.dt The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp, by Augustus C. Buell-A Project Gutenberg eBook
.de body {width:80%; margin:auto;}

.de .font85 {font-size: 85%}

// Macros

.dm h3 $1
.sp 2
.h3
$1
.sp 2
.dm-

// footnote
.dm fn-start
.ni
.fs 85%
.fn #
.dm-

.dm fn-end
.fn-
.fs 100%
.pi
.dm-

// letter
.dm letter-start
.sp 1
.fs 85%
.in +4
.dm-

.dm letter-end
.in -4
.fs 100%
.sp 1
.dm-

// verse
.dm verse-start
.sp 1
.in +1
.fs 85%
.nf b
.dm-

.dm verse-end
.nf-
.fs 100%
.in -1
.sp 1
.dm-

.dm ch-head
.sp 1
.fs 85%
.in +2
.ti -2
.dm-

.dm ch-head-end
.fs 100%
.in -2
.sp 2
.dm-

// max line length
.ll 72

// default indentation for .nf l blocks
.nr nfl 4

// Page numbering
// .pn off  turn off visible page numbers
// .pn link // turn on page number links

// paragraph formatting, indent paragraphs by 1.0 em.
.nr psi 1.0em
.pi

// Transcriber's notes in a nice box.
.de .tnbox {background-color:#E3E4FA;border:1px solid silver;padding: 0.5em;margin:2em 10% 0 10%; }

// include a cover image in HTML only
.if h
.il fn=cover.jpg w=600px
.if-


.bn f001.png
.pn +1

.sp 4
.h1
THE MEMOIRS||<s>OF</s>||CHARLES H. CRAMP
.sp 3
.bn f002.png
.bn f003.png
.bn f004.png
.pn +1
\_
.if h
.il fn=frontis.jpg w=600px id=frontis
.ca
CHARLES H. CRAMP
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.nf c
[Illustration: CHARLES H. CRAMP]
.nf-
.sp 4
.if-

.bn f005.png
.pn +1
.pb
.sp 4
.nf c
<xxl>THE MEMOIRS</xxl>

<s>OF</s>

<xxl>CHARLES H. CRAMP</xxl>


<s>BY</s>

<xl>AUGUSTUS C. BUELL</xl>

Author of “Life of Paul Jones,” “History of Andrew Jackson,”
“Life of Sir William Johnson,” Etc.
.nf-

.if h
.il fn=publogo.jpg w=100px
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
.nf c
[Illustration: Publisher’s Logo]
.nf-
.sp 2
.if-

.nf c
<s>PHILADELPHIA AND LONDON</s>
<l>J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY</l>

<s>1906</s>
.nf-
.bn f006.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.pb
.sp 4
.nf c
<sc>Copyright, 1906</sc>

<sc>By J. B. Lippincott Company</sc>

Printed by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia
.nf-
.bn f007.png
.pn +1
.sp 4
.pb
.sp 4
.h2
PREFACE
.nf c
❦
.nf-
.sp 2
<sc>It</sc> is not often that the memoirs of a man
cover the history of threescore years of active
manhood. Still more rare is it that the period
covered happens to be the most fruitful of
progress known in the annals of mankind. And
yet more remarkable, even to the point of the
unique, is it that such a career, in such an
epoch, should be inextricably interwoven with
the history of one of the fairest arts and one of
the most fascinating sciences,—Naval Architecture
and Ship-building.

All this is true of the subject of this memoir,
Charles Henry Cramp.

Such phrases as “prominently identified
with” or “an acknowledged leader in” his
sphere of creative activity do not adequately
express Charles H. Cramp’s personal and professional
relation, or rather his individual
identification, with the maritime and naval history
of his country. Those phrases applied to
his status and his rank would be commonplace.
.bn f008.png
.pn +1
His impress is far deeper than that, and the
association of his name and his personality
with the art and its triumphs have become a
symbol.

The generation of naval architects and ship-builders
among whom he began his life-work
sixty years ago have long since passed away.
Of them all he stands alone, the only surviving
link that binds the romantic memories of wood
and canvas to the grim realities of steel and
steam. Even the generation that knew him in
the middle of his long and fruitful career is
gone. He is the only man who has alike designed
and built ships for the navy of the Civil
War and for that of to-day,—alike for the navy
that fought at Charleston and Fort Fisher and
for the navy that won Santiago and Manila
Bay,—twoscore years asunder! In all the history
of our country there has never been another
professional career like his. No other
man ever made such an impress as he upon the
life, welfare, and progress of the nation. No
other man, without ever holding a public office,
has so indelibly left his mark upon our greatest
and most vital public interests as he has done.

He has passed from the sphere of membership
.bn f009.png
.pn +1
in his profession and has become its exponent.
His name is a synonym for the art in
which he has so long been master, and the mention
of his personality instantly suggests the
science whose triumphs he has so often and so
well won.

This status and this rank are by no means
limited to our own country. Mr. Cramp is as
familiar in London as in Philadelphia; as
well known in Tokio and St. Petersburg as
in New York or Washington.

Undoubtedly, the first impression one will
derive from the study of Mr. Cramp’s career
and character as mirrored in his acts and his
writings is his singleness of purpose, fixity of
resolve, and directness of method. These are,
in fact, his distinctive traits, and to them,
throughout his long and arduous life, all others
have been rigorously subordinated. If he appears
to be exacting of others, he is yet more so
with himself. It is not to be expected that in
a life so long, in an experience covering literally
the scope of the civilized world, and in
a range of endeavor so wide and diversified, all
could be plain sailing. On the other hand, few
men have encountered more or greater obstacles.
.bn f010.png
.pn +1
No man ever faced them more cheerfully
or combated them with more sanguine pluck.
If he did not always triumph over them, it was
because they were insurmountable, or because
those upon whom he relied for a proper share
in the sum-total of effort failed him. He himself
never left undone anything that a clear
head could devise or a resolute will strive for.

But with all his singleness of purpose, fixity
of resolve, and directness of method in professional
pursuits, Charles H. Cramp, as a
member of society at large, is a man of the
broadest vision and most comprehensive culture.
Intent as he may be upon his work, he
“never takes the shop home with him,” as the
saying is. He has always possessed the happy
faculty of laying down his burdens at the close
of each working-day to find mental recreation
in social occasions, in general literature, art,
and the higher order of social amusements. A
clever writer in a magazine sketch of him many
years ago said, “Charles H. Cramp knows
more about more things than any other man of
his time!” Unlike most epigrams, this is
true, and in terse fashion it conveys a portrayal
of his intellectual make-up. Mastery of
.bn f011.png
.pn +1
the literature of his own profession, rich and
varied as it is, forms but a small part of Mr.
Cramp’s mental equipment. To all these attainments
add the lessons and observations of
wide travel and constant association with leading
minds and controlling personalities at
home and abroad, and the result is a perfectly
equipped, all-round man of affairs.

During his whole active career Mr. Cramp
has held positions of command. At the age of
nineteen he began to direct operations and assume
responsibilities; and such status he has
maintained for threescore years, with constantly
increasing volume of operations and
incessantly growing weight of responsibility.
But through all he has kept the even tenor of
his way, neither elated by triumphs nor depressed
by reverses, and guided always by an
inflexible integrity and a scrupulous honesty
that are proverbial.
.bn f012.png
.pn +1
.bn f013.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2
CONTENTS
.nf c
❦
.nf-
.sp 2
.ta r:6 h:45 r:5
<sc><s>Chapt.</s></sc> || <sc><s>Page</s></sc>
I. | Early ship-building in Philadelphia and Colonies—Paul\
Jones—Joshua Humphreys—Alliance—Truxtun—Embargo—Decade\
following War of 1815—Rebecca Sims—Inauguration\
of Packet Lines—Thomas P. Cope—Decay\
of Eastern Trade in Philadelphia—Auction Sales of Cargoes  | #11:ch01#

II. | Birth—Relatives—High School—Magnetic Observatory—Note\
on Davidson—Surf-boats for Mexican War—First\
Propeller Tug Sampson—ship-builders of New York and\
Philadelphia—Clipper Ships, 1850—Zenith of American\
Carrying Trade—Crimean War—Cunard Line—Libertador—Armored\
Ships—Board Appointed to Take Charge\
of Appropriation to Build Them—Account of New Ironsides—The\
Monitor—Speech of Bishop Simpson—Sub-Department\
of Navy—Light-draught Monitors—Sinking\
of the First—Collapse of Sub-Department—Rebuilding\
of Yazoo, Tunxis and Others—Miantonomah—Origin of\
Fast Cruisers—Evolution of Modern Marine Engineering\
in this Country     | #39:ch02#


III. | Foreign Commerce in 1865—The Clyde and George W.\
Clyde, and Introduction of Compound Engines—Commerce\
of 1870—Merchant Marine—Lynch Committee—Mr.\
Cramp and Committee—Lynch Bill—American\
Steamship Company—Visit to British Shipyards—John\
Elder—British Methods—Interchange of Methods—Merchant\
Marine, Continued—Dingley Bill—Defects—Act\
of 1891, Providing Registry for Foreign Ships—St. Louis\
and St. Paul—Extract from <i>Forum</i>—Remarks on Article—Committee\
of ship-builders and Owners—New\
Bill Introduced by Frye and Dingley—North Atlantic\
.bn f014.png
.pn +1
Traffic Association—New Shipyards—Tactics of North\
Atlantic Traffic Association—Our Navigation Laws,\
<i>North American Review</i>—Mr. Whitney—Unfriendly Legislation—Mr.\
Whitney’s Letter—Effects of Letter—Mr.\
Cramp’s Letter to Committee of Merchant Marine—International\
Mercantile Marine    | #97:ch03#


IV. | Condition of Navy after Civil War—Admiral Case’s Fleet—Virginius\
Scare—Huron, Alert and Ranger—Secretary\
Hunt—First Advisory Board—Secretary Chandler—Puritan\
Class—Finished—Steel—Hon. J. B. McCreary\
and Appropriation Bill for New Navy—Members of Second\
Naval Advisory Board—Standard for Steel for New\
Ships Chicago, Boston, Atlanta and Dolphin—Secretary\
Whitney—Beginning of New Navy, by Charles H.\
Cramp—Baltimore, Charleston and Yorktown—Purchase\
of Drawings by Navy Department—Commodore\
Walker—Premium System—Mr. Whitney’s Views—Premiums\
Paid—Attack on System—Secretary Tracy—War\
College Paper—Classifying Bids    | #154:ch04#

V. | Armstrongs—Russian war-ship Construction—Arrival of\
Cimbria at Bar Harbor—Visit of Wharton Barker to\
Shipyard—Visit of Captain Semetschkin and Commission\
to the Yard—Purchase of Ships—Newspaper Accounts—Captain\
Gore-Jones—Mr. Cramp’s Account of\
Operations—Europe, Asia, Africa and Zabiaca—Popoff\
and Livadia—Visit to Grand Duke Constantine—Anniversary\
Banquet in St. Petersburg of Survivors of Cimbria\
Expedition—Object of Visit to Russia—Mr. Dunn\
and Japan—Contract for Kasagi—Jubilee Session of\
Naval Architects in London—Visit to Russia—Correspondence\
with Russian Officials—Visit to Armstrongs’—Japanese\
war-ship Construction—Coming Sea Power—Correspondence\
with Russian Officials—Invited to Russia—Asked\
to Bid for war-ships—Our Ministers Abroad—Construction\
of Retvizan and Variag—Maine    | #205:ch05#
.ta-
.bn f015.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2
ILLUSTRATIONS
.nf c
❦
.nf-
.sp 2
.ta h:40 l:15
| <s><sc>PAGE</sc></s>
<sc>Charles H. Cramp</sc> | #<i>Frontispiece</i>:frontis#
<sc>Clippership Morning Light</sc> | #12:morning#
<sc>Clippership Manitou</sc> | #24:manitou#
<sc>Cruiser Yorktown</sc> | #36:york#
<sc>Monitor Terror</sc> | #48:terror#
<sc>Cruisers Baltimore and Philadelphia</sc> | #60:baltimore#
<sc>Cruiser Newark</sc> | #72:newark#
<sc>Cruisers Pennsylvania and Colorado</sc> | #84:penns#
<sc>Cruiser Columbia</sc> | #96:colum#
<sc>Armored Cruiser Brooklyn</sc> | #108:brook#
<sc>Armored Cruiser New York</sc> | #120:ny#
<sc>Battleship New Ironsides</sc> | #132:iron#
<sc>Battleship Iowa</sc> | #144:iowa#
<sc>Battleship Alabama</sc> | #156:alab#
<sc>Battleship Maine</sc> | #158:maine#
<sc>Battleship Retvizan in Commission</sc> | #180:russ#
<sc>Battleship Retvizan Docking</sc> | #192:retv#
<sc>Cruiser Variag</sc> | #204:variag#
<sc>American Liner St. Paul</sc> | #216:stp#
<sc>Medi-J-Ieh Launching</sc> | #228:medi#
<sc>Medi-J-Ieh in Commission</sc> | #240:launch#
<sc>Battleships Indiana and Massachusetts</sc> | #264:indi#
.ta-
.bn f016.png
.bn p011.png
.pn 11
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.nf c
<xl>MEMOIRS

<s>OF</s>

CHARLES H. CRAMP</xl>

▤
.nf-
.sp 4
.h2 id=ch01
CHAPTER I
.pm ch-head
Early Ship-building in Philadelphia and Colonies—Paul
Jones—Joshua Humphreys—“Alliance”—Truxtun—Embargo—Decade
following War of 1815—“Rebecca
Sims”—Inauguration of Packet Lines—Thomas P.
Cope—Decay of Eastern Trade in Philadelphia—Auction
Sales of Cargoes.
.pm ch-head-end

<sc>The</sc> historical value of the character and
career of individuals must be rated by their
share in and impress upon the events of their
time. This is equally true of success and failure.
For example, the most famous man of
modern time terminated his career in the most
colossal failure known to history,—Napoleon
Bonaparte. Yet, if we judge by the interest
the civilized world takes in every shred of his
history and by the perennial halo that envelops
his name, people do not think about either his
triumphs or his disasters, but fix their attention
.bn p012.png
.pn +1
singly upon the impress he made upon
civilization.

On the other hand, George Washington
ended his career in success and glory. But
few, except students and pedants, know much
about Washington beyond that he was the
founder of a new nation and the Father of a
new country which a century after his death
has become the most formidable on earth.

Thus, in either case, whether of success or of
failure, both gigantic, mankind rates the importance
of each by the impress he made upon
the events of his time and by its enduring
character.

Viewed broadly, the Europe of to-day as
compared with the Europe of 1775 is as completely
the creation of the popular forces incarnated
in Napoleon Bonaparte, as the
American Republic of to-day as compared with
the revolted Colonies of 1775 is the creation of
the popular forces whose exponent George
Washington was. From this point of view, the
fact that one failed while the other succeeded
in the personal sense cuts no figure whatever.

.if h
.il fn=i012.jpg w=600px id=morning
.ca
CLIPPERSHIP MORNING LIGHT
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CLIPPERSHIP MORNING LIGHT]
.sp 2
.if-

These observations, while they have none
other than a general relation to our immediate
subject, are pertinent to the main thread of our
theme. The real test of greatness in an individual,
and therefore of the historical value of
.bn p012a.png
.bn p012b.png
.bn p013.png
.pn +1
his character and career, being the impress he
makes upon the events of his time, it follows
that, unless the mention of a man’s name instantly
suggests some great thing or things
that he has done, or in a masterful way has
helped to do, that man was not great; he made
no impress upon his times, and his biography
can possess no historic value. But whenever
the name of a man stands as the exponent of
some great thing done or as the symbol of
notable achievement, then the character and
career of that man belong to history, and the
obligation devolves upon literature to suitably
perpetuate his memory.

This, the prime test and condition of enduring
fame, has been fulfilled by the subject of
this memoir, Charles Henry Cramp. Not alone
in his own country, but in Europe and Asia,—from
St. Petersburg to Tokio,—the mention
of his name instantly suggests triumphs in the
science of naval architecture and marine engineering
and successes in the art of building
ships. However, before proceeding to a history
of the career and life-work of Mr. Cramp
himself, it seems proper to survey the historical
antecedents of his science and his art in
his own field of action.

The art of naval architecture and the industry
of ship-building were almost coeval with
.bn p014.png
.pn +1
the primitive establishment of the English-speaking
race on the American continent, and
this was more particularly true of Philadelphia
than of any other place. In the earliest
grants of land to settlers, William Penn invariably
included a clause requiring them,
when clearing the land granted, to “spare all
smooth and large oak-trees suitable for ship-timber.”

In 1685, three years after Penn arrived in
the Colony, it was reported to the Lords of
Trade in London that “six ships capable of
sea-voyage and many boats have been built at
Philadelphia.” From this early beginning the
industry grew rapidly, until in 1700 four yards
were engaged in building sea-going ships alone,
besides several smaller concerns which built
fishing-boats and river-craft. Two rope-walks,
two or three block-makers’ shops, and
several other special manufactories of ship-building
material, had been put in operation.
At first the spar-iron work needed was brought
from England, but by the beginning of the
eighteenth century all the ship-smithing required
for Philadelphia-built ships was done
on the spot.

The first four yards were located at different
points along the beach, between the foot of
Market Street and the foot of Vine Street, and
.bn p015.png
.pn +1
there they remained until about the middle of
the eighteenth century. By that time the value
of that part of the river front for commercial
wharf purposes had increased to such an extent
that the ship-building industry could not
afford to hold it. In the meantime new yards
had been established down as far as South
Street, others as far north as the present foot
of Fairmount Avenue. Obedient to this law of
trade the four older yards moved their plants
either northward or southward, as convenience
or economy might dictate. But after 1744 no
ships were built between Market and Vine
Streets. The last of these original shipyards
of Penn’s time to succumb was the largest and
most important one in Philadelphia. It was
owned and managed by Mr. West, who was at
that time the leading ship-builder in the Colonies;
and the ground his shipyard occupied
had been deeded to him by William Penn in
part payment for a ship he had built for Penn
several years before. He removed to the present
foot of Green Street.

