel’s flesh. I found Baron Dumont here, who corroborates
the complete defeat of the Egyptians. As he saw the three
first columns pass within gun-shot, and as in the second where,
according to all accounts, the artillery ought to have been, he
only saw a great number of camels and mules, it is generally
believed here that Ibrahim has buried his cannons in the
Desert.
The third column only of his infantry was seen, reduced to
5000 men; a separate body at Jufila of 2000 men, who were
some days since with Ibrahim Pacha near to Kerek: all these
people were half dead with hunger. The losses of Ibrahim in
men, in horses, and in beasts of burden, in passing the Jordan,
were very great. Finally, his Excellency Hassan Pacha upon
the news of peace, sent a safe conduct to Ahmed Menikli Pacha,
commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and gave him to understand
that he would not attack him in his retreat, provided
that he did not come to plunder the villages near to Chalil.
Ahmed Menikli Pacha, conducted by an officer of Hassan
Pacha, then chose the road towards Gaza in his retreat upon
Egypt. The cavalry, reduced to 2500 horses and 700 dismounted
horsemen, was in the most miserable condition: and
had it not been for the Convention, two battalions in the almost
impracticable passes of the Wadi-el-Ghor, one day south of
Chalil, would have been sufficient to stop that column. It
appears to be very necessary for the troops coming towards
Gaza to withdraw, in order that there may never be more than
3000 men at a time in this place. I request your Excellency
to communicate this letter to General Michell.
.pm signature2\
' I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ A. Jochmus, Lieut-General.'
P.S. There is plenty of barley at El-Chalil, and there
are other provisions there, but rice and butter must be sent
there.
.fn-
.bn 186.png
.pn +1
“The cavalry,” observes the General, “are
reduced to 2500 horses and 700 dismounted horsemen,
in a miserable condition, and if it had not been
for the Convention”—(oh! that Convention!)—“two
battalions, in the almost impracticable passes
of Wadi-el-Ghor, would have been sufficient to stop
the columns.” To catch a bird you must put salt
on his tail,—to stop the columns they must have
come through the Ghor, which, according to Col.
Napier, they never did, having only crossed it to the
south of the Dead Sea, on their way to Gaza.
.bn 187.png
.pn +1
Hassan Pacha, who commanded the division to
which Colonel Napier was attached, reported that
he had sent a safe conduct to Achmet Menikli
Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and that
his officer conducted him to Gaza. Colonel Napier
knows nothing of this, nor does Lieutenant Loring,
who, after communicating with this division, set out
in search of Ibrahim, of whom he could get no
tidings, and returned to Gaza; therefore the safe
conduct must have existed only in Hassan Pacha’s
imagination, or if he did send it, it certainly never
arrived; but if it was sent, more shame to the
Turkish authorities, who not only meditated attacking
Ibrahim, fancying his army was destroyed, but
had actually given orders to that effect. This Captain
Stewart ascertained from Rechid Pacha, who
admitted that orders had been sent to General Jochmus
to act upon Ibrahim’s line of march, and impede
it as much as possible, abstaining at the same time
from any direct attack. But as Ibrahim’s troops
began to arrive in a very different state from that
which this gentleman expected, he changed his mind
and set out for Jaffa, post haste, overtook the courier
with the letter, and put it into Colonel Bridgeman’s
hands, who immediately protested in the council
.bn 188.png
.pn +1
against such proceedings[62], which would compromise
the honour both of Great Britain and Turkey, after
the guarantees that had been exchanged between Captain
Stewart, Colonels Rose and Alderson, and the
Egyptian Generals[63]. This decided conduct of Colonel
.bn 189.png
.pn +1
Bridgeman had the desired effect; promises were
given that no hostile movement should be made, but
every possible assistance should be afforded. These
assurances were kept, but more owing to the strength
of Ibrahim than to the good faith of the Turkish
.bn 190.png
.pn +1
authorities; and as for Rechid, the officer who recommended
the movement against Ibrahim, I am
informed by an eye-witness, that he went into Ibrahim’s
presence with fear and trembling, using the
words, “Il m’assassinera,” and absolutely stooped
down and kissed the hem of his garment.
.fn 62
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 315.
.fn-
.fn 63
.nf c
Guarantee by Menikli Pacha, and the other Chief Officers of
the Egyptian Army, at present encamped near Gaza.
.nf-
.rj
Gaza, January 28, 1841.
We, the Undersigned, being assembled in council with
Commodore Houston Stewart, Royal British Navy, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Alderson, Royal Engineers, after the discussion
which has taken place, have pledged ourselves, that his Highness
Ibrahim Pacha will, on his arrival at Gaza, execute the
orders of his Highness Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt,
for the evacuation of Syria, and that he will not make any
movement whatever against those orders; for all of which we
give our signatures and affix our seals.
.in 10
(Signed) Ahmed Menikli, Gen. of Division;
Kourchid, Gen. of Division; Selim, Gen. of Division;
Ahmed Dramaly, Gen. of Division; Ishmael,
Gen. of Brigade; Ibrahim, Gen. of Brigade; Mahmoud
Bey, Capt. Navy.
.in
.hr 10%
.in 5
.ti -5
Captain Houston Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson to
Menikli Ahmed Pacha and the other Chief Officers of the
Egyptian Army at present encamped near Gaza.
.in
.rj
Gaza, January 28, 1841.
In consequence of the written guarantee which you have
now given us, making yourself responsible that his Excellency
Ibrahim Pacha, as well as yourselves, will implicitly obey, and
forthwith carry into effect with perfect good faith, the orders
of his Excellency Mehemet Ali Pacha for the evacuation of
Syria by the whole of the Egyptian army: We, Houston
Stewart, Captain of Her Britannic Majesty’s ship Benbow, and
Senior Naval Officer on the coast of Syria, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Ralph Carr Alderson, Royal Engineers, representing
here the united forces of Great Britain, do pledge ourselves that
no molestation nor any obstacle be put in the way of such
evacuation, and that you are perfectly safe in diminishing your
forces here as fast as possible; and, further, that provided you
continue to make that diminution to the satisfaction of the
said Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, we promise to insist with his
Excellency the Seraskier, Zacharias Pacha, Commanding-in-Chief
the Ottoman forces, that no advance shall be made by
the Turkish troops now at Megdill, nor Governor be sent to
Gaza, until Colonel Alderson shall have reported the evacuation
complete; and we promise, that if the Turkish authorities
refuse to ratify and accept any one of these conditions, we will
immediately, and in perfect honourable faith, give you notice
thereof.
.nf r
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ Houston Stewart.
R. C. Alderson.
.nf-
.hr 10%
.nf c
Guarantee by the Seraskier, the Moustechar Effendi, and
Lieutenant-General Jochmus.
.nf-
We, the Undersigned, upon the received declaration of his
Excellency Menikli Ahmed Pacha and the other Egyptian
Generals and Officers, to carry forthwith into execution the
entire evacuation of Syria and the Desert, consent and promise
faithfully to abstain from any hostile movement, according to
the promise given by Commodore Stewart and Colonel Alderson,
with the proviso that the forces at present near and at
Gaza, march on El-Arish within seven days from this, embarking
such men in transports as are sick, unfit for campaign, and
unable to march according to Colonel Alderson’s judgment, and
provided no movement is made by any Egyptian force at Gaza,
east or northward.
Given under our hand and seal at the Imperial head-quarters
of Jaffa, January 30, 1841.
.nf r
(L.S.)\ \ \ \ \ Moustechar Effendi, Seraskier,
Jochmus, Lieutenant-General.
.nf-
.fn-
On the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha he approved of
the conduct of his Generals, and made the following
reply to the Seraskier:—
.pm start_quote
.ti 0
“Your Highness,
“I am going from Syria for Egypt. Your letter
has reached me; the Egyptian troops are concentrating
in Gaza, and when they have their necessary
supplies, they will go immediately according to your
wishes.
“I have written this to you in a friendly manner
and have sent it to your Highness.
.rj
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ \ “Ibrahim.”
.pm end_quote
.bn 191.png
.pn +1
Being duly informed of the arrival of Ibrahim,
and how affairs were going on in Syria, I wrote as
follows to Lord Minto and Viscount Palmerston:—
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“Carysfort, Alexandria,'\
' February 5, 1841.'\
'“My Lord,'
“Ibrahim Pacha arrived at Gaza on the 31st,
with the rear-guard of the Syrian army; he has
brought from Syria between 20,000 and 30,000 men,
including 6000 cavalry in good order.
“The Turkish authorities at Jaffa were very
much disposed to find a pretence to attack him, and
I believe nothing but his strong force prevented
it. He has already commenced his march across
the Desert, and in a week hence there will not be an
Egyptian soldier in Syria.
“It was arranged that the Syrians, if any were
with the army, were to return from Gaza, but I
suspect Ibrahim was afraid to disorganize his army
by letting them go. Captain Stewart was there, and
I wrote to him to say they were not to be embarked,
unless he had a suspicion that the Turks intended
using them against Ibrahim; in that case, I recommended
them to be disarmed, or even allowed to
retire into Egypt; in fact, he was to do anything to
avoid a collision, and as there are an abundance of
Egyptians in Turkey, it will be an easy matter to
exchange them.
“I dined with the Pacha yesterday; he is quite
satisfied now his army is safe, and I am sure if the
.bn 192.png
.pn +1
Porte will now let him alone he will improve this
country much; but he is apprehensive they will
demand some part of his fleet, and otherwise vex
him. He looks to England to protect him, and if
we do, he will become our vassal if we wish it; in
fact, there is nothing we can ask in reason that he
will not do. Next to Egypt being a colony of
England, it is best that it should be an independent
power, paying tribute to the Porte. Our commerce
to India will become very extensive; and
the facility of travelling become easier every day.
He intends putting a lock from the canal into the
Nile, to enable passengers to go from hence to Cairo
without moving from the steam-boats that are to be
established, and I have no doubt ere long a railroad
will be made from Cairo to Suez; the distance is
eighty-four miles. Four in hand may be driven
across the desert at present.
“I shall remain here, (unless ordered to the
contrary,) till I hear the last man is out of Syria. I
think the sooner the Consuls return the better. I
have not heard a word about them.
.pm address2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
' “Charles Napier.”'
.pm address '“To the Right Hon. Earl Minto.”'
.pm end_quote
.hr 10%
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3a\
'“H.M. Steam-vessel Stromboli, Alexandria,'\
' February 6, 1841.'\
'“My Lord,'
“In my last communication to your Lordship, I
mentioned that Ibrahim Pacha had arrived at Gaza.
.bn 193.png
.pn +1
I was mistaken; he arrived on the 31st of January,
with the rear-guard of his army, the whole consisting
of between 30,000 and 40,000 men in good order.
The Turkish authorities were very much disposed
to interrupt them; and indeed, General Jochmus
did advance on Gaza, (contrary to the opinion of
General Michell,) with the intention of attacking
him, but retreated rather precipitately. I have
written in very strong terms to him, and have
instructed Captain Stewart to protest against any
attempt he may make; and by the last accounts
I had from him, all is quiet. Ibrahim began to
retire across the Desert on the 1st, and I apprehend
by the 15th there will not be an Egyptian
soldier in Syria. The Pacha has not yet received
the hereditary title from the Porte, but I trust your
Lordship will push the point; he has all the desire
to throw himself into the arms of England.
“I dined with him a few days ago. I have had
a good deal of conversation with him and Boghos
Bey about abolishing the Slave Trade, and I have
some hopes of carrying that point before I leave
this, which will not be till after the arrival of the
Liverpool on the 16th. I have made him quite
understand that nothing will gain him so many
friends as such a measure.
.nf r
“I have, &c.,
“Charles Napier.”
.nf-
.pm address\
'“To Lord Viscount Palmerston.”'
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 194.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XIV.
.pm start_summary
Contradictory Statements as to the Numbers of the Egyptian
Army—Reason for abiding by the Reports of the
British Officers—Colonel Alderson’s Detail of the Retreat—General
Jochmus’s Statement—Lieutenant Loring’s
Mission.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
It appears rather difficult to get at the exact
amount of Ibrahim’s army, either when it left
Damascus, or when its two divisions arrived at
Gaza and Akaba. In the Levant Papers are several
statements upon the subject; but they are rather
contradictory[64]. This is not to be wondered at, as
the framers of some of them must have been sorely
puzzled to account for the numbers, who, in spite
of famine, cold, and “the sword of the fierce and
revengeful Haouranees[65],” unquestionably made their
appearance[66] at the places I have named. I shall,
therefore, prefer to abide by the statements of
the British officers at Gaza, who had no former
.bn 195.png
.pn +1
reports to bolster up, and who undoubtedly have
described things precisely as they fell under their
observation.
.fn 64
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 292, 301, 307, 366,
367.
.fn-
.fn 65
See page #124#.
.fn-
.fn 66
See General Jochmus’s letter and accompanying statement,
in Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 305-307.
.fn-
By Colonel Bridgeman’s report[67], Ibrahim
brought to Gaza 15,000 infantry and 6000 or
7000 cavalry. Lieutenant Loring, who was charged
by me with superintending the evacuation, gave
the infantry at 23,550 men, and the cavalry 6440,
independent of Souliman’s division of 5000 men,
and 175 pieces of artillery[68] who marched from El-Mezereib
to Akaba and Suez, by the way of Maan,
at which latter place he provisioned himself for his
march, arrived safely at Cairo, and by all the information
I received at Alexandria, and what Souliman
Pacha communicated to Colonel Napier at
the former place, he did not lose a gun, and the
Colonel was himself an eye-witness to the excellent
state of his cavalry. This enumeration of
Lieutenant Loring’s does not include the noncombatants.
.fn 67
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 282, 332.
.fn-
.fn 68
Ibid., pp. 309, 310.
.fn-
Colonel Alderson, who was with the naval
officer, carried up the amount of Ibrahim’s army to
33,000 men[69], besides Souliman’s force. He remarks,
.bn 196.png
.pn +1
in a private document with which I have
keen favoured:
.fn 69
Ibid., p. 307.
.fn-
“It appears Ibrahim commenced his retreat from
Damascus on the 29th of December to El-Mezereib:
at the latter place he divided his forces into five
columns[70]: 1st, the artillery and guns[71], women, &c.,
via the Desert and Suez, under Souliman Pacha;
2nd, the cavalry, consisting of ten regiments, under
Achmet Menekli Pacha; two of them (the cavalry of
the Guards) were recalled to join Ibrahim, after he
recrossed the Jordan, near Jericho; the 3rd and
4th, each consisting of five regiments of infantry;
.bn 197.png
.pn +1
and lastly Ibrahim himself, with three regiments of
foot guards, the two cavalry regiments of the guard
as before stated, and from 300 to 400 Arnauts,
Henadi, and 300 rifles. Each of these last four
divisions had orders to make the best of their way
to Gaza.
.fn 70
“Does not this division of Ibrahim’s army at El-Mezereib
at once convince any military man that he considered peace as
concluded; and that a want of provisions was the only enemy
he had to fear? he therefore divided his troops, so that one
arm should not retard the other.
“Cavalry, by forced marches, were enabled to get on faster
than the infantry, encumbered as they were by women, &c.,
and barley was no doubt very scarce.
“In a military point of view, either in advancing or retreating
in an enemy’s country, it would be considered very injudicious
to have infantry without cavalry on the route; that
Ibrahim knew this well, his sending for the two regiments of
cavalry of the guard, on finding at Rieha (Jericho) that the
Turkish troops were in position to resist his march via Hebron,
fully shows.”
.fn-
.fn 71
“The number of the guns has been variously stated, but
I believe they were between 150 and 200.”
.fn-
“When they left Damascus they had only sixteen
days’ provisions, in addition to which they obtained
a small supply of flour at El-Mezereib. The cavalry
were sixteen days on the march, the infantry twenty-seven
and twenty-eight, and Ibrahim’s corps thirty-four.
Small supplies were occasionally received
from the villages, but they avoided the great towns,
and made for the Dead Sea, which they kept sight
of, and approached as near as the nature of the
country would allow.”
Colonel Alderson, who was of
their arrival at Gaza, and collected all the information
he could, states that Ibrahim left Damascus
with 62,499 souls, including women and children;
there arrived at Gaza, independent of women and
children, 27,000 regular troops, of which 4250 were
cavalry, and 3200 irregulars; the garrison of Gaza
consisted of 2800 men. Thus, then, 33,000 men
either embarked from Gaza or marched from thence
.bn 198.png
.pn +1
between the 23rd of January and the 19th of
February, besides 9215 under Souliman Pacha, who
marched to Suez.
Colonel Alderson’s account stands thus:
.ta h:50 r:10
Arrived at Gaza | 30,200
Marched with Souliman | 9,215
Regular troops missing | 8,859
Irregular troops supposed to have gone to their\
homes | 8,440
Women and children supposed to have arrived\
at Gaza | 2,000
Perished | 3,786
| —————
| 62,500
.ta-
Be it remembered this loss of human life took
place after the submission of Mehemet Ali on the
11th of December, and the greater part after his
submission had been accepted by the Porte. The
poor sufferers had taken no interest in the contest,
but had been dragged from their homes to gratify
the ambition of Mehemet Ali; why, then, after his
submission were they not allowed to retire in safety?
Where was the merit of forcing Ibrahim through
the Desert, when he might have taken the shortest
road to Gaza, where he had depôts of provisions?
These men lost their lives, not in open war with the
.bn 199.png
.pn +1
Turkish army, which they never saw, but were
plundered and butchered by the Arabs; therefore
there was no great credit due to those who were the
authors of such measures, barbarous in themselves,
and, as I have already shown, contrary to the
opinion of Austria, (who would most probably be
supported by the Allied Powers,) who had declared
they would disavow any attack on Ibrahim
Pacha[72].
.fn 72
See pp. #46#, #54#.
.fn-
General Jochmus, in his letter to Sir Robert
Stopford, dated the 15th of February[73], states the
remains of Ibrahim’s army to be 19,000 men; and
from the reports of the Turkish and European staff-officers
sent to ascertain the numbers, the estimate,
he says, is quite correct. General Jochmus makes
his calculation from the reports of his officers, which
must be received with caution. Captain de L’Or
gave Ibrahim’s losses in five days at 10,000 men;
this was considered by the English officers very
much exaggerated, nor do I see how Ibrahim and
Souliman, who were both good generals, could have
met with such a loss, unpursued as they were by a
regular army, and having nearly 10,000 cavalry to
.bn 200.png
.pn +1
cover their retreat and protect them from the few
irregulars that followed them, and who, if they did
not behave better than those Colonel Napier had
under his command[74], would never have come within
sight of them, and it is more than probable, picked
up the stragglers only.
.fn 73
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 305.
.fn-
.fn 74
See page #151#.
.fn-
Lieutenant Loring, in his report[75]; states that he
did not reach Caiffa till the 15th of January; the
weather had been very boisterous and the steamers
were hardly seaworthy. Having procured horses at
Acre, he proceeded along the coast, through Tortura
and Cesarea, and arrived on the 17th at Jaffa, where
were stationed the greater part of the Turkish
forces, having returned from their demonstration on
Gaza the day before.
.fn 75
A private document furnished by him to me. His public
report appears in the Levant Papers, Part III., p. 309.
.fn-
On the same evening, by the advice of General
Michell, he proceeded to Jerusalem in company
with Major Wilbraham and Selim Bey, who was the
bearer of a letter from the Seraskier to Ibrahim;
he was also provided with a firman to the Governor
and Scheiks to assist them on the road. On arriving
at Jerusalem they found Hassan Pacha had marched
.bn 201.png
.pn +1
on Halil (Hebron) with 8000 men and six pieces of
artillery.
Thither they proceeded and arrived the same
evening. On acquainting Hassan Pacha with their
mission, he was easily persuaded to return to Jerusalem;
they then pushed forward, but instead of
getting information from the authorities, Abder
Rahman, the scheik of the El-Halil district, plainly
told them that he would neither give them information
nor assistance, and there is no doubt whatever
he was acting under orders from the Turkish authorities.
Abder Rahman must have known where
Ibrahim’s army was, because he had just returned
from Maan, to which place he had accompanied the
Baron Dumont on his excursion to destroy the
magazines; in which, however, the Baron failed,
as Souliman’s division had passed through the day
before and pretty nearly cleared the stores. Finding
it impossible to advance with any prospect of
meeting Ibrahim, they returned to Gaza, where they
found Achmet Menekli Pacha had arrived with
the greater part of the cavalry. He made bitter
complaints of the conduct of the Arabs, and Lieutenant
Loring immediately proceeded to Jaffa to
remonstrate with the Turkish authorities on the
.bn 202.png
.pn +1
conduct of their officers. From Jaffa he returned
to Gaza with Captain Stewart and Colonel Rose,
accompanied by Rechid Pacha, and everything
appeared settled in an amicable manner with Achmet
Pacha to facilitate as much as possible the evacuation
of Syria.
Mr. Loring was present some hours after, when
Rechid Pacha, to the utter astonishment of the
British officers, declared his intention of immediately
returning to Jaffa, confessing at the same time that
he had sent orders for the advance of the Turkish
troops to endeavour to cut off the communication
between the division at Gaza and those hourly
expected from the Desert. As has been already
shown[76], the spirited remonstrance of Captain
Stewart and Colonel Bridgeman put a stop to this
infamous proceeding.
.fn 76
See pages #175#, #176#.
.fn-
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 203.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XV.
.pm start_summary
Embarkation of the Egyptians—Mode in which it was conducted—Departure
of Ibrahim Pacha—Retreat of Souliman’s
Division—Complete Evacuation of Syria—Letter of
Lord Ponsonby—Delivery of the Turkish Fleet—Anxiety
of Mehemet Ali for the safety of his Army—Letter from
Boghos Bey to the Author on the subject.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
The season of the year was very unpropitious for
embarking troops on the coast of Syria, nevertheless
Mehemet Ali, who had no idea of difficulties or the
risk he ran of losing his ships at Gaza, which is at
the very bottom of the Mediterranean, and from
whence there is no escape should the wind blow on
the land, sent three transports, two steamers, two
corvettes, and a brig of war, from Alexandria, with
directions to carry the troops to Damietta. The
surf is generally so high on the coast that six days
out of seven embarking troops is attended with great
danger. The Egyptian admiral and generals were
indefatigable in their exertions; they seldom left the
beach night or day, and Ibrahim himself, when he
recovered, was frequent in his attendance. The
poor Arabs, whether sick or well, were obliged to
strip, take their clothes on their heads, and wade up
.bn 204.png
.pn +1
to their armpits, and were then bundled into the
boats like so much lumber; the women and children
were treated in the same manner. Human
life is little thought of amongst either Turks or
Egyptians.
Ibrahim Pacha remained to the last, and embarked
on the 18th of February on board the Hadji
Baba, and landed at Damietta; the same day a
regiment of cavalry or of cuirassiers, and two corps
of irregular horse, marched for El-Arish, and the
town was shortly after taken possession of by a
Turkish regiment of cavalry.
As to the retreat of Souliman Pacha’s column I
am not able to speak very particularly. Some documents
that would have given the whole detail, had
they arrived, have not reached me. I believe, however,
that after parting from the main body at El-Mezereib
on the 4th of January, the column reached
Maan on the 13th, supplied themselves with provisions,
and then pursued their route to Akaba, where
the guns and stores were embarked and carried to
Suez, to which port the troops repaired overland,
and arrived there in tolerable condition and with
very little loss, reaching Cairo about the middle of
February.
.bn 205.png
.pn +1
Thus terminated the evacuation of Syria, and
after comparing the different reports, the loss of the
Egyptians could not have been less than 10,000 men,
(besides women and children,) the greater part of
whom most probably deserted, and were destroyed
by the Arabs. The Turkish army never came in
contact with them, except in the affair at Medjdel;
they were, however, followed and harassed by irregulars,
and also suffered from want of provisions;
but under all circumstances the retreat seems to
have been well conducted. Ibrahim’s crossing the
Jordan was a masterly man[oe]uvre; it alarmed the
Turks, saved Gaza, and greatly facilitated his arrival
there. The Turkish army appear to have followed
a very prudent course by taking up a position to
cover Jerusalem, Acre, and Jaffa, thereby securing
those places against a breach of faith on the part of
Ibrahim, had he entertained any notion of the sort;
and it is just as well they never came in contact:
Ibrahim was well provided with cavalry, and that
is an arm of which the Turkish soldiers are very
apprehensive, and I have no idea they could have
maintained themselves steady enough in square to
resist an attack of cavalry.
Had the Convention been adopted by Sir Robert
.bn 206.png
.pn +1
Stopford in the first instance the loss of life incurred
in this retreat might have been saved, and the
country would have suffered much less than it did.
Nothing has been gained by its rejection; it stipulated
for the delivery of the Turkish fleet, the
evacuation of Syria, and the confirmation of Mehemet
Ali in the hereditary government of Egypt,
all of which have now been obtained, with the
loss, it is true, of some thousands of human
beings, who were not at all interested in the war.
General Jochmus thinks that the military question
has been decided, and that the Turks drove Ibrahim
out of Syria; it is very certain that Ibrahim marched
out of Syria, harassed by the different tribes, but
the Turkish army might just as well have been at
Constantinople; in fact, they were just where they
ought to have been, and the only fault committed by
the Turkish authorities was giving directions to the
different tribes to harass Ibrahim’s retreat, which
was quite improper after the unconditional submission
Mehemet Ali sent to the Porte by Captain
Fanshawe. This submission, too, was well known
in Syria at the time they were thus acting, for we
learn from Captain Stewart that on the 9th of
January the Gorgon arrived at Jaffa, bringing the
.bn 207.png
.pn +1
news that the Pacha’s submission had been accepted
by the Porte[77].
.fn 77
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 164, 311.
.fn-
The British Ambassador, I find, has not hesitated
to take upon himself the responsibility of the
attempts made by General Jochmus to destroy
Ibrahim’s whole army. The following is his letter
to Lord Palmerston, for he shall speak for himself:—
.pm start_quote
.pm heading '“My Lord,' '“Therapia, February 23, 1841.'
“I transmit copy of one of General Jochmus’s
despatches to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford[78], that I
may insure its being known to your Lordship, as it
affords information essential to a correct judgment
of the affairs of this country.
.fn 78
Ibid., p. 288; and p. 119, et seq. of this volume.
.fn-
“It is shown in the despatch, that had it not
been for the perseverance of General Jochmus in
taking measures against Ibrahim Pacha, it would
have been easy for Ibrahim to remain with his army
in Damascus until, the arrangement with Mehemet
Ali having been completed, he might have retreated
with a great unbroken force to Egypt, instead of
having his army defeated and nearly destroyed, and
wholly demoralized.
“Had Ibrahim remained at Damascus, the military
question would have been undecided, and it
.bn 208.png
.pn +1
would have been easy to assert that victory might
still have been on the side of the Pasha, had
Mehemet Ali thought it politic to continue the war.
“If Ibrahim had taken back to Egypt his large
army unharmed, Mehemet Ali would possess a force
that might encourage him to resist, and might
possibly make him stronger than ever. The energy
of General Jochmus has rendered all doubt and
delusion on the subject of the military question
impossible, and has shown, that under able command
the Turkish troops are more than a match
for the Egyptian army and General; his energy has
also taken from Mehemet Ali the best means he
could have to support resistance, and therefore has
afforded the best ground for hoping he will submit.
“All this good is due to the energy of General
Jochmus. The praises General Jochmus gives to
those who have done good service, are proofs of his
honourable and just feelings.
.nf r
“I have, &c.,
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”
.nf-
.pm address '“Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.”'
.pm end_quote
I have already mentioned the arrival of the
Turkish Commissioners at Alexandria, and the
formal delivery of the fleet[79] on the 11th of January,
which sailed on the 20th of that month from
Alexandria; and the greatest credit is due to
.bn 209.png
.pn +1
Admiral Walker for his exertions in fitting out
that fleet, many of which were obliged to be
lightened even to their ballast, and take in their
guns and stores outside; this they did without
anchoring, and got clear of the land before sunset.
Mehemet Ali having parted in good faith with this
valuable deposit, became alarmed about the fate
of his son and his army, and though he complained
little to me in person, desired Boghos Bey to write
to me on the subject.
.fn 79
See page #71#.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Commodore,'\
'“Alexandria, Jan. 30, 1841.'
“I have the honour of informing you that,
according to the last despatches received from Gaza,
almost all the Egyptian army is already assembled
in that town; that it is believed there that Ibrahim
Pacha will arrive to-day or to-morrow; that although
the cavalry regiments are already on their way towards
Egypt, the infantry being too much fatigued,
it will be desirable on every account to transport it
to Egypt by sea, and thus, according to the desire of
both parties, to spare the loss of men; but that the
English officers who are in authority at Gaza object
to the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms, a
circumstance which appears inexplicable, it being
mentioned in the Convention concluded between you
and the Egyptian Government, that the Egyptian
troops should be transported to Egypt by sea with
.bn 210.png
.pn +1
their arms and baggage. Seeing, then, this opposition
on the part of the English officers, it appears probable
that they are not acquainted with the contents
of the Convention above-mentioned. You are therefore
requested, Commodore, to write to the authorities
at Gaza, in order that they may no longer oppose
the Egyptian troops embarking with their arms and
baggage for Alexandria; to send your letter to His
Excellency Abbas Pacha, so that it may reach his
address in time; and to have the goodness also to
inform me of it, in order that a sufficient number of
vessels may be sent to Gaza.
.nf r
“Receive, Commodore, &c.,
“Boghos Joussouf.”
.nf-
.pm address2\
'“To Commodore Napier,'\
' &c., &c., &c.”'
.pm end_quote
In consequence of this application, I wrote the
letters to the British and Turkish authorities in
Syria already given[80], and did everything I could to
tranquillize the Pacha’s mind, and assured him that
I felt perfectly satisfied Captain Stewart would do
all in his power to oblige the Turks to keep faith.
.fn 80
See pp. #92#, #95#.
.fn-
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 211.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XVI.
.pm start_summary
Examination of the Conduct of the Allied Ministers at Constantinople—Lord
Ponsonby’s Propositions regarding the
Hereditary Government of Egypt— by the other
Allied Ministers, but on consideration rejected by them—Lord
Palmerston’s Conversation with the Turkish Minister—Note
of the Four Powers in favour of the Hereditary
Tenure.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
It is now proper to examine a little into the conduct
of the Allied Ministers at Constantinople, who, of
course, had some influence over the Porte, and
exercised it, in framing the Hatti Sheriff reinstating
Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt; and I
shall take the Levant Correspondence to guide me
in my criticism; for although a great deal of that is
no doubt suppressed, there still remains enough
to form an opinion on the wisdom of the Allied
Ministers.
I shall take the British Ambassador in hand
first, as he had more influence, and took a more
prominent part than the Ambassadors and Ministers
of the other powers.
After the news of the surrender of the Turkish
fleet arrived at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby
.bn 212.png
.pn +1
wrote to the Internuncio and to M. Titow[81], recommending
conditions which should be attached to the
grant of the hereditary pachalic of Egypt to Mehemet
Ali, which they approved of in the first
instance, but on reconsideration, they, like wise
men, rejected.
.fn 81
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 221.
.fn-
Lord Ponsonby, in his letter to Lord Palmerston[82],
states, that he will follow his Lordship’s
instructions of the 17th of December, and do all he
can to secure the Sultan against the evil designs of
Mehemet Ali, and preserve the people of Egypt
in future from the oppression which they have
hitherto endured. “I am convinced there is no way
of doing both, so certain, as that which your
Lordship says you wish would be taken, viz.:
taking the collection of the revenue out of the
hands of the Pacha.” I see nothing of the sort
in Lord Palmerston’s letter; he gives an opinion
that the Porte will be able to make certain regulations
for the government of Egypt, but not one
word is said about the collection of the revenue;
and surely it was not statesmanlike of Lord Ponsonby
advising the Porte to impose conditions on
.bn 213.png
.pn +1
Mehemet Ali which they had no power of enforcing,
for Lord Ponsonby knew full well that neither
England, or the other Powers, could touch Egypt,
without provoking a war with France. He says,
“The Austrians desire to put a sudden end (as they
suppose they can do) to the question here, by
yielding every thing to the Pacha. Your Lordship
desires to establish future security both for the
Sultan and his Egyptian subjects. My duty is to
follow your orders; but could I be shaken in that
duty by the exertions of the Austrians, I should be
still deterred from acting with them for such a
purpose, by my own knowledge that all this question
is to be most rigidly scrutinized in Parliament,
and that severe censure would fall upon me if I
deviated from your instructions[83].”
.fn 82
Ibid., p. 207.
.fn-
.fn 83
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 208.
.fn-
I do indeed hope that Parliament will scrutinize
his conduct, and ascertain whether or not it is true
that the Ambassador instructed General Jochmus
to follow up hostilities after the submission of
Mehemet Ali[84], and thereby cause the death of some
.bn 214.png
.pn +1
thousands of human beings, which was just as bad,
if not worse than the chase of the negroes in Nubia,
of which Lord Ponsonby speaks with such horror[85].
The only difference between the two is, that the
chase of the negroes was the custom of the country,
whereas the chase of the Egyptians from Syria
was not according to the custom of civilized nations,
as it was carried on after the submission of
Mehemet Ali, and when there was not the least
necessity for it.
.fn 84
I think there could not be much difficulty in proving
that he did give such orders, when we consider the terms in
which his Lordship speaks of General Jochmus’s conduct, in
his letter to Viscount Palmerston, already given. See p. #195#.
.fn-
.fn 85
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 226.
.fn-
The British Ambassador, in writing to Baron
Stürmer and M. Titow, quotes the 3rd, 5th, and 6th
Articles of the Treaty of the 15th of July[86], and
makes a budget for the Pacha, showing the resources
of Egypt in the year 1833[87] to be 62,778,750
piastres, while the expenditure was only 49,951,500,
which may have been correct or not; but it appears
to me that the tribute Mehemet was to pay to the
Porte on his being reinstated in the government of
Egypt, ought to have been fixed by the state of the
revenue and expenditure in 1841, when the war
ceased.
.fn 86
See Appendix, Vol. I.
.fn-
.fn 87
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 219.
.fn-
.bn 215.png
.pn +1
The proposition his Excellency makes is, that
the Sultan should issue a firman, giving the hereditary
government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali; but
he is to bear in mind that Egypt was just to be
considered like any other pachalic of the Turkish
empire, and at a future time he should be made
acquainted with the nature and extent of his administrative
powers[88].
.fn 88
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 221.
.fn-
All this would have been very well had the
power of the Porte alone put down Mehemet Ali,
and then had the means of enforcing the firman; but
the Ambassador must have known full well, that
had Mehemet Ali been left to himself, he could have
dictated terms to the Sultan, and that, even after
all the losses he met with in Syria, occasioned by
the Allied Powers, and the losses he met with in
his retreat by the bad faith of the Turks, he was
still in a position to resist the whole power of the
Turkish empire.
M. Titow, as well as Baron Stürmer and Count
Königsmark, as I have before stated, at first agreed
with Lord Ponsonby[89], but asked his opinion about
the restrictive clause relating to the nomination of
.bn 216.png
.pn +1
the successor of Mehemet Ali. Their approval of
the British Ambassador’s proposal seems to have
thrown his Excellency off his guard, and he wrote
to M. Titow:
.fn 89
Ibid., p. 222.
.fn-
“I reply at once to your question, and I say that
I think it will be more prudent to keep everything
like specific arrangement for the settlement that
will flow from the assertion and establishment of
the Sultan’s sovereign authority and right. You will
observe that I used the expression, ‘hereditary in
the family of Mehemet Ali,’ which cannot tie up
the Sultan’s right to specify the mode in which the
succession shall take place; and if it should be
argued hereafter that the succession should be in
the direct line, (and, as it is called, by representation,)
the answer would be easy, that nothing
of the sort is known to Turkish law, nor is usual in
the East, succession being commonly regulated by
very different principles.
“I do not see any inconvenience in leaving this
matter untouched, but I do fear that any thing that
might give Mehemet Ali ground for discussion and
dispute at this moment might be inconvenient, and
would be seized upon by him. He cannot deny the
Sultan’s sovereignty, which he has already admitted;
.bn 217.png
.pn +1
it will be impossible for him to refuse the hereditary
right, as it is expressed, without denying, at the
same time, the sovereignty of the Sultan already
acknowledged.”
The alteration of the opinion of the Allied
Ministers only appears in Lord Ponsonby’s letter
to Baron Stürmer two days after, in which he
withdraws his proposal[90]. He, however, alludes to
a letter from Baron Stürmer, communicating this
change of opinion, in which the Baron asks, “Have
we any right to act according to our fancies, when
the route we have to pursue is clearly traced
to us?”
.fn 90
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 224.
.fn-
To which Lord Ponsonby replies, “Certainly
not; and in conformity with your just notions, I
will continue to act, without the smallest deviation,
upon the instructions of December 17, which have
already been made known to you, but which, to
avoid error, I transcribe literatim from the document.
“‘It will indeed be necessary, that in reinstating
Mehemet Ali in the Pachalic of Egypt, care should
be taken to make such arrangements as would
protect the people of Egypt from a continuance of
.bn 218.png
.pn +1
the tyrannical oppression by which they have of late
years been crushed, and should secure the Sultan
against a renewal of those hostilities which have
compelled him to have recourse to the aid of his
Allies. But the means of effecting all these purposes
may be found in the stipulations of the Treaty
of the 15th of July, without removing Mehemet Ali
from his Pachalic. The Treaty says, that all the
laws of the Turkish Empire, and all the Treaties of
the Porte, shall apply to Egypt, just as much as to
any other province of the Sultan’s dominions; and
the land and sea forces which may be maintained by
the Pacha of Egypt, shall be part of the forces of the
empire, and be kept up for the service of the State.
“‘Under these stipulations, the Sultan will of
course be able, by an exercise of his legislative
authority, to establish unity of flag, and of military
and naval uniform, throughout all his provinces; to
limit the number of troops which each province
shall, according to its population, maintain; to
regulate the mode of enforcing the conscription, so
as to protect the people from undue burthens and
oppressive levies; to fix the number and class of
ships of war which shall belong to the several naval
ports of his dominions; to fix the manner in which
.bn 219.png
.pn +1
commissions in the army and navy shall be granted
in his name, and by his authority; to determine
that a single monetary system shall prevail throughout
all his dominions, and that there shall be but
one Mint. The Treaty specifies, that none but the
legal imposts should be levied in Egypt, which will
secure the people from undue exactions; and the
execution of the Convention of 1838, by which all
monopolies are to be abolished, will at once free the
industry of the people of Egypt from those oppressive
restrictions which have hitherto kept the great
mass of the population in the most abject poverty,
and which have gradually thrown out of cultivation
extensive tracts of land that were formerly tilled and
productive.
“‘By such means it seems to Her Majesty’s
Government, that future security might be afforded,
both to the Sultan and to his Egyptian subjects,
against the disposition of Mehemet Ali to rebel
against his Sovereign, and to oppress the people of
the province he would have to govern.’
“The above constitute the sole rule I can follow,
and they are the only words I am at liberty to use in
the counsel I shall consent to give to the Sublime
Porte.”
.bn 220.png
.pn +1
The reader will observe these instructions were
merely general, and ought to have been followed
only so far as the Porte had the power of enforcing
them; besides, at the time they were given, Lord
Palmerston was not aware what force Mehemet Ali
had in Egypt; and there is not a word in these
instructions to lead Lord Ponsonby to suppose that
Lord Palmerston would have recommended the
Porte to set aside Ibrahim Pacha, which was evidently
Lord Ponsonby’s aim.
His Lordship finishes his letter to the Baron by
observing, that as Mehemet Ali had rejected the
Treaty of the 15th of July, the Allies are free to
act as they think proper. However free they might
have been, they always declared they should abide
by the basis of the Treaty of the 15th of July, which
was acknowledged by my Convention, and also by
the instructions of the 15th of October, which
Lord Palmerston quotes in his despatch of the
17th of December,—that despatch which the British
Ambassador takes for the guide of conduct, viz.:
“Your Excellency and your colleagues will, of
course, have given to the Porte the advice specified
in my despatch of the 15th of October to your
Excellency:” and again, “In fact these articles of
.bn 221.png
.pn +1
agreement were substantially a complete surrender
on the part of Mehemet Ali, and he was led to
suppose, that in asking for hereditary tenure, he
was only asking that which the Porte was willing to
give[91].”
.fn 91
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 88, 89.
.fn-
Lord Palmerston writes still more strongly to
the Ambassador, under date of the 29th January[92],
in which, relating a conversation he had had with
the Turkish Minister in London, he says, in reply
to the unwillingness of the Porte to grant the hereditary
pachalic communicated to him by Chekib
Effendi, “I said, that in all affairs, one must be
content with what is practicable, and not endanger
what has been obtained by striving after that which
is unattainable. I said, that it is clear that Mehemet
Ali has made his submission in the expectation
that he should obtain hereditary tenure in
Egypt: now if, after all, this tenure were to be
refused to him, what would probably be the consequence?—renewed
revolt, or an attitude, at least,
of passive resistance. What would then be the
remedy? Such a state of things could not be
allowed to continue, because if it lasted, it would
.bn 222.png
.pn +1
amount to the separation of Egypt from the Turkish
Empire. But the Sultan, has not, at present, naval
or military means sufficient to enforce his authority,
in such a case, over Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The
Sultan, would, therefore, be obliged to have recourse
for aid to his Allies. But the measures hitherto
agreed upon by the Four Powers in virtue of the
Treaty of July, are confined to the expulsion of the
Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and Candia, and to
the driving of Mehemet Ali’s forces and authorities
back within the limits of Egypt. If, then, the
Sultan were to apply to the Four Powers for assistance
to attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a
new deliberation of the Conference would become
necessary.
.fn 92
Ibid., p. 169.
.fn-
“Now, I said to Chekib, I could tell him beforehand
what would be the result of that deliberation,
if the assistance asked for by the Sultan were
required in consequence of the Sultan’s refusal to
comply with the advice given him by the Four
Powers, to confer upon Mehemet Ali hereditary
tenure of his Egyptian pachalic. I said I knew
perfectly well that the Four Powers would decline
giving the Sultan such assistance; and what then
would happen? Why, the Sultan would, in consequence,
.bn 223.png
.pn +1
find himself, for want of sufficient means of
his own, obliged to grant to Mehemet Ali, with a
bad grace, and after an ineffectual attempt to avoid
doing so, that which he might now make a merit of
conferring willingly; and thus, instead of performing,
as he now may do, an act of sovereign power, at
the suggestion of his Allies, he would appear to all
the world as making an extorted concession to a
subject.
“I said that I would not attempt to represent as
being of no value or importance a sacrifice which is
unquestionably a great one, because such a representation
could not convince the Sultan. But I
begged Chekib Effendi to request his Government
to consider the immense importance of the moral
and physical strength which the Sultan has gained
by the events of the few last months, and to
remember that all which the Sultan has gained,
Mehemet Ali has lost. That thus their relative
positions have been so entirely changed, that the
Pacha can never again become really dangerous or
seriously troublesome to the Sultan, if the Sultan
avails himself properly of the stipulations of the
Treaty of July; and if he shall well organize his
army, navy, and finances, and shall place those
.bn 224.png
.pn +1
branches of his public service upon an efficient
footing. I desired Chekib Effendi to bear in mind
that the Sultan has recovered, for his direct authority,
the whole of Syria, Arabia, and Candia; points
which, with reference to military, naval, financial,
and religious considerations, are of the utmost
importance, and for the recovery of which the
Sultan would, at this time last year, have gladly
made very considerable sacrifices. I further reminded
him, that a faithful execution of that stipulation
of the Treaty of July, which says, that all
the laws and treaties of the empire are to apply to
Egypt as to any other province, will afford a most
essential security for the sovereign authority of the
Sultan. I therefore requested Chekib Effendi to
urge his Government to conclude this matter without
further delay, because it is of great importance for
all parties concerned, that it should be brought to a
final settlement as soon as possible.