In 1750-51 two ships were built in West’s
new yard, which exceeded in size any merchant
vessels previously constructed in America.
One of them was of three hundred and twenty
and the other of four hundred tons burthen.
They were sent to England with cargoes of
.bn p016.png
.pn +1
colonial produce, and on arrival at London
were both bought by the East India Company
and placed in the regular East India and China
fleet. They were as large as any merchant vessels
built in England up to that time, and of
superior model and construction. One of
them—the larger of the two—remained on the
list of the East India Company more than
thirty years; and in 1751 had for one of her
passengers to India, Warren Hastings, who
was going out to Madras as a young clerk in
the Civil Service, to become the first Governor-General
of British India, and founder of the
British Empire in Asia.

During this period, the third quarter of the
eighteenth century, a new scheme of ship-building
commended itself to the enterprise
and ingenuity of Philadelphia shipwrights.
This was the construction of what they called
“raft-ships.”

The local supply of ship-timber in the forests
of England, particularly of frames, knees,
keels, and the larger spars, had begun to decline
to the danger-point by 1750. The size of
ships, both for commerce and for war, was
constantly increasing. This increase incessantly
involved the use of longer and heavier
timbers for frames, larger knees and futtocks,
and thicker planking. Meantime the forests of
.bn p017.png
.pn +1
England became smaller and smaller. The
great old trees had been cut down and sawed or
hewn up, and the younger stems had not found
time to grow in their stead.

Indeed, before 1750, England had begun to
import ship-timber from the Baltic; but it was
mostly deal boards used for cabin-work, ceilings,
sheathings, etc. Now she began to look
to her American Colonies for the heavier materials.
It was difficult to load and stow this
kind of timber through the hatchways of the
ships then available. The ingenuity of Philadelphia
shipwrights met this obstacle by building
the timbers themselves into the form of
ships, and they were then navigated across the
Atlantic to be broken up on arrival in British
ports. These “raft-ships” were built with
bluff bows and square sterns, their sides being
several feet thick. To make them water-tight,
they were sheathed with two thicknesses of
boards which “broke joints,” and were caulked.
The largest of these, called the “Baron Renfrew,”
measured the equivalent of five thousand
tons in a regular merchant ship. She
got safely across the ocean, but went ashore on
Portland Bill in a fog and broke up. Most of
her timber, however, was picked up by English
and French vessels which cruised for
weeks in search of it. Among the mast-timber
.bn p018.png
.pn +1
she carried was one white pine tree ninety-one
feet long by four feet eight inches diameter at
the butt inside the bark. This tree was used
for the mainmast of the “Royal George,” a
three-decker then building at Chatham (1774).
It was doubtless still in the ill-fated ship when
she heeled over and went down at Portsmouth
in 1782. The “Baron Renfrew” was the last
of the “raft-ships.” The oncoming Revolution
stopped all kinds of commerce for eight
years, and though after the peace ship-timber
was again exported to England, it went as hold
or deck cargo in regular vessels.

Summing up the colonial period, it may be
said that, while the records were imperfectly
kept and some lost, enough is extant to show
that between 1684 and 1744 one hundred and
eighty-eight square-rigged ships and over
seven hundred brigs and schooners, besides immense
numbers of boats, river-sloops, fishing-yawls,
etc., were built at Philadelphia. Her
only rival in the Colonies during that period
was Portsmouth, New Hampshire, but Philadelphia
held the ascendency over all in the size
and total tonnage of her ships.

That the Colonies should have developed the
ship-building industry from their earliest existence
was natural and necessary. If you
take a modern map of the United States and
.bn p019.png
.pn +1
draw from Maine to Georgia a heavy black line
averaging one hundred miles back from the
general trend of the sea-coast, you will have in
close approximation the geography of colonial
settlement at its maximum. In this belt, this
“narrow fringe of civilization,” were concentrated
for more than a century all the energies
of English-speaking pioneers, rapidly increasing
in numbers and incessantly augmenting the
products of enterprise and industry which,
from surplus over home consumption, had to
seek markets over sea.

In those early days the population kept
within easy reach of the coast or of the arms
of the sea and estuaries which abound from
the Savannah on the south to the Penobscot on
the north. The back country, forming the eastern
or Atlantic slope of the Appalachian chain,
was little more than a hunting and trapping
ground or a field for primitive trade and barter
with the Indians. As for the vast “hinterland,”
west of the Alleghenies, it was, up to
the middle of the eighteenth century, when the
final struggle between England and France for
supremacy on this continent began, an unbroken
wilderness, inhabited only by hostile
savages, and unknown to any white men except
the Jesuit priests and the cunning traders
of French Canada.
.bn p020.png
.pn +1

For all these reasons, the gaze of the English-speaking
colonists from the earliest settlements
to the beginning of the conquest of Canada
was always bent toward the sea, and all
their enterprise and energy were directed to
the commerce of the ocean. Under such conditions,
the development of skill in ship-building
was inevitable; and with that necessity was
also bred a scientific alertness in marine architecture
itself which, as soon as political independence
freed its scope, became supreme
throughout the civilized world.

The outbreak of the Revolution of course, for
the time being, put an end to merchant ship-building
in all American ports. But in Philadelphia
the paralysis was only temporary, and
the energies heretofore directed toward construction
of ships for the uses of peace were
soon turned to the conversion of available merchantmen
into vessels of war or privateers, and
the building of new frigates ordered by Congress.
The first American squadron, that of
the ill-starred Commodore Esek Hopkins, was
composed entirely of merchant vessels taken
up in the harbor and converted into men-of-war
in the shipyards of Philadelphia during
the autumn of 1775.

It was in the selection and conversion of
these four merchantmen into cruisers that Paul
.bn p021.png
.pn +1
Jones, founder of the American navy, first
gave to the United States his energies and his
talents. Thus Philadelphia was the birthplace
of a new sea-power, and her shipyards have
ever since been the foremost contributors to its
growth, until even now, though only a century
and a quarter old, it has achieved imperial
rank.

In November, 1775, Congress authorized the
construction of six 32-gun frigates and seven
other war vessels of less dimensions. Four of
the frigates were allotted to Philadelphia shipyards.
They were the “Washington,” the
“Randolph,” the “Delaware,” and the “Effingham.”
The first two were frigate-built
from their keels, but the “Delaware” and
“Effingham,” to save time, were built upon
frames already on the stocks for merchant
ships when the war began. On this account
they were not quite as large as the regular
frigates and rated twenty-eight instead of
thirty-two guns.

From 1775 till the peace of 1783, Philadelphia
yards built a great number of privateers
and converted a few ships for the “State
Navy,” as it was called, that is to say, ships
provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and assigned to the Continental service.
One of these, a converted bark of two hundred
.bn p022.png
.pn +1
tons and mounting sixteen 6-pounders, has
passed into fame as the “Hyder Ali.” Under
Lieutenant Joshua Barney she took the “General
Monk,” a regular sloop-of-war, mounting
fourteen 9-pounders and four 6-pounders. The
“Hyder Ali” was a small French bark which
arrived at Philadelphia with military supplies
early in February, 1782. She was at once
bought by the State and placed in Humphrey’s
yard for conversion into a cruiser. Within six
weeks she was put in commission, and she took
the “General Monk,” April 8, about two
months after her arrival in port as a merchant
vessel. This was the last capture of an English
man-of-war in the Revolution.

The peace of 1783 found Philadelphia possessing
only thirteen merchant vessels, all built
before the war and nearly all of which had
served as privateers during the conflict. No
new merchant keel had been laid in a Philadelphia
yard between 1775 and 1782; but the industry
revived with wonderful energy. From
1782 to 1787, one hundred and fifty-five vessels
were built, of which fifty-six were square-rigged
ships averaging over three hundred tons.
From this period on the progress was very
great. The outbreak of the wars of the French
Revolution in 1793 at once threw a vast carrying
trade into American bottoms, the United
.bn p023.png
.pn +1
States being for a long time the only neutral
maritime nation. By the year 1801, when the
treaty, or truce, of Amiens was signed, nearly
three hundred sea-going ships were owned in
Philadelphia, all home-built, and fourteen shipyards
were in operation,—eight in the northern
or Kensington and six in the southern
or Southwark district. These were all first-class
shipyards, building the largest full-rigged
ships of that epoch. In that period and
for a long time afterward the leading Philadelphia
shipyard was that of Joshua Humphreys,
in Southwark, and its proprietor and manager
was himself the foremost naval architect of
his time. When Congress, in 1794, authorized
the construction of six frigates, and thereby
laid the foundation of what we call the modern
or “regular” navy, as distinguished from the
old Continental navy of the Revolution, prominent
ship-builders were asked to submit plans,
the government then having no naval constructors.
The plans of Mr. Humphreys were
adopted for all six frigates. Three of them
embodied a distinct advance in size and weight
of armament over vessels of similar rate in
other navies, and were classed as 44-gun frigates.
The other three were designed as 38-gun
frigates, and were an improvement upon the 36-gun
ships of European navies. These six ships
.bn p024.png
.pn +1
were built by contract,—one of the forty-fours
and one of the thirty-eights at Philadelphia;
one forty-four at Boston; one at New York;
one thirty-eight at Baltimore, and one at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In addition to
these, a 32-gun frigate, the “Essex,” was built
at Salisbury Point, Massachusetts, by private
subscription, and given to the government.

.if h
.il fn=i024.jpg w=600px id=manitou
.ca
CLIPPERSHIP MANITOU
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CLIPPERSHIP MANITOU]
.sp 2
.if-

Mr. Humphreys had the contracts for the
Philadelphia-built frigates, and on May 10,
1797, he launched the 44-gun frigate “United
States,” which was the first ship of the regular
navy to be water-borne. Thus to Philadelphia
belongs the credit of having fitted out
the first squadron of the Continental navy in
1775, and of launching the first ship of the
regular navy in 1797. In 1799, Mr. Humphreys
completed a third frigate, named the “Philadelphia.”
This ship is described in some histories
as a “forty-four,” and in others as a
“thirty-eight.” As a matter of fact, she was
neither; but properly rated, under the rules
then in vogue, as a 40-gun frigate. This difference
was due to the fact that she carried
thirty long 18-pounders on her gundeck as
against twenty-eight 18-pounders in the “Constellation”
class, or as against thirty long 24-pounders
in the “Constitution” or 44-gun
class. The “Philadelphia” was beyond question
.bn p024a.png
.bn p024b.png
.bn p025.png
.pn +1
the most perfect frigate of her day. She
was the same length as the “Constitution,” but
of less beam, slightly less draught, and on finer
lines. In her design, Mr. Humphreys had sacrificed
to speed some of the battery power of
the forty-fours, and therefore had to substitute
18-pounders for 24-pounders on the gundeck.
She was the fastest sailing war-ship in the
world, beating the “Constitution” by nearly
two knots an hour. In her first, and unfortunately
her last, voyage, from this country to
Tripoli, she logged on one occasion three hundred
and thirty-two knots in twenty-four
hours, and on another three hundred and
thirty-seven, the latter run being an average
slightly exceeding fourteen knots. She was
lost in Tripoli harbor in 1803. It is not too
much or too little to say of either that Joshua
Humphreys held a professional rank similar to
that of Charles H. Cramp, that of the foremost
naval architect of his era; and with exceptions,
not worth mention, they are the only
American naval architects whose designs for
sea-going war-ships have been adopted by the
navy.

It is worthy of remark in this connection,
that when the plans of Mr. Humphreys were
adopted in 1794-95, the government not only
had no naval constructors of its own, but in
.bn p026.png
.pn +1
fact no Navy Department, except a Bureau in
the War Department, so that Mr. Humphreys
could have no competitors but other private
ship-builders. Mr. Cramp’s designs, however,
have been adopted under the scrutiny of a
highly competent and most critical corps of
regular naval constructors and marine engineers.

The renewal of general war in Europe in
1803 gave a fresh impetus to the neutral carrying
trade of the United States, and with it a
corresponding stimulus to ship-building all
along the coast, though most pronounced and
on a larger scale at Philadelphia than elsewhere.
Between the above date and 1812 nine
more shipyards were established, making
twenty-three all told in operation at one time.
The largest merchant vessel up to that time
built in America was one of seven hundred and
five tons, constructed by Samuel Bowers for
the East India trade, and her dimensions were
not exceeded in merchant construction until
after the War of 1812-15. Her contract price
was $24,000; at the rate of $34 per ton gross
measurement. At that time vessels of similar
class cost ten guineas ($50) per gross ton in
British shipyards.

In a public document on the statistics of
ship-building, we find a statement that “in
.bn p027.png
.pn +1
June, 1787, the ship ‘Alliance,’ owned by Robert
Morris and commanded by Captain Thomas
Read, sailed from Philadelphia for Canton and
Batavia. She was of seven hundred tons burthen,
and the largest ship built for commerce
in America at that time.”

The statement that the “Alliance” was
“built for commerce” is an error. She was
the famous old Revolutionary frigate which
Paul Jones and John Barry had commanded
at different times. After the peace of 1783 she
was sold to Mr. Morris, or rather turned over
to him in part payment for advance he had
made to the Continental government. She was
converted into a merchant ship and made several
China voyages. The government then
bought her back again in 1790, but she was
not refitted as a war vessel.

During the general period under consideration,
that is to say, from the end of the Revolution
to the beginning of the War of 1812, a
new and highly important deep-sea traffic came
into existence, of which Philadelphia soon obtained
the supreme command. This was the
East India and China trade. The first vessel
to clear from Philadelphia for China direct
was the new ship “Canton,” built by Humphreys
and commanded by Captain, afterward
Commodore, Thomas Truxtun.
.bn p028.png
.pn +1

This was the same Thomas Truxtun who,
during the Revolution, had seen more service
in privateers than any other sailor then afloat.
He served either as mate or commander in the
Philadelphia privateers, “Andrew Caldwell,”
“Congress,” “Independence,” “Mars,” and
“St. James,” from 1775 to 1782. His ships
made altogether sixty-five captures of British
merchantmen and transports. While commanding
the “St. James,” of twenty guns, in
1781, he beat off and disabled a British 28-gun
frigate. After the Revolution he commanded
Philadelphia Indiamen from 1785
to 1798, when he was commissioned one of the
original six captains in the regular navy. In
the short war with France in 1799 he commanded
the “Constellation,” 38-gun frigate,
and took the French frigate “l’Insurgente,”
of forty guns.

The “Canton” sailed from Philadelphia on
December 30, 1785. She returned in May,
1787, having made the round voyage to Canton,
Batavia, and home in a little over sixteen
months. Her venture was highly profitable.
From this beginning the far eastern trade grew
steadily until, in 1805, Philadelphia alone owned
twenty-seven ships plying in it, ranging from
four hundred and twenty to seven hundred and
five tons. Between 1805 and 1812, inclusive,
.bn p029.png
.pn +1
the number of Philadelphia Indiamen and
China ships increased to forty-two, notwithstanding
the injurious effect of President Jefferson’s
ill-advised embargo. In fact, that measure
was not much observed by ship-owners in
the India and China trade. President Jefferson
did not attempt to enforce his embargo by either
civil or military power, and very soon after he
proclaimed it, the understanding became general
among merchant ship-owners that if they chose
to take the risks entailed by the British “Orders
in Council” and Napoleon’s “Decrees of
Milan and Berlin,” they could do so at their
peril, with no recourse for protection or indemnity
in case of misfortune. Under these
conditions, ship-owning merchants, in other
coast cities who traded with European or West
India ports, for the most part hesitated to take
the chances. But the Philadelphia merchant
princes, who controlled the American trade
with the British and Dutch East Indies and
China, were not so easily foiled. They loaded
and despatched their ships during the embargo,
a period of nearly two years, almost as
freely, if not as ostentatiously, then as they
had done before or as they did afterward. This
policy was founded upon the soundest judgment.
The India and China merchants of Philadelphia
understood perfectly that the titanic
.bn p030.png
.pn +1
struggle between England and Napoleon involved
conflicting policies and ambitions relating
only to the commerce between America and
Europe, not to that between America and the
Orient. Occasionally an American ship bound
for India or China or thence for home would
be brought to by an English or a French
cruiser and searched. But, as those ships
never carried anything contraband of war, the
worst that ever happened to them was the occasional
impressment of parts of their crews
by the English or the levying of a small tribute
by the French. The voyages, as a whole, were
seldom interrupted, and almost never terminated
by detention or capture. These were
the halcyon days of Philadelphia’s trade with
the far East. From 1803 to 1815 the French
could not trade to the Orient at all. And
though the East India Company kept up the
sailings of its fleet with more or less regularity,
yet the war rates of insurance and the expense
and inconvenience of constant convoy
placed their traffic at signal disadvantage as
compared with that of the neutral Americans.

The Philadelphia-built Indiamen and China
ships of that day had another and even more
important element of safety: Given plenty of
sea-room and clear weather, with sailing wind,
.bn p031.png
.pn +1
no British or French cruiser of their time
could get anywhere near them.

For example, the “Rebecca Sims,” built by
Samuel Bowers in 1801, and overhauled, coppered,
and newly sparred and rigged in the
winter of 1806-07, passed Cape Henlopen the
10th of May, 1807, and took a Liverpool pilot
aboard off the mouth of the Mersey the 24th,
having run from the Delaware Capes to the
Mersey in fourteen days. Notwithstanding all
the improvements in clipper ships after her
time, the “Rebecca Sims” still holds the sailing
record between Henlopen and Liverpool!

The “Woodrup Sims,” built for the same
owner by Mr. Humphreys in 1801, was chartered
for the China trade in 1808. She passed
out of the Capes the 8th of April and anchored
in Whampoa Roads, Canton, the 6th of August,
one hundred and seventeen days from the Delaware.
But from this must be deducted two
days hove-to in Table Bay, Cape of Good
Hope; three days in port at the Isle of France
(now the Mauritius), and two days hove-to in
Angier Road, Java Head, the actual running
time having been one hundred and ten days.
Manifestly, ships capable of that kind of sailing
had little need to fear the cruisers of England
or of France.