“Chekib Effendi promised me to write to Rechid
Pacha to this effect, and he said that he had no
doubt that the Sultan will comply with the advice
of his Allies.”
The day after this conversation, and in conformity
with Lord Palmerston’s views, the Allied
.bn 225.png
.pn +1
Ministers sent a note to Chekib Effendi, expressing
their opinion that the Sultan should confer on the
descendants of Mehemet Ali in the direct line, the
Pachalic of Egypt[93].
.fn 93
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 171.
.fn-
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 226.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XVII.
.pm start_summary
Determination of the Allied Courts to secure the Hereditary
Pachalic for Mehemet Ali—Correspondence between Baron
Sturmer and Lord Ponsonby—Decisive Instructions from
Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby—Conference of the
Allied Ministers with Rechid Pacha—Project for settling
the Egyptian Question—Lord Ponsonby’s Observations at
the Conference—The Firmans decided on—Refusal of Lord
Ponsonby to allow the English Consul-General to return
to Egypt—Lord Ponsonby’s Letter to Rechid Pacha.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Before the last communication could reach the
British Ambassador, indeed before it was written,
Baron Stürmer in a letter of the 7th of January[94],
had told him that Prince Metternich had written
in the most peremptory terms, that the Four
Courts had pronounced that the hereditary succession
in the functions of the Government of Egypt
should be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali, and
he finishes by condoling with Lord Ponsonby, that
the Allies have destroyed the hope they both had
of seeing the power of Mehemet Ali crumble to
pieces. He adds, “My part is played, and it only
remains for me to await in silence the orders which
.bn 227.png
.pn +1
my Government may be pleased to transmit to me,
and execute them scrupulously.”
.fn 94
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 183.
.fn-
The English Ambassador, in no way daunted,
replies[95], “It is wholly indifferent what may be the
private opinion of any of us as to this question,
which is the affair of our Governments, and for
which none of us are responsible; but it is another
thing to act ‘without orders,’ and I will not incur
‘that’ responsibility, and therefore I must decline
acting in concert with you until I am authorized to
take the steps you propose, by instructions to that
effect. It is necessary I should acquaint our colleagues
and the Ottoman Ministers with my position,
and I shall do so without loss of time. I have
been told by the best authority, including yourself,
if I mistake not, that your Government had not
decided to grant the hereditary right to Mehemet
Ali; and at the Conference it did appear that you
had no authority to mention that point. This
matter, however, is not of a very recent date, and it
is not at all impossible that more than one alteration
may have taken place in the language or opinion of
that Government, and that which is erroneous now,
may have been right before, or possibly may be so
.bn 228.png
.pn +1
again, for in this affair there has been a perpetual fluctuation
of circumstances. If my Government has
not sent me orders, it cannot be for want of time, as
they would have reached me through Vienna as soon
as the instruction you have received.”
.fn 95
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 185.
.fn-
The Ambassador wrote in the same sense to M.
Titow and Count Königsmark[96], complaining of the
breathless haste they were proceeding in, in recommending
the hereditary succession, and urging every
argument to prevent it in the first instance; all of
which happily failed, and at last he got decided
instructions from home, which produced a couple of
short notes to the other Ministers and M. Pisani.
.fn 96
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 185, 192.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“My dear Sir,'\
'“Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.'
“I hasten to acquaint you, that in consequence
of what I have received from my Government by
the messenger who has just arrived here, I have
instructed my Dragoman to inform his Excellency
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the British
Government advises the Sublime Porte to grant to
Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”'
.pm address '“To M. Titow.“'
.pm end_quote
.bn 229.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Sir,'\
'“Therapia, Jan. 10, 1841.'
“You will acquaint his Excellency the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, that I am ordered to counsel the
Sublime Porte, in the name of the British Government,
to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary
government of Egypt.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”'
.pm address '“To M. Frederick Pisani.”'
.pm end_quote
Lord Palmerston, in a short letter of February
10[97], approves of the Ambassador’s conduct, without
stating whether it was the long correspondence to
endeavour to induce the Allied Ministers not to
recommend the grant of the hereditary tenure, or
the short correspondence recommending the grant to
be confirmed.
.fn 97
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 197.
.fn-
Notwithstanding that Lord Ponsonby had been
foiled in his first attempt to prevent the Porte from
conferring the hereditary pachalic on Mehemet Ali,
he was not discouraged, and returned to the charge
with fresh vigour, on the question of attaching
such conditions to the hereditary title, as would
render it worse than useless; and I have shown that
on reflection, the Allied Ministers altered their
.bn 230.png
.pn +1
opinion, and Lord Ponsonby in consequence withdrew
his proposal.
On the 4th of February the Allied Ministers
were invited to a conference with Rechid Pacha,
who laid before them his project of definitively
settling the Egyptian question, which was as follows:—
.pm start_quote
“Hereditary succession of Egypt granted on
condition that all the Treaties and all the laws of the
empire shall be applied to Egypt as to every other
part of the Ottoman empire.
“The Sultan reserves to himself to choose among
the male descendants of Mehemet Ali whom he shall
please. The heir chosen for the Government of
Egypt shall not have the title of Vizier until he shall
have received the investiture of the Sultan, and after
such investiture he shall be styled Vizier, and treated
like the other Viziers of the empire. Considering
the advanced age of Mehemet Ali, he is exempted
from proceeding to the capital; his successors are
under an obligation to do so.
“As the Porte contemplates an improvement in
its coinage, the money which Mehemet Ali may coin
in Egypt should have the same alloy and value as
that of the Sultan.
“All appointments to civil and military employments
must proceed from the Sultan, and all promotions
emanate from His Highness; wherefore
Mehemet Ali is prohibited from appointing to any
.bn 231.png
.pn +1
employment, and making provision for any office
without the authorisation and consent of His Highness;
in order, however, to leave him means of
military organisation, he is permitted to appoint up
to the rank of captain inclusive.
“The tribute to be paid yearly shall be fixed
separately.
“The distinctive marks (nischan) of every rank,
as well civil as military, are to be ordained by His
Highness.
“The uniforms, as well civil as military, must
resemble those worn by the civil and military officers
of the Sultan, the whole adapted to the climate; it
being well understood that the cut and shape must
be absolutely the same.
“With respect to the garrison for the maintenance
of good order in Egypt, the Porte proposes
from 20,000 to 25,000 troops.
“The conscription which in the other provinces
furnishes one man in a hundred, shall not in Egypt
furnish more than one in two hundred.
“The Government of Egypt has always been
bound to provide for the wants of the Holy Cities;
Mehemet Ali must therefore, as a faithful subject,
act in conformity with what is imposed on him by
the situation of Governor of Egypt[98].”
.pm end_quote
.fn 98
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 229.
.fn-
Lord Ponsonby, being first called upon for his
opinion, stated, he had no objection to offer, but
.bn 232.png
.pn +1
after his colleagues had spoken he should make
some observations on the Tribute. The other
Ministers gave their assent to the propositions of
Rechid Pacha; the arguments they used Lord
Ponsonby does not report to Lord Palmerston, as
they would appear in the Protocol, but which
Protocol is not, I suppose for some wise purpose,
inserted in the Levant Papers. We must, then,
content ourselves with the British Ambassador’s
own observations. He begins by stating, that
Mehemet Ali having been deposed, and the Porte
appealed to, to reinstate him, sufficiently proves
that the Treaty of the 15th of July does not
bind the Allies. His Lordship, I believe, was
singular in this opinion, for it has been distinctly
and repeatedly stated by the Allied Ministers both
in London, Vienna, and Constantinople, that the
Treaty of the 15th of July should be the basis of the
settlement of the Egyptian question; and in no part
of the correspondence does it appear that the Allies
approved of the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and it
may therefore be fairly inferred that they entirely
disapproved of it.
His Lordship takes for granted the Treaty is not
an absolute rule, and thus observes:
.bn 233.png
.pn +1
“If the Treaty be not the absolute rule, why are
we to counsel the Sublime Porte to take a measure
that was adopted in that Treaty, at a time when
affairs were in a state totally different from their
actual state? The Treaty was a compromise with
Mehemet Ali, and all its stipulations were conditional,
and with a view to engage him to accept it.
Mehemet Ali decided to refuse the Treaty, and to
try the chance of arms. He has been vanquished,
and he has made unconditional submission to his
Sovereign. How then can the Treaty be obligatory
upon the Allies, (of whom the Sultan is one,) to take
the measures framed for another position of affairs
which has ceased to exist?
“If then the Treaty be not obligatory upon the
Allies, the counsel to be given by us to the Ottoman
Porte is to be based upon the instructions we have
received from our Courts; and we are not to advise
the Porte to adopt measures that are impossible to
be reconciled one with another, and contradictory, so
as that one measure, if adopted, shall defeat almost
every other measure which we are ordered to
recommend.”
The document is much too long, but may be
seen in the Levant Papers. The burden of it is, that
.bn 234.png
.pn +1
Mehemet Ali should be crippled in his finances to
prevent him doing further mischief; and the Ambassador
finishes by saying, “I have reason to believe my
colleagues entertain an opinion different from mine.
They have had before them for their
the instructions from Lord Palmerston so often
referred to. They are possibly better able to interpret
them than I may be, but I understand them in
the sense I have described; and it is for others,
not for me, to decide, and to take such part as
they may esteem the best. Those whom I have
now addressed can judge, as well as I can do,
what is the opinion of the British Government.
My opinion is of little importance, excepting to
myself, but I must stand before my country and
justify my acts[99].”
.fn 99
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 229.
.fn-
All this would have been right enough if the
Porte had the power to enforce it, but not having
the power, they only exposed their own weakness to
Mehemet Ali, and gave him an opportunity of
treating their overtures with the contempt they
deserved.
On the 15th of February Rechid Pacha officially
delivered to M. Pisani, Lord Ponsonby’s dragoman,
.bn 235.png
.pn +1
copies of the firman granting the hereditary succession,
the firman for governing the provinces bordering
on Egypt, as likewise an official note to the
four Ministers, and a letter from the Vizier to
Mehemet Ali[100], communicating to them at the same
time, that the Consuls might proceed to Alexandria
in the steam-boat, which would leave in the afternoon
without fail. This information had been
privately communicated by the dragoman to Lord
Ponsonby on the 13th.
.fn 100
See these documents in the Levant Papers, Part III.,
pp. 247-252.
.fn-
Nothing was, however, further from his Lordship’s
intention than allowing the British Consul-General
to return. He appears to have been
dissatisfied because he was not consulted before the
measure was decided on, and he informed the
Turkish Minister that he should not require the
Consul-General to return, because it might not suit
the British Government to establish the Consul-General
on the same footing as before; that Mehemet
Ali might refuse; and lastly, that Colonel
Hodges could not leave Constantinople so suddenly[101].
Of these three arguments the only valid
.bn 236.png
.pn +1
one seems to be, the probability of Mehemet Ali’s
refusing the conditions; but even granting that, it
would have been more politic to have sent the
Consuls with the Turkish Commissioner who bore
the firmans, with orders to persuade Mehemet Ali, if
possible, to accept them, and to signify to him at the
same time that the flags would not be hoisted till that
point was arranged. They being on the spot, and in
an official capacity, furnished with instructions from
the Ambassador at Constantinople, would have seen
how far it was possible for Ali to accept
the firman without risking the tranquillity of Egypt,
and would necessarily have more influence on the
Pacha than I could have, being totally unprovided
with instructions, and not having received a single
line from the Ambassador to guide my conduct.
.fn 101
See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 239, 240.
.fn-
On the 15th of February Lord Ponsonby wrote
officially to Rechid Pacha[102], disowning having had
any thing to do with the firman, and stating that he
never had been consulted at all, or knew any thing
about it, till every thing was decided, and ordered to
be sent to Alexandria. The fact is, the Porte saw
that Lord Ponsonby was determined to keep the
question open, and therefore arranged the firman
.bn 237.png
.pn +1
without asking his advice. What that advice might
have been is hard to say; but we must infer that
had he been consulted, the firman would have been
much more stringent than it was, and which, as it
turned out, was not palatable to the Pacha, who
absolutely constrained the Porte to alter it, and
give him more favourable terms; in this, as we
shall see, he was supported by the majority of the
Ambassadors.
.fn 102
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 325.
.fn-
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 238.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XVIII.
.pm start_summary
Delay in forwarding the Firmans to Mehemet Ali—Instructions
to the Commissioner—The Author’s Visit to the
Egyptian Flag-ship—Substance of the Firmans—Objections
of the Pacha—The Author’s Advice—Letter to Lord Palmerston—The
Author’s last Interview with Mehemet Ali—Return
to Malta—Correspondence with Sir Robert Stopford—Return
to England.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
Although it had been distinctly stated to Mehemet
Ali in the Vizier’s letter of the 12th of January,
(in consequence of the remonstrance of the Allies)[103],
.bn 239.png
.pn +1
that he should be confirmed in the hereditary
government of Egypt after the delivery of the fleet
and his complete submission, still the confirmation
was delayed for a considerable time, and the firman
did not arrive at Alexandria until the 20th of
February, and was brought by Said Muhib Effendi,
who was instructed to read the firman[104] in full
divan, and if rejected by the Pacha, he was to
exhort him to receive it. He was also the bearer
of the fez and the nisham of the Vizier, which
Mehemet Ali was to wear on the day the firman was
.bn 240.png
.pn +1
read. He was to inform him, that in consequence
of his advanced age, the Sultan did not require him
to go to Constantinople to receive his investiture,
but that one of his sons was expected to thank the
Sultan in person for the signal favour conferred on
his father. He was further instructed, in the event
of Mehemet Ali’s remonstrating against any part of
the firman, to send back the steamboat for further
orders; but in the event of the Pacha’s rejecting
the firman, he was to demand that the rejection
should be in writing.
.fn 103
.ce
The Grand Vizier to Mazloum Bey.
.rj
19 Zilkadé, 1256. (12 January, 1841.)
In the letter which I wrote and sent by your Excellency
to his Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha, there is nothing clear or
precise relative to the hereditary succession to the Government
of Egypt. It is said, in general terms, that he shall be reinstated
in the Government of Egypt. It is then probable, it is
to be presumed, that his Highness will conceive suspicions in
this respect; and it is for this reason that it has been judged
necessary to give the following explanations upon this point.
As the letter which Mehemet Ali Pacha sent to me, and by
which he offered his submission to His Imperial Majesty, commenced
by making mention of the Convention which had been
concluded between him and Commodore Napier, and as the
Sublime Porte had not accepted that Convention, which it
regarded as null and of no effect, it was thought that if I had
spoken in my letter of the hereditary succession, it would have
been, in substance, to recognise the Convention, and that is the
reason why it was omitted to speak of it.
Nevertheless, His Imperial Majesty, whose goodness and
favours are shed over his servants truly submissive, entertaining
with regard to Mehemet Ali Pacha the benevolent intentions
which are in unison with the sentiments of moderation by
which the High Allied Powers are animated, it is certain that
as soon as he shall have proved by facts, as has been declared
in my letter, the submission which he has offered, by immediately
restoring the Ottoman fleet, and by making over, without
delay, to the Commissioners of the Sublime Porte, the
countries which are known to be in question, and which are
situated out of Egypt, His Highness will be pleased to reinstate
him in the government of Egypt, with right of hereditary
succession.
The requisite conditions laid down by the Treaty of Alliance,
and other points connected with those conditions, are
about to be settled; and as all this will be arranged at the
same time that the investiture of the hereditary succession
shall take place, I abstain for the moment from entering into
details upon this subject.
However, it is important that His Highness should know
in a few words what is doing, and that he should be apprized
beforehand, that if a single one of the conditions which shall
have been laid down, is not observed, the hereditary succession
will be abolished.
You will therefore formally ratify to Mehemet Ali, on the
part of His Imperial Majesty, in case that, in conformity with
what has been said above, his submission shall be a fact, the
conditional hereditary succession aforesaid. And in order altogether
to dispel the doubts which he might have in this respect,
and to inspire him with entire confidence, you will even allow
him, if necessary, to see my present official despatch.
Such are the orders of the Sultan, in conformity with
which you will be careful to act, and it is for this purpose that
I write to you the present despatch.
.fn-
.fn 104
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 242.
.fn-
The day after the arrival of the firman, Mehemet
.bn 241.png
.pn +1
Ali visited the Liverpool steamer, and from thence
invited me on board the Egyptian Admiral’s ship.
The old man appeared in low spirits, but nevertheless,
he seemed proud of pointing out the cleanliness
and order that reigned in every part of his ship.
On entering the cabin, the whole of the guns were
fired at once, and the rest of the squadron followed
the example of the flag-ship. He conducted me
through every part of this magnificent vessel, and
it was quite impossible to conceive any ship better
fitted in every respect. After the inspection the
drums beat to quarters, and in less than three
minutes she was ready for action. The men were
well trained, and the guns exercised with great
alacrity, though not quite in the style of the Excellent.
The magazine was opened, the powder-boxes
handed up, the rigging stoppered, fire-engines and
buckets at hand, and large tubs full of water were
placed along both the lower and main deck in great
abundance. After the gun exercise, a party were
paraded with their cutlasses and muskets, and it was
altogether surprising to see how well the poor Arabs
went through their exercises. The yards were then
manned; but in this part of their man[oe]uvres they
were not quite so expert.
.bn 242.png
.pn +1
After the exercises were over, we retired into
the cabin, and I ventured to ask if he was satisfied
with the news from Constantinople, at which he
shook his head, and expressed a desire to see me in
his palace. On arriving there he begged me to sit
beside him on the divan, pipes and coffee were
called for as usual, and through the medium of his
interpreter, he communicated the substance of the
firman[105], which he also gave me in writing; it is as
follows:—
.fn 105
The firmans are given at length, as are also the instructions
of the Turkish Envoy, and the official notifications connected
with the affair, in the Levant Papers, Part III., pp.
241-254.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
“Egypt within its ancient limits is granted to
you and to your male descendants on the following
conditions:
“1st. When there shall be a decease of the
incumbent, the Porte shall select among his heirs
the person who shall best suit it, who will be summoned
to Constantinople to receive the investiture.
The present concession does not involve any precedence
over the other Viziers, and the Governor in
whose favour it is made shall, as regards the title
and the other prerogatives, only enjoy the advantages
which are assigned to him.
“2nd. The Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, and the
.bn 243.png
.pn +1
other fundamental laws of the empire, as likewise
the treaties present or future with foreign Powers,
shall be executed in Egypt.
“3rd. All the duties and all the revenues of
Egypt shall be collected in the name of the Sultan;
and as the Egyptians form a portion of the subjects
of the Grand Signior, the rules adopted in the rest
of the empire for the collection of the taxes shall be
observed in Egypt. In order that the Sultan may
be well assured that the people are not over-taxed, a
fourth part of the gross revenue arising either from
customs-duties, tenths, or all other duties, shall
appertain to the Sultan, and be in the place of
tribute; the other three-fourths shall be applied to
the liquidation of the charges of collection and of
the expenses concerning the internal administration,
the maintenance of the troops, the household of
the Viceroy, and the contributions in kind allotted
every year to the Holy Cities. The preceding
arrangements shall take effect from the first day
of the year 1257 (the present time), and be carried
into execution for five years, at the expiration
of which term, provision will be made according
to the circumstances and condition of Egypt. In
order that the duties may not be levied arbitrarily,
and in a manner prejudicial to the people,
the Sultan, having undertaken to watch over the
interests of his subjects, considers that the presence
of a comptroller of finance is necessary
in Egypt: you will conform yourself to the order
.bn 244.png
.pn +1
which shall hereafter be sent to you on this
subject.
“4th. Measures are about to be taken at Constantinople
in order that the money may be coined
of the same die, as likewise of the denomination and
weight corresponding with its value; the money
coined in Egypt in the name of the Sultan must be
so at the rate adopted.
“5th. During peace, Egypt can be protected by
18,000 soldiers; this number shall not be exceeded;
and as the land and sea forces of Egypt are at the
disposal of the empire, the Porte, in case of war,
will fix the augmentation which it is requisite to
give to them. In the other parts of the empire, the
soldier, after a service of five years, is free; this rule
shall be enforced in Egypt. Consequently, there
shall be chosen from the existing army, and according
to the periods of service, 20,000 men, of whom
18,000 shall serve in Egypt, and 2000 shall be sent
to Constantinople. Every year a ballot shall be
had, in conformity with the rules of equity, and in
proportion to the population of each district, for the
levy of 4000 men, of whom 3600 shall be incorporated
into the troops of Egypt, and 400 shall be
sent to Constantinople, the whole to replace those
who are discharged. The soldiers liberated from
service shall not be re-enlisted. It is possible that
as regards the material, the troops cannot be clad in
Egypt as they are at Constantinople, but as regards
the shape of the clothing, the badges, and the
.bn 245.png
.pn +1
standards, they shall be wholly alike. The same is
the case with regard to the naval forces.
“6th. The Viceroy of Egypt cannot confer ranks
except up to that of Solkal-Aghassi (adjutant-major);
as regards the superior ranks, they must be applied
for to the Sublime Porte.
“New ships of war shall not be built without the
permission of the Porte.
“The continuance of the hereditary succession
being subject to the execution of each of these
fundamental dispositions, in case of non-execution,
the concession of hereditary succession will be
revoked.”
.pm end_quote
Another firman conferred upon the Pacha the
government (not hereditary) of the provinces of
Nubia, Darfour, Kordofan, and Sennaar. This
firman forbids the incursion of the troops into these
provinces, who had been permitted to seize the
inhabitants, male and female, and retain them as
slaves in lieu of pay. He was also prohibited from
reducing the slaves to the state of eunuchs, a common
practice in Egypt.
The Pacha pointed out to me how impossible
it was to comply with the firman relative to the
hereditary title. That in the first place, with
respect to the Porte choosing his successor from
.bn 246.png
.pn +1
any of his family, that it was a blow directed
against Ibrahim Pacha, which was both unjust and
impolitic. That he was his eldest son, and well
worthy of succeeding him; besides which, even if he
consented to such a condition, it was by no means
clear that Ibrahim would, and even if he did, it would
sow the seeds of dissension in his family. That as
to the appointment of his officers, it had always
been the practice to allow the Pacha of Egypt to
appoint them up to the rank of General, and that the
proposed restrictions would dissatisfy the army, and
probably cause a mutiny. The 3rd Article, stipulating
that he was to pay a fourth of the revenue of
Egypt to the Porte, appeared to him oppressive to
Egypt. He asked my advice how to act in his
present position. This was a delicate question; I
had no instructions from home, nor from the
Admiral, who was at Malta, and no communication
of any description from Lord Ponsonby, and simply
a letter from Colonel Hodges, stating the fact of
the firmans having been sent, and his opinion
that the conditions would not be accepted by the
Pacha.
The reasons the Pacha gave for rejecting parts of
the firman were so just and so strong, that I did not
.bn 247.png
.pn +1
hesitate to express my opinion that they ought not
to be accepted, and I advised him to write to the
Porte, and respectfully point out the impossibility
of his accepting such terms.
I knew in doing this I was taking a good deal of
responsibility on myself, as it was probable these
terms had been suggested to the Porte by some of
the Ambassadors, if not by all; but, being on the
spot, and seeing that should Ibrahim, who was at
the head of a large army, resist, and be supported in
his resistance by the officers of the army, which was
pretty certain, the whole country would be thrown
into confusion, I knew I should incur censure for
not taking upon myself the responsibility of advising
the Pacha to adopt what I thought was the
safest course. Had the British and the other Consuls
been at Alexandria, I should have left it entirely
to them.
The following is my letter to Lord Palmerston,
relating the whole occurrence:—
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“My Lord,'\
'“Stromboli, Alexandria,'\
' Feb. 23, 1841.'
“I have the honour of inclosing the translation
of the Hatti Scherif, which was brought here by the
Turkish Commissioner on the 21st.
.bn 248.png
.pn +1
“The Pacha has accepted the 2nd, 4th, and 5th
Articles, and the part of the 6th which regards the
construction of men of war; he begs the Sublime
Porte to modify Article 3 as being oppressive to
Egypt.
“The first article he considers quite inadmissable,
as it would not be acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha,
would cause discord in his family, and a civil war at
his death. He also objects to the part of Article 6
which relates to the appointment of officers; hitherto
they have all been appointed by him, with the
exception of General of Division, and a sudden
deviation from that system would disorganize the
army, and bring his authority into contempt.
“The Pacha has repeatedly consulted me on this
subject; and it is a most delicate situation to be
placed in, as I cannot know what instructions your
Lordship may have given to Lord Ponsonby; but
judging of the intentions of the Allies from the
Treaty of the 15th July, I cannot think it was contemplated
by the Allies to attach such a condition
to the hereditary title, and I did not hesitate to tell
His Highness as much. It is true I might have
preserved silence; but placed as the Pacha at present
is, he is sure of turning to some one for advice, and
that person would have been the French Consul-General,
out of whose hands I have kept him since
my arrival here; in fact, he looks up to England for
protection and advice, and I believe I am the only
person he consults.
.bn 249.png
.pn +1
“There is a separate firman giving him the
pachalic of Nubia for life, with the condition that
the chase should be suppressed, and no more
eunuchs made. This he has no objection to; and
he regrets the Sublime Porte has not taken the
initiative and abolished slavery. I have urged him
strongly to do this at once; but he says it is surrounded
with so many difficulties, that the people’s
minds must be prepared before he can venture on
such a measure.
“Mr. Larking goes home in the Liverpool in
bad health; and he will explain to your Lordship
the position of this country, and the anxiety of
the Pacha for the friendship of England. The
Consuls are not yet arrived from Constantinople,
which is to be regretted. I don’t know that I
have any right to stay now my mission is finished.
Syria is entirely evacuated, and many lives have
been lost in consequence of the rejection of the
Convention, and the menacing attitude of the
Turks, which obliged Ibrahim Pacha to go round
the Dead Sea, instead of marching straight on
Gaza.
“After the honourable manner the Pacha has
behaved about the fleet, it is to be regretted the
Porte should have pressed him so hard, particularly
as I do not see how they can enforce their demands,
and I do not apprehend the Allies will risk another
armament to enforce them.
“The Scheiks and Emirs are arrived at Cairo;
.bn 250.png
.pn +1
and they will be sent to Syria immediately on their
arrival here.
“February 24. I saw the Pacha last night; he
had a very long conversation with the Turkish
Minister, who seems to be aware of the impossibility
of imposing such terms on the Pacha, and he has
sent his steamer to Constantinople for fresh instructions.
I do hope they will be more reasonable at
Constantinople. I do not think it would have
been possible to have concocted a better plan to
throw discord and confusion into a country, than
the terms they have proposed to him. Egypt is
making rapid strides to improvement, and is now
beginning to feel the advantages of Mehemet Ali’s
system. He is, it is true, an Oriental, and has many
mistaken notions; but he must be treated with kindness
and consideration.
“A good many Syrians have come into Egypt
with the Egyptian army. I have demanded their
immediate release; and for the first time, had rather
a warm discussion with him on the subject. He
promises to send them to their homes; but not till
he hears from Constantinople. I regret this, because
it will furnish his enemies with weapons against him;
but I cannot wonder at his being irritated, because
he has not been treated well. He behaved so
honourably about the fleet, that he deserved some
consideration. Imposing such a heavy tribute on
him, will have either the effect of stopping improvement
in Egypt, or if he goes on with his public
.bn 251.png
.pn +1
works, he will have to oppress the people, and he
was on the point of reducing the poll-tax, when the
Hatti Scherif arrived.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Charles Napier.'
.pm address '“To Viscount Palmerston.'
“P.S. I have this moment received a letter from
Boghos Bey, promising the release of the Syrian
troops.”
.pm end_quote
My last interview with the Pacha was not of
a very pleasant nature; for the first time, he neither
offered me a pipe, nor took one himself, and was
in very ill humour. I pressed him hard about the
Syrians, which he evaded; and I told him I should
speak to him no more on the subject, but should
address an official letter to Boghos Bey; this I did,
and he answered, promising their immediate release.
Next morning the Pacha set out for Cairo to see
Ibrahim, who, for some reason or other, had declined
coming to Alexandria. Seeing that I could be of
no further use here, I made up my mind to proceed
to join the Powerful in Marmorice Bay, and accordingly
paid a parting visit to Boghos Bey. The
old man was very civil, and informed me he had
orders to present me with a snuff-box set in brilliants.
.bn 252.png
.pn +1
Boghos Bey had before pressed me to
receive a large present as a souvenir from the Pacha,
which I declined, as being contrary to our rules and
regulations; but in this instance he pressed the box,
saying it was an Eastern custom, and the grand
souvenir should be given at a later period. I replied
that I should have had no objection to have taken
a small keepsake of little value from the Pacha; but
that in my last interview, I did not think he had
behaved well, and evaded giving me any answer
about the Syrian troops, in which I thought he had
not kept his word. I added that he might rely
upon it the British Government would insist on the
performance of his promise.
I then took leave of Boghos Bey, left Alexandria
on the 1st of March, and arrived at Marmorice Bay
on the 3rd. I there found orders to proceed to
Malta, where I arrived on the 22nd, and was placed
in quarantine. The day after my arrival I received
a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, which left
me in doubt whether the Government had repented
their approval of my Convention or not. The letter
and answer I insert, together with the Admiral’s
further reply:—
.bn 253.png
.pn +1
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“Princess Charlotte, Malta,'\
' March 15, 1841.'
“I am desired by the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty to acquaint you, that whatever may
have been the political considerations which induced
Her Majesty’s Government to sanction a Convention
entered into under the circumstances in which
you felt yourself placed, their Lordships fully concur
in my opinion of the injury and inconvenience to
which Her Majesty’s service may be exposed by a
junior officer taking upon himself such a responsibility,
which can only be justified by the event as
in the present instance.
.pm signature2\
' “I am, &c.,'\
'“Robert Stopford, Admiral.'
.pm address2\
'“Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,'\
' H.M.S. Powerful.”'
.pm end_quote
.tb
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
' “H.M.S. Powerful,'\
'Malta, March 28, 1841.'
“Had I not received a letter from the Admiralty
direct, together with private ones from Lords Minto
and Palmerston, approving of the Convention I
entered into with Mehemet Ali, which Convention
was based on the Treaty of the 15th of July, and
approved of by the great Powers of Europe, who
are now carrying it out, I should have considered
your letter of the 15th of March, communicating
their Lordships’ opinion, as intended to convey a
sort of censure.
.bn 254.png
.pn +1
“I am quite aware, when an officer takes upon
himself the responsibility I did, there must be strong
reasons to justify him; I took the same responsibility
at Sidon and Boharsof, and had I been defeated
I incurred the same risk of censure, and I
trust, as long as I can benefit my country by incurring
, I shall always possess strength of
mind to do it.
“I take this opportunity of observing how much
I regret that you should have found it necessary, in
disapproving of my Convention, to have expressed
yourself in such harsh terms of me to Mehemet Ali,
which placed me in a most unpleasant situation at
Alexandria.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,\
'“Chas. Napier, Commodore.
.pm address2\
'“To Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford,'\
' G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Malta.”'
.pm end_quote
.tb
.pm start_quote
.pm heading3\
'“Sir,'\
'“Princess Charlotte, at Malta,'\
' March 23, 1841.'
“I do not intend into the political merits
of your Convention with Mehemet Ali, which has
been subsequently sanctioned by Her Majesty’s
Government, but as Commander-in-Chief upon this
station I think I should have signally failed in my
duty if I had not represented to the Admiralty any
act of an officer under my command which I considered
to be contrary to the rules and customs of
the naval service.
.bn 255.png
.pn +1
“I am not aware of any harsh expression towards
your proceedings, in my letter to Mehemet Ali,
as I consider the words ‘hasty and unauthorized’
perfectly justifiable under the circumstances of the
case, and which accounted for my refusing to ratify
the Convention.
.pm signature2\
' “I am, &c.,'\
'“Robert Stopford, Admiral.'
.pm address2\
'“Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,'\
' H.M.S. Powerful.”'
.pm end_quote
On the 31st of the same month, having obtained
a month’s leave of absence, I hauled down my broad
pennant, and proceeded to England in the Oriental
steamer, and arrived at Liverpool in the middle of
April.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 256.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XIX.
.pm start_summary
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London—Protocol of the
5th March—Note of Chekib Effendi—Note of the 13th of
March—Lord Palmerston’s explanation of the Views of the
Allies regarding the Hereditary Tenure—Conference of the
16th March—Protocol—Endeavour to include France in a
Convention for closing the Straits of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus—False Position of the Porte—Views of Lord
Ponsonby and of the other Ambassadors—Instructions of
the Austrian and British Governments—Opinions of M.
Guizot—Turkish Plan of Settlement—Note of the 10th May.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
When Lord Palmerston heard from Sir Robert
Stopford that the Turkish fleet had arrived at Marmorice
Bay, and that Ibrahim Pacha had reached
Gaza, he immediately assembled the Foreign Ministers,
and, on the 5th of March, they agreed to a
Protocol to the following effect[106]:—
.fn 106
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 235.
.fn-
1. That Mehemet Ali had submitted, and asked
for pardon.
2. That he had delivered the Ottoman fleet to
the Commissioners.
3, 4. That he had evacuated Syria; and that the
Turkish authority was established there and in
Candia.
.bn 257.png
.pn +1
5. That the Sultan had accepted the submission,
and pardoned Mehemet Ali, his children, and adherents.
6. That the Sultan had announced his intention of
reinstating Mehemet Ali with hereditary succession.
The conditions settled on the 15th of October
and 14th November[107], being thus fulfilled, the assembled
Ministers determined that the Consuls of
the Four Powers should now return to Alexandria.
.fn 107
See Vol. I., p. #vol1_249#; Vol. II., p. #15#.
.fn-
On the 11th of March, Chekib Effendi, the
Ottoman Minister, communicated to Lord Palmerston[108]
that the Porte had restored Mehemet Ali, and
forwarded him the firmans I have already mentioned,
and requested his Lordship to communicate them to
the other Ambassadors in London, and he desired
an answer to the official communication; whereupon
Lord Palmerston again assembled the Foreign Ministers
on the 13th of March[109], and they drew up a
Collective Note, expressing their lively satisfaction
at the event, and communicating to the Ottoman
Minister that they had heard from Alexandria, under
date of the 24th of February, that Mehemet Ali
had admitted, without reserve, that the treaties and
.bn 258.png
.pn +1
laws of the empire should apply to Egypt in the
same way as to the other provinces of the empire.
That he had acceded to the regulation of the monetary
system, the service and uniform of the troops,
and the building of the ships. That he had replaced
under the orders of the Sultan, the land and sea
forces, and, in fact, that at the present moment he
had put himself in the situation of a subject, and
that it appertains to the Sultan alone to settle the
internal administration, and take into consideration
the wishes which Mehemet Ali has submitted to
the Sultan. The Ministers finish the Note by
stating, “The Undersigned are fully assured that
these explanations, conceived in a sincere spirit of
conciliation, would be received by the Sultan in the
same manner in which he has constantly received
the advice already given by his Allies,—advice disinterested
and sincere, which His Highness has
justly appreciated, when he accomplished, by an
act of clemency, a work of pacification which his
Allies had frankly aided him in effecting.”
.fn 108
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 241.
.fn-
.fn 109
Ibid., p. 263.
.fn-
Lord Palmerston wrote at the same time to
Lord Ponsonby[110], transmitting the Note of the
Plenipotentiaries, and remarking that doubts might
.bn 259.png
.pn +1
arise out of the wording of the first Article of the
Hatti-Sheriff, which specifies the conditions to be
imposed upon Mehemet Ali. “The wording of that
Article might lead to the supposition, that the
Sultan intended to reserve to himself to choose
upon each vacancy in the pachalic of Egypt, any
one of the descendants of Mehemet Ali, without
regard to any fixed rule whatever; and that thus
the principle of hereditary tenure would be rendered
illusory.
.fn 110
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 326.
.fn-
“Her Majesty’s Government conceive, that this
was by no means the intention of the Porte, and
that what was meant to be established by the
condition above-mentioned is, that while, on the
one hand, the Sultan grants to the descendants of
Mehemet Ali in the direct male line hereditary
succession in the pachalic of Egypt, the Sultan
reserves his own sovereign rights intact, by declaring,
that those descendants shall not succeed as
a matter of course and of inherent right, as would
be the case with the rulers of an independent state,
but shall each in turn receive his appointment
from the Sultan, and by a separate act of the
Sultan’s sovereign power.
“If this is a correct view of the meaning of the
.bn 260.png
.pn +1
Article in question, there can be no difficulty on the
part of the Porte in giving such an explanation
thereof as will remove all misunderstandings; and
the Porte might say, that is the intention of the
Sultan that this right of selection shall in all cases
he exercised in favour of the next male heir to the
deceased Pacha, unless, by infancy or by physical
incapacity, such male heir should be incapable of
taking charge of the administration of the province,
in which case the person next in relationship to the
deceased Pacha would be appointed in his stead.
The Sultan might, at the same time, make it to be
clearly understood, that it is his intention that Ibrahim
shall succeed to Mehemet.”
Lord Palmerston was also of opinion that it
would not be difficult to settle the affair of the
tribute, and that the Allies had purposely abstained
from entering into the question; and that relative
to the appointment of the officers, could be easily
arranged.
On the 16th of March the Allied Ministers in
another conference[111] conceiving the Eastern Question
settled, engaged the French Government to
rejoin the European family, and they initialed a
.bn 261.png
.pn +1
Convention recognising the right of the Porte to
shut the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus
against ships of war of all nations. The Protocol
was as follows:—
.fn 111
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 321.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
“The difficulties in which His Highness the
Sultan was placed, and which decided him to apply
for the support and the assistance of the Courts of
Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, being
now removed, and Mehemet Ali having made towards
His Highness the Sultan the act of submission
which the Convention of the 15th of July was
designed to bring about, the Representatives of
the Courts, parties to the said Convention, have
considered that, independently of the execution of
the temporary measures resulting from that Convention,
it is of essential importance to record in the
most formal manner, the respect which is due to the
ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of
which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of
war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the
Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.
“This principle being from its nature one of
general and permanent application, the respective
Plenipotentiaries, provided with the orders of their
Courts to this effect, have been of opinion that, in
order to manifest the agreement and union which
regulate the intentions of all the Courts in what
concerns the maintenance of the peace of Europe,
it would be proper to record the respect which is
.bn 262.png
.pn +1
due to the above-mentioned principle, by means of
an arrangement in which France should be invited
to concur, at the invitation, and agreeably to the
wish, of the Sultan.
“This arrangement being calculated to afford to
Europe a pledge of the union of the Five Powers,
Her Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, agreeably to an understanding
with the Plenipotentiaries of the Four
Powers, undertook to bring this matter to the
knowledge of the French Government, requesting
it to take part in an arrangement by which, on the
one hand, the Sultan should declare his firm resolution
to maintain for the future the above-mentioned
principle; the Five Powers, on the other hand,
should announce their unanimous determination to
respect that principle and to conform themselves
thereto.
.ta r:50 l:5
“(Initialed) | E. N.
| P.
| B.
| B.
| C.
.ta-
.pm end_quote
On the 6th of March Mehemet Ali’s and Said
Muhib Effendi’s letters to the Vizier arrived at
Constantinople[112]. Mehemet Ali’s, in respectful
terms, and with great clearness, pointed out the
.bn 263.png
.pn +1
impossibility of his consenting to the first, third,
and part of the sixth articles of the Firman; the
other articles he cheerfully acceded to. The Commissioner
makes a long report of the arguments he
used to induce Mehemet Ali to consent, and the
very clever way he evaded them; and it must be admitted
the old Pacha had the best of the argument.
.fn 112
See these documents in the Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 341, 353.
.fn-
The Porte, as might have been expected, was
now in a false position; France had so far joined
the Allies as to initial the Treaty for shutting the
Dardanelles, but it was not likely she would now
attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali or even advise him
to yield; and under this embarrassment Rechid
Pacha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to
the Ministers for advice. Lord Ponsonby did not
hesitate to entirely agree with Rechid Pacha that
the application of Mehemet Ali to change some
of the articles of the Firman was no proof of
submission[113]. The Firman, says the Ambassador,
is an order, and no subject can refuse to obey an
order and be considered submissive; he does not
admit that he petitioned for a change, but he
asserts that he disobeys. I cannot read Mehemet
Ali’s letter in that sense. After giving his reasons
.bn 264.png
.pn +1
why the hereditary succession should go by right
of primogeniture, which appear to me convincing,
he states, “It is evident, moreover, that his Highness,
moved by sentiments of clemency, desires the
maintenance of repose and tranquillity, and it is for
that reason that I request that the question of the
hereditary succession may be settled as has been
stated above.” Surely this may be considered petitioning,
and in a moderate way too, when we
recollect that Mehemet Ali knew full well that the
Porte had no means of enforcing these orders.
.fn 113
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 371.
.fn-
What the Ambassador says of the preparations
Mehemet Ali was making for resistance is incorrect.
I was at Alexandria at the time, and I saw
no new preparations; there were a few men completing
his unfinished works, which were so ill
constructed that if not attended to they would have
crumbled to pieces. He was certainly reorganizing
his army, after the retreat, which was absolutely
necessary; but even had he been preparing for
resistance could he be blamed? The Firman that
was sent to him was so perfectly absurd that no
man in his senses, with an army of 50,000 or 60,000
man, and upwards of 10,000 cavalry, would have
accepted such terms from a weak master; and no
.bn 265.png
.pn +1
set of men, possessed of common understanding,
and knowing the relative position of the Porte and
Mehemet Ali, would have counselled such a Firman.
The Ambassador finishes by recommending the
Porte to do nothing till they have heard from Great
Britain.
Baron Stürmer was a wiser man, and he recommended
the Porte to seek some means of acceding
to the entreaties of Mehemet Ali without compromising
the dignity of the Sultan[114]. Baron Königsmark
and M. Titow declined giving an opinion till
they received further instructions[115].
.fn 114
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 372.
.fn-
.fn 115
Ibid., p. 374.
.fn-
On the 29th of March Rechid Pacha and
Ahmed Fethi Pachi were displaced, and succeeded
by Rifat Bey, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Tahir Pacha, as Capudan Pacha.
On the 31st March Prince Metternich, seeing no
end to this question, instructed Baron Stürmer to
inform the Divan, that if they did not adopt the modifications
to the Firman recommended by the Conference
of London, the Emperor of Austria would withdraw
altogether from the alliance. Prince Metternich
writes most strongly; he observes, “The contents
.bn 266.png
.pn +1
of your despatch of the 17th of March attract our
most serious attention, because they prove the
existence of a position without precedent in the
annals of diplomacy. What, for example, has been
the result of the very precise instructions of the
30th of January? What attention have the Divan,
and the agents of the Four Courts, paid to the
opinion expressed in that document? On the one
hand we see the Porte undecided as to the course
which it will have to take on the subject of the
representations of Mehemet Ali against certain
articles of the Firman; and on the other, the Representatives
of the Four Powers ignorant how to
counsel from the very clear words of the Collective
Note above mentioned; in truth, M. le Baron, it
is impossible to make it out.” This is pretty strong
language, which he follows up by saying, “The
instructions I sent you on the 26th of March have
replied, by anticipation, to your scruples, and I
flatter myself you will have considered those instructions
as anticipating the orders which each of
you have applied for, and not have hesitated to offer
the advice they contain.