To give an approximate idea of the value of
.bn p032.png
.pn +1
Philadelphia’s East India and China trade in
its halcyon days, it may be related that in the
autumn of 1812 the ship “Montesquieu,” belonging
to Stephen Girard, left Canton for the
Delaware <i>via</i> Batavia. At the latter port she
took on board, in addition to her China cargo
from Canton, a rich freight of spices. She
left Batavia before the news of the War of
1812 reached there. Her commander had intended
to touch only at the Cape of Good Hope
on his voyage home, that being a British colony.
But when about five hundred miles east
of the Cape he spoke a Portuguese vessel
bound for Macao, whose captain informed him
that England and the United States were at
war. He then ran for Tristan d’Acunha,
where he obtained needed supplies of water
and wood, with such fresh provisions as the
island afforded. Thence shaping his course
homeward he arrived off the Capes of the Delaware
in April, 1813. There she was brought
to and taken by the British frigate “Tenedos.”
But Mr. Girard was on the alert, and, judging
about the time she ought to arrive, had been
waiting for her in a cottage he owned at or
near Lewes, and she was taken in plain sight
of the shore. He at once put off in a pilot-yawl
under a flag of truce, boarded the British
frigate, and after some parley succeeded in
.bn p033.png
.pn +1
ransoming the “Montesquieu” for £37,000
sterling in specie bills on London! He then
took his ship up the river to Philadelphia. The
blockade had raised the value of China and
East India products enormously in the American
market, and Mr. Girard realized the handsome
sum of $1,220,000 from the sale of her
cargo over and above the $185,000 he had paid
as ransom. He was also offered a large sum
for the ship herself to fit out as a privateer,
but part of his agreement with the British
captain was that she should not be used for
that purpose, and so she was laid up during
the rest of the war.

Upon the conclusion of peace in 1815, the
India and China trade of Philadelphia was renewed
with great vigor, and ship-building became
more brisk than ever before.

The war had nearly obliterated the whaling
fleet of New England and New York. Unable
to replace those lost or destroyed as quickly
as they desired in their own ports, the whaling
owners resorted to Philadelphia, and in the
seven years between 1815-1822 sixty-four
ships, ranging from three hundred to four
hundred tons, were built on the Delaware for
the whale fishery to hail from New Bedford,
Nantucket, New London, Sag Harbor, and
other whaling ports. A peculiarity of these
.bn p034.png
.pn +1
transactions was that most of the contracts for
building whale-ships were taken by New England
builders and then sublet to Philadelphia
yards.

At the same time, that is, in the decade following
the peace of 1815, a new element of
ocean commerce came into being. This was
the inauguration of regular packet-lines. The
pioneer of this enterprise on any considerable
scale was the famous “Cope Line,” founded
by Thomas P. Cope in 1820, and employing at
first five ships which were among the largest
and best vessels then afloat. This line continued
to run until the Civil War. Its ships
were from five hundred and sixty to one thousand
two hundred and eighty tons. They
sailed from Philadelphia the 20th of each
month and from Liverpool the 8th, their trip-time
averaging thirty days and being almost
as regular as the modern steamship lines. In
addition to this regular monthly service, extra
ships were frequently despatched as the exigencies
of trade and travel might require.

Mr. Cramp, in one of his reminiscences, relates
an interesting anecdote of the Cope Line.
Soon after Jackson was inaugurated President,
he appointed John Randolph, of Roanoke,
Minister to Russia. The Cope Line being
then far ahead of all other channels of ocean
.bn p035.png
.pn +1
travel from Philadelphia to Europe, Mr. Randolph
presented himself at its shipping-office.
In his usual grandiloquent manner he said to
the first man he encountered: “Sir, I want to
see Thomas P. Cope.” He was shown to Mr.
Cope’s office, and said to him, “I am John Randolph
of Roanoke. I wish to take passage to
Liverpool in one of your ships.” Mr. Cope replied,
“I am Thomas Cope; if thee goes
aboard the ship and selects thy state-room and
will pay $150, thee may go.” Mr. Cope apparently
could see no reason why a Philadelphia
ship-owner and head of a great packet
line should stand in awe of even a Virginia
statesman.

About 1828-30 the India and China trade of
Philadelphia suddenly declined, and in a few
years passed almost entirely into the hands of
New York and Boston. In a historical paper,
Mr. Cramp describes the conditions of this
traffic at its zenith, and suggests the cause or
causes of its remarkable decline.

The custom, he says, was upon the arrival of
the vessels to announce in the papers not only
of Philadelphia but also of New York, Boston,
Baltimore, and even less important cities, that
the goods would be sold at auction, to begin on
a certain day. These auction sales brought
great numbers of merchants from other cities
.bn p036.png
.pn +1
to Philadelphia, and during the first quarter
of the nineteenth century it was beyond doubt
the most profitable single line of traffic on the
continent. The merchants engaged in it were
not mere buyers and sellers as the term is understood
now. They were important public
characters, diplomatists and financiers, and
their influence extended to the remotest parts
of the earth. They amassed enormous fortunes
and lived like princes. Some of them,
either singly or in associations, owned fleets
that would compare favorably with our then
existing navy in numbers and tonnage. At its
highest development, say, between 1825 and
1836, the volume of Philadelphia’s Oriental
trade frequently reached sixty millions a year.

.if h
.il fn=i036.jpg w=600px id=york
.ca
CRUISER YORKTOWN
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CRUISER YORKTOWN]
.sp 2
.if-

Finally, however, causes began to operate
which gradually changed the tide of affairs.
These causes, as stated in the historical paper
by Mr. Cramp, were numerous. Among them
was the fact that, as the original merchants
who had built up the trade grew old or died,
their immediate heirs or descendants did not
care to carry on the enterprises of their fathers
or their grandfathers, and many of them
lived permanently abroad. Eventually, at the
moment when the jealousy, envy, and ambition
of rivals, particularly in New York and
New England, had reached the critical stage,
.bn p036a.png
.bn p036b.png
.bn p037.png
.pn +1
the Legislature of Pennsylvania enacted a law
imposing a certain tax on all auction sales
within the State. This was a tax ostensibly
universal and covering the whole business of
sales by auction, but its real purpose was to
get at and derive revenue from the great auction
business of the China and India trade of
Philadelphia. In those days it might easily
happen that the auction sales of two or three
ships’ cargoes would exceed in value, and
therefore in revenue, all the rest of the auction
sales in the State at large during the same
time.

Of course, this was a development of a tendency
on the part of the rural or country legislator
of that time, which unfortunately has
not entirely died out, to tax the great cities by
special enactments for the benefit of the general
revenue of the State.

As already stated, other causes had for some
time been operating to weaken or shake Philadelphia’s
supremacy in the Oriental trade, but
the imposition of this tax, falling upon the
heels of those causes, proved to be the last
straw that broke the camel’s back. The result
was that between 1825 and 1836 the great India
and China traffic of Philadelphia almost disappeared.
However, and notwithstanding the
diversion of this trade to other ports, principally
.bn p038.png
.pn +1
in New England, the marine architects
and ship-builders of Philadelphia managed to
retain the better part of the construction of
vessels, which for many years afterward were
employed by their successful rivals.

This somewhat extensive and discursive
survey of the early colonial and post-Revolutionary
conditions of Philadelphia ship-building
seems requisite to a proper understanding
of the state of the art and its accompaniments
at the time when the subject of this Memoir
first appeared upon the scene, and it also
serves to indicate or explain what he had to do
and the prior achievements which he had to
equal or excel in his pursuit of professional
success and eminence.
.bn p039.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2 id=ch02
CHAPTER II
.sp 2
.pm ch-head
Birth—Relatives—High School—Magnetic Observatory—Note
on Davidson—Surf-boats for Mexican War—First
Propeller Tug “Sampson”—Ship-builders of
New York and Philadelphia—Clipper Ships, 1850—Zenith
of American Carrying Trade—Crimean War—Cunard
Line—“Libertador”—Armored Ships—Board
Appointed to Take Charge of Appropriation
to Build Them—Account of “New Ironsides”—The
“Monitor”—Speech of Bishop Simpson—Sub-Department
of Navy—Light-draught Monitors—Sinking
of the First—Collapse of Sub-Department—Rebuilding
of “Yazoo,” “Tunxis,” and others—“Miantonomah”—Origin
of Fast Cruisers—Evolution of
Modern Marine Engineering in this Country.
.pm ch-head-end

<sc>Charles Henry Cramp</sc> was born May 9,
1828. He was the eldest son of William Cramp
and Sophia Miller. At the time of his birth his
father was a master shipwright, not yet engaged
in ship-building on his own account, or
at least not the proprietor of a shipyard.

The Cramp family are of the old German descent,
and they were among the first settlers on
the banks of the Delaware. The name was
Krampf up to the Revolution, when, according
to the fashion at that time, it was anglicized.
They came from Baden.
.bn p040.png
.pn +1

The fact that the art of ship-building “ran
in the blood” may be judged from the fact that
in 1788 Paul Jones, commanding the Russian
Black Sea fleet during the Turkish war of that
period, under the reign of Catherine the Great,
says in his journal that among the foreign employees
of the Russian Ministry of Marine was
a naval architect named John Cramp, who held
the position of secretary to the Russian Black
Sea administration and had charge of the dock-yard
which had been established at Kherson.

The Millers and Byerlys of the mother’s
family were also ship-builders. Mr. Cramp’s
maternal grandfather, Henry Miller, who had
become proficient as a shipwright, at twenty-one
invested his small fortune in an interest in
the cargo of a vessel in one of the earliest voyages
after the Revolution from the port of
Philadelphia to the East, taking in China, the
Indies, and the Philippines. His departure
was witnessed by his fiancée, Elizabeth Byerly,
who waited faithfully and patiently his return.

These vessels were fitted out “man-of-war
fashion,” with the captain and mates, carpenter
and boatswain as officers, and the latter
were the battery commanders.

They always carried a supercargo, and sold
the cargoes at the various ports and invested
.bn p041.png
.pn +1
the proceeds in China shawls, teas, spices, and
other products of the East.

At that time the waters of the East Indies
and China swarmed with adventurers, pirates,
rovers, and privateers; and the armed merchantmen
had frequent brushes with them. In
fact, many merchantmen of that time became
imbued with the restless, adventurous spirit
of the age and, commanding vessels heavily
armed, took possession of some of the weaker
ships they encountered, becoming veritable
pirates for a time, and then returning to their
homes under peaceful guise when the profits
of their voyage had reached a satisfactory figure.
The foundations of many fortunes in our
Atlantic cities were laid upon such practices.

Mr. Miller embarked again with his augmented
capital, in fact, making four voyages,
each time with the profits of previous voyages
in the new one, encountering many adventures
with the pirates that infested the waters of
the East and with an occasional privateer.

It was on his return from the fourth voyage
when he, with the accumulations of his original
venture sufficient to secure a life of ease and
comparative luxury, and eager to meet his fiancée,
who would be patiently awaiting his arrival,
was in sight of Cape Henlopen, with the
full assurance that his voyages were ended and
.bn p042.png
.pn +1
with every anticipation of a happy consummation
of his eager wishes, a large privateer carrying
a French flag hove in sight in a position
of advantage.

The privateer, carrying a heavier armament
and larger crew, captured the vessel before
she could get inside of the Capes, and took the
whole party to Martinique, where the whole
property was confiscated and all the crew and
officers were put in jail.

Mr. Miller, who was a Mason, was astonished
to find that the French jailer was also one,
and, as a mark of kindness, took him out and
made a body-servant of him. His ingenuity
and adaptability to circumstances enabled him
to escape, and he reached Philadelphia without
a cent and but little raiment. When Elizabeth
Byerly was seen next day on Point-no-Point
Road in a buggy with him, she looked as happy
as if fortune was already in her hands. When
they were married the next day, a serviceable
loan from a friend facilitated the marriage
festivities.

His restless, adventurous spirit, augmented
by his voyages at sea, now took a different
turn, and his time was taken up by trips from
Pittsburg to New Orleans in arks that he and
his companions built in Pittsburg, and with
cargoes of produce and other freight they
.bn p043.png
.pn +1
floated down the Ohio and Mississippi, relieving
each other at steering or playing the violin
and taking an occasional shot at a deer
that would be found swimming across the river.
The rivers Ohio and Mississippi ran through
a wilderness at that time, and its fascinations
had a wonderful effect on him.

After the cargoes and the lumber of which
the arks were built were sold and the proceeds
lost in speculation, they would make their way
up to Natchez or other river towns, where they
would be sure to get a steamboat or a flat boat
or two to build, and then return to Philadelphia
for a while. Henry Miller became well
known on the rivers, and could always secure
a commission to build the various craft that
were found in the waters of the West.

One of Henry Miller’s sisters married John
Bennett, a ship-builder of repute, who went to
live in Bordentown while engaged with his
sons at Hoboken as shipwright and ship-builder
for the celebrated Stevens family. It
was there that with other vessels they built the
yacht “Maria,” named after the wife of John
Stevens. The building of the “Maria” was an
event, and Maria Stevens spent most of her
spare time at the yard in looking over her construction
and finish. The Stevens battery was
begun during the Bennett period.
.bn p044.png
.pn +1

Mrs. Miller’s brother was John Byerly, and
her sister married William Sutton, both noted
ship-builders. So when William Cramp, who
had learned his profession under Samuel
Grice, married Sophia Miller, two families of
ship-builders were united.

Charles H. Cramp was two years old when
his father acquired frontage on the Delaware
in Kensington and established a shipyard of
his own.

This early enterprise of William Cramp,
who was then twenty-three years old, has since
grown to be the great establishment known as
The William Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine
Building Company.

It does not seem necessary here to recount
the progress of that pioneer enterprise. Suffice
it to say that at the time when William
Cramp founded his shipyard it was one of
fourteen on the Delaware at different points
on the river front between Southwark and
Kensington, and it is the only one of the fourteen
that remains in existence.

Of Charles Henry Cramp’s childhood and
early youth, it is not necessary to speak here
in detail. He was, it might be said, born into
the atmosphere of naval architecture and the
art of ship-building, and from his earliest activity
.bn p045.png
.pn +1
he never practised or attempted to practise
any other profession.

When about fourteen years of age he had exhausted
the educational possibilities of the ordinary
schools and entered the old Central
High School, which was then presided over by
Alexander Dallas Bache, the most consummate
master of the science of applied mathematics
and the physical sciences of his time in this
country, if not in the world. While at the High
School, Mr. Bache was appointed to take
charge of the appropriation of a million dollars
by Congress to defray the cost of a series of
observations on terrestrial magnetism in co-operation
with similar observations along the
same lines in Europe, and also for the purpose
of making certain observations in meteorology.
The appropriations for the last-named observations
were made on the recommendations
of Professor Espy. This was about 1846.

While Washington was the central point of
the observations, Philadelphia was practically
the head-quarters, because Professor Bache
and his associate. Major Bache, resided there.

Observations were established at Charleston,
New Orleans, and Utica, and they communicated
with Toronto, the Canadian station.

Professor Bache took his observers at Philadelphia
from among the pupils of the High
.bn p046.png
.pn +1
School for night work, and he had the day
observers from the University.

George Davidson, Charles H. Cramp, and
William H. Hunter were among the number,
and the observations, after being collated at
Washington, were ultimately deposited at the
Smithsonian Institute, and later on formed the
basis of the operations of the “Signal Service
Bureau.” At the time the observations were
made, the magnetic telegraph had not as yet
been utilized, and the course of storms was
portrayed by mail after they had occurred.

Not long after this period, Professor Bache
was appointed to succeed Mr. Hasler as head
of the Coast Survey. He invited the young
men who were in the group of the magnetic
installation to accompany him in his new field
of labor, and Mr. Cramp was invited with the
rest, but desiring to engage in ship-building he
pursued that art.

Mr. Davidson, who was in the magnetic observations
with Mr. Cramp, and was a school-mate
and life-long friend, remained on the
Coast Survey under Mr. Bache, and spent the
greater portion of his life on the Pacific in
that capacity; and it was under his direction
and control that the great Triangulation of our
newly acquired possessions there from the
Rocky Mountains to the coast was made by
.bn p047.png
.pn +1
him, and said to be by scientists the greatest
work in geodesy ever made by or under one
man.

He is now Professor of Commercial Geography
in the University of California. He has
filled nearly every position there that required
the highest attainments in the physical sciences.
The Alaska Commission, inauguration
of Lick Observatory, expeditions for the observation
of eclipses of the sun, are a small
portion of the important positions that he has
filled. His contributions to science would fill
volumes.

At the end of a term of three and one-half
years under the tutorship of Professor Bache,
Mr. Cramp entered the shipyard of his maternal
uncle, John Byerly. This arrangement
was made, notwithstanding the fact that his
father, William Cramp, was then actively engaged
in ship-building on his own account; the
idea being that it would be better, all things
considered, for him to begin his practical experience
under other tutorage than that of his
own father.

About 1846, or in his nineteenth year, Mr.
Cramp, having attained to a certain point the
qualifications of a practical ship-builder in his
uncle’s shipyard, went to that of his own
father.
.bn p048.png
.pn +1

.if h
.il fn=i048.jpg w=600px id=terror
.ca
MONITOR TERROR
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: MONITOR TERROR]
.sp 2
.if-

Among the first things undertaken when in
his father’s yard, Mr. Cramp designed the
pioneer propeller tug-boat ever built in the
United States, the “Sampson,” and it fixed the
type now so numerous in the waters of America.
She was of a peculiar build. Her dimensions
were eighty feet long and twenty feet
beam. She had as much dead rise as a pilot-boat
or “pungy,” and had a keel three feet
wide at the stern-post. In getting up the design,
it was considered indispensable by the
marine engineers at that time to have the screw
entirely beneath the bottom of the vessel, and,
as the screw was six feet in diameter, the engine-builders
wanted the keel six feet wide.
When shown the impracticability of this, they
were content to have three feet of the screw
beneath the bottom of the ship. The propeller
shaft ran on top of the floors and the bearings
were between the frames. The crank was between
the frames and just cleared the outside
planking in its sweep. She proved to be a
profitable investment for the owners, Michael
Molloy & Son, who ordered another one.
This was the “Bird.” She had a narrower
keel, and the bearings of the propeller shaft
were secured to the top of the floors. Another
one was built a short time after, and, in view
of the shallow water in which she had to run,
.bn p048a.png
.bn p048b.png
.bn p049.png
.pn +1
the keel was only ten inches wide. This was
considered a great detriment to the efficiency of
the screw; but on the trial it was found that
the importance of wide keels was overestimated,
and the practice came to an end.

A considerable operation of unusual and interesting
character was undertaken by his
father about that time, and in which Mr.
Cramp himself assisted. This was the design
and construction of a fleet of surf-boats intended
for the purpose of facilitating the landing
of General Scott’s army at Vera Cruz. The
naval and military authorities of that time
were doubtful of the capacity of the ordinary
boats of the fleet itself to land a sufficient body
of troops at one time to command the shore.
The intention at first was to provide a sufficient
number of boats to land the whole army
at once, and three hundred boats were contracted
for upon a design made by William
Cramp.

Only a part of them was built by Mr. Cramp,
but they were all built upon his plans. They
were large surf-boats of three different sizes,
and were carried to Vera Cruz on the decks of
schooners chartered for the purpose. The
thwarts were taken out of the larger boats and
the smaller ones of different sizes were stowed
in them.
.bn p050.png
.pn +1

The “Standard History of the Mexican
War” shows that out of the total number
(three hundred) designed by Cramp and contracted
for with different boat-builders, only
one hundred and eighty-six (186) were actually
delivered and used, and in the operations
against Vera Cruz, General Scott’s army was
landed by divisions. The Regular Division
commanded by General Worth was put on
shore first, then the Volunteer Division of General
Robert Patterson, and, finally, the mixed
Regular and Volunteer Division of General
Twiggs.

After these boats had been used for their
original purpose they were cast adrift. Their
sea-worthiness may be estimated from the fact
that some of them were picked up in mid-Atlantic
months afterward.

There are stories in history about invading
armies burning their bridges behind them, but
this is unquestionably the only instance where
an army deliberately cast loose the boats in
which it had landed upon the soil of an enemy.
Burning bridges might mean, and doubtless
would, the simple destruction of means of recrossing
a river in the case of disaster, but the
destruction or dispersion of the boats in which
Scott’s army landed at Vera Cruz meant the
obliteration of any possible means they might
.bn p051.png
.pn +1
have had of crossing a gulf and ocean had the
fortune of war been adverse to them.

Starbuck, in his “History of the American
Whale-fishery,” refers to this incident, and
says that some of these boats were picked up
by whaling-ships, whose crews highly prized
them, and that they were used for years afterward
in the sperm and right-whale fisheries
of the Pacific Ocean.

At the beginning of the career of Mr. Cramp
in ship-building, the profession had arrived at
its highest state of efficiency in everything that
related to the design, finish, and outfit of ships.
They were with but few exceptions all of wood,
and it was in the wooden ship and during the
period between 1840 and 1860 that the art and
everything belonging to it attained its highest
proficiency. Ship-building as an art, profession,
and science culminated about this time,—the
great transition from wood to iron.

From the earliest period up to that time the
professional ship-builder or “master builder,”
as he has always been called, was a master in
reality. He designed, modelled, and built his
own ships, and his appreciation of the beautiful
and his artistic taste were of the most refined
and cultivated character, and were everything
that the term sculptor, artist, and constructor
meant. He was acutely sensitive; his
.bn p052.png
.pn +1
contempt for the quack and commonplace in his
profession was as great as that of the physician
in regular practice for the medical quack.

The builder, the shipwright, the commander,
and sailor of this period have never been
equalled in any of their professions since, and
with but few exceptions the modern steel ship
is a retrograde in everything pertaining to the
real art as compared to the ship of the period
we refer to. The ships, of course, are larger
now, and that is all. This period was not only
noted on account of the high character of the
art, but ship-building plants in New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore turned out the
finest specimens of construction in the world.
All of the workmen—shipwrights, ship-joiners,
ship-smiths, ship-painters, and caulkers—were
without equals on the planet.

The Webbs, the Westervelts, the Steers family,
Jere Simonson, Smith and Dimon and others
of New York, and John Vaughan, John
Byerly, the Van Duzen family, John K. Hammett
and William Cramp, of Philadelphia,
were the leaders of their profession the world
over. In the navy were to be found the Grices,
the Humphreys, the Hanscoms, Delano, and
others.

The introduction of the iron ship was made
under very unfavorable conditions. The first
.bn p053.png
.pn +1
to take hold of the new material were people,
mechanically speaking, of commonplace character
both here and abroad, and the art or profession
as a rule retains the original taint up
to this time. There are some exceptions; some
ship-builders in Great Britain carried their art
into the Iron Age,—the Napiers, the Ingliss
family, and others in Great Britain, and the
Cramps in the United States.

Mr. Cramp’s mould loft practice and methods
as carried on from the wooden-ship period
is the practice now in use in the construction
of the navy.

The great advance in the steamship of the
period thence up to this time has been in the
machinery; and in marine engineering the
English were our masters. There has been no
advance here in the ship-building art in any
respect.

The decade following the Mexican War and
preceding that of the Rebellion was marked
chiefly by the final or ultimate development of
the clipper type of sailing-vessel, and also by
the gradual surrender of sail to steam in propulsion
and of wood to iron in construction.
The clipper idea was undoubtedly of Baltimore
origin, and, in fact, the name of that city was
given to the type,—the “Baltimore Clipper.”
They were, of course, sailing-vessels. In all
.bn p054.png
.pn +1
respects of model, of structure, size of spars
and sails, dimensions of hull, etc., the type was
distinctly American. It is known, however,
that the earliest clippers built in Baltimore
were intended for and used in the African
slave-trade. In this nefarious traffic they were
extremely successful, because in the day of
their beginning there were no steam cruisers
to enforce the laws making the slave-trade piracy,
and there was no sailing cruiser afloat
which could keep within sight of a Baltimore
clipper in the slave-trading days.

The type, though originating in Baltimore,
was not developed there to its ultimate capacity,
but the idea was taken up by Philadelphia,
New York, and New England ship-builders
and embodied in the famous lines which
plied between this country and the Pacific
Ocean. The discovery of gold in California
also gave a great impetus to commerce in sailing-vessels.
Of course, steamships soon began
to run from New York to the Atlantic side of
the Isthmus and from the Pacific side to San
Francisco, but there was no railway across the
Isthmus at first, so that very little freight
traffic could be handled by these steamers.
The result was that all freights between the
Atlantic coast and California had to go around
.bn p055.png
.pn +1
Cape Horn, and in this traffic the clipper ship
fully asserted its value.

The decade of the 50’s was really the zenith
of the American carrying trade on the ocean.
Relatively to the total amount of ocean commerce,
our ships carried a larger proportion
of it than ever before in time of peace. Of
course, during the Napoleonic wars, when our
flag was neutral, we carried a larger proportion
of our own products than in the 50’s, but
never before in a time of general peace.

The Crimean War, which happened during
this period, also helped American commerce in
the ocean carrying trade, because the French
and English took up a great deal of their
tonnage for transporting troops and military
supplies during the years 1854, 1855, and 1856,
and to a great extent the places of these ships
were filled by vessels under the American flag.

All these causes combined to create marked
activity in American ship-building.

To this might be added the effort to establish
a trans-Atlantic steamship line under the
American flag in opposition to the heavily subsidized
Cunard Line. This was known as the
Collins Line, and while the government aid
lasted it held its own in competition with its
British antagonists, but the subsidy was soon
.bn p056.png
.pn +1
withdrawn, and with it the Collins Line collapsed.

On the whole, so far as American ocean commerce
and ship-building are concerned, the
decade of the 50’s was one of the most interesting
in our history. During that period the
Cramp concern built from the designs and
under the superintendence of Charles H.
Cramp a considerable number of important
sailing merchant vessels, together with several
steamers, mostly constructed for the
coasting trade between the ports on the Atlantic
and on the Gulf. Cramp also built
during that period seven steamers for Spanish
or Cuban account to be used in the coasting
trade of the Spanish West Indies. They
were called “Carolina,” “Cardenas,” “Alphonso,”
“Union ‘Maisi,’” “General Armero,”
and “Union No. 2.” The last one
was not finished until the outbreak of the Rebellion,
when she was taken possession of temporarily
by the government and converted
into a gun-boat, now in the navy list as the
“Union.” An interesting incident in Mr.
Cramp’s career was his visit to Havana for
the purpose of delivering these ships. In their
delivery and in making settlement for their
construction he spent several months at Havana,
where his knowledge of the Spanish
.bn p057.png
.pn +1
language, in which he always retained considerable
proficiency, was of great service to
him.

The first war vessel designed by Mr. Cramp
was the “Libertador,” built for Venezuela.
She was fitted with a pair of trunk engines by
Messrs. Sutton & Smith, who were noted for
their skill in building trunk and oscillating
and other marine engines. She mounted a
large pivot-gun on her quarter-deck, and when
fired off on her trial trip at Market Street, the
windows there were broken and the gun nearly
kicked herself overboard.

We now arrive at the period of the Civil
War, in the operations connected with which
Mr. Cramp’s genius first became conspicuous
in the broad or national sense.

The work hitherto described, although important
in its time and place and under its
conditions, which were those of peace, had
really served little more than the purpose of
a practical training-school to fit him for the
broader and more comprehensive duties and
responsibilities which the exigencies of the
Civil War imposed.

At the outbreak of that struggle, optimistic
statesmen, like Mr. Seward, dreamed that it
would be over in ninety days. Those dreams
went up in the smoke of the first Bull Run.
.bn p058.png
.pn +1
Then the authorities at Washington awoke to
the fact that they had on their hands a long
and stubborn war.

It is a fact not generally known, or usually
lost sight of, that during the first six months
of the Civil War, that is to say from April
to September, 1861, inclusive, the South raised
and embodied a larger number of troops than
the North did, and the scale in that respect
did not turn until the government had begun
to realize the results of its call for five hundred
thousand men. But the problem that confronted
our authorities was not military alone.
It soon became clear to sagacious minds that
a great sea power must be created as well as
an overpowering force by land. It was a
foregone conclusion that notwithstanding the
great numerical disparity between the white
population of the South and that of the North,—the
proportion being about six millions in
the South to twenty-five millions in the North,—it
would be impossible to overcome them so
long as their ports remained open. If the
Southern people could continue without serious
hindrance to exchange their cotton for
European, principally English, arms, ammunition,
military supplies, and munitions of war
of all kinds, together with provisions and clothing
of the kind which they had habitually imported,
.bn p059.png
.pn +1
their armies could keep the field; their
railroad system could be kept in fair running
order, and the numerical superiority of the
North must thereby to a great extent be neutralized.
Therefore an effective blockade became
an immediate and absolute necessity.

The total coast-line of the Confederacy, Atlantic
Ocean and Gulf together, was three
thousand six hundred miles long, measured in
straight lines. The shore-line, or sinuosities,
was considerably more than twice that length.
It is a coast indented with numerous inland
bays and estuaries, affording easy access to
the immediate interior and safe refuge for
their ships or the ships of those with whom
they traded. Of course, a mere blockade by
proclamation would not be respected by any
foreign maritime power. Paper blockade
so-called had been ruled out of consideration
years before in solemn congress or conference
of the Great Powers.

At that moment our navy was at its lowest
ebb, and, of the few ships available for immediate
service, many were on foreign stations
and could not easily or quickly be recalled, as
the cable system of communication was then
unknown.

The task therefore became that of immediately
improvising a navy capable of enforcing
.bn p060.png
.pn +1
a real blockade. To accomplish this,
before the end of 1861 every steamer of every
description that could keep the sea or carry a
gun was pressed into the service, and our
commercial fleet, so far as steam navigation
was concerned, ceased to exist.

These converted vessels served a fairly good
purpose <i>ad interim</i>, or until the government
could bring its resources to build a more effective
fleet of regular men-of-war.

In addition to this necessity for the immediate
improvisation of a blockading fleet, the
question of armored vessels presented itself,
because, besides the blockade, bombardment of
sea-coast fortifications which had been seized
by the Confederates must be an essential part
of the general plan of operations.

.if h
.il fn=i060.jpg w=600px id=baltimore
.ca
CRUISERS BALTIMORE AND PHILADELPHIA
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CRUISERS BALTIMORE AND PHILADELPHIA]
.sp 2
.if-

The idea of armored ships was then entirely
novel. In 1861 only two efforts had been made,
one by England and the other by France, to
construct an <i>armored sea-going vessel</i>. To
meet this necessity of having ships capable
of attacking heavily armed forts, Congress
passed an act, approved August 3, 1861, authorizing
the construction of armored vessels.
This act authorized and directed the Secretary
to appoint a board of skilled naval officers
to investigate plans and specifications
that might be submitted for the construction
.pn +1
.bn p060b.png
.bn p061.png
.pn +1
of iron- or steel-clad steamships or steam floating
batteries; and, on their favorable report,
authorizing the Secretary to cause one or more
armored or iron- or steel-clad steamships to
be built, making an appropriation of $1,500,000
to carry the act into effect. Pursuant to this
act, the Secretary appointed on August 8 a
board consisting of Commodore Joseph Smith,
Commodore Hiram Paulding, and Commander
Charles Davis, to examine such plans as might
be submitted, and issued an advertisement,
under date of August 7, calling for plans and
prices. The advertisement stated that a general
description and drawings of the vessels’
armor and machinery, sufficient to indicate
the character and probable efficiency of the
vessel, would be required; also that the offer
must state the cost and time for completing,
exclusive of armament and stores, the rate of
speed proposed, etc. Persons proposing to
make offers under this advertisement were required
to inform the Department of their intention
before the 15th of August, and to have
their propositions presented within twenty-five
days from the date of the advertisement.

On September 16, 1861, the board reported
that seventeen offers had been laid before
them. All but three, however, were ruled out,
mainly on account of insufficiency of data or
.bn p062.png
.pn +1
lack of drawings. Several of them were, in
fact, mere suggestions.

The three selected were: First, one to be
built of wood and plated with four inches of
iron; to be a full-rigged ship of about three
thousand three hundred tons displacement;
price, $780,000; length of the vessel, two
hundred and twenty feet; breadth of beam,
sixty feet; depth of hold, twenty-three feet;
contract time, nine months; draught of water,
thirteen feet; speed, nine and one-half knots.

The second, offered by C. S. Bushnell & Co.,
of New Haven, was of the low freeboard monitor
type, the invention of which is commonly
ascribed to John Ericsson; and the third,
offered by same parties, which was afterward
known as the “Galena.”

The first vessel described afterward became
the “New Ironsides.” Her hull was designed
entirely by Mr. Cramp. Generally speaking,
her type was that of a broadside sea-going
iron-clad. She was a roomy, comfortable ship
for her officers and crew. Her fighting quarters
were well protected against the shot of
that day. Although engaged with forts and
batteries a greater number of times than any
other one vessel in the service, her armor was
never pierced.

Perhaps at this point a description of the
.bn p063.png
.pn +1
vessel and the conditions attending her construction,
in the form of a paper read some
years ago by Mr. Cramp before the Contemporary
Club, of Philadelphia, will be more
pointed and interesting than any other delineation.

It is as follows:
.pm h3 "“NEW IRONSIDES”"
.pm letter-start
“When the ‘New Ironsides’ was contracted for there
was no white oak timber available outside of Pennsylvania.
Timber of this kind was cleaned out in Delaware
and Maryland, and Virginia was for the time-being inaccessible.
So the timber that must be used was growing
in the forests of Pennsylvania when the contract was
signed.

“With the exception of pine decking every stick of
timber was of white oak, and being the largest wooden
ship ever built, the frames were very heavy,—the floor
timbers were two to each frame, and, being without first
futtocks and running from bilge to bilge, they required
a tree large enough to be twenty-two inches in diameter
at a height of forty-five feet from the ground. Trees of
this kind were very scarce in Pennsylvania, and frequently
only a single tree would be found in a township, which
had been preserved as an heirloom by the owner, and it
was often difficult to persuade him to sell.

“During the month of October, 1861, we advertised in
the country papers that we would pay a dollar a running
foot for every tree that was brought to us by the first
of January, under the requirements that they were to be
at least twenty-two inches in diameter at forty-five feet
.bn p064.png
.pn +1
from the ground, and the logs were to be sided on two
sides anywhere from thirteen inches up to eighteen inches.

“At this time, the beginning of the war, farming and
business in country towns being very slack, all suitable
trees in the forests of Bucks, Berks, Delaware, and
Chester counties and some counties more remote were
prospected by the country-people and farmers, who
worked very hard utilizing moonlight nights as well as
daytime in cutting and shipping this timber. These
counties were traversed by the North Pennsylvania Railroad,
and the various stations from Quakertown down
were soon gorged with logs that had to be delivered at
our shipyard on or before the first of January to meet
our requirements. By the first of January we had logs
sufficient to make all the floors of the ship, and quite a
number were left at the stations where they had accumulated
too rapidly for the railroad to handle them, and
they could not be delivered within our time limit. This
timber was afterward bought at a reduced price.

“Not being able to get yellow pine, the beams and
water-ways were made of white oak. Some of these pieces
were sixty feet long and were sided up to sixteen inches.
But notwithstanding these difficulties and the fact that
all the frame-timber was standing in the forest when we
took the contract, yet the vessel was launched in six
months after it was signed.

“The region traversed by the North Pennsylvania Railroad
in furnishing the frames, water-ways, and beams
became exhausted in its turn, so that toward the termination
of the war white oak for the beams of the light-draught
monitors had to be procured chiefly in Columbia
County, in the interior of the State of Pennsylvania.

“There was also difficulty in securing timber for the
.bn p065.png
.pn +1
curved futtocks, which were principally made of roots
and were obtained from Delaware.

“The frames were fitted together solidly and caulked
before ceiling or planking was secured, and the outside
planking below the lower edge of armor was twelve inches
thick, tapering off to the lower turn of the bilge to five
inches. So the ship in her defensive capabilities was a
war machine of no mean type.

“If the ship had been built of steel instead of wood,
she would have been sunk when she was struck by a spar
torpedo off Charleston.

“The explosion took place at the height of the orlop-deck,
where the outside planking was twelve inches thick,
and where the end of a sixteen-inch beam backed the
frames. The side sprung in about six inches at the point
of contact with the torpedo, ‘brooming’ the end of the
sixteen-inch oak beam, and considerable water came in
for a short time. The side of the ship, through the elasticity
of the material, came back to its original form in
a short time and the leak stopped. A gigantic marine,
who was sitting on his chest at that part of the deck near
the point of the explosion was thrown upward against
the beams above him, breaking his collar-bone, and he was
the only person injured on the ship.