“Nevertheless, as in the course of this affair we
have already been exposed to see ourselves deceived
.bn 267.png
.pn +1
in our expectations, I now direct you to invite
your colleagues to a conference, and acquaint them
that the Emperor enjoins you to insist on the Divan
admitting the modifications which the other Courts
desire, for the interest even of the Porte, to see
introduced into certain articles of the Firman. And
should your colleagues decline doing so, you are to
take the step prescribed, either alone or with those
who will join you; and should the Porte refuse to
listen, the Emperor will consider himself as restored
to entire liberty of position and action[116].”
.fn 116
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 378.
.fn-
Lord Palmerston writes under date of the 10th
of April[117]; that he conceives his former despatches
and the Collective Notes are sufficient to guide Lord
Ponsonby in the advice he shall give, and that it
is important the dispute between the Porte and
Mehemet Ali should be settled as soon as possible,
and that the Government do not think the objection
stated by the Ambassador, “that it would not be
proper for the Sultan to negotiate with Mehemet
Ali,” ought to weigh against the extreme urgency
of coming to a final settlement, and that no settlement
can be made without a direct communication.
.bn 268.png
.pn +1
“On some points,” his Lordship adds, “Mehemet
Ali has reason on his side, in others he is
clearly and decidedly wrong.” The Sultan ought,
therefore, without delay, to modify the Firman in
the objectionable parts, and explain that other parts
cannot be altered without a departure from the
terms of the Treaty of the 15th of July.
.fn 117
Ibid., p. 364.
.fn-
Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby more
peremptorily on the 21st of April, inclosing a copy
of Prince Metternich’s letter to Baron Stürmer, and
acquainting his Lordship that Her Majesty’s Government
concur in the view taken of the matter
by the Austrian Government, and are prepared to
take the same course[118].
.fn 118
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 385.
.fn-
M. Guizot in a conversation with Mr. Bulwer at
Paris, took the same view of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th
articles of the Firman I had done, and admitted he
disapproved of some of Mehemet Ali’s pretensions,
and had taken care to tell him so; and that the only
way to settle the dispute was by the Allies pressing
the Porte on one side, and France pressing Mehemet
Ali on the other[119].
.fn 119
Ibid., p. 382.
.fn-
On the 27th of April, Chekib Effendi, the
.bn 269.png
.pn +1
Ottoman Minister in London, submitted to Lord
Palmerston a new plan[121], which was little better than
the first: the Porte offered to confer the Government
of Egypt, after the death of Mehemet Ali, either on
Ibrahim Pacha or any other son that Mehemet Ali
might select, on condition that afterwards, the right
of selection should devolve on the Porte; if that was
not approved of, it was proposed that one of his
descendants should be chosen by the members of
his family and by the chief people of the country,
and proposed to the Sublime Porte, which choice
should be confirmed, and the person nominated
by the Sultan; the other articles remained the
same. Who could have put this wild scheme into
the heads of the Divan, it is not easy to conceive;
this plan would certainly have settled the succession
on Ibrahim Pacha, but on failure it would have
given rise to intrigues without measure, and also
have put the dignity of the Porte in a worse position
than at once fixing the hereditary succession in
the family of Mehemet Ali as he wished. The
Plenipotentiaries met in London on the 10th of May,
and very adroitly passed over the new proposition
of Chekib, and repeated their opinion that the
.bn 270.png
.pn +1
succession should go in the right line, from father
to son. As to the tribute, they recommended that
it should be fixed at a stated sum, subject to revision
at certain periods, and they conceived that the
difficulty which had arisen relative to promotion,
could only be considered as of secondary importance.
They finish by saying that they persist in their views
communicated to the Porte in the Collective Notes
of the 30th of January, 13th of March, and by the
Protocol of the 5th of March[120], and that they look
upon the submission formally made by Mehemet Ali
as absolute, and in consequence the Turco-Egyptian
question terminated[122].
.fn 120
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 389.
.fn-
.fn 121
See pages #171#, #244#, #245#.
.fn-
.fn 122
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 404.
.fn-
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 271.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XX.
.pm start_summary
Colonel Napier’s Account of his Missions to Egypt—Seizure
of the Maronite and Druse Emirs and Sheikhs—Their Condition
in Egypt—Their Return to Syria—False Assertions
of the French—Mission for the Liberation of the Syrian
Soldiers—Difficulty of ascertaining their Number—Bad
Faith of the Pacha—Infamous Proposal of a Turkish Officer—Sudden
termination of the Negotiation—Suspicious
conduct of the Egyptians—Liberation of the Syrians.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
I have already mentioned that on my way down
the river from Cairo, in February, 1841, I met
Colonel Napier. He had been dispatched from
Syria by Colonel Bridgeman, with orders to bring
back the Scheiks and Emirs for whose restoration
to liberty I had stipulated in my correspondence
with Boghos Bey[123]. The Colonel’s own account of
this mission, and of a subsequent one in which he
was employed by the Foreign Office to procure the
release of the Syrian troops carried into Egypt, is
as follows:—
.fn 123
See Vol. I., pp. #vol1_254#-278.
.fn-
.pm start_quote
“Shortly before the allied forces landed in Syria,
several of the most influential Maronite and Druse
chieftains[124] of Mount Lebanon being seized by
.bn 272.png
.pn +1
Ibrahim Pacha, were, together with a great number
of their servants and dependants, embarked on
board an Egyptian vessel at Acre. On arriving at
Alexandria, these unfortunate people, after being
loaded with chains, and subjected to every species
of indignity, were sent up the Nile to the remote
regions of Sennaar, there to work at the Pacha’s
recently discovered gold mines.
.fn 124
“Maronite Emirs or Princes.—1. Emir Hyder of Solymah.
2. Emir Faoul Shehab. 3. Emir Faris Shehab. 4. Emir
Youssouf Shehab. 5. Emir Mahmoud Shehab. 6. Emir Abdallah
Umrad. 7. Emir Ali Kaid Bey. 8. Emir Ali Faris.
“Druse Scheiks or Chieftains.—9. Scheik Hamoud Naked.
10. Scheik Kassim. 11. Scheik Abbas. 12. Scheik Nickul el
Cassim (a Christian).
“And about sixty followers.”
.fn-
“One of Commodore Napier’s stipulations with
Boghos Bey being the emancipation of these mountain
chiefs[125], after the evacuation of Syria by the
Egyptians I was sent by Colonel Bridgeman, then
in command of the British troops, to accompany
these Emirs and Scheiks back to their own country.
.fn 125
See the correspondence on this subject in Vol. I., pp. #vol1_254#,
#vol1_258#, et seq.
.fn-
“On my arrival in Egypt, in February, 1841, I
immediately proceeded on the purport of my mission,
and ascended the Nile in quest of my charge.
Mehemet Ali, I learnt, had already sent orders for
their liberation, and I met them all at Cairo on their
way to Alexandria. Finding them here in the most
complete state of destitution, clothed in rags, without
money, and in want of the common necessaries of
life, I made several representations on the subject
.bn 273.png
.pn +1
to the authorities, which were, however, disregarded;
and it was only through the active mediation of that
gallant old soldier Souliman Pacha (who had just
returned across the Desert) and on his and my repeated
applications, that daily rations were at last
served out to these unfortunate people.
“After numerous vexatious delays, the order for
them to proceed to Alexandria at length arrived; a
fine Egyptian corvette was placed at my disposal for
their conveyance, and about the middle of March,
1841, I had the satisfaction of landing them, (with
one exception[126],) in safety at Beyrout, where they
were received with the greatest enthusiasm.
.fn 126
“The Emir Youssouf, the son of the Emir Solyman
Shehab, of El Haded, who died of fever in Upper Egypt.”
.fn-
“Although the return of these Emirs and
Scheiks may entirely be attributed to Commodore
Napier, the French merchants and priests in Beyrout
and Lebanon had the assurance to arrogate to
themselves the merit of the act, and widely spread
this report in the mountains, which assertion, however,
I as flatly contradicted, and completely succeeded
in disproving this false and barefaced assertion.
Shortly after this I rejoined my regiment at
Gibraltar.
“The Commodore, in thinking of his mountain
friends, had not neglected the interests of the unfortunate
Syrian soldiers, who, having been pressed
into the Egyptian service, were, on the evacuation
of Syria, unwillingly dragged after Ibrahim Pacha to
.bn 274.png
.pn +1
the ‘Land of Bondage.’ The Commodore’s stipulation
with Boghos Bey on the subject was, ‘that
as soon as the evacuation of Syria should be effected,
the whole of these men should be immediately sent
back to their country.’ However, time wore on,
and as Mehemet Ali showed no symptoms of
his promise, the writer was again sent to Egypt by
the Foreign Office, with directions to exact from the
Pacha the accomplishment of his engagement to Sir
Charles Napier as to the Syrian soldiers, and to
accompany those soldiers back to their
Armed with ‘full powers[127],’ I left the Rock on the
.bn 275.png
.pn +1
26th of May, and arriving at Alexandria about a
month later, at once set about the performance of
my task, and this I very soon discovered would be
no easy one.
.fn 127
.ce
Viscount Palmerston to Lieutenant-Colonel Napier.
.pm heading\
'(Extract.)'\
'Foreign Office, May 14, 1841.'
I have to instruct you, immediately on the receipt of this
despatch, to proceed to Alexandria to demand from Mehemet
Ali the release of the Syrian soldiers, whom he promised Sir
Charles Napier to dismiss; and you will accompany those
soldiers back to Syria.
I have applied to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
to provide you with a passage on board the steam-vessel which
conveys the mail from Gibraltar to Malta; and the Admiral at
Malta will be instructed to send you on to Alexandria, and also
to make arrangements for conveying the Syrian soldiers, when
released by Mehemet Ali, from Egypt to the coast of Syria.
You will report your proceedings in execution of this instruction
directly to me, and also to Colonel Bridgeman, or the
officer commanding the British detachments on shore in Syria,
to whose orders you will be subject while employed on this
service; and who will be instructed to direct you to return to
your regiment when the service is completed.
I inclose a despatch to Colonel Hodges, directing him to join
you in demanding from Mehemet Ali the release of these
Syrians; and you will deliver the same to Colonel Hodges, if
he should be at Alexandria, when you arrive there. But you
will not delay making the demand, if Colonel Hodges should
not have arrived.
.fn-
“In the first place, it was difficult to ascertain
the exact number of surviving Syrians of Ibrahim’s
army who had arrived in Egypt, particularly as
every obstacle was industriously thrown in the
way of obtaining such information. The Egyptian
authorities estimated the number of survivors at
so low a figure as 3000; however, from all the
information I was able to collect, I concluded the
sum total to amount to about 10,000 or 12,000;
nor was I much out in this calculation, though the
extremes of heat and cold, the griping hand of
hunger and thirst during the winter retreat over the
plains of the Haouran, and across the sands of the
Desert, to say nothing of the plague which had been
raging in Egypt since their return to the latter
country;—all these circumstances combined,—had
made sad havoc amongst their devoted bands.
“The Pacha at first sheltered himself under the
plea of not being able to take any steps in the matter
until he had received the sanction of the Sultan,
and thus gained a month or six weeks, until a communication
.bn 276.png
.pn +1
was sent and answer returned from Constantinople.
The reply of the Porte arrived in the
shape of a Turkish officer of the rank of ‘Meeralaï,’
(Colonel), who, whatever might be his secret instructions,
came with professed orders for the immediate
liberation of the Syrians. Still no great
alacrity was manifested to comply with these injunctions.
Time passed away; the month of August
arrived, and with it Colonel Barnett, the British
Consul-General, who joined me in urging the fulfilment
of an engagement which the Pacha continued as
perseveringly, to evade. Mustapha Bey, the Turkish
Commissioner, apparently united with us in our
request; but it may not be here irrelevant to remark,
as an instance of what reliance may be placed on
Turkish faith and honour, that this person had the
audacity to propose to me the enlèvement of Mehemet
Ali on the occasion of a proposed visit of the
latter to Her Majesty’s steamer Medea; adding,
that taking the old gentleman captive to Stamboul,
would ensure the fortune of us both! I was strongly
inclined to turn the tables on the fellow, by letting
the Pacha into the secret; but the consequence
would probably have been fatal to the offender, who,
after all, was perhaps no worse than the majority of
Oriental diplomatists.
“How long the negotiation might otherwise have
been protracted is hard to say; but, luckily about
this time, my representations received great additional
weight from the unexpected appearance of a
.bn 277.png
.pn +1
couple of British line-of-battle ships at Alexandria,
the Rodney and Calcutta having received orders to
station themselves off that port. Accordingly, on
the 7th of September, I received a communication
from Boghos Bey, stating that the first detachment
of Syrian soldiers, to the amount of 1100, would
embark in two of the Pacha’s vessels on the following,
and sail the succeeding day, offering me, at the
same time, accommodation on board; which offer,
however, was politely declined.
“Fully relying on the accuracy of this statement,
I was, on the following day (the 8th), not
a little surprised to find that the vessels, with these
troops on board, had gone out of port early on that
morning. I immediately communicated the circumstance
to the Consul-General, and as suspicions were
entertained at the time that the Pacha had,—with the
concurrence of the Porte,—some design of sending
troops to Candia, we concluded that the destination
of the people, who were thus clandestinely smuggled
off, might not be for Syria. Under this impression,
Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, was immediately
communicated with, and he ordered the Egyptian
vessels to be watched by the Calcutta and Medea,
in which latter vessel I embarked.
“But whatever their originally proposed destination
might have been, under this goodly escort, the
first batch of Syrians arrived in safety at Beyrout on
the 14th of September, and being duly handed over
by me to the British and Turkish authorities,—Col.
.bn 278.png
.pn +1
Rose and Selim Pasha,—were shortly afterwards
followed by the remainder of their unfortunate fellow
exiles, to the amount of 10,000, who returned to their
native shores in the most miserable plight, without
pay, many in rags, and the greater part with several
months’ arrears due to them, some even to the extent
of from twenty to twenty-four months!
“So much for the faith, justice, and honour of
His Highness Mehemet Ali Pacha!”
.pm end_quote
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 279.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XXI.
.pm start_summary
Prince Metternich’s Orders to the Internuncio—Lord Ponsonby’s
Correspondence with Baron Stürmer—Hesitation
of the Porte—Message from Lord Ponsonby to Rifat Pacha—The
new Firman granted—Accepted by Mehemet Ali—Termination
of the Eastern Question.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
The peremptory orders of Prince Metternich to
Baron Stürmer, to settle the Egyptian question,
arrived on the 12th of April at Constantinople,
whereupon the Baron wrote to Lord Ponsonby to
inform him that his colleagues of Russia and
Prussia had agreed to hold to the Porte an uniform
language, and requesting to know if he could count
on his Lordship’s concurrence in this instance[128].
.fn 128
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 417.
.fn-
I give his Lordship’s answer in full, that the
reader may judge for himself: it is an exquisite piece
of diplomacy, and judging from it, it would be
extremely difficult to decide whether the Ambassador
had followed his instructions or not.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Therapia, April 14, 1841.'\
'“Monsieur l’Internonce,'
“I had the honour to receive this day at a few
minutes before 4 o’clock your Excellency’s official
.bn 280.png
.pn +1
Note dated the 13th instant, and I reply to it without
a moment’s delay. Your Excellency has communicated
to me a despatch you have received from
Vienna, containing directions for the conduct your
Excellency is to pursue, and your Excellency expresses
your desire that I should act in co-operation
with your Excellency and both our colleagues of
Russia and Prussia, in furtherance of the measure
you are directed to adopt. If I am not in error,
the measure you are to take, is to make known to
the Sublime Porte the opinions and views of the
Conference at London, as that opinion, or those
views, are stated and exposed in the Collective Note
of the Representatives of the Four Powers addressed
to Chekib Effendi, and dated 13th of March, 1841,
and in Lord Palmerston’s instructions, dated 16th
of March, 1841, and addressed to me.
“I have already had the honour to acquaint you,
that I had not only made known to the Ottoman
Minister the contents of those documents, stating
at the same time the opinion I entertained of the
anxiety of the Allies to bring the Egyptian Question
to a termination at any rate; but I also communicated
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Collective
Note and Lord Palmerston’s instructions in
original. Your Excellency will therefore be satisfied
that I have already done in my individual capacity
that which is so fervently urged in the despatch
your Excellency has received.
“Your Excellency will, I am sure, have the
.bn 281.png
.pn +1
goodness to acquaint me what you and our colleagues
may desire to have done further for making
known the opinion and views of the Conference to
the Sublime Porte; I mean the mode of acting.
Your Excellency is, no doubt, fully informed of the
fact that the Ottoman Ministers have come to a
decision to modify the Article of succession to the
government of Egypt, with the view of rendering it
agreeable to the wishes of the Conference; that the
Ottoman Ministers have also modified, with a similar
intention, the Article of the military rank to be
conferred by the Pacha of Egypt; and that they
are engaged in considering in what manner the
Article of tribute may be modified so as to meet the
views of the Conference.
“Your Excellency is also acquainted with the
disposition manifested in the instructions sent by
Rechid Pacha to Chekib Effendi, to arrange this
last-mentioned point; and no doubt your Excellency
will esteem that to be an evidence from which
we may draw the conclusion, that the Sublime Porte
is desirous to gratify the wishes of the High Allies
of the Sultan, and may be supposed likely to act in
the spirit of concession whenever the wishes of
those Powers shall have been made known to the
Sublime Porte.
.pm signature2\
'“I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”'
.pm address '“The Baron de Stürmer.“'
.pm end_quote
.bn 282.png
.pn +1
His Lordship, under the same date, writes to
Lord Palmerston that the Porte had given way to
the wish of the Allies, and come to the resolution
that the government of Egypt should be inherited
by the eldest son; that Mehemet Ali should have
the right to appoint officers to the army below the
rank of General of Brigade, and that the tribute
should be fixed at a stated sum.
The Porte, still in doubt, or wishing for delay,
asked Lord Ponsonby what were his precise notions
relative to the execution in Egypt of the laws of the
Sublime Porte as laid down in the Separate Act of
the Treaty of Alliance, as it could not know what
the Allied Powers would say should Mehemet Ali
not fulfil that part of the Treaty. To which Lord
Ponsonby replies, that he is quite ignorant what will
be the opinion of the Allies on this point, and he
therefore cannot give advice.
Baron Stürmer, though an old diplomatist, seems
to have been puzzled with Lord Ponsonby’s letter
to him, and did not reply. This called forth another
letter, which with the reply I give.
.pm start_quote
.pm heading\
'“Monsieur l’Internonce,'\
'“Therapia, April 19, 1841.'
“On the 14th instant I had the honour to
receive an official Note from your Excellency desiring
.bn 283.png
.pn +1
me to inform you if I was disposed to co-operate
with your Excellency and our colleagues in carrying
into effect the instructions received from our Courts,
&c., &c.
“I had the honour to reply to your Excellency’s
note the same day, and after having, at some length,
explained what my conduct had been, (being desirous
to concur with my colleagues,) I requested your
Excellency to have the goodness to inform me in
what way your Excellency and our colleagues desired
that I should act, in furtherance of the instructions
of our Governments.
“This is the fifth day since I sent my note, and
not having had the honour to hear from you, I take
the liberty to express my hope, that your Excellency
will favour me with a reply, as it is necessary for me
to state to my Government everything connected
with this affair.
.pm signature2\
' “I have, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ \ “Ponsonby.”'
.pm address '“The Baron de Stürmer.”'
.tb
.pm heading\
'“M. l’Ambassadeur,'\
'“Constantinople, April 21, 1841.'
“I received yesterday morning the letter which
your Excellency did me the honour to address to
me the day before yesterday.
“The Sultan having at length adopted with
regard to the Pacha of Egypt resolutions in conformity
with the advice and wishes of his august
Allies, and those resolutions having yesterday been
.bn 284.png
.pn +1
announced to us officially, our task, it appears to me,
is accomplished. The question which you have the
goodness to ask me, M. l’Ambassadeur, as to the
kind of co-operation which my colleagues of Russia
and Prussia and myself expected from you, becomes
therefore unnecessary.
“If I have not replied to that same question
which was already contained in your letter of the
13th of this month, it is because you had assured
me therein that you had done everything which had
depended upon you, by communicating to the Porte
the acts of the Conference of London and Lord
Palmerston’s instructions of the 16th of March, and
in acquainting it at the same time with the strong
desire of the Allied Powers to see the Egyptian
affair terminated ‘at any rate.’ Now, that was
precisely what we wished to propose to your Excellency
to do, and there remained nothing more for
us to ask you.
.pm signature2\
' “Be pleased, &c.,'\
'(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ “Sturmer.”'
.pm address '“Viscount Ponsonby.”'
.pm end_quote
The Porte, though they expressed their satisfaction
with the plan proposed by the Representatives
of the Four Powers, were extremely slow in following
it out, and the British Ambassador, who
seemed now to be disciplined into obedience by
Prince Metternich and Lord Palmerston’s peremptory
.bn 285.png
.pn +1
instructions, on the 12th of May directed his
dragoman to tell Rifat Pacha that if any further
delay took place, he should feel it necessary to call
upon his colleagues to support him in inquiring of
the Sublime Porte the cause of the delay[129]. This
letter quickened the motions of the Divan; and on
the 22nd of May the new Firman was laid before the
Allied Ministers, and approved of by them[130]. This
Firman complied with Mehemet Ali’s demands; it
left Constantinople on the 2nd of June, arrived at
Alexandria on the 7th, was accepted by Mehemet
Ali, and was publicly read on the 10th[131].