“The time involved in the construction of the ‘New
Ironsides,’ launching in six months from the laying of the
keel, was remarkable in view of the fact that, besides the
timber difficulty, nearly all the skilled workmen and ship-wrights
here had gone into the navy-yard, and we were
compelled to scour the country for men who were mostly
indifferent mechanics. A large number of ship-carpenters
and other men came from Baltimore and Maine, who
had left their homes to avoid conscription or to secure
the high rates of wages paid here.
.bn p066.png
.pn +1

“An interesting incident connected with the building
of the ‘New Ironsides’ was the fact that during the first
half of her construction the progress in naval ordnance
had advanced so rapidly that the authorities concluded to
enlarge the caliber of her guns sufficiently to double the
power of the original design. The ship was at first
planned to carry sixteen 8-inch smooth-bore guns, which
was at that time considered the heaviest caliber that could
be worked in a broadside mount. Having in view the fact
that all war-ships heretofore built, particularly steam-ships,
exceeded their calculated draught, I determined to
avoid a similar error in this ship. I provided against it
in my calculations of displacement by allowing a foot for
a margin. The draught was not to exceed fifteen feet; I
allowed for fourteen feet. The minimum height of the
port-sills above water at load draught, to insure sea-worthiness
and ability to fight the guns in sea-way, should
have been seven feet, according to our instructions. But
in getting up the plans I arranged that the port-sills
with the 8-inch battery would be eight feet above water.
My calculations having been correctly made, I had a foot
to spare.

“About three months after we began work, and when
the frames were up and the beams in, the Department
decided to arm the ship with fourteen 11-inch Dahlgrens
in broadside and two 200-pounders (8-inch Parrotts).
They were all muzzle loaders. This, together with the
increased weight of ammunition for the larger guns, exactly
consumed my foot of margin and brought the
port-sills down to the normal height of seven feet above
water, and the draught of ship there was not over fifteen
feet, the original design.

“It may not be improper to say that I received much
credit and congratulation from the Board and others for
.bn p067.png
.pn +1
my foresight in allowing the margin as I did, and for
the correctness of my calculations. But for that the modified
battery would have brought the port-sills down to
six feet or less, which would have rendered it dangerous
to open the main-deck ports in much of a sea.

“During the earlier stages of the construction of this
ship but little attention was paid to it by the people of
the country; the exciting conditions of the war on land;
battles won and lost; the movement of troops, etc., occupied
the entire attention of the people; so that while the
yard was left open and no fence around it there were no
visitors.

“When the battle between the ‘Monitor’ and ‘Merrimac’
took place a short time before launching the ‘New
Ironsides,’ the whole world was aroused, and their attention
was called to the fact that there were such things as
armor-clad ships.

“When the number of visitors who applied for admission
was so great that we had to build a high fence
around the shipyard, and only admitted those who secured
tickets issued by us, and when the launch took place, it
was under conditions of great excitement and enthusiasm.
The completion of the ship was accomplished in a very
short time, and her first scene of operations was before
Fort Sumter, which she bombarded eleven months and
two days after the contract was signed.

“At this point the history of the contracts may be
stated:

“When the appropriation was made by Congress for
the purpose of constructing iron-clads, the Secretary of
the Navy, as has been remarked, created a board on
armored ships, consisting of Commodores Paulding,
Smith, and Davis, who were fully authorized to carry out
the provisions of the law and make contracts, keeping
.bn p068.png
.pn +1
in view what had been done by England and France in
the way of iron-plated floating batteries. These gentlemen
advertised for plans and specifications accompanied
by proposals for accomplishing the purpose of the act
of Congress. There were twenty-five or thirty proposals,
embracing a great diversity of projects, the principal features
of most of which were lack of well-defined plan,
type, and character.

“After considerable investigation, the board decided
to accept three plans and award the contracts. They were
the ‘New Ironsides,’ the original ‘Monitor,’ and the
‘Galena.’ Those three vessels exhibited a vast diversity
in form, construction, and outfit.

“A number of fables have originated and have come to
be believed as truths about many of the circumstances
attending the selection of plans. Among others, it was
said that Mr. Lincoln himself, being impressed with the
claims of Mr. Ericsson, had to interfere, and ordered the
board to select the ‘Monitor.’ This is entirely false,
for no such demonstration was ever made by Mr. Lincoln,
and the board was not influenced at all by any considerations
of that or any other kind except their own judgment.

“The contract for the ‘New Ironsides’ was awarded
to Merrick & Sons; the design, plans, and specifications
of hull complete had been made by me in connection with
Mr. B. H. Bartol, who conceived the project and had
charge of the proposal to the government,—Mr. B. H.
Bartol was Superintendent of Merrick & Sons at that
time. When the contract was awarded to Merrick &
Sons, they sub-let the hull together with the fittings to
our firm, in accordance with a previous agreement with
Mr. Bartol. The contract price was about $848,000.
Merrick & Sons furnished the engines and armor plate.
.bn p069.png
.pn +1
The engines were designed by I. Vaughan Merrick, and
were duplicates of those which they had completed for a
sloop-of-war, and were for a single screw. The speed was
about seven knots. She was bark-rigged with bowsprit.

“After completing the ‘New Ironsides,’ I proposed to
build two more of similar type with certain modifications
and improvements, that is, sea-going iron-clads, with
twin screws instead of a single one, and in increasing the
speed and the efficiency of the armor. But at that time
what was known as the ‘Monitor craze’ was in full blast,
and, notwithstanding the excellent all-around performance
of the ‘New Ironsides,’ she remained the only sea-going
broadside iron-clad in the navy, and was the first to fire a
gun at an enemy, and fought more battles than all other
sea-going battleships past and present put together.

“The armor plate of the ‘New Ironsides’ was made
partly at Pittsburg and partly at Bristol, Pennsylvania,
and was of hammered scrap iron. It was four inches
thick, and the plates, which could now be rolled in many
mills and be considered light work, were then looked upon
as marvels of heavy forging.

“When the contract was made for the ship, wages for
shipwrights were $1.75 per day, and in less than two
months they rose to $3 per day. We contracted for all
the copper sheathing and bolts the day after signing the
contract at twenty-nine cents per pound; in four months
it was sixty cents per pound. Materials in general went
up from 50 to 100 per cent. before we finished the ship.

“Great and radical changes have since occurred, but,
primitive as the ‘New Ironsides’ seems in comparison with
modern battleships, it is doubtful if any one now existing
will ever see as much fighting or make so much history
as she did. Last July, in an address read before the
Naval War College at Newport, I said:
.bn p070.png
.pn +1

“‘I cannot better illustrate my point than by comparing
the first and the last sea-going battleships built
and delivered to the government by Cramp. The first
was the ‘New Ironsides,’ built in 1862. The last is the
‘Iowa,’ completed in 1897. Each represented or represents
the maximum development of its day.

“‘The ‘New Ironsides’ had one machine, her main
engine, involving two steam-cylinders. The ‘Iowa’ has
seventy-one machines, involving one hundred and thirty-seven
steam-cylinders.

“‘The guns of the ‘New Ironsides’ were worked, the
ammunition hoisted, the ship steered, the engine started
and reversed, her boats handled, in short, all functions of
fighting and manœuvring, by hand. The ship was lighted
by oil lamps and ventilated, when at all, by natural air
currents. Though, as I said, the most advanced type of
her day, she differed from her greater battleship predecessor,
the old three-decker ‘Pennsylvania,’ only in four
inches of iron side armor and auxiliary steam propulsion.
She carried fewer guns on fewer decks than the ‘Pennsylvania,’
but her battery was nevertheless of much
greater ballistic power.

“‘In the ‘Iowa’ it may almost be said that nothing
is done by hand except the opening and closing of
throttles and pressing of electric buttons. Her guns are
loaded, trained, and fired, her ammunition hoisted, her
turrets turned, her torpedoes, mechanisms in themselves,
are tubed and ejected, the ship steered, her boats hoisted
out and in, and the interior lighted and ventilated, the
great search-light operated, and even orders transmitted
from bridge or conning-tower to all parts by mechanical
appliances.

“‘Surely no more striking view than this of the development
of thirty-five years could be afforded.’
.bn p071.png
.pn +1

“The battery of the ‘New Ironsides’ was mounted in
broadside, and she had eight ports of a side, out of
which she fought seven 11-inch Dahlgrens and one 200-pounder
Parrott, the maximum train or arc of fire being
about 45 degrees.

“The ‘Iowa’s’ four 12-inch guns are mounted in pairs
in two turrets, and train through arcs of about 260 degrees
forward and aft respectively. Her eight 8-inch guns
are mounted in pairs in four turrets, and each pair trains
through an effective arc of about 180 degrees.

“The ‘New Ironsides’ had no direct bow or stern fire.

“The ‘Iowa’ fires two 12-inch and four 8-inch guns
straight ahead and straight astern.

“The maximum shell-range of the heaviest guns of
the ‘Ironsides’ was about a mile and a quarter, that of
the ‘Iowa’s’ heaviest guns is about eight miles. The
muzzle energy of the ‘Ironsides’’ 11-inch smooth bores
was to that of the ‘Iowa’s’ 12-inch rifles about as 1 to 26.

“The fate of the ‘New Ironsides’ is well known: she
was destroyed by fire at League Island in 1866, about a
year after her last action.”
.pm letter-end

Judged by modern standards of construction,
the time expended in building the “New
Ironsides” was marvellously brief, six months,
because, as Mr. Cramp said, she was in action
against Fort Sumter within eleven months
from signing of the contract.

Of course, there can be no comparison between
the methods of her construction or the
nature of her appliances and those of a modern
battleship, yet in her time and for her day she
.bn p072.png
.pn +1
was the most formidable and powerful sea-going
battleship afloat.

Mr. Cramp, notwithstanding that he was
entering upon a new and untried field without
any prior guidance of observation or experience,
undertook the design and construction
of this remarkable vessel with all the confidence
that a sense of professional mastery
never fails to inspire; and so confident was
he that the “New Ironsides” would prove a
success that, while she was building, he proceeded
to design two other vessels of the same
type, but embodying numerous improvements
which his experience in construction of the
“Ironsides” from day to day suggested to
him, and when these designs were completed
he offered them to the Department.

He then discovered that the Navy Department
had become entirely under the influence
of what might be called the “Monitor craze,”
which absolutely dominated the councils of the
Department and of Congress in respect to
armor-clad vessels.

A combination, or “ring,” was formed, with
head-quarters in New York, to prevent the
construction of any type of iron-clad vessel except
monitors, and it had sufficient power to
carry its determination into effect.

.if h
.il fn=i072.jpg w=600px id=newark
.ca
CRUISER NEWARK
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CRUISER NEWARK]
.sp 2
.if-

A sudden halt was made in the development
.bn p072a.png
.bn p072b.png
.bn p073.png
.pn +1
of the armored sea-going type which originated
during the Crimean War. France had
finished the construction of “La Courunne,”
“La Gloire,” and several others, one of which
had made a voyage to Vera Cruz before our
Civil War, and certain lessons derived from
that ship during the voyage were utilized in
the construction of the “New Ironsides.”
Both England and France were proceeding
slowly in the development of the very complete
type of battleship of the present day. While
they built several vessels of an improved monitor
type and adopted the turret on a roller
base, in many cases they adhered to the course
first laid out. The late British battleships have
fixed barbettes and shields for their heavy
guns.

The old Timby turret is practically a revolving
barbette extending above the guns,
which had to be loaded at the muzzle and the
rammer being jointed, eleven minutes being
occupied in loading and firing.

In the operations before Charleston, the
Confederates would leave their bomb proofs
after a shot was fired, and prepare for the
next one during the eleven minutes and retire
unharmed, ready to renew the contest. Under
these conditions, the defence became a system
.bn p074.png
.pn +1
of guns in a casemate connecting with a bomb
proof.

The old-fashioned monitor, viewed simply
as a floating battery for use in smooth water,
was serviceable. It was not in any sense a
sea-going vessel, and it was always in danger
of foundering as it crept along the coast from
harbor to harbor. Besides this, it was almost
intolerable to its officers and men in the living
sense. In fact, service in the monitors developed
a new and distinct disease known in the
war-time pathology as the “monitor fever.”
Whenever one was torpedoed, as for example
the “Tecumseh” in Mobile Bay, she sank immediately;
so quickly, in fact, that her crew
below deck were unable to escape. The torpedo
which the “New Ironsides” resisted
practically without injury would have instantly
sunk any monitor then existing. The
“Ironsides,” on the contrary, was a sea-going
vessel of the best and stanchest type, capable
of any length of voyage with comfort and perfect
safety to her officers and crew.

A wise administration of the Navy Department,
or one not affected by the influence of
cranks and combinations, would have built at
least half a dozen vessels of that type as soon
as they could be constructed.

Mr. Cramp, realizing and appreciating the
.bn p075.png
.pn +1
value of the type, and knowing that the influences
which prevented its multiplication in
the navy were unworthy, keenly felt the sting
of his repulses. However, he proceeded to
build such ships as the Department required,
including a monitor, and from that time to
the end of the war gave the navy the full benefit
of his experience and skill in all directions,
both in new construction and repair.

Partly through the natural unthinking enthusiasm
of the people in times of great
excitement and partly through a carefully
planned campaign of sentiment adroitly managed
by the ring, the monitor became almost
the symbol of patriotism.

After the repulse of the “Merrimac” in
Hampton Roads, Ericsson was almost deified,
particularly by that class of people who consider
rant synonymous with eloquence. Yet
such sentiments were actually cherished at the
time by a great many people who knew nothing
whatever about the actual merits of different
types of vessels. But their fanaticism
made the operations of the monitor ring easy,
and at the same time made it impossible to
introduce or carry forward any other type of
armored vessel during the whole Civil War,
no matter how efficient or how desirable it
might be.
.bn p076.png
.pn +1

Captain Ericsson is popularly credited, and
doubtless will be in history, with the complete
invention of the monitor. So far as the form
and structure of the hull, which was simply
“scow bottom,” and the fantastic type of its
propelling engine and the Ericsson screw were
concerned, this is probably true, at least so far
as known; but the main distinguishing feature
of the monitor was not its model of hull nor
its propelling engine, but its revolving turret;
and this device had been invented and patented
by Mr. John R. R. Timby several years before
the outbreak of the Civil War. Timby had
proposed to use the revolving turret system
for sea-coast defence, as a primary proposition.
However, in his description, upon which
his letters-patent were issued, he suggested
that it might also be applied to floating structures
or batteries. All that Ericsson did in
the application of the turret system to his
monitor was to appropriate Timby’s invention
and act upon his suggestion; a fact which was
abundantly demonstrated afterward when Mr.
Timby received compensation for the infringement.

But all these facts probably went for little
or nothing. It seemed that the people had
determined to make a demigod of Ericsson,
.bn p077.png
.pn +1
and there was no gainsaying them. They
would have it so, and so it is.

Mr. Cramp, in a hitherto unpublished paper,
deals with the history and operations of the
monitor ring with regard to its <i>personnel</i> and
the details of its origin and methods, the origin
of the “fast cruisers of the navy,” and the
“state of marine engineering of this country
as it existed at that time.” In this paper, as
will be seen, he hews to the line.
.pm h3 "THE “MONITOR.”"
.pm letter-start
“The coming out of the ‘Merrimac’ for the last time,
and her successful repulse by the ‘Monitor’ having driven
her back into Norfolk, gave a boom to the monitor system,
the extent of which had never been witnessed in this
country before.

“The enthusiasm that always greets successful combats
in war-time was on this occasion of an extraordinary
character, and the whole country was aroused to the highest
pitch of excitement.

“The designer of the ship, John Ericsson, already well
known as one of the principal promoters and successful
advocates of screw propulsion, and Alban C. Stimers, who
was engineer during the fight, and some of the officers,
were the recipients of the most extravagant and hysterical
demonstrations in the way of hero worship.

“An illustration of the effect that this battle had on
the popular mind at that time may be found in an
address of Bishop Simpson at the Academy of Music
in Philadelphia.

“During the war, frequent addresses were made
.bn p078.png
.pn +1
throughout the country by well-known orators, states-men,
and ministers of the gospel, intended to promote
a patriotic spirit and encourage the doubtful.

“I was present at the Academy of Music shortly after
the ‘Monitor’ had been made famous by repulsing the
‘Merrimac,’ when, in referring to Mr. Ericsson, the
Bishop stated that ‘the Almighty had directly interposed
in the contest between Captain Ericsson and Robert
Stephenson in England,’ both of whom had responded to
the offer of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company
of a premium of £500 sterling for the most improved
locomotive engine. This was at the very beginning
of the introduction of railways in Great Britain,
and the following engine entered for the prize:

“The ‘Novelty,’ by Ericsson and Braithwait; the
‘Rocket,’ by Robert Stephenson; the ‘Sans Pareil,’ by
Timothy Hackworth, the ‘Perseverance,’ by Mr. Burstall.

“Mr. Joseph Harrison states in his book, the ‘Locomotive
Engine,’ that ‘the prize was easily won by the
“Rocket,” built by George and Robert Stephenson, having
fulfilled, in some respects, more than all of the requirements
of the trial.’

“Bishop Simpson, in referring to this incident, said
that ‘the Almighty had interposed to prevent Captain
Ericsson from succeeding there, so that he might become
disgusted with England and shake the dust of that country
from his feet and depart for America, in order that
he might be here ready to save the country.’

“In using the words ‘in saving the country,’ Bishop
Simpson looked on the fight between the ‘Monitor’ and
the ‘Merrimac’ as a great many other people did; that is
to say, if the ‘Merrimac’ had escaped, she would have
bombarded Philadelphia and New York and other cities
of the North, thereby compelling the government to submit
.bn p079.png
.pn +1
to the South. But the ‘Monitor’ having destroyed her
before she got out, John Ericsson was therefore entitled
to all the credit due to a person who had been specially
delegated by the Almighty for saving the country. John
Ericsson had already become famous on account of conspicuous
efforts in promoting screw propulsion in the
United States generally, and particularly with reference
to the use in war-ship construction. In view of his unceasing
labors in this direction his name had become inseparably
associated with the screw propeller. This
added much to the enthusiasm that prevailed at that time,
and all minor considerations being overlooked. It was
discovered a very short time after the war was ended
that, even if the ‘Merrimac’ could have escaped at that
time from her encounters with the ‘Cumberland,’ ‘Congress,’
and ‘Monitor,’ it would have been impossible for
her to go as far north as Philadelphia or New York. It
was found that she was in a very badly crippled state as
a result of her ramming the ‘Cumberland’ and ‘Congress;’
and the statement was made by those who temporarily
repaired her in Norfolk that her bow was split to
a great distance below the water.

“To use the words of one of the workmen, he had ‘put
more than a bale of oakum in the opening.’

“The construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ ‘Monitor,’
and ‘Galena’ had already been practically taken out of
the hands of the Construction Department of the Navy
by the Secretary of the Navy, who became a convert to
the monitor craze after the battle with the ‘Merrimac.’
The ‘Monitor’ had become the ideal type of armored war-ship,
and a sort of sub-department of the navy was
created and located at New York for the sole purpose
of building and fitting out monitors.

“This establishment in New York was placed under the
.bn p080.png
.pn +1
immediate supervision of Admiral Gregory, the active
head being Chief Engineer A. G. Stimers, who had been
the chief engineer of the ‘Monitor’ during her engagement
with the ‘Merrimac.’ He had associated with him
Isaac Newton and Theodore Allen, the nephew of Mr.
Allen of the Novelty Works in New York. This board
was in direct communication with the Secretary of the
Navy.

“The monitor party, which may be described as the
executive of the ring or the New York section of the
Navy Department, soon assumed a position of great
power and responsibility; the balance of the Department
amounting to practically mere nothing in the way
of new construction.

“Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen were autocrats. They
spent money lavishly, ordered vessels, designed them, made
contracts, sub-contracts, made purchases, and carried
everything with a high hand.

“Mr. Lenthall, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and
Mr. Isherwood, who was on his staff as engineer, were
entirely set aside, and practically disappeared from the
scene as far as new constructions were concerned.

“A large number of monitors were built, slightly improved
in structural detail over the original, and were
engaged as soon as finished in the operations before
Charleston.

“The head-quarters in New York was often called the
‘draughtsmen’s paradise,’ on account of the great number
of draughtsmen employed there, and who were getting
twenty dollars a day. The most extraordinary displays of
drawings were issued to the various machine-shops which
were building monitors at that time. They were particularly
noticeable on account of the extravagant character
of the shading of the circular form of the turrets,
smoke-stacks, conning-towers, etc.
.bn p081.png
.pn +1

“The inspectors of construction that were employed by
the New York party emulated their superiors in carrying
things with a high hand at the various concerns where
they inspected the vessels.

“Up to that time our concern had not built any monitors.
We were not in what was called the ‘Monitor Ring,’
not having indorsed the type nor manner of construction,
besides being the authors of the ‘New Ironsides’ type,
which the ring had determined to suppress.

“Immediately after the ‘New Ironsides’ had been engaged
in a small way in the first fight at Charleston, we
recommended that the government should build other
vessels like her, but with twin screws and with other
improvements.

“By request of Assistant Secretary Fox, we prepared
plans of the proposed ships, some all iron, and others
of iron and wood in the construction of the hull; but the
Department in Washington refused to listen to or recommend
anything. The New York section continued to be
paramount, and we were ruled out of naval construction
for a time.”
.pm letter-end
.pm h3 "LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS."
.pm letter-start
“The next development of the craze was that of the
so-called ‘Light-draught Monitors.’ These were intended
to operate in Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and various
other shallow waters in the South. Twenty of them were
authorized, and we responded to the advertisement of
them by bidding for one or more.

“It was found that, with the exception of Harlan &
Hollingsworth, we were the lowest bidders. We were a
little higher than Harlan & Hollingsworth, but the time
in which we offered to build them was shorter than theirs.

“The government promptly gave us one and the Harlan
.bn p082.png
.pn +1
yard one, and notified eighteen other bidders that they
could have one each at the same price as ours, which
amounted, as near as I can remember, to $350,000.

“Some of the bids ran as high as $750,000, and these
bidders had some delicacy in accepting prices at one-half,
because, to accept the contract at one-half, it would be an
acknowledgment that they did not know what they were
about, or that they were trying to rob the government.

“The fact is, that none of the bidders except Harlan
& Hollingsworth and ourselves were ship-builders. They
were in other lines of mechanical construction, and of
course they did not have the slightest idea of what was
to be done or what it would cost.

“The drawings on which the vessels were to be built
were of the crudest character; only a midship section and
one or two vague longitudinal sketches being furnished as
a guide or basis of construction.

“Notwithstanding, as I said before, we were the lowest
bidder, thereby saving millions of dollars to the government,
only one was awarded to us. The balance was
offered to the other bidders at our price, and the offer was
accepted by most of them.

“Having received our contract, we promptly visited
New York to get the details of construction and engines
in order to begin work and procure materials. The demand
for materials was greater than the supply, and all
were in a feverish state of excitement. To get our orders
out quickly, I immediately made application to Mr.
Stimers for plans, and had a long and detailed conversation
with him and Theodore Allen over what plans they
had developed, and numerous alterations were made to
the plans as drawn.

“Their first plan permitted the boilers to come within
three and one-half inches of the bottom plating of the
.bn p083.png
.pn +1
ship, practically landing the boilers on the three and one-half
inch angle-bars, which had at that time no floors.

“I suggested in a rather strong way that this would not
do, and after considerable discussion they concluded to
make the vessels a little deeper, give the deck more spring,
and put shallow floors in. Other important alterations
were made as the work progressed.

“We would have had our vessel overboard first, but the
northward march of General Lee previous to the battle
of Antietem interfered with the furnishing of materials,
and also with our own working force in the shipyard.

“Our employees, with those of the rolling-mills supplying
materials near Philadelphia, organized themselves into
military companies for the purpose of defence. Two companies
were formed in our establishment.

“While these delays affected us, they did not interfere
with the progress of the monitor which was building in
Boston; but when this vessel was launched, she sank to
the bottom from lack of buoyancy, and a halt was called
on the nineteen other vessels.

“These vessels had been constructed on very vague
plans and conditions. Mistakes were made in the original
design, and weights added without investigating the correctness
of the original sketch, which, with the so-called
‘calculations,’ were furnished by Mr. Ericsson; at least
they had been examined, approved, and signed by him.
They were not furnished to bidders.

“The day after this launch, the ‘Monitor Ring’ was
in a state of collapse! Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood
now reasserted their proper authority. They ordered Mr.
Stimers and Mr. Allen to reduce the weights in the turrets,
and wherever else it was possible to do so sufficiently
to make the vessels float.

“These reductions in equipment, outfit, etc., were communicated
.bn p084.png
.pn +1
to the builders at Chester, before they launched
the ‘Tunxis’; but these vessels, by the reductions, were
rendered entirely useless for their designed service, or
any other.

“Finding that the Boston vessel and the ‘Tunxis,’ built
at Chester, notwithstanding the alterations, lacked efficiency
to a serious degree, they decided to rebuild most
of the others by deepening them, and the whole matter
was placed in my hands by Chief Engineer King, who
with some others were designated by the Secretary of the
Navy to investigate and prepare plans for the deepening,
and to ascertain the cost of the alterations.

“After a careful investigation, I found it would be
necessary to increase the depth of the hulls about thirty-three
inches, involving the necessity of raising the solid
oak decks to that extent with the hull proper, and the
armor backing and armor which had to be taken off and
replaced.

“A so-called expert was detailed to assist me in my
calculations, but, having no use for him, I did not avail
myself of his services.

.if h
.il fn=i084.jpg w=600px id=penns
.ca
CRUISERS PENNSYLVANIA AND COLORADO
.ca-
.if-
.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration:
CRUISERS PENNSYLVANIA AND COLORADO
Copyright, 1905, by John W. Dawson]
.sp 2
.if-

“When I sent my plans and our price for the deepening
of the vessel to the Secretary, he immediately awarded
us the contract for deepening ours (the ‘Yazoo’), and
accepted our price, and notified the eighteen other people
that he would give them the same price for deepening
theirs. The other contractors would not accept my price,
and they denounced me for not having put a ‘higher price
on the job,’ when I had the opportunity to do so. I told
them that I had estimated that we would make 30 per
cent. profit, and I contended that that was enough, notwithstanding
we were under the influence of war prices,
and that I had been delegated to do what I considered was
.bn p084a.png
.bn p084b.png
.bn p085.png
.pn +1
right. In other words, I held that the Secretary had
placed me upon honor.

“These eighteen other builders ultimately got higher
prices than we did. They made all sorts of claims to the
government through their representatives, and made life a
burden to the Secretary by showing, or endeavoring to
show, him that wages were higher everywhere else in the
localities where these vessels were built than they were
in Philadelphia.

“In fact, every one of the other builders ultimately received
higher prices than we did, and later on some were
awarded additional sums by act of Congress, notwithstanding
that the drawings, specifications, plans, and designs
for the alterations were made by me without pay! without
even thanks!

“Subsequently the Department decided not to alter all
alike, and about one-half of them were finished without
the turrets, and the big guns were taken out, thereby relieving
their builders of the necessity of making them
deeper. The decks were finished, and they were designated
as a sort of torpedo boat for harbor defence. These
vessels, as altered according to my recommendations,
would have been efficient factors in the operations in the
southern waters if the war had not ended before they
were finished.

“The ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, with all its investitures
and appointments, was abandoned, and the
Navy Department took up the monitor matter from that
time onward. But the mischief had been done. The service
had been debauched and the Treasury robbed of
millions, which an intelligent policy from the start might
have saved.

“During the alterations on the ‘Yazoo,’ the Chester
light-draught monitor was sent to our place to be altered.
.bn p086.png
.pn +1
Notwithstanding she had been finished with the reduced
weights recommended by Mr. Stimers, she still continued
defective, and was sent to our yard to be altered according
to my new plan.

“As it was necessary to raise the turret in order to
raise the deck, and as we were compelled to haul the
vessel out of the water, we took the guns out of the
turret and proceeded to remove it also. Hoisting out the
guns was an easy accomplishment, but the removal of the
turret was a difficult problem.

“At first sight, cutting out the rivets and bolts, taking
apart and rebuilding it, appeared the most feasible. This,
however, was an expensive transaction. After careful investigation,
we concluded that it could be hauled off the
ship on to the dock on sliding-ways if the work was done
with the greatest rapidity with the best men at it. The
removal of guns and turret to the dock was successfully
accomplished.

“On account of the great cost due to occupying a dry-dock
long enough to make the change, it was determined
to haul her out on sliding-ways, reversing the process of
launching, and that without using a coffer-dam for laying
the ground-ways.

“The vessel was hauled out by the use of six 12-inch
falls, two of which were attached to end of upper ways,
two to a chain that passed around the stem extending to
amidships, the ends lashed to the ship just above high-water
mark, and the other two to holes in the bow made
for the purpose.

“When the six large ‘crabs’ were started with all of
the men that could be put on them, they never stopped
until the vessel was entirely out of the water, taking a
day and a night for the operation.

“This was by all odds the heaviest vessel ever hauled
.bn p087.png
.pn +1
out on ways in this country, and, in view of the simplicity
of its preparations and the limited cost, was one
of the great achievements of the time occupied by the
Civil War. But little or no notice was taken of it by the
papers, as battles lost and won were the sensation of the
day.

“While the craze for constructing monitors had possession
of the country, the government built nothing else
in the way of armored vessels.

“Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood, who was on Mr. Lenthall’s
staff at that time, had no power to antagonize the
monitor craze successfully, and a large one of wood was
ordered to be built in each navy-yard, to be designed by
the constructor of that particular yard as far as the
hulls were concerned. But little money of the vast expenditures
of the navy during the war was devoted to
other iron-clad constructions than that of the monitor
class.

“The ‘Miantonomah,’ which was one of these vessels
built in one of the navy-yards and designed by the constructor
at the navy-yard in which she was built, was sent
to Russia under command of Commodore John Rodgers
with Assistant Secretary Fox, as Special Envoy to convey
to the Emperor certain congratulations. The idea was
that the government of Russia would construct a number
of large monitors. The trip, so far as that was concerned,
was a failure. Commodore Rodgers, who went in command,
was formerly in command of one of the original
monitors which had been engaged in the contests before
Charleston, and also in the Savannah sounds in the Civil
War, and he was one of the strongest of the captains in
favor of that type. As a rule, the captains and other
officers were all adverse to them.

“While the Navy Department and Naval Committee of
.bn p088.png
.pn +1
Congress were favorable to the monitor type, Messrs. Lenthall
and Isherwood were against it; but they were very
backward in doing or in recommending anything else, and
permitted themselves to be overlooked. In view of this
negligence on their part, it was argued that it was better
to try to do something, even if it turned out wrong, than
to do nothing at all.”
.pm letter-end
.pm h3 "ORIGIN OF FAST CRUISERS."
.pm letter-start
“On account of the heavy loss of our ships captured
by the Confederate cruisers, and our failures to capture
any of them with the exception of the ‘Alabama,’ which
was accidentally discovered and destroyed by the ‘Kearsarge,’
our Navy Department conceived it necessary to
have constructed a number of very fast cruisers, faster
than any known afloat.

“The Department delegated Messrs. Stimers and Allen,
when in the height of their power in their ‘Sub-Department’
in New York, to design and have them constructed.

“Not being naval architects, and not having any naval
architect of competent knowledge in connection with their
‘Sub-Department,’ but having an exalted idea of their
own abilities not only as naval architects and engineers,
and everything else in that direction, they designed some
ships of a peculiarly fantastic model, and engines of
equally fanciful character which they called, for short,
the ‘grasshopper engine.’

“Having the power to design these vessels and contract
for them, they invited me to inspect the plans and build
two of them.

“On looking over these designs, I began to criticise
them, and recommended modifications.

“I was wound up suddenly by the observation that, as
they intended to give us two ships and give us what they
.bn p089.png
.pn +1
considered a fair price for them, we must build them
exactly as they were designed.

“As the price they offered was high, and feeling that
we would practically have our own way with them, provided
we adhered to the general type of design, and
having no responsibility, we thought that we had better
take them and make a handsome sum out of them than
to stand out on trifles and fight for glory alone.

“I had commenced at the beginning of the war with
criticising the monitors, and our concern got nothing, and
the grass might have been growing in our yard if we
adhered to that course. So the price was fixed for these
ships, and we were about going on, when the fatal contretemps
of the launching of the Boston light-draught
monitor occurred. The ‘fast cruiser’ contracts of Stimers
and Allen were set aside, and a large sum of money
saved to the government. The ring was broken. They
who had had unlimited power heretofore suddenly found
themselves without the power to contract for a dingy.

“This was really a great disappointment to us and
several other contractors, because the price they fixed for
the cruisers was liberal, and, as they would not listen to
suggestions, they were naturally expected to take the
responsibility.

“After the matter of the fast cruisers was taken out
of the hands of the ‘Sub-Department of the navy’ after
the sinking of the Boston monitor, the Navy Department
ordered each of the four navy-yards to design one on a
scheme of general dimensions, and giving the engines out
by contract to the various engine-builders, the engines,
with two exceptions, being designed by Mr. Isherwood.
The machinery for the ‘Madawaska’ was designed by
Ericsson!

“At the same time, to encourage private enterprise,
.bn p090.png
.pn +1
one was given to us, hull and machinery of our own
design. We awarded the engines to Merrick & Sons,
who built them on their own designs. All of these vessels
were constructed of wood. Our ship was called the
‘Chattanooga,’ and that built at the Philadelphia Navy-Yard
was called the ‘Neshaminy.’

“The engines designed by Mr. Isherwood were geared,
the propellers making two and one-half revolutions to
the engine’s one. When these engines were designed,
gearing was supposed to be an indispensable necessity in
screw-engine practice.

“The engines designed for the ‘Madawaska’ by Ericsson
were of the same design as that of the ‘Dictator,’
and would be considered of fantastic character at the
present time; that, however, might be said of most marine
engines of that period.

“Much was expected of the ‘Madawaska’s’ engines by
Mr. Ericsson’s friends, but after a trial of twenty minutes
it was stopped, as the crank-pin and main-bearing
brasses ran out into the crank-pit before they had attained
their required performance.

“The engines were subsequently taken out and compound
engines of poor design were put in by parties who
had never built a compound engine before. The performance
of these engines was but little better than that
of the original.

“Having been eminently successful in the introduction
of compound engines in this country, by the construction
of four compound engines for the American Line and
one set for the ‘George W. Clyde’ of our own design, we
made application to the government to substitute the design
of compound engines in place of the first set of
‘Madawaska,’ but our offer was not accepted, unfortunately
for the government.
.bn p091.png
.pn +1

“All of these vessels were of good model, and all
built according to the latest improvements of the great
ship-builders and contractors, and the devices in the way
of rigging, spars, and other outfit, besides the model and
general arrangements were from the stand-point and designs
of the naval constructor and ship-builder at the
yard where they were built. No ships in modern times
have been superior to them in design, construction, and
ship-building technique. The engines, however, were not
up to the standard, and, no matter what else may be said
of them, they were much too small.

“Some time after these vessels were laid up, an effort
was made by private parties in New York to utilize them
in a trans-Atlantic line to carry the mail, and a proposition
was made to the government covering certain conditions
under which they could be operated. The proposition
meeting a favorable consideration, an exhaustive examination
of the engines was made by Mr. Norman
Wheeler, of New York. He found that the gearing of
the driving-wheels and pinion had been worn down five-eighths
of an inch during their trials; the project was
abandoned, and the ships gradually disappeared.

“It has been stated that the ‘Wampanoag’ made her
designed speed from New York to Charleston in one trial.

“The British government was very much interested in
this scheme of building fast cruisers for our navy. Captain
Bye-the-sea, who was Naval Attaché of Great Britain,
was ordered to investigate the matter here. He decided
to obtain the plans and drawings of the ‘Chattanooga,’
and applied to the Secretary of the Navy for his approval.
The Secretary sent a letter to us stating that, so far as
he was concerned, he had no objection. So we furnished
Captain Bye-the-sea with the drawings of the ‘Chattanooga’
in return for some valuable information that he
.bn p092.png
.pn +1
had, which we expected to utilize in some construction of
our Navy Department. We did not, however, realize anything
in that direction.