.fn 129
See Levant Papers, Part III., p. 433.
.fn-
.fn 130
Ibid., p. 435.
.fn-
.fn 131
Ibid., p. 472.
.fn-
Thus terminated this long protracted question,
which might have been as easily settled after the
signing of my Convention on the 28th November,
1840, as it was on the 10th June, 1841, and without
at all compromising the honour or dignity of the
Porte, who the reader has seen was, through the
rejection of my arrangement, obliged to make concession
to a conquered vassal. Who was the principal
adviser of the Sultan the reader will be able
to judge by what I have stated; and if that is
not sufficiently satisfactory, he may turn over the
.bn 286.png
.pn +1
Levant Correspondence, where he will find that the
British Ambassador, even at the eleventh hour, lent
a willing ear to every report which designing people
were too happy to make to him, prejudicial to
Mehemet Ali.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 287.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XXII.
.pm start_summary
Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali not
the Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the Porte—Representations
of the Allied Powers—What Interests affected
by the Independence of Mehemet Ali—Views of France—Designs
of Russia.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
The Syrian and Egyptian question being now
brought to a close, by the total evacuation of the
former country, and Mehemet Ali’s establishment
in the hereditary pachalic of Egypt almost on his
own terms, it is time to inquire what has been
gained by measures that had well nigh plunged
Europe into a war, the end of which no man could
have foreseen.
I think every impartial man who has read the
correspondence must allow that Mehemet Ali was
not the aggressor. It is quite true he was anxious
to be independent, and no wonder that a man who
had acquired such extensive possessions by the sword
should be desirous of emancipating himself from a
weak master. I am not going to justify Mehemet
Ali’s first invasion of Syria: that would have been
the time for the Allies to have discouraged him, and
a naval force sent off Acre would have been quite
.bn 288.png
.pn +1
sufficient to have put an end to his ambitious
designs; but nothing of the sort was done. Mehemet
Ali was allowed to follow up one victory after
another, till his road to Constantinople was open,
and the Turks, having been refused assistance by
their friends, called in the Russians to protect them;
and the Treaty of Kutayah settled for that time the
Eastern question.
The Allied Powers, on learning that preparations
were making for war at Constantinople, instructed
their Ambassadors to urge the Porte to preserve
peace. At the same time Russia took the initiative,
and instructed her Consul to desire Mehemet Ali to
recall Ibrahim, and to withdraw the Egyptian army
to Damascus. What right had Russia, after consenting
to the Treaty of Kutayah, to make such a
proposal? Would it not have been safer and wiser,
had the Allied Powers preserved the status quo, or
even persuaded the Porte to acknowledge Mehemet
Ali at once, and confer on him the government of the
countries he had conquered, stipulating at the same
time that he should establish a milder government
in his extensive possessions? It had been proved
that Turkey, weak as she was, was entirely incapable
of governing her distant provinces; and would it not
.bn 289.png
.pn +1
have been better to have given her a powerful ally
who would have been interested in protecting her
against her natural enemy, Russia, than curtailing
his power, by restoring provinces which she had not
been able to govern, and at best giving her a discontented
vassal? It may be argued that such a
proceeding would have been dismembering the
Turkish empire: I answer, that was already done
by the Treaty of Kutayah, and it would have
been much safer to have let things alone.
Candia, which was entirely separate both from
Egypt and Syria, might have been restored to
the Porte; this would have given her more real
strength than she is ever likely to receive from
her very imperfect possession of Syria.
Let us now examine whose interests would have
been affected by giving Mehemet Ali independence.
No power in Europe is so much interested in
keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain,
and no power is more aware of that than France; for
in the very first conversation Count Molé had with
Lord Granville[132] he alluded to the subject, and the
French Government have never let slip an opportunity
of doing acts of kindness to Mehemet Ali,
.bn 290.png
.pn +1
so as to keep him as much out of our hands as
possible, and I fear they have too well succeeded.
France had opened a considerable trade with Egypt,
and she entertained great fears that English enterprise
would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she
should have befriended the Pacha in every possible
way. France is as well aware as we are, that
steam navigation having got to such perfection,
Egypt has become almost necessary to England as
the half-way house to India, and indeed ought to be
an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken
Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the breakup
of the Turkish empire, which is not far distant,
to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, we
were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we
not looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been
politic to have confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so
that in the event of his stopping the road to India by
Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open,
one remaining in the possession of the Ottoman
empire, and the other in that of the Pacha of Egypt.
It is not, however, usual for a Government to quarrel
with their own interests, and it is so decidedly
the advantage of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate,
by every possible means, the passage across the
.bn 291.png
.pn +1
Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the
soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to
have supported Mehemet Ali, and I have not the
smallest doubt that when France saw we were
committed against him, she seized that opportunity
of quitting the alliance in order to make the Pacha
her firm friend.
.fn 132
See Levant Papers, Part I., p. 1.
.fn-
France, however, though she had all the desire
to protect the Pacha, even at the risk of war, with
match lighted ready to put to the gun, hesitated,
and, fortunately for Europe at large, Louis Philippe
had either not nerve to begin the strife, or being
desirous of preserving peace, refused to adopt M.
Thiers’ plan of sending the French fleet to Alexandria.
The Ministers resigned, and Europe was
saved from a general conflagration.
What aid France actually promised to the
Pacha, or whether she ever decidedly promised
him any, we do not know, but it is not to be
supposed he would have resisted the wishes of
the Allied Powers without some hope of assistance
at the last moment. The fall of Acre opened the
Pacha’s eyes; he turned his back on France, and
listened to English counsels, which guided him for a
while. But the hostile conduct of our Ambassador
.bn 292.png
.pn +1
at Constantinople so disgusted him, that he again
turned to France, who received him with open arms,
and thus completely destroyed the English influence
in Egypt.
I think I have shown that England had no
immediate reason to clip the Pacha’s wings, and
that France supported him because England was
against him. To Prussia it must have been quite
indifferent whether Mehemet Ali kept possession of
Syria or not; nor do I see what interest Austria
could possibly have in displacing him—quite the
contrary. Russia cannot be a pleasant neighbour to
Austria; and the Porte is a feeble ally. By raising
Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened;
and indeed, the Pacha, in possession of Syria
and Egypt, would have been as much interested in
controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself.
Who then was to gain by reducing the power
of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and Russia alone.
The Emperor of that great and powerful state
saw clearly that the duration of the Ottoman empire
was drawing to a close; and that, sooner or later,
Russia would be the greatest gainer by its dissolution.
It is not then to be wondered at that she
should be content to wait her time, and accept the
.bn 293.png
.pn +1
legacy that would fall in to her at its demise; and
all she had to do was to prevent a skilful practitioner
coming to her assistance. That practitioner was
Mehemet Ali; and had he been supported by
France, England, Austria, and Prussia, his independence,
granted by the Porte and guaranteed by those
Powers, would have been a far greater blow on
Russia than she has received for many years; and
which blow, I have no doubt, she would have used
every effort to avert. We, however, fell into her
views; the Treaty of the 15th of July was signed;
Mehemet Ali has been sent back to Egypt; the
Syrian provinces restored to the Porte, and she has
become weaker than ever.
Various reasons have been given for Mehemet
Ali’s obstinate refusal to listen to the advice of the
Allies. At one time it was supposed he was backed
by Russia, who wished for an excuse to come to
Constantinople for the second time; and, indeed,
after the battle of Nizib, and the defection of the
Turkish fleet, that was my opinion. To check Russia,
I always thought that the combined fleets should
have proceeded at once to Constantinople, which
was the thing, of all others, the Emperor wished
to avoid; and Count Nesselrode distinctly stated to
.bn 294.png
.pn +1
Count Medem, that if a French fleet appeared in
the sea of Marmora, he would withdraw the Ambassador,
and then take such measures as he saw necessary
to re-establish the independence of the Porte[133].
.fn 133
See Levant Papers, Part I., p. 307.
.fn-
When France began to take a different view of
the question from the other Powers, and support
Mehemet Ali, Russia at once came forward, and
despatched Baron Brunnow to England with a letter
from the Emperor to the Queen. Part of the proposal
of Russia was that the French and English
should appear off Alexandria, while the Russian fleet
should anchor in the Bosphorus. This France most
properly and most decidedly objected to. Lord
Palmerston took the same view; and though he
expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the good
intentions of Russia, he was of opinion that if it
was necessary for a Russian force to appear in the
Bosphorus, a British force should be there also. To
this, as might be expected, Baron Brunnow objected,
and lamented that the British Government had not
more reliance on the good faith of Russia. After
various discussions, unnecessary to enter upon here,
Russia gave up the point of being the sole protector
of Constantinople, and consented to a small English
.bn 295.png
.pn +1
force being sent there in the event of the Russian
fleet appearing in the Bosphorus[134]. France in consequence
withdrew from the alliance, and the Four
Powers decided so far to fall into the views of Russia
as to put down Mehemet Ali, who was the best
supporter the Ottoman empire could have had, and
give back Syria to the Porte, and thereby accelerate
her fall.
.fn 134
See Levant Papers, Part I., p. 553.
.fn-
The defection of France brought the other Powers
closer together; and the insurrection breaking out
in Lebanon hastened the signing of the Treaty of
the 15th of July. We have seen that the movement
was put down by the energy of the Pacha; and that
he refused the conditions that were offered to him,
and determined to defend himself; and, under all
circumstances, I think he was right. He had good
intelligence from Constantinople; he knew the
Turkish Government could only spare a very small
force; he knew we had only 1500 marines in the
fleet; he was quite certain that Prussia would send no
troops to Syria; and he did not think that Austria
would; and he was sensible that Great Britain,
Austria, and Prussia, would be very unwilling to call
in the military assistance of Russia, which would
.bn 296.png
.pn +1
also be disagreeable to the Porte. Besides this, he
had a very large army in Syria, which had always
been victorious, and was well commanded, and the
season of the year was far advanced, and not a safe
harbour or anchorage (with the exception of Scanderoun,
which was too far distant) on the coast where
our ships could take shelter in the winter. In addition
to all this, he was backed by France, and was
determined to put every thing to the hazard of a
die; and had his views been properly followed up,
he must have succeeded.
.fm lz=t rend=y
.bn 297.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
CHAPTER XXIII.
.pm start_summary
Errors of the Pacha—His proper course of Action—Mismanagement
of Ibrahim Pacha in Syria—Gain or Loss of Turkey
by the Acquisition of Syria—Conduct of the Turks in
Lebanon—Quarrels of the Mountaineers—Ill treatment of
the Prince—Consequent hatred of Turkish rule—Conclusion.
.pm end_summary
.sp 2
The first error Mehemet Ali committed was not
immediately ordering Ibrahim to march on Scutari
after the battle of Nizib. At that time the Allies
had not come to a final arrangement, and the British
and French fleets were not collected in Besika Bay.
Had he done that at once, Russia would certainly
have come down to Constantinople with a fleet and
army; France would have got alarmed, and probably
ordered her fleet up the Dardanelles; Great Britain
would have done the same. Russia would have
urged the Porte to prevent it, which she would have
been obliged to have complied with, and the probability
is that Europe would have been set by the
ears, and in the struggle Mehemet Ali would most
likely have retained the government of Syria;
indeed, both France and England would have been
obliged to have made use of Mehemet Ali against
.bn 298.png
.pn +1
Russia, and the Porte, who must have joined with
Russia in preventing the fleets from forcing the
Dardanelles. His second error was, in not concentrating
his army the moment he resolved on resisting
the decision of the Allies.
At the time we landed in D’Jounie Bay, the
Egyptian army in Syria could not have consisted of
less than 80,000 men of all arms. They were distributed,
it is true, in various parts of the country.
Ibrahim Pacha ought to have divined our plan of
operations the moment we landed; he ought also to
have ascertained from his spies, (which we could not
prevent,) the number of our troops, and the works
we were throwing up, which of themselves showed
our weakness. He must have also known how slow
the mountaineers were in coming in in the first
instance for arms. Seeing all this, had he acted
with vigour, and set his troops in motion from
Tripoli, he would first have saved D’Jebail, then
occupied Gazir, and prevented the Emir Abdallah
from joining our standard. Had Osman Pacha
advanced at the same time from Balbeck, and occupied
Antura and the strong ground in front of our
advanced posts, while Souliman Pacha, strengthening
himself at Beyrout with a couple of thousand men
.bn 299.png
.pn +1
from Sidon, might have marched with his army from
Beyrout, and occupied the convents and high
grounds above the Nahr-el-Kelb, and threatened
an advance at the same time at the mouth of the
river, he would, in the first place, have prevented a
single mountaineer from joining our standard, and
the overwhelming force which he would have mustered
almost within shot of us, would have been
quite sufficient, without firing a gun, to have made
us pack up our traps and carry the Turkish troops
to Cyprus. By some strange fatality he remained
inactive; we gained confidence; were successful in
all our enterprises; desertion began in Ibrahim’s
army, which was just as likely to have begun in
our’s; and when at last Ibrahim made an effort, and
advanced to Beckfaya and Boharsof, instead of collecting
the whole of his forces, and driving us from
Ornagacuan, he did not bring half his troops, and
allowed himself to be attacked on both flanks, front
and rear, and was defeated. Still the game was not
up with him; withdrawing his troops from Tripoli,
Aleppo, Adana, and concentrating the whole at
Zachle, Malaka, and Damascus, and seeing we
hesitated in following up our successes, he ought to
have taken advantage of the absence of the squadron
.bn 300.png
.pn +1
at Acre, and the weakening of the garrison at
Beyrout, and pushed on the latter place, which he
would have taken with ease, and found abundance of
provisions. He should then have marched on
Sidon, which probably would have shared the same
fate.
These movements being communicated to the
Governor of Acre, would have encouraged him to
hold out; and if he was forced to withdraw, he
could have joined Ibrahim, and again marched on
Acre, where they would have found a practicable
breach; and most certainly, at that season of the
year, the British squadron would not have remained
in so open an anchorage.
Such vigorous measures would have had a great
effect on France, and there is no knowing what
might have happened. This was not done; and
Ibrahim, without making one effort to draw our
attention from Acre, or to profit by our absence,
remained inactive, and to his astonishment, heard of
the surrender of that renowned fortress, which he
had not in the least calculated upon. Still his cause
was not lost; our troops were divided in Beyrout,
Sidon, Tyre, and Acre, and, I believe, we had also
some at Tripoli.
.bn 301.png
.pn +1
The gale of the 29th of November alarmed the
Admiral for the safety of the squadron. The coast
was abandoned, except by a steamer or two, and
there was nothing whatever to have prevented Ibrahim
from again advancing, and recovering all his
losses, and which he would have been perfectly justified
in doing when the Convention was rejected.
Why he did not, to every military man acquainted
with the country, and with our weakness, must be a
matter of surprise.
Had any of these operations I have described
been put in force, Mehemet Ali would have been
now in Syria, and a war among the European Powers
in all probability would have been raging.
We will now examine what Turkey has gained
by the recovery of the Syrian provinces. She has
got back her fleet, which will never be of the least
use to her, and is an expensive floating ornament
to the Seraglio. Situated as the Turkish empire is,
with a rapid stream cutting her in two, it is evident
her only proper defence is a fleet of steamboats;
with these, and the Bosphorus and Hellespont
properly fortified, she may defy attacks either from
the north or the south, and have a rapid means
of communicating with her islands and possessions
.bn 302.png
.pn +1
on the Syrian coasts, and of suddenly transporting
troops to any part of her extensive empire. The
Turks are not sailors, and never will be, and are
therefore much better adapted to serve in vessels
moved by steam than in line-of-battle ships, where
seamanship cannot be dispensed with.
The Porte has regained Syria, and with it a most
extensive kingdom and discontented population, and
instead of keeping her army at home to defend her
against Russia, her natural enemy, she is obliged to
maintain a large force in Syria to keep down her
justly irritated subjects, whom she has neither the
talent nor inclination to govern either with prudence
or decency. Syria is divided, as before, into
pachalics, and influential Turks are appointed, as
usual, to govern them. There is neither law nor
justice. The Turk sits all day smoking his pipe,
and the people are plundered by their underlings
as usual; and they now feel they were better off
under the government of Mehemet Ali than they
are now under their former masters. They pay the
taxes they formerly did under the Porte; they pay
Mehemet Ali’s taxes in addition, and are plundered
into the bargain by their old rulers. Property of
every description is less protected than it was,
.bn 303.png
.pn +1
trade destroyed, and the roads insecure throughout
the country. As for Mount Lebanon, whose population
was the first to come forward and join our
bands, and whose position the Allies and the Turks
themselves promised to alleviate—how have they
been treated? As yet they have received little or
no remuneration for the burning of their villages
and destruction of their property by Ibrahim Pacha,
in revenge for their having joined the standard
of the Sultan. They have been badly paid for
the losses we ourselves caused them at D’Jounie,
at Beyrout, Acre, and Sidon. The old feuds
between the Maronites and Druses, which had
nearly subsided, have been fomented by their
rulers, and I fear Mehemet Ali himself, as might
have been foreseen, has not been altogether blameless
in assisting to set them by the ears.
In the course of my work it has been shown
that the Maronites were the first to take up arms in
the cause of the Sultan. The Druses being more
under the influence of the old Emir Bechir, came
forward at a later period, and when the war was
nearly finished, they became jealous of the Maronites;
and the Turks, instead of by prudent
management discouraging these feelings, rather
.bn 304.png
.pn +1
fomented them, with the view of weakening both.
The mountaineers had been armed during the
insurrection, and they are looked upon more as
enemies, than friends who had assisted in bringing
them back to power.
In the beginning of November, 1841, about the
period when the taxes for the support of the local
government were to be raised, the chiefs of the
Druses requested the Grand Prince to attend at
Deir-el-Kamar, the seat of government, to consider
how the taxes were to be distributed; this being
acceded to, they sent orders to the different tribes
to come armed to the meeting, which was certainly
not a very peaceable way of settling who was to
bear the burden of taxation. These tribes concealed
themselves in the houses of the Scheiks
of the family of Abu Bekr, in Deir-el-Kamar, and,
without provocation, sallied out of their houses, set
fire to the town in several places, and plundered
and murdered several of the peaceable inhabitants.
The Maronites, taken entirely by surprise, suffered
very considerably at first, but being rallied by their
leaders took up arms, and a regular battle ensued,
which lasted with occasional intermission for several
days. The Prince defended himself in his palace,
.bn 305.png
.pn +1
but seeing the Druses were the strongest, repeatedly
sent to Selim Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman
troops at Beyrout, for assistance; none, however,
arrived. This was exactly what the Turks wanted—the
more men killed on each side, and the more
exasperated they became against each other, the
better they were satisfied. “Divide and Govern,”
was their motto.
When the news of this unfortunate rencontre
came to the knowledge of our gallant Consul-General,
Colonel Rose, he immediately set out for
the mountains, and at imminent hazard to himself,
succeeded in putting an end, for a time, to the broil.
Unfortunately, however, the Maronite Christians
hearing of the danger of their countrymen at Deir-el-Kamar,
sent a strong force to relieve them; this, as
might be expected, again brought the Druses into
the field, and again the Grand Prince sent to Selim
Pacha, but his appeal to him was in vain, and the
Druses being the strongest, he was besieged in his
palace for twenty-four days.
Instead of Turkish troops being sent to put
down the insurrection and relieve the Prince, he
received orders to repair to Beyrout; and his
provision and ammunition being expended, he was
.bn 306.png
.pn +1
obliged to capitulate with the Druse Scheiks, who
guaranteed his safety and that of his retinue and
their property; and though the negotiations were
carried on through the medium of the messenger
sent by Selim Pacha, no sooner had the Prince
quitted his residence, than the Druses rushed upon
them, seized their arms, horses, and clothes, and
even stripped them to their shirts. The Prince
himself did not escape this indignity. On his
arrival at Beyrout he made strong and repeated
representations to Selim Pacha, and entreated him
to assist in putting down the civil war, but in vain.
The fact is, Selim Pacha was acting under the
orders of the Porte, who only wanted a good excuse
to put an end to the government of the ruling
Prince.
Shortly after this the Porte threw off the mask;
the Grand Prince was arrested and sent to Constantinople,
and Omar Pacha, a German who had entered
into the Turkish service, and served under my orders
in Syria, was appointed by the Porte Governor of
Lebanon. He may be a good man enough; but
certainly, a Christian having changed his religion
was not a fit man to govern the Christians of Lebanon.
The poor Prince has lost the whole of his
.bn 307.png
.pn +1
property, and his family is brought to ruin. This is
the gratitude of the Porte; this is the reward he has
obtained for his eminent services; and this is the
way the Ottoman Government have treated their
allies.
We are informed by Sir Robert Peel that our
Ambassador at Constantinople has protested against
these acts, and also against the Porte sending Albanian
troops (who are little better than barbarians)
into Syria, and that they have promised to remove
Omar Pacha, and restrict the services of the Albanians
to garrison duty only. How far the Porte will
keep their promise we shall see; but, I confess,
with such a man as Izzet Pacha at the head of the
Turkish Government, and who is only putting into
execution what he planned when in Syria, and for
which he was recalled, I confess I have no reliance
upon him, or indeed upon any Turkish Pacha. They
are all alike, and quite incapable of preventing the
fate of the Ottoman empire, which is tottering to its
base, and the sooner it goes the better; it is unworthy
of preserving.
Had my advice been followed, and the seaports
of Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Anti-Lebanon, been put
under the jurisdiction of the Grand Prince, assisted
.bn 308.png
.pn +1
by a council of the powerful Emirs, and the Turkish
troops removed entirely from his territory, causing
him to pay a reasonable tribute to the Porte, the
whole Mountain would have been bound by gratitude
to the Sultan, and would have assisted him to keep
the rest of Syria in order. As it is now, there is
nothing but the most inveterate hatred existing
against the Turkish Government; and I most sincerely
hope the different sects will unite, and make
a noble effort to drive their miserable and tyrannical
rulers out of their fine country. Cultivation and
commerce would then revive; a field would be
opened to British enterprise, and we might recover
the influence we had in the mountains, and which
has been lost, in consequence of the inhabitants
believing that we have not made use of our power
to obtain from the Porte all that was so liberally
promised them when we were in want of their
assistance.
.bn 309.png
.pn +1
.tb
I cannot close this work without returning my
best thanks to all the officers and men who served
in the squadron that Sir Robert Stopford did me the
honour of putting under my command. The very
laborious services they performed in D’Jounie Bay
is above all praise; this was no question of sending
a Lieutenant and a working party on shore; the
whole of the ships’ companies were constantly employed,
headed by their Captains. Captain Reynolds
was my second in the landing at D’Jounie, and
continued his unremitted exertions till he was sent
off Alexandria. Captain Berkeley was my second
on the attack at Sidon, and both of us regretted that
I could not employ him in the assault on shore; but
it was absolutely necessary that he should remain on
board the Thunderer to regulate the firing as we
advanced, and to cover our retreat if necessary. Nor
am I less obliged to Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney,
who was my ambassador to Mehemet Ali, and who
with great decision landed at once at the Palace and
opened the negotiations. Indeed, all the officers,
both of the Navy and Marines, as well as Selim
.bn 310.png
.pn +1
Pacha, General Jochmus, Omar Bey, and the whole
of the Turkish officers, did their duty to my entire
satisfaction, and I should be but too proud to command
such a force on another occasion. The merits
of Admiral Walker are too well known to make it
necessary for me to say one word in his praise.
I must also take this opportunity of thanking
the Commander-in-Chief for having placed the
Allied force under my direction when the ill health
of Sir Charles Smith obliged him to proceed to
Constantinople.
.bn 311.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.h2
APPENDIX.
.hr 20%
.sp 2
.h3
No. I.
.pm start_summary
Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafiz
Pacha, found at the Turkish Head-Quarters
after the battle of Nizib[135].
.pm end_summary
.fn 135
Forwarded by Colonel Campbell to Lord Ponsonby, and
published in the Levant Papers, Part I., pp. 362-365.
.fn-
.sp 1
.nf c
Plan of march of the Army of the Sultan against
Egypt, in nine Articles.
.nf-
Seeing that the Egyptian Government will never
submit to its Sovereign, it is very probable that in
the approaching summer it may declare and obtain
its independence. As all my efforts and all my
calculations have been useless, there is nothing but
war which will render me master of that province,
and which will unite it to the empire of the
Osmanlis, and for its execution and success good
dispositions must be taken.
Art. I.—For the success of this enterprise,
rigorous laws must be established; in the public
orders the grade of Seraskier shall be promised to
all the Ferik Pachas, if they do not betray their
trust or intrigue; but if they fail in their duties,
.bn 312.png
.pn +1
they shall be immediately turned out of the
service.
Art. II.—According to this plan, the army
ought to consist of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, with
120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000 infantry,
15,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery and engineers, and
the remaining 10,000 irregular troops.
Art. III.—Wherever the enemy shall be met,
he should be attacked by the artillery; it is necessary
that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise
the artillery daily in line of battle.
Art. IV.—To prevent the Egyptians from
making a sudden attack upon Marash, it is necessary
that this town be fortified and guarded by a
strong body of troops. After having taken these
measures, the Commander-in-Chief will march upon
Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus, and then to
Acre, to take possession of that fortress, and not to
lose time in obtaining possession of all the said
towns. After the capture of Acre, he must leave a
strong body of troops in that place, and march
direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be
considered the first conquest of this war; this enterprise
may, perhaps, be accomplished within four or
five months; and if the Egyptian Government does
not return under the dominion of the empire, let the
Commander-in-Chief know that the war will be
indefinite, and he must take measures in consequence;
for the conquest of Egypt being the second
achievement, four or five months will be necessary
.bn 313.png
.pn +1
for the success of this second enterprise. According
to this calculation, the important possession of Syria
and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to
accomplish.
Art. V.—According to the information we have,
Solyman Pacha is not content with his position. A
man of so much importance should be got rid of.
An officer should be sent to him to endeavour by all
means to gain him over to our side. Solyman Pacha
being a European, one of our French officers must
be sent to him to endeavour to gain him over to us.
Art. VI.—Mehemet Ali, up to the present time,
has given no higher grade to Arabs than that of
Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of
Colonel, General, and Pacha; in our camp, there
are Arabs who have the rank of Pacha. Such being
the case, he who deserts to us with thirty soldiers,
shall receive the rank of Lieutenant; and he who
deserts with from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the
rank of Captain; and if a Commandant deserts with
his battalion, the rank of Colonel; and those who
intrigue in the Egyptian army to make the soldiers
revolt, whether he be an officer or Colonel, shall
obtain high grades with us. In order to put this
project into execution, it is necessary to write proclamations
and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp
by means of spies.
Art. VII.—The Druses, the Mutualis, who are
in the Egyptian army, the chiefs of tribes, and the
people who are under the dominion of Mehemet Ali,
.bn 314.png
.pn +1
should be encouraged by promises to embrace our
party. Accordingly their intentions should be seconded,
and they should be granted all they desire;
and the better to succeed in this enterprise, it is
necessary that Hafiz Pacha should have with him
7000 or 8000 purses, to distribute money where he
judges it convenient and useful.
Art. VIII.—In the army of Mehemet Ali Pacha,
there are a great many European employés, by means
of whom all his plans and projects may be known.
It is necessary, in order to be well informed, to send
spies among them, in order that the success of the
war, which is about to open in the approaching
summer, may be ensured.
Art. IX.—In order to disembark 10,000 or
12,000 men at Tripoli, the squadron must be put in
movement, and as soon as the corps d’armée shall
march from Marash, it is necessary to enter into
communication with the Druses, the Mutualis, and
other Cabaïles. For the success of this enterprise,
thirty or forty pieces of field artillery, from 10,000
to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and materiél,
must be prepared to be sent by sea on the first
demand. The persons charged with this enterprise
should employ all their diligence in order that these
affairs may terminate as soon as possible.
.bn 315.png
.pn +1
.h3
No. II. See Vol. I., page #vol1_18#.
.pm start_summary
Translation of a Petition (in Copy) from the
Nations and Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon
and Syria, to Sultan Abdul Medjid of
Constantinople.
.pm end_summary
.ce
A Petition.
We humbly supplicate, at the threshold of the
Divan of the Mighty Sovereign, the Benevolent and
Just, the Venerated Authority and Daring Lion, the
Lord of the Sword and of the Pen—(viz. of Death
and Mercy)—the Shadow of God over the Earth,
our Honoured Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan, may
God perpetuate the days of his flourishing reign for
ever and ever, Amen.
That the frightful tyranny and the horrible
oppression and cruelty under which Mehemet Ali
Pacha has belaboured us—(he who pretends to be as
one of your Majesty’s slaves, but who, in fact, has
dared to be treacherous to your most illustrious and
venerated defunct Father, of blessed memory, and
whose abode now may be Paradise)—have compelled
us to throw ourselves at the feet of your Imperial
Throne, which is adorned with the rays of justice
and mercy,—spreading our supplicating arms towards
your Majesty’s paternal and sublime clemency,
that you to turn your eye towards our
protection and safety,—knowing as we do how vast
and extensive the equity of your Majesty’s Government,
which is so renowned throughout the world.—and
how immense and unlimited your Majesty’s
.bn 316.png
.pn +1
mercy and clemency; wherefore our hearts burn
with the fire of the desire of attaining that happiness
also, which is enjoyed by all those fortunate beings
who are your subjects. What crime have we committed
to cause your Majesty’s resplendent face to
be turned away from us, and thereby we should be
left to be thrashed under the edges of an unbearable
tyranny and of an insupportable iniquity and oppression,
while our fathers and forefathers, ever since a
period of four hundred years, have continually enjoyed
the happiness and comfort of the protection of your
Majesty’s Imperial Standard? We are their sons,
and prepared to follow their steps, that we may
inherit the same happiness which they enjoyed for
so many centuries, to the great glory of your
Majesty’s Imperial Dynasty.
We therefore pray and supplicate your paternal
benignity and clemency not to abandon us, and
to let it be said that a vast and numerous population
has been left to be immolated as a sacrifice to the
selfish ambition and sordid avarice of a single man,
a tyrant, totally void of feeling and humanity, who
not only proved himself ungrateful to, and forgetful
of, your Majesty’s great bounty to him, but dared,
most perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your
sacred person. Seeing ourselves thus placed in this
most wretched and miserable condition, bordering on
the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation,
we have got up and raised your Majesty’s mighty
Standard in defence of the legitimate and lawful
.bn 317.png
.pn +1
rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for
which we shall continue to fight to the last breath
of our existence; and therefore we trust to the
Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your Majesty’s
assistance, to overpower that common enemy of
yours and ours, and to drive him away from your
dominions.
Hence, we again supplicate and implore the
Throne of your Majesty’s universal mercy and
clemency, to turn your royal face towards us with
your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our
said enemy having stopped all the roads against us
by land and also by sea, and thereby prevents us
receiving any supply of the necessary warlike stores
we are in need of; and as we have no fleet to oppose
his, we most earnestly entreat your Majesty to afford
us the needful recourse for the opening of the roads,
&c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably
placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent
ruin. But no, never will your Majesty’s imperial
and paternal mercy and benevolence allow such a
disastrous calamity to befall us! And we pray the
Almighty God to preserve your sacred person, and
to perpetuate the days of your glorious reign with
happiness and victory.
Signed and Sealed by your Majesty’s Slaves.
.ta c:40 l:25
(No Date) | The Nation of Mutuali.
| The Nation of Druse.
| The Christian Nation.
| Faris Honeish, &c., &c.
.ta-
.bn 318.png
.pn +1
.in 4
.ti -4
Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount
Lebanon to his Excellency the British Ambassador.
.in
.sp 1
.pm heading\
'After the usual Compliments,' '(Translation.)'
The humanity which so eminently distinguishes
all the acts of the British Government,—the readiness
with which it steps forward to the assistance of
the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make
the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed
by that portion of their fellow-creatures that are
blessed with happier Governments,—embolden the
Syrians to appeal to England for her mediation
to rescue them from the destruction with which
Mehemet Ali threatens them now.
Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he
has trampled us under foot by an oppression which
knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most
atrocious and cruel.
For the last eight years, we have acceded to all
his demands, and because he has left us nothing
more to give him, he menaces us with extermination;
nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he
drinks the very blood of our children, and satiates
the licentiousness of his soldiers with the honour
of our families. Driven to despair, we have taken
up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard
our dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword
with which he threatens to erase us from among
nations.
Abandoned by the world, we implore the protection
of Great Britain. In the humanity of her
.bn 319.png
.pn +1
Government, and in the generosity of one of the
greatest and most powerful nations, rest all our hopes
in this cruel crisis. All that we demand is, to be
allowed to return to our legitimate Sovereign Abdul
Medjid,—a natural desire coming from loyal subjects.
Why should two millions and a-half of His Highness’
subjects be sacrificed to the personal ambition
of one man, who himself, forgetful of the
benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword
against the bosom of his own Sovereign?
We have but one prayer,—we seek but to be
allowed to enjoy, in common with the rest of His
Highness’ subjects, the rights and privileges secured
to them by the Hatti-Sheriff; and it is in this hope
that we submit our petition to your Excellency,
praying that you will be pleased to lay it before the
“Divan” of Great Britain, the Ally of our august
Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may
be honoured with a speedy glad tidings, before we
are utterly destroyed by the Governor of Egypt.
May the Almighty prolong the days of your
Excellency with happiness to the end of time.
.ta c:15 r:8 l:40
(Signed) | (L.S.)| Prince Faris Shehab.
| (L.S.)| Emir Haidar.
| (L.S.)| Sheik Faris Habeish, &c.
| | The Maronite Nation.
| | The Druse Nation.
| | The Mutualis.
.ta-
.bn 320.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.in 4
.ti -4
Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount
Lebanon to his Excellency the French Ambassador.
.in
.ce
(Literal Translation from the Arabic.)
.ti 0
After the usual Compliments,
The painful news that have reached us by the
newspapers, have struck a terrible blow to Syria,—they
have torn the hearts of men, women, and
children, now menaced to be exterminated by Mehemet
Ali, to whom France has deigned to grant
her powerful protection. Can she be possibly
ignorant of the evils this man has made us suffer
since fortune has made him master of Syria? They
are innumerable. Suffice it to say, that the most
distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppression,
have driven us to despair, and have renewed in us
the ardent desire of returning to the paternal government
of our august Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is
not this a legitimate desire from a loyal people?
France, a nation so great, so magnanimous, that has
extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages spilt
so much blood to establish it in her own Government,
refuses us to-day her powerful influence to
obtain the enjoyment of the same good!
The French press says, “that France will not
admit of any arrangement that has for basis the
restitution of Syria to its legitimate Sovereign.” Can
it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French
nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to
see us crushed by a systematic oppression which
.bn 321.png
.pn +1
alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government from
others.
We wish but to be allowed to return to the
protection of our legitimate Sovereign, whom we
have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred
years. We demand but to participate in the privileges
and rights of the Hatti-Sheriff which our
gracious Sovereign has granted to all his faithful
subjects, without exception, without distinction.
We appeal to the French Government—we supplicate
the French nation at large, to assist us to obtain
our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled
us to take up arms for the defence of our lives
and the honour of our families, from the brutality of
the Egyptian soldiery, or to bury ourselves in the
ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one; and
as such, we sincerely trust that the French Government
will not abandon us in a moment so dangerous.
It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency
this, our prayer, begging that you will be pleased to
lay it at the feet of the throne of your august Master,
the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdul Medjid.
.ta c:15 r:8 l:14 c:3 l:10
(Signed) | (L.S.)| Prince Faris Shehab. ||
| (L.S.)| Prince Yousuf Shehab.||
| (L.S.)| Emir Haidar, &c., &c.||
| | The Maronite| }|
| | The Druse | }| Nations.
| | The Mutuali | }|
.ta-
.bn 322.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.h3
No. III.
.nf c
Letter from Commodore Napier to Lieut.-Col.
Hodges.
.nf-
.pm heading3\
'My dear Hodges,'\
'H.M.S. Powerful, Beyrout,'\
'July 15, 1840.'
I received your letter and postscript of the 10th
and 13th of July, and I think you are as cautious
a diplomatist as if you had been at it for the last
twenty years; you do not make a single remark
upon what my opinions were relative to this expedition
of Mehemet Ali. I do not feel that there
is any responsibility on me whatever; I am positively
forbid to meddle with anything that Mehemet Ali
may do, as long as he lets alone British persons and
property; and however I disapprove of this, I can
only obey.
The Pacha’s troops marched out yesterday morning,
and although they met with no resistance, they
set the whole country in a blaze, convents and
all. I wrote a very strong letter to the Egyptian
Admiral, which I begged him to communicate to
Abbas Pacha, a copy of which accompanies this.
Mr. Wood was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and he
came off a few days ago, bringing petitions from the
poor Mountaineers to the Sultan and the French
and English Ambassadors; he landed again early
this morning, and brings off news that the insurgents
are divided amongst themselves, have been abandoned
by many of their chiefs, are badly armed, and,
by all I can collect, unless they are succoured with
.bn 323.png
.pn +1
arms and ammunition, the insurrection will be put
down very shortly, and thus will finish all hope of
Syria being released from the power of Mehemet
Ali, by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves, and
the question will become more complicated than
ever; all of which might have been avoided, had the
Admiral had instructions how to act, or had he
taken upon himself, which I feel assured would have
been approved of by our Government at home.
I am surprised the mission of Mr. Wood has not
been notified to you, as he certainly was sent here
by Lord Ponsonby, and I have the Admiral’s order
to facilitate him, and even to send the Cyclops
back when he has any particular communication to
make.
Should Mehemet Ali come this way, the shortest
way of putting an end to all doubts would be to
seize him. I do not say I am prepared for so bold
a step, but if I see much cruelty and devastation
going on, I don’t know whether I should not be
very much disposed to do it, unless he came accompanied
by such a force as would render the success
doubtful; but I have no idea that he will come,
because I believe all will be settled without him,
and you will find that the strength of the insurgents
has been very much magnified. You seem to
think that Mehemet Ali is on his last legs, but I
think this will strengthen him very much; he is
evidently backed up by the French, that is clear by
the language held by all the French officers, and
.bn 324.png
.pn +1
we have Thiers’ speech, which is plain enough. You
say, if we act with vigour and determination, we
shall carry through Lord Palmerston’s policy without
the aid of any foreign power; but, my good friend,
the opportunity is lost, his troops are landed and
his squadron by this time is in Alexandria, and I
do not see now where our vigour and determination
can be applied.
July 20.—It was only yesterday I could get
anything positive about the Egyptians. Our Consul
knows nothing, and he will believe nothing against
the Syrians, but a Frenchman has read me a letter
from Souliman Pacha, saying the insurrection was put
down; and another from his secretary, detailing the
whole of their operations. It appears they marched
as far as Hammana, about eight hours from here,
and met less than a couple of hundred of the insurgents,
whom the Albanians disposed of, and the
Emir Bechir sent to desire them to submit, and
give up their arms, which many of them have done.
I was not satisfied with this, and last night I went
down in the Cyclops, and sent on shore at Zouk and
Jebel, when they informed me that the son of Emir
Bechir had been there and told them. It is a pity
you had not a vessel to have sent earlier information,
but even that would have made no difference, as
nothing would have been done; it serves them right
for their behaviour to me, and I hope you will tell
Lord Palmerston so. I shall keep this open till the
last moment.
.bn 325.png
.pn +1
July 21.—The Indian mail is just arrived; I have
no more news. I wish you could come this way, for
I fear there is no chance of my going to Alexandria;
I shall, however write to the Admiral by the Austrian
steamer, which I expect hourly.
.pm signature2\
'Believe me, &c.,'\
' Charles Napier.'
.h3
No. IV. See Vol. I., page #vol1_52#.
.in 4
.ti -4
Extract of Letter from Commodore Napier
to Admiral the Honourable Sir Robert
Stopford, G.C.B.
.in
.pm heading3 ''\
'D’Journie, Head-Quarters of the Army'\
'of Lebanon, September 16, 1840.'
In execution of your order of the 9th instant, I
removed the whole of the Turkish troops from the
transports and the marines of the squadron into the
steamers. The Dido and Wasp took up an anchorage
well up to Beyrout Point, in order to draw
Souliman Pacha’s attention from the position I
intended to disembark at. Soon after daylight, the
squadron and steamers you had put under my orders
weighed; the Turkish squadron, under Admiral
Walker, weighed also; and the whole, with the
exception of Zebra, who flanked the Egyptian camp,
worked up to Beyrout Point, where a considerable
force of the enemy was in position.
.bn 326.png
.pn +1
When the breeze freshened, the whole bore up
for D’Journie. Castor and Hydra anchored close to
Dog River, landed the Turkish troops, and completely
blocked up the pass leading to D’Journie.
The Powerful and Pique, Gorgon, Cyclops and
Ph[oe]nix, followed by the Turkish squadron, ran into
the bay of D’Journie, and landed the troops in an
incredibly short time, owing to the excellent arrangement
of Captain Reynolds, who took charge of the
landing. Admiral Walker put his troops on shore
at the same moment with great celerity and order;
a position was then taken up, and the artillery
landed, the few Albanians stationed here retiring
without firing a shot. The Carysfort and Dido
went off D’Jebel, about three leagues to the northward,
to act against a strong tower, garrisoned by
Albanian troops.
D’Journie is a good-sized bay, with a promontory
projecting considerably into the sea. A road from
Beyrout lies along the shore, and is practicable for
infantry, artillery, and cavalry: this road the Revenge
covered. The road from Tripoli leads also along
shore, and the Wasp and Ph[oe]nix covered a gorge,
over which it would be necessary to pass. Two
roads lead from Baalbec by Antura, where an excellent
position was taken up by two battalions of
Turks, supported by five companies of marines.
The left of this is protected by an impassable gorge,
the right rests on the sea, Dog River separating it
from high ground in front.
.bn 327.png
.pn +1
The first day the inhabitants who had been driven
into the mountains, came in slowly for arms, but
these few took them with great avidity, and hastened
to the mountains to drive away the Emir Bechir’s
troops, and open the mountain passes,—this done,
the mountaineers have flocked in in great numbers,
with the Sheiks, who have crowded to the standard
of the Sultan.
I beg to inclose Captain Martin’s reports of the
occupation of D’Jebel and Batroun, in which he
speaks highly of Captain Austen, of the Cyclops,
and of the officers employed[136].
.fn 136
See Vol. I., pp. #vol1_62#-66.
.fn-
I regret the loss he met with; it was not to be
avoided. The inhabitants of this city are most
warlike and determined, and many Albanians have
suffered by their severity.
Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitred our positions the
day before yesterday.
I have sent a battalion of Turks in advance of
Gazir to open the country, and give due notice,
should he endeavour to turn our left by that road,
which he will have some difficulty in doing, as the
country is covered by the broadsides of the ships.
I have much reason to be satisfied with the zeal
of the whole of the officers and seamen employed:
their exertions in completing our lines, under Mr.
Aldrich, of the Engineers, is beyond all praise.
Permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the first
success of the army of Lebanon. You, yesterday,
.bn 328.png
.pn +1
were witness of the arrival of his Highness the Emir
Abdallah, the Governor of the district of Kesrouan,
and of the enthusiasm of the mountaineers; and if
this continues, I have every reason to think that the
Egyptian army will be obliged to retire from the
sea-coast, and the mountains of Lebanon.
.pm signature2\
' I have, &c.'\
'Charles Napier, Commodore.'
.h3
No. V. See Vol. II., page #17#.
Instructions for Captain Fanshawe, on his
Mission to Alexandria.