“The ‘Inconstant,’ built by the British government, was
practically the same model as that of the ‘Chattanooga,’
but with another deck added to her, which gave her an
entirely different appearance, and which made her look
a good deal heavier above the water than the ‘Chattanooga’
did, particularly as far as the stern was concerned.

“The ‘Wampanoag,’ one of the ships built at one of
the navy-yards, made what was designated as one quick
trip from New York to Charleston; but in doing so the
teeth of the gearing were worn to the extent of five-eighths
of an inch, practically ruining her usefulness for any
future service. The vessel was laid up and never sent to
sea again.

“The ‘Chattanooga’ did not make a successful trial.
The engines were too small, and a long contest between
the engine-builders and Mr. Isherwood occurred over the
construction of the machinery, ending in the engine-builders
making modifications, and the vessel was laid up.

“As these ships were considered at that time too expensive
to equip for sea service in time of peace, they
were laid up; being wooden and very much neglected, they
rotted at their wharves.

“The failure of these vessels to demonstrate the propriety
of building fast cruisers was due altogether to
defective machinery and to defective marine engineering
as it generally existed at that date in this country, and to
the material of their construction being of wood.”
.pm letter-end
.pm h3 "EVOLUTION OF MODERN MARINE ENGINE."
.pm letter-start
“At that time a large majority of the marine engineers
of the United States were adherents of the paddle-wheel,
.bn p093.png
.pn +1
walking-beam type of engine, and nothing would do but
that type of engine. That was particularly the case in
the city of New York.

“Philadelphia, at a very early period in the history of
steam propulsion, advocated the propeller engine, and as
far as the working of propeller engine was concerned, the
degree of workmanship and skill in its design attained
there was never excelled in Europe or America. These
engines were generally small in power, and the prejudices
of the people were against them, particularly as all New
York ship-builders and marine engineers spoke of propeller
engines with the most profound contempt.

“Now and then some one in New York would build a
propeller engine of poor design which would prove disastrous,
so in large enterprises the walking-beam, side-wheel
type of engine prevailed and was the fashion.

“This was done to such a great extent that when the
first line of steamships was established between Philadelphia
and Charleston, side-wheel engines were put in them
by parties who had a great deal of interest with the
management of the steamship company.

“In fact, it was this craze for the walking-beam engine
and side-wheels in New York which ruined us as a steamship
building country, and was one of the many causes
for the supremacy in ocean commerce that Great Britain
ultimately attained.

“After the government had stopped the subsidy, the
Collins Line, which was run at an enormous expense, was
withdrawn. We were completely out of the business.
The influence of Philadelphia, as we had no large ships
or large steamship companies, was not listened to.

“Rather than adopt the propeller and go to Philadelphia
to have the engines built, steamship owners in New
York permitted the whole steamship business, together
.bn p094.png
.pn +1
with all the foreign trade, to go to foreign countries. The
British began early to establish large machine shops and
to perfect the propeller engine. Though slow, they were
sure.

“There was not a time in the history of steam navigation
that we did not feel that we could equal or even
excel the English builders of propeller steamships that
were coming to this country. But, as I said before, we
could not induce the New York merchants to embark in
the enterprise.

“I am sure that if we had abandoned the side-wheel
and commenced with the propeller at the time the British
did and continued with steadfastness, we never would have
lost it.

“The ships of this country were right, of the best form
and model, and they were in advance of anything in
Great Britain, as far as hull construction and design were
concerned; but, while the ship-builders in New York were
among the greatest in the world, the builders of marine
engines there were the poorest in the world.

“When it was discovered that the propeller steamship
was in every respect the best and had come to stay, it
was too late to try to recover our trade.

“The construction of monitors and machinery during
the latter end of the war was very demoralizing, and had
its effect upon naval constructions long after the war
was over.

“The Construction Department, which had not shown
much enterprise during the war, had become very much
deteriorated, and the system was inaugurated, principally
by Mr. Isherwood, which exists at the present day, of
dividing the executive department into many bureaus;
and, to strengthen their heads and give them power, it
was also provided that the appointment of these heads
.bn p095.png
.pn +1
of bureaus should be made by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, thus making the Senate a coördinate
factor in their existence, and the heads of bureaus independent
of the Secretary of the Navy.

“This was started, as I said before, by Mr. Isherwood,
who was on Mr. Lenthall’s staff. He organized the
Bureau of Steam Engineering as an independent bureau,
not subordinate to the Secretary, and having its head
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Of course he was made its Engineer-in-Chief.”
.pm letter-end

That being started, other bureaus as they
practically exist at present, the heads of which
are independent of the Secretary, were established
the same way. A great deal of friction
occurred between the various branches of the
Navy Department at that time, the effects of
which continued for a good while. Nothing
was built by the government, although the Secretary
of the Navy had full power to do practically
as he pleased with the appropriations.
The appropriations in Congress at that time
were made in bulk, and the Secretary could
give vessels out by private contract or build
them in the navy-yards.

Some few vessels involving antique ideas
were started in the navy-yards and were principally
of wood. The engines were contracted
for by the various engine-builders of the
United States. They were constructed practically
on one general design.
.bn p096.png
.pn +1

On account of some irregularities and misunderstandings
in the way of giving out contracts
and certain favoritisms, together with
the jealousies and bickerings of the various
heads of the Departments and officers of the
Navy, Congress became more and more exacting
in their appropriations, until at last nothing
was done in the Navy Department without
a special appropriation for the particular purpose.

At the end of the Civil War in 1865, a large
number of United States vessels under contract
were uncompleted. In some cases, notably
of the monitor type, work was immediately
suspended upon them, and settlements were
made after long and tedious delays. The
Cramp concern, as already mentioned, had one
vessel in hand under these conditions, the first-class
fast cruiser “Chattanooga;” but the
government provided for her completion,
which was carried out, and her delivery concluded
the relations of Mr. Cramp to the navy
of the Civil War.
.bn p096a.png
.pn +1

.if h
.il fn=i096.jpg w=600px id=colum
.ca
CRUISER COLUMBIA
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CRUISER COLUMBIA]
.sp 2
.if-

.bn p096b.png
.bn p097.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2 id=ch03
CHAPTER III
.sp 2
.pm ch-head
Foreign Commerce in 1865—The “Clyde” and “George
W. Clyde,” and Introduction of Compound Engines—Commerce
of 1870—Merchant Marine—Lynch Committee—Mr.
Cramp and Committee—Lynch Bill—American
Steamship Company—Visit to British
Shipyards—John Elder—British Methods—Interchange
of Methods—Merchant Marine continued—Dingley
Bill—Defects—Act of 1891, Providing
Registry for Foreign Ships—“St. Louis” and “St.
Paul”—Extract from <i>Forum</i>—Remarks on Article—Committee
of Ship-builders and Owners—New Bill
Introduced by Frye and Dingley—North Atlantic
Traffic Association—New Ship-yards—Tactics of
North Atlantic Traffic Association—Our Navigation
Laws, <i>North American Review</i>—Mr. Whitney—Unfriendly
Legislation—Mr. Whitney’s Letter—Effects
of Letter—Mr. Cramp’s Letter to Committee of Merchant
Marine—International Mercantile Marine.
.pm ch-head-end

<sc>The</sc> return of peace in 1865 found the country
without sea-commerce either coastwise or
foreign. Such ships as had not been taken
up by the government had, with the exception
of a few whaling-vessels in the Pacific Ocean,
been transferred to foreign flags to save them
from the ravages of Confederate pirates or
cruisers which, to all intents and purposes,
so far as construction, armament, equipment,
.bn p098.png
.pn +1
and crews were concerned, were nothing but
British privateers in disguise. In the mean
time England had taken every advantage of
the situation, and by 1865 had practically absorbed
all the magnificent ocean-carrying trade
which the United States enjoyed prior to 1860.
American ship-building was at a stand-still.
The government at once threw upon the market
all the ships which it had taken up for
gun-boats, auxiliary cruisers, transports, etc.,
during the war. They were sold for anything
that they would bring, and they were bought
up as a speculation by new companies unfamiliar
with the shipping business, and as a
consequence they all failed. The ships were
obsolete or worn out and soon passed out of
existence. Certain coastwise lines continued
to do a small business, but little or no attempt
was made to restore our foreign trade; first,
because none of the vessels which the government
threw on the market were in a condition
to undertake it; and, second, because, in consequence
of the inflated prices of everything,
any attempt to compete either in seafaring
labor or material with England would have
been absurd. Besides this, the whole energy
and capital of the country were immediately
directed to an extraordinary expansion of railway
systems, so that the attention of the people
.bn p099.png
.pn +1
was entirely diverted from the sea and
fixed upon the interior. For the next five or
six years little or no ship-building of any description
was done anywhere in the United
States.

It was at this time that the Cramp Company
considered it indispensable to attach engine
building to the construction of hulls, as no
satisfactory arrangement could be made to
secure accurate performance that involved two
independent and diverse handicrafts in the
undertaking. They secured the services as engineer
of Mr. J. Shields Wilson, whose training
in the I. P. Morris Company, and at Neafie
& Levy’s works had demonstrated his fitness
for the post, and as to whose methods they
were familiar.

One of the first achievements of the new
enterprise was the design and construction of
the compound engines for the “George W.
Clyde,” finished in the spring of 1872, the
first present accepted type of compound marine
engines built in America. Immediately
following them in 1873 and 1874 were the four
ships for the American Line, the “Pennsylvania,”
“Ohio,” “Indiana,” and “Illinois.”

The “George W. Clyde” was built for
Thomas Clyde, who was the first ship-owner
to introduce screw propulsion in ocean commerce
.bn p100.png
.pn +1
in the United States by building the
twin-screw steamship, the “John S. McKim,”
built in 1844, which he used in the trade of the
Gulf of Mexico and as a transport when the
war with Mexico occurred.

Having built the first screw steamship, the
“John S. McKim,” and the first steamship
with compound engines, the “George W.
Clyde,” Mr. Clyde responded with alacrity
to the recommendations of Mr. Cramp in
favor of the use of the triple-expansion engines
by building the “Cherokee.”

The “Mascott” for Mr. Plant was built at
the same time.

Mr. Clyde had formed the acquaintance of
Mr. Ericsson soon after his arrival in this
country in 1839, just before the “John S. McKim”
was constructed, and became an early
convert to his fascinations in exploiting the
superior merits of screw propulsions over
every other.

The “John S. McKim” and engines were
designed by Mr. Ericsson, and built near Front
and Brown Streets, Philadelphia.

Mr. Jacob Neafie, of Reaney, Neafie & Co.,
celebrated engine builders, who began business
soon after by constructing propeller engines,
had considerable practical experience in the
construction of the “John S. McKim’s” engines
.bn p101.png
.pn +1
before Reaney, Neafie & Co. had started
business.

Mr. Ericsson had early secured the friendship
of Commodore Stockton, and had a boat
built for towing purposes by the celebrated
ship-builders Lairds, of Berkenhead, called
the “R. F. Stockton.” Commodore Stockton
had been already biased in favor of screw
propulsion on account of the invention of the
screw propeller as it practically exists to-day
by John Stevens in 1803. Mr. Stevens was the
head and front of the organization of the bay,
river, and canal navigation between the two
great cities of New York and Philadelphia, of
which Commodore Stockton was a member.

The successful introduction of screw propulsion
in the United States was certainly
owing to the combined efforts of Stevens,
Ericsson, and Clyde.

Mr. Clyde was always to the front where
new improvements were to be made.

The Cramp Company, having taken the lead
in these new departures in engine construction
at the beginning, have continued to remain
there. They have ceased to construct wooden
vessels, sail or steam, since the construction
of the “Clyde,” of iron. This vessel was for
Mr. Thomas Clyde, and preceded the “G. W.
Clyde.”
.bn p102.png
.pn +1

By 1870 the deplorable state of the American
merchant marine attracted the attention
of the Administration and Congress. The
House of Representatives organized a select
committee to investigate the causes of its decline,
with instructions to submit in its report
suggestion or recommendation of remedy.
This is known in Congressional history as the
“Lynch Committee,” from its Chairman, the
Honorable John R. Lynch, Member of Congress,
of Maine. This committee surveyed the
situation exhaustively, taking the statements
of a large number of ship-owners and ship-builders,
and while there was considerable divergence
of views as to the sum-total of causes,
there was little or no diversity of opinion as
to the most immediate and effective remedy.

This committee, after thorough investigation
and mature deliberation, reported that, in
view of the policy of foreign maritime nations,
particularly Great Britain, in the way of subsidies
and other methods of aiding and promoting
their merchant marines, it would be
impossible for American ship-owners to compete
with them in the absence of similar expedients
on the part of our own government.
In other words, the Lynch Committee reported
in effect that the primary requisite toward a
resurrection of the American merchant marine
.bn p103.png
.pn +1
would be the adoption of a policy of subvention,
or, as it is commonly termed, subsidy.

However, while the Lynch Committee was
logical in its suggestion or recommendation of
remedy, its investigations, so far as the sum-total
of the causes of decline were concerned,
and its estimate of those causes were incomplete
and inconclusive, because it started out
with the dogma that the then existing depression
of the merchant marine was due wholly
to the ravages of the war; and it did not take
into account the correlative or co-operative
facts of the situation, which were much broader
and deeper in their application and effect than
the mere suspension or destruction of our
merchant marine by the war itself. In other
words, the Lynch Committee failed to grasp or
appreciate the fact that, while the war was
wrecking our sea-going commerce, foreign
maritime powers, and particularly the English,
were making the most gigantic efforts not
only to take the place of our ruined trade, but
also to provide for a perpetuity of the substitution,
so that at any time between the close of
the war and the investigations of the Lynch
Committee it had become impossible for an
American ship-owner to operate a ship or a
line of ships in any route of ocean traffic. By
means of liberal subsidies under the guise of
.bn p104.png
.pn +1
mail pay, the British had in the interim covered
every sea-road and appropriated every
channel of ocean commerce. This fact the
Lynch Committee seems to have ignored, although
it was really the prime factor in the
situation, as it stood in 1870. Mr. Cramp, in
his statement before the Lynch Committee,
went altogether out of the beaten path pursued
by most of the other ship-builders or ship-owners
who appeared. He said in effect that
while the Civil War had been an immediate
cause of the destruction of our merchant marine
as it existed at the beginning of that
struggle, still that was purely a physical cause,
and in the absence of other causes need not
operate after the war ended.

He called attention to the fact that the war
had now been ended five years, but that the
condition of our merchant marine, particularly
in foreign trade, remained as pitiable as it had
been in the height of the struggle. This he
said argued the existence of other and more
lasting causes than the simple destruction by
war, whether by the government taking up our
merchant-ships for its own use, or by the
transfer of a great many of them to foreign
flags to get the benefit of neutrality, or by
the actual depredations of Anglo-Confederate
privateers.
.bn p105.png
.pn +1

He explained that during our misfortune the
English took every advantage in the way of
appropriating to themselves and to their own
ships the traffic which our ships had formerly
carried; that when the war closed, they had
absolute command of the ocean-carrying trade,
our own as well as theirs.

He said that not only did the British government
subsidize and otherwise aid their
ships and ship-owners, but that they also
brought to bear all the tremendous resources
of their navy to help and encourage British
ship-builders. Notwithstanding her enormous
and well-equipped public dock-yards, the English
government built a very large percentage
of its hull construction in private shipyards,
and not only that, but <i>all</i> their marine-engine
work was let out by contract to private engine-builders,
mainly independent establishments.

He stated that the result of this policy had
been to develop the industry of marine engine
building in Great Britain to a degree unknown
anywhere else in the world.

On the contrary, our own government had
done little for its navy since the war, and what
little it had done had been carried out entirely
in navy-yards.

This not only deprived private ship-building
of the kind of aid and encouragement which
.bn p106.png
.pn +1
England lavished upon her private shipyards
and engine-shops, but the navy-yards themselves
were a constant menace to the good
order and content of mechanics working in
private shipyards.

Moreover, he said that the same class of
mechanics who, immediately prior to the war,
worked for $1.75 a day, now (1870) demanded
and received $3.00 to $3.50 a day; whereas
ship-building wages remained the same in England
as in 1860.

He warned the committee that the day of
wooden ships, particularly steamships, was
past, and that the iron ship had come to stay,
not only in England but everywhere else in the
world.

He said that to enable the business of building
iron ships and heavy marine machinery to
become firmly established in this country, a
very large amount of manufacturing machinery
must be supplied, and in view of the
present outlook no one would invest any considerable
amount of capital in that direction
without assurance of some aid and encouragement
from the government similar to that
which England rendered to her ship-building
industry.

He then dwelt at considerable length upon
the demoralization among mechanics produced
.bn p107.png
.pn +1
by the government’s policy in confining its
naval construction to the navy-yards.

He reviewed briefly the struggle between the
Cunard and Collins Lines prior to 1858, and
showed conclusively that the downfall of the
American Collins Line was due to the persistent
and constantly increasing subsidies
lavished by the British government upon the
Cunard Line, which our government in 1858
met by withdrawing the Collins subsidy and
giving them instead the sea and inland postage
on mail matter actually carried. In this respect
he said Congress indirectly came to the
aid of the Cunard Line and helped it to overthrow
the Collins Line. He hoped that the
committee would give these particular facts
their earnest attention. He said that they did
not require deep or intricate investigation, because
they were matters of common notoriety,
known to everybody who was at all conversant
with the commercial history of the country.

The admission of material for building iron
ships free of duty, he said, would be an advantage,
of course, and many believed that if
our ship-builders could be relieved from the
tariff and get their material free they could
compete successfully with foreign builders;
but the difference in wages was too great to
be entirely overcome by the mere admission
.bn p108.png
.pn +1
of materials duty free. As for materials, he
would always prefer American iron for the
construction of ships to foreign iron, provided
it could be got at the same, or very nearly the
same, price. There were many inconveniences,
he said, attendant upon sending abroad for
iron plates. He informed the committee that
it was necessary to get the form of every plate
and have it sketched before it was ordered,
and if, after doing that, we must send abroad
to have them made, very great inconvenience
and delay would result.