.sp 2
.ti 0
By the Honourable Sir Robert Stopford, &c.
Having received instructions from the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty to send a competent
officer to Alexandria, in order to make a communication
to Mehemet Ali, the substance of which
is stated in a letter from Viscount Palmerston to
their Lordships of the 14th of November, of which
you will receive a copy,—it is my direction you
proceed forthwith in H.M. steam vessel Megæra to
Alexandria, taking with you the Dragoman named
in the margin[137], and on your arrival, after communicating
with the senior officer, who will give you
every support, you will demand to have an interview
.bn 329.png
.pn +1
with Mehemet Ali, in the presence of Boghos Bey,
in order to make to Mehemet Ali a communication
from Her Majesty’s Government. When admitted
you will be guided in all respects by the directions
contained in the said letter; and further, should the
written document which Mehemet Ali may deliver
to you, for the purpose of being transmitted to Constantinople,
contain an expression of a desire, on
the part of Mehemet Ali, to obtain hereditary tenure
of the Pachalic of Egypt, you will not decline to
receive and convey the document on that account,
provided it shall also contain the engagements mentioned
in the aforesaid letter. You will also state
that if Mehemet Ali, as a proof of his desire for
conciliation, expresses his readiness to restore the
fleet immediately, you will offer in my name every
assistance in conducting it to Marmorice, where it
will be placed at the Sultan’s disposal; and making
the senior officer acquainted with the result, you will
return in the Megæra, and join me at Marmorice.
.fn 137
John Chumarian.
.fn-
Should the senior officer be at any distance
from the port, you will not go out of your way, but
communicate with him on your return from Alexandria.
Given on board the Princess Charlotte, off
Cyprus, 6th Dec. 1840.
.in 10
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ Robert Stopford, Admiral.
.in
.ti 0
By command of the Commander-in-Chief,
.in 10
(Signed)\ \ \ \ \ John Loudon, Secretary.
.in
.pm address 'Captain Fanshawe, H.M.S. Princess Charlotte.'
.bn 330.png
.pn +1
.h3 id='app06'
No. See Vol. II., page #36#.
.pm start_summary
Protocol of the Conference held at the house of
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime
Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part,
and the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain,
Prussia, and Russia, on the other.
.pm end_summary
.sp 1
Minister for Foreign Affairs. You are aware,
gentlemen, that a letter was addressed by Mehemet
Ali to the Sublime Porte, and you are acquainted
with its contents. The Sublime Porte yesterday
received likewise the Memorandum of the Conference
of London of the 14th of November. The
Sublime Porte directs me to ask you, gentlemen,
if Mehemet Ali by this letter has complied with the
spirit of the Memorandum, and if his submission
ought to be considered as real?
Ambassador of England. I think that it belongs
to the Sultan alone to decide this point.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Up to this time
there have only been words on the part of Mehemet
Ali; if he executes the promises made in the letter,
then his submission may be considered as real.
Ambassador of England. I leave to my Colleagues
to decide upon that point. As for me, I see
nothing before me at present which can authorize
me in explaining myself, or in giving an opinion.
Internuncio of Austria. With the view of relieving
myself from all responsibility, and of making
.bn 331.png
.pn +1
the views of my Government in so important a
matter clearly manifest, I have deemed it fitting to
give my vote in writing. I will now read it to the
Conference:—
“I have read over and over again with the most
scrupulous attention the letter which Mehemet Ali
has just addressed to the Grand Vizier, and on
which I am called upon to pronounce my opinion.
I have found nothing in it which is not correct.
The tone which pervades it has appeared to me
to be altogether proper. It might have been desirable
that no allusion had been made to the Convention
of Commodore Napier; but we are all
agreed that it would have been much more so that
the Convention in question had never been concluded;
and Mehemet Ali, by referring to it, has
only made use of an advantage which has been
gratuitously offered to him. Besides, it was Captain
Fanshawe alone who should have represented to
him that an act which the Allied commanders had
declared null and of no effect, ought not to be
mentioned in the letter to the Grand Vizier. But
I will not dwell on this point, which, after all, is
now only of secondary interest. I return to Mehemet
Ali’s letter. In this letter the Pacha declares
himself ready to do all that is required of him, and
in this respect his submission appears to me entire.
“I should then be of opinion that this submission
should be accepted; that an officer of his
Highness should be sent to Alexandria; that Mehemet
.bn 332.png
.pn +1
Ali should be enjoined to deliver up to him
the Ottoman fleet; that, according to the terms of
the Separate Act of the Convention of the 15th of
July, the Allied commanders should be invited to
assist at such delivery; that the Pacha should be
summoned to evacuate the provinces or cities of
the Ottoman empire still occupied by the Egyptian
troops, and situated beyond the limits of Egypt;
finally, that the Grand Vizier, in replying to his
letter, should announce to him that when once these
conditions should be entirely fulfilled, his Highness,
from deference to his Allies, would be pleased to
reinstate him in his functions as Pacha of Egypt.
This advice is what the Conference of London
wished that we should give to the Sublime Porte,
in case Mehemet Ali should yield to the summons
about to be made to him. As for the tribute, the
land and sea forces, and the laws which must govern
Egypt, those points have been settled beforehand
by the Convention of the 15th of July, and it will
be sufficient to execute in this respect the stipulations
contained in the IIIrd, Vth, and VIth Articles
of the Separate Act annexed to the Convention.
“I should consider as in every respect to be
regretted any hesitation on the part of the Porte to
comply with the advice of its Allies. The most
brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in
Syria; those successes have surpassed our calculations,
our anticipations, our expectations. Syria
has returned to the rule of his Highness, and thus
.bn 333.png
.pn +1
the principal object of the alliance is accomplished.
To proceed further does not enter into the views of
the Allied Powers; the Conference of London has
pronounced with sufficient distinctness in this respect.
The Sublime Porte may doubtless have good
reasons to desire the destruction of Mehemet Ali;
but as it has not the means of effecting it itself, the
task of doing so would devolve upon its Allies. Now
would it desire, in return for the services which they
have rendered to it, to involve them in an undertaking
which would endanger the general peace, so
ardently desired by all people, and so happily maintained
up to the present time?
“It is especially towards France that the attention
of our Governments is at present directed; that
Power is entitled to their respect and their consideration;
and if the menacing and warlike attitude
of the Thiers Ministry could not stay them in their
course towards the end which they proposed to
themselves, and which they have attained, they
appear henceforth to be desirous to dedicate all
their care to keep well with the Ministry which
succeeds it, and whose language announces a prudent,
moderate, and conciliatory policy. They must
consequently enter into its position, make allowances
for the difficulties by which it is surrounded, and not
expose it to be hurried along against its will in a
false course. In the present state of sentiments in
France an unlooked-for event might subvert everything;
and is it not for the interest of all and for
.bn 334.png
.pn +1
that of justice, that they should frankly unite themselves
with those who govern France, to prevent a
like calamity?”
The Internuncio thereupon reads the third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of the Separate
Act of the 15th of July.
Envoy of Prussia. I partake of the opinion of
the Internuncio. Mehemet Ali’s proceeding appears
to me in fact to be in conformity with the spirit of
the Memorandum. I think besides, that Mehemet
Ali having solicited his pardon of the Sultan, the
Sublime Porte ought not to act with too great
severity against him; that, on the contrary, it ought
to lend itself to explanations, and to evince consideration
and moderation, not only for the interest
of the Porte itself, but also for the general interest
of Europe.
Chargé d’Affaires of Russia. In all that relates
to the general question the views of my Government
cannot differ from those of the three other Courts,
its Allies; my instructions are founded on that principle.
In the special question which forms the
object of this Conference, the existing documents
ought to point out to us the course and the rules to
be observed; now this course and these rules appear
to me to be already laid down by the Memorandum
of the Conference of London on the 14th of
November, and by Lord Palmerston’s despatch of
the 15th of October. The Memorandum had not
yet reached me from my Government; it is the
.bn 335.png
.pn +1
Internuncio who has had the goodness to communicate
it to me; I have only received Lord Palmerston’s
despatch, which is mentioned, and I conceive
that I shall conform to the meaning of these documents,
by joining, under existing circumstances, in
the vote pronounced by the Internuncio.
Ambassador of England. The question, I repeat,
appears to me to depend upon the fact of the submission
of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan appears to
me to be the sole judge in such a question: he
alone has the right to decide. If the Sublime Porte
informs us that the Sultan has accepted Mehemet
Ali’s submission, that he is satisfied with it, the
orders of my Government enjoin me, in such a case,
to advise the Porte to grant to Mehemet Ali the
hereditary government of Egypt. Until that time,
until the Porte communicates to us the decision of
the Sultan, I must abstain from giving any advice,
any opinion.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. There are different
kinds of submission. Mehemet Ali might, for example,
have come himself, according to our usages, or
have sent some one to implore his pardon; but that
is not what we mean. The Memorandum requires
that Mehemet Ali should restore the fleet, that he
should evacuate certain countries. He writes that
he will do all this; if he accomplishes these promises,
the Sublime Porte will be able to credit his
submission, but the letter cannot of itself alone be
considered as a real submission.
.bn 336.png
.pn +1
Internuncio of Austria. The letter is a commencement
of submission. If the Sublime Porte
demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali
restores it, and if he evacuates the countries specified
in the Memorandum, his submission will certainly
be then complete.
Chargé d’Affaires of Russia. It is certain that
we shall not be able to consider the submission of
Mehemet Ali as completed until he shall have
restored the fleet, and evacuated the Holy Cities,
as well as the other places specified in the Memorandum;
but for the present we should abide by the
text of the Memorandum and of the instruction
addressed by the Admiralty to Admiral Stopford,
wherein mention is made of a letter to be delivered
by Mehemet Ali to the officer commissioned to
notify to him the decision of the Conference of
London.
Internuncio. What more could Mehemet Ali
do? He must begin by saying that he submitted,
and he could not, at the same instant, carry into
effect all the conditions of his submission.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, alluding to what
the Ambassador for England had said, observes,
that up to the present time there had been no
question of hereditary succession.
Internuncio. I am not at this moment called
upon to discuss that point, on which I have no
precise instruction; but, the case occurring, I shall
conform myself altogether on that matter to what
the Ambassador of England shall do.
.bn 337.png
.pn +1
Ambassador of England. For my part, I have
precise orders to advise the Porte to grant hereditary
succession to Mehemet Ali, so soon as it shall
apprize us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission
of Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only
be conditional; I have not the right to judge of the
reality of the submission, and I must wait, before
giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the
fact of the submission.
Internuncio. As for me, I must repeat it, I look
upon the letter of Mehemet Ali, as a first step
towards his submission.
Ambassador of England. It will not be in my
power to act in the sense of the instructions of my
Government, until the Sublime Porte shall have
declared that it considers the submission of Mehemet
Ali as complete. But I cannot demand of
the Sultan any declaration whatever on that matter,
for I should think that I trenched upon his rights.
It is for his Majesty to decide.
Envoy of Prussia. I think, as I have already
said, that the Sublime Porte ought not, in the
present case, to act with too great severity, and I
must always exhort it to act with moderation.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Porte has
never wished to act with severity; facts have already
proved it. It does not wish to do so even now. It
wishes, on the contrary, to act in concert with its
Allies; and although it is doubtless for the Sultan
to decide on the submission of Mehemet Ali, nevertheless,
.bn 338.png
.pn +1
as his Allies have declared their intentions
in the Memorandum, I have thought it right to consult
their Representatives to know whether Mehemet
Ali’s proceeding is in conformity with the spirit of
the Memorandum: but, since their opinions are at
variance, they might refer to the decision of the
Conference of London.
Internuncio. But there is no variance between
us; we all think that Mehemet Ali’s submission, in
order that it should be complete, must be followed
by the execution of the conditions which are imposed
upon him. I think, moreover, that to refer the
question to the decision of the Conference of London
would be to appeal from the Conference to the
Conference, and lose time in useless adjournments.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. I think that Mehemet
Ali must first execute the conditions imposed
upon him; as for the hereditary succession, that is
another question upon which I am not prepared to
explain myself.
Internuncio once more declares, that when the
time arrives, he will concur in the steps of the Ambassador
of England on that point, and the Envoy of
Prussia makes the same declaration.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. You are aware,
gentlemen, that on his accession to the throne the
Sultan had granted to Mehemet Ali the hereditary
administration of Egypt; he rejected that favour.
Still later, with the view of sparing the shedding of
blood, the Treaty of July 15 granted it to him;
.bn 339.png
.pn +1
Mehemet Ali equally rejected it. It was necessary
to have recourse to measures of coercion, and the
Sultan withdrew this favour from him. At present
it appears to me that there can no longer be a question
of a right in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the
Sultan is free to take his decision on this point.
Representatives unanimously admitted that the
Sultan possesses his entire freedom of action in this
respect, and that Mehemet Ali could not appeal to
any right.
Envoy of Prussia added, that any concession in
favour of Mehemet Ali could only be considered as
an effect of the Sultan’s generosity; for the independence
of his Highness is the object of the Convention
of July 15; but the more advantageous the
Sultan’s position is at the present time, the more
will it perhaps allow him to be generous.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since Mehemet
Ali has rejected the Treaty of July 15, that Treaty
no longer exists for him, and other conditions might
be imposed on Mehemet Ali.
Internuncio. But the Treaty continues to exist
for us.
Ambassador of England. I declare that, in my
opinion, Mehemet Ali has now no right; that the
Sultan is master to take the course which he shall
consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our
advice.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressing himself
to the Internuncio, says to him: Your Excellency
.bn 340.png
.pn +1
began by saying, that if the Sultan is satisfied with
the letter of Mehemet Ali, his submission ought to
be accepted. But Mehemet Ali has already written
a thousand letters of the same kind. Can any faith
be placed in his letters? It is evident besides that
there is some trick even in this last letter. For
example, he speaks of Commodore Napier’s Convention,
which is a void act, in order to come to the
subject of hereditary succession.
Internuncio. That is true; but this letter, given
in consequence of a summons made to him by the
English Admiral in the name of the Four Powers,
cannot be compared to all those which he has addressed
of his own accord to the Sublime Porte, and
specifically to Hosrew Pacha.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. You understand,
gentlemen, that in any case it is necessary that the
Porte should have time to reflect upon this matter.
Internuncio. Assuredly, an affair of this kind
cannot be concluded in a day; it is, doubtless,
necessary that your Excellency should be able to
concert with your colleagues, and take the orders of
the Sultan.
Minister for Foreign Affairs observes, that having
to submit to the Council and to the Sultan his report
on the Conference of this day, he is desirous of
knowing, definitely, what is the conclusion which he
should communicate to them.
Representatives reply that their opinion being
recorded in the present Protocol, they refer themselves
to it.
.bn 341.png
.pn +1
Ambassador of England. I repeat that I must
wait for the decision of the Sultan to give the advice
which is enjoined to me by the orders of my Government.
Internuncio observes once again how much it
would be to be regretted if the Porte should not
conform with promptitude to the wish expressed by
the Allied Courts in the Memorandum of the 14th
of November.
.h3
No. VII.
Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Napier to Sir
Charles Napier.
.pm heading 'My dear Father,' 'Cairo, February 16, 1841.'
I have just returned from a visit to Souliman
Pacha, who is a fine hearty old soldier, and begs to
be remembered to you, saying it will be some time
ere he forgets the cannonnade you gave him. I told
him how much you were annoyed at his house
having been plundered at Beyrout, assuring him
that the English had nothing to do with it; to
which he replied that he was aware that he was
under an obligation on that account to the Austrians;
but he said that some things of his which
you had ordered to be sent to him, had been seized
by the douane at Beyrout, and amongst others some
arms from Persia, which he valued much as curiosities.
.bn 342.png
.pn +1
When his house was plundered all his papers
was destroyed; amongst others some military works
of his in manuscript, which had cost him the labour
of years.
Ibrahim Pacha was present at Beckfaya, and
mentioned your having taken off your hat. He was
also in person at the crossing of the Jordan, when
we returned in such a hurry to Jerusalem. He says
it was merely a demonstration, which answered the
purpose for which it was intended, and which caused
him to gain three marches on us. We had altogether
a most interesting conversation, which lasted
upwards of an hour, and during which he was civil
in the extreme, shaking me repeatedly by the hand,
and ended by desiring to be most particularly
remembered to you.
Feb. 17.—Souliman Pacha has just called on me;
he is a fine old fellow. I gave him a bottle of porter;
he drank your health, and told me to let you know
he had done so heartily.
He brought back with him 8000 troops of
artillery, who were much harassed by the Arabs
from Akaba. He says he put to death every one
of them whom he caught. I did not like to ask
him if he had many Syrians amongst his troops;
but I am sorry to inform you that there are a
great many here, who have arrived with the troops
from Gaza.
About eight regiments of infantry are now encamped
near this, the last of which arrived yesterday
.bn 343.png
.pn +1
from Gaza, which they left on the 4th instant; and
from what I can learn from the men, they were
forced to accompany the Egyptians. Besides the
infantry, a couple of regiments of lancers have come,
some irregular Mogrebins (from the Deserts of
Libya), and some irregular Turkish cavalry from
Anatolia; I believe about 200. The horses, particularly
those of the lancers, are in good condition,
and it is lucky for me that I could not get my
mountain horsemen to approach them[138], as they
would have eaten us without salt. I dine with Souliman
the day after to-morrow, and manage to spend
my time pleasantly enough; but I am anxious to
hear from our head-quarters, and have as yet been
able to learn nothing positive about the Emirs, but
have sent to Thebes to obtain information.
.fn 138
See page #151#.
.fn-
.pm tbstars
The disturbances have already begun in the
Hedjaz since the Egyptian troops have been withdrawn;
and a Prophet, calling himself King of the
Land and Sea, has already set up the standard of a
religious warfare. * * * *
.pm signature2\
'Your affectionate son,'\
' E. Napier.'
.bn 344.png
.pn +1
.hr 20%
.h3
No. VIII.
.nf c
Letter from Boghos Bey to Sir Charles
Napier.
.nf-
.pm heading\
'Commodore,'\
'Alexandria, June 19, 1841.'
I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of the letter,
dated May 27, with which you have honoured
Having placed it before His Highness the Viceroy,
I am desired to express his grateful acknowledgements
for the friendly expressions it contains.
On the two points, “of the return of some Syrian
soldiers who are still here, and of the regulation of
the monopoly,” which form the principal object of
your letter, I believe that I cannot do better than
transcribe, Commodore, the words which His Highness
proffered in reply, as I have obtained authority
to transmit them to you.
“I cannot see the motive why my friend Napier
should be in any difficulty; he who has talked with
me, who has seen all, and doubtless, with his penetration,
understood all. No one is ignorant that
since the signing of the Convention with him the
difficulty of the question could not have been made
smoother; the affair having been submitted to different
conditions, has been prolonged by negotiations
with the Envoy of the Sublime Porte; and whilst
the conditions were under consideration, they could
not be executed, neither could they consider my
conduct strange, still less suppose that I was
thereby breaking my word. Thank God, it is now
.bn 345.png
.pn +1
arranged to the satisfaction of the parties; the
Firman has arrived, and has been solemnly read in
public with the usual ceremonies. I am now only
under the necessity of submitting to the clemency
of my Sovereign as to the quota of the tribute. I
have already conferred on this subject with his
Envoy here, who is on the point of setting out, and
the matter is almost arranged. Now that the moment
has arrived to put successively into execution the
conditions contained in the above-mentioned Firman,
my friend Napier will very soon learn that what I
talked to him about, that what I said to him concerning
the monopoly, will be effected in a manner
to promote the interests of the country; and I hope
that his friendship for me will be more than ever
strengthened.”
In sending you, Commodore, on the part of His
Highness, the preceding communication, I am desired
also to present his friendly salutations, and I avail
myself of this opportunity in my own person to
reiterate the assurances of the high consideration
with which I have the honour to be,
.pm signature3\
' Commodore,'\
'Your very humble and very obedient servant,'\
' Boghos Joussouff.'
.ce
THE END.
.bn 346.png
.pn +1
.pb
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London:
Harrison and Co., Printers,
St. Martin’s Lane.
.nf-
.bn 347.png
.pn +1
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“The personal character of the Author is not only impressed upon
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Footnotes:
.fm lz=h
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.dv class='tnotes'
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Transcriber’s Note
Hyphenation has been retained as printed. Where a word is hyphenated
on a line break, the hyphen is retained or removed depending on
instances elsewhere in the text.
The printer provided a short list of #errata:errata# for this volume.
The changes indicated there have been incorporated into this text.
In the Table of Contents, the page indicated for Appendix I (p. 301)
should be p. 299, and has been corrected.
The title of Appendix No. VI (Protocol) was misprinted as No. V.
The first footnote, on p. #33#, has no anchor in the text. This has been
added at an appropriate point.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The following issues should be noted, along with the
resolutions. The references are to the page and line in the original.
.ta l:8 l:46 l:12 w=90%
| is disposed to acce[e]pt the submission | Removed.
| the 17th Chewal, (the [22nd of November/11th of December,) | Per Errata.
| the quickest possible co[u/n]veyance | Inverted.
| after which you[ you] would attack | Redundant.
| “[‘]Having arrived at Naplouse, I was to order | Removed.
| who was [an-eye witness/an eye-witness] | Misplaced.
| [Opposed/Approved] by the other Allied Ministers | Per Errata.
| for their consi[ed/de]ration | Transposed.
| it was possible for Mehe[n/m]et Ali | Replaced.
| by incurring responsibi[li]ty | Inserted,
| I do not intend to[ ]enter into the political merits | Inserted.
| showed no symptoms of fulfil[l]ing | Inserted.
| back to their country[,/.] | Replaced.
| that you may[ be] pleased to turn your eye | Inserted.
| No. V[I]. See Vol. II., page 36 | Added.
| with which you have honoured me[.] | Added.
.ta-
.dv-