This statement of Mr. Cramp before the
Lynch Committee, of which the foregoing is
only a synopsis, was really the key-note to all
subsequent argument in favor of government
aid to American ship-building and ship-owning.
It presented the matter in a new light, or
a light which was new in 1870.

.if h
.il fn=i108.jpg w=600px id=brook
.ca
ARMORED CRUISER BROOKLYN
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: ARMORED CRUISER BROOKLYN]
.sp 2
.if-

It might be remarked here, in referring to
his statement that “the form of every plate
must be sketched before it is ordered, etc.,”
that Mr. Cramp himself was the originator of
that system in this country, a system of ordering
plates sheared to sizes at the mill. (See
“American Marine,” W. W. Bates.) Until he
established this innovation, plates for building
iron vessels had been rolled as nearly as possible
to the sizes required and then sheared
.bn p108a.png
.bn p108b.png
.bn p109.png
.pn +1
and trimmed at the shipyard. This itself was
a very remarkable and striking innovation, and
was immediately taken up by all iron ship-builders
in the country, and is now the universal
practice.

The legislative result of the first effort of
Congress to take cognizance of the condition
of the merchant marine was the bill introduced
by Mr. Lynch, February 17, 1870.

Mr. Lynch’s bill, although it may be described
as the pioneer effort for the resurrection
of the American merchant marine, proposed
in concise form and plain, easily comprehensible
terms, without any unnecessary
verbiage or circumlocution, as practical and
as sensible a system of subvention as has ever
been put forward since. It was comprehensive
in its scope, universal in its application, and
liberal in its provisions. Later bills, more
elaborately framed and more diffuse in their
verbiage, have hardly improved upon the simple
matter of fact form in which Mr. Lynch
embodied his proposed policy.

This was the beginning of a Parliamentary
war between American ship-owners on the one
hand and the influence of foreign steamship
companies on the other; a war which has at
this writing lasted more than thirty years.

One subsidy was granted by Congress at this
.bn p110.png
.pn +1
early date, that of the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company; but hardly had that subsidy begun
to operate, when an exposure of certain methods
by which it was procured brought about a
great public scandal, which for the time-being
put a peremptory end to the whole policy.

Whether the charge that the Pacific Mail
subsidy was obtained by corrupt methods was
true or not, the means in obtaining it were
no more corrupt than those which have been
employed by foreign steamship interests to
defeat legislation in Congress favorable to
American shipping from time to time ever
since.

Notwithstanding these discouraging conditions,
a group of Pennsylvania capitalists
formed “the American Steamship Company,”
and decided in 1871 to try the experiment of
an American Line to Liverpool. They contracted
with the Cramp firm for four first-class
steamships, to be superior in sea speed,
comfort, and other desirable qualities to any
foreign steamship then in service. These four
ships were designed by Mr. Cramp, and built
under his superintendence between 1871 and
1873 inclusive, and were put in service under
the names of the “Indiana,” “Illinois,”
“Pennsylvania,” and “Ohio,” now commonly
known as the old American Line. That these
.bn p111.png
.pn +1
ships were designed with the highest degree
of ability and constructed with the utmost skill
is sufficiently attested by the fact that they
are all in serviceable condition at this writing
(1903), over thirty years old. These ships
broke the record in speed which was held by
the “City of Brussels,” and consumed less
than half of the coal in doing it.

As soon as the construction of these ships
had been awarded to his Company, Mr. Cramp
determined to examine the conditions of marine-engine
development abroad, and with that
object in view sailed immediately for Europe.
His narrative of the trip and its results are as
follows:
.pm h3 "VISIT TO BRITISH SHIPYARDS."
.pm letter-start
“When the organization of the Company was perfected,
the compound engine as developed by John Elder had
made its appearance, and a fierce opposition to its introduction
was made by engine-builders in Great Britain
generally.

“Its advocates were among the ablest engineers in that
country, foremost among whom was Mr. MacFarland
Gray, whose unassailable attitude in its favor in the
columns of ‘Engineering’ vindicated its claims and
successfully established its introduction. While the idea
was an old one and had been introduced before Watt’s
time, it failed, as most improvements do when they do
not get into proper hands to be developed.

“To John Elder belongs the credit of its permanent
.bn p112.png
.pn +1
and practical introduction into ocean navigation, and but
little improvement has been made in his work up to this
time.

“Mr. B. H. Bartol, who occupied a high position for
intelligence and sagacity in the business world and as a
practical marine engineer of the highest attainments, was
one of the directors of the new steamship company, and,
desiring that the ships should be in advance of the times,
he recommended that I should go to Great Britain and
make an exhaustive examination of the compound-engine
question.

“Mr. J. Shields Wilson, who had been selected by me
as the engineer of our Company, which had recently added
engine building as a department of its business, accompanied
me. Mr. Wilson had already gone very deep into
the investigation of the compound question, and had
acquired a strong bias in its favor; and he had already
designed the compound engines for the ‘George W. Clyde.’

“Mr. Bartol recommended the steamship company to
appropriate $10,000 to pay our expenses in the investigation,
arguing that the money could not be spent in a
better way, and that they could not get another party
better equipped than we were to undertake it. He also
stated that he would oppose the construction of any
steamers until he became convinced that they would be
of the most advanced type in everything that pertains to
most modern requirements.

“The money was promptly appropriated, and with Mr.
Wilson I took passage in the ‘Italy,’ the first trans-Atlantic
steamer with compound engines of John Elder’s
make and type, whose reported performance in economical
coal consumption was considered at that time marvellous.

“We soon made the acquaintance of the chief engineer
of the ship, whose name also was Wilson, and Mr. Wilson
.bn p113.png
.pn +1
practically lived with him. He was permitted to take
cards under varying conditions, and secured an accurate
account of coal consumption and of all other matters
likely to be of interest.

“When we arrived at Liverpool, we visited the Lairds’,
being the first English shipyard that either of us had ever
visited.

“We then visited every great marine engine and ship-building
works on the Thames and Clyde, beginning with
the Thames, whose shipyards at that time stood higher
in the <i>art</i> of ship-building and in the proficiency of
marine-engine construction than the Clyde shipyards.
When we started on our tour we determined to adhere to
a fixed policy and procedure wherever we went, which was
to frankly praise whatever we thought deserving of it and
to adversely criticise whatever we thought deserved such
criticism; and particularly to make no secret of the principal
object of our visit.

“Our Company was practically unknown then in Great
Britain, and steamship building was supposed to be an
unknown art in America; but we were received with much
cordiality and frankness, probably from mere curiosity,
if nothing else.

“Fortunately for us, we visited the works of Mr.
Zamuda first, where a capable engineer was delegated to
show us around. It having been noticed that we had registered
our names, one as ship-builder and constructor and
the other as marine engineer, the Superintendent was
anxious to have our dimensions taken. There was no time
wasted, and our questions and remarks covering everything
in sight or in the field of ship-building methods
were showered on him in a deluge. He had expected to
get through with us in a very short time, thinking that a
sort of perfunctory visit ‘in one door and out at the
.bn p114.png
.pn +1
opposite’ would be sufficient; but finding that he had been
mistaken, he sent a boy out with a note and soon received
an answer. We spent the greater part of the morning
there. When it became noon, he explained that he had
sent a note out to Mr. Zamuda, stating that we were well
up in everything pertaining to the business, etc. Mr.
Zamuda’s reply was to send us in to him when we were
through. He received us with much consideration and
politeness, invited us to take luncheon with him, and
devoted much time to questions as to wages of workmen,
materials, and where they were secured, prices, character
of output, etc.

“When he found that we were doing considerable in
the way of iron ship-building, principally coastwise, he
was much astonished to know that most of the workmen
as well as Mr. Wilson and myself were native to the soil,
and he had much to say on the subject.

“When he had finished with us, and after we had
informed him of the purpose of our visit and that we
wanted to see the principal shipyards in the country, he
stated that he would facilitate our purpose by giving us
letters to the Superintendents of the principal places; explaining
that they would take time to show us what was
worth seeing, while, if we went to the office, we would
only be hurried through in a careless manner.

“It was due to this act of kindness on his part that
our visits afterward were so successful in the acquisition
of valuable information, and as to the generous hospitalities
that we received. We visited first the Thames Iron
Works, John Penn & Sons, Mandsleys, and others.
From the Thames we went direct to the Clyde, where we
visited the Thompsons, the Lairds, Tod and McGregor,
John Inglis, Elders, and some others.

“The consensus of opinion of the different shipyards on
.bn p115.png
.pn +1
the subject of compound engines was, as a rule, unfavorable.
We found that the opposition was principally due
to the fact that the change from the old type to the new
involved important and radical modifications in the constructions
of boilers and of engines, so they hesitated to
discard their old plans, patterns, and methods, the value
of which they were sure of, and to grope into an unknown
field of augmented costliness.

“Of course, these arguments to us were not convincing,
and as we advanced to the north we found ourselves quite
biassed in favor of the new type. Whatever doubts we
may have had up to the time of our arrival at the Fairfield
Works, they were forever removed when we visited
their magnificent erecting shop. We saw there <i>thirteen
compound engines</i> in various states of completion, with
their various parts ready for assembling, some about
ready for installation in the ship, the whole exhibiting
everything in the way of finish and arrangement both in
their various parts and in the whole erection. Up to this
time we had encountered engines of the oscillating type,
the trunk, the plain vertical, and horizontal in every varying
form and construction. It was the same old story,—an
old one before we left home; and now, without any
preparation whatever for it, this vision of thirteen actualities
of the new departure burst upon our view. We spent
the entire day there, the Superintendent affording us
every opportunity to examine the parts and discuss the
subject. We found as much novelty in the boiler construction
as in the engine.

“An old Philadelphia boiler had made its appearance
here as ‘the Scotch Boiler’; this differed from the old
one only in the thickness of the plates, due to the
necessities of the use of higher steam.

“After this there was nothing to be seen, and we
.bn p116.png
.pn +1
hastened home, and in a very short time the Elder type
of compound engines was under construction for our new
ships practically before any of the various shipyards in
Great Britain other than John Elders’ took hold of them.

“To John Elder belongs the entire credit of introducing
and perfecting the compound engine, and there
has been but little improvement in his work up to this
time. MacFarland Gray at that time was a persistent
advocate of this engine, and his work on ‘Engineering’
was of great value. He took especial pains to aid us in
our investigations.

“This trip was a most useful one besides the investigation
of compound engines; it gave us an opportunity of
examining every method pertaining to hull construction
and equipment there, and to discuss all of the problems
and methods belonging to it.

“Two great changes in mechanical method and practice
in certain details of engine building took place in Great
Britain as a result of our visit, and the arrival of the
‘Pennsylvania,’ the first of the American Line; although
we took no active measures in that direction.

“We found during this trip that the art of flanging
boiler-plates in Great Britain was entirely unknown, and
that all British boiler-heads were secured to the side
plates and to the furnace ends by means of angle bars in
the corners, a crude and primitive method of construction.
It was impossible for us to understand this backwardness
or ignorance on the part of the British, as the
flanging of boiler-heads had always prevailed here.

“We called the attention of the British builders generally
to this superiority in boiler construction, but little or no
attention was paid to what we said at that time; but
when the four ships of the new line arrived in Liverpool,
draughtsmen from all quarters were sent to make sketches
.bn p117.png
.pn +1
of the boiler work, and of many other devices new to
them, besides the boiler construction, one of which was
the use of white metal in bearings and journals. This
feature in the engine construction the British had not
taken up when we visited their works.

“We can claim to have introduced boiler flanging and
the use of white metal in British ship construction on
account of our recommendations, and the practical illustration
of their utility on the arrival of the ships of the
American Line.

“The builders there, however, were very slow in the
general adoption of these methods. At first boiler-heads
were delivered at engine-works flanged by the mills that
made the plates, and Sampson Fox added boiler flanging
to his business of making corrugated furnaces. Having
seen a boiler furnished with corrugated furnaces by Sampson
Fox in England, I introduced them in two yachts built
for George Osgood and Charles Osbourne, the first furnaces
of the kind in America. These yachts were known
as the ‘Corsair’ and the ‘Stranger.’”
.pm letter-end

The construction of the four pioneer ships
went on as it had begun, without promise of
aid from the government, which steadily maintained
its attitude of neglect as to the national
merchant marine, while hundreds upon hundreds
of millions in the shape of guarantee
bonds and public land grants were poured out
by the Congress in favor of western railroads,
but not one dollar for the merchant marine.

Still, notwithstanding these discouraging
conditions, Mr. Cramp did not abate in the
.bn p118.png
.pn +1
slightest degree his endeavors to keep the needs
of the country in the direction of a national
merchant marine before Congress and the public.
A compilation of the articles he published
and of his statements before the committees
of both Houses of Congress would, on the
whole, fill several volumes like this one. It is
therefore impracticable to reproduce here the
actual text of his arguments and his expositions.

Newspaper organs of the foreign steamship
interests published in this country denounced
him as a “subsidy beggar” and other like
epithets, which was all that they had to offer
in answer to his deductions and arguments;
but even that did not disturb the even tenor of
his way.

Finally, in the Forty-seventh Congress, a
joint select committee of three Senators and six
Representatives was organized, of which Nelson
Dingley, of Maine, was chairman; and this
organization led to the formation of a new
standing committee of the House known as the
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
Mr. Dingley’s committee spent an entire
summer in going from point to point on the
sea-board and taking testimony and statements
of all classes of business men interested in any
way or informed to any responsible degree as
.bn p119.png
.pn +1
to the condition of the merchant marine and
as to the possible or probable means to bring
about its resurrection.

The investigation of the Dingley Committee
led to the formulation of a comprehensive
measure known as the “Dingley Shipping
Bill.” It was thoroughly and exhaustively discussed
through three Congresses, until finally,
in the last hours of the short session of the
Congress ending March 4, 1891, a bill was
passed providing for a meagre and wholly insufficient
subsidy in the shape of special pay
for carrying the ocean mails of the United
States. This bill was not only meagre in its
provisions, but it was not comprehensive in
its application. It did not result in any immediate
increase of foreign tonnage. The following
year, however, Mr. Cramp, in a spirit
of meeting the free-ship people half-way,
agreed to a compromise which provided that
certain ships of foreign (British) registry
might be admitted to American registry, provided
their owners would contract to build two
ships of equal class and tonnage in the United
States. This was the act by virtue of which
the English steamships “New York” and
“Paris,” belonging to the International Navigation
Company, an American corporation and
owned by American capital, were brought under
.bn p120.png
.pn +1
the American flag, and the “St. Louis”
and “St. Paul” were contracted for and built
to meet the condition imposed by this law.

The principal dimensions and qualities of
these ships are as follows:
.sp 2
.fs 85%
Length between perpendiculars, 535 feet 8 inches.

Length over all, 554 feet 2 inches.

Extreme beam, 62 feet 9 inches.

Depth from first deck to flat keel, 42 feet 4 inches.

Depth of hold for tonnage amidships, 23 feet 2 inches.

Height of bow above water-line at load draught, 39 feet.

Number of decks, 5.

Number of water-tight compartments exclusive of ballast tanks, 12.

Gross register, 10,700 tons.

Load displacement (about), 15,600 tons.

Dimensions of main dining-saloon, 109 feet 4 inches by 46 feet.

Dimensions of second cabin, 39 feet 6 inches by 56 feet.

Seating capacity of main saloon, 322.

Seating capacity of second cabin, 208.

Berthing capacity of steerage (about), 900.
.fs 100%
.sp 2

.if h
.il fn=i120.jpg w=600px id=ny
.ca
ARMORED CRUISER NEW YORK
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: ARMORED CRUISER NEW YORK]
.sp 2
.if-

The propelling machinery is a pair of vertical
inverted quadruple-expansion engines, to
carry a working steam-pressure of two hundred
pounds and develop from 18,000 to 20,000
collective indicated horse-power. These are
the largest and most powerful marine engines
ever built in America, and, as the principle of
quadruple expansion has never before been
.bn p120a.png
.bn p120b.png
.bn p121.png
.pn +1
applied on so large a scale, its results in this
case have been watched with interest by the
entire profession of marine engineering.

Structurally, the art of naval architecture
has been exhausted in their design, and the
skill of the best mechanics in the world was
tried to the utmost in their construction.
Whatever may have been their performance as
to speed and time of passage, nothing is hazarded
in saying that in safety, seaworthiness,
and comfort they are not surpassed by anything
afloat.

In the general public or patriotic sense the
chief element of interest in these ships is the
fact that they represent the inception of an
effort to restore the prestige of the United
States as a maritime commercial power. The
condition of affairs existing at the time the
new American Liners were projected was the
culminating point of our feebleness on the
ocean.

The Act of 1891 was framed to expire by its
own limitation in ten years from its date.
Taken in connection with the Act of 1892, already
referred to, it brought about the construction
of two first-class American trans-Atlantic
greyhounds (the “St. Louis” and
“St. Paul”). Other companies or lines running
to the West Indies, Mexico, and South
.bn p122.png
.pn +1
America were also stimulated to build a few
new ships, but, generally speaking, the effect
of both these acts was limited, and produced
no serious impression for the better on the
American merchant marine in general.

This fact became evident very soon after
these acts went into effect, and it became clear
that a broader and more comprehensive policy
must be adopted in the same direction if any
great or lasting improvement of the condition
of our merchant marine was to be expected.

This led to the framing of a new act, thoroughly
comprehensive in its scope and universal
in its application, on lines similar to
those of the Dingley Bill of 1882, but broader.

Prior to 1891, Mr. Cramp had confined the
statements, deductions, and arguments based
upon his experience and observation wholly to
hearings before committees of Congress, with
now and then a newspaper interview, which
in the nature of things must be transitory and
soon forgotten. But in the fall of 1891 he determined
to place his knowledge before the
public in a more permanent form. This he
began with a paper in the <i>Forum</i> for November
of that year. The limits of this Memoir
do not admit of the reproduction of this paper
in its entirety. It filled sixteen pages of the
<i>Forum</i>. The summary of the conclusion, however,
.bn p123.png
.pn +1
may be reproduced. After an exhaustive
analysis of the existing conditions and their
causes, together with a survey of the probable
effects of the act approved the previous March
(March 3, 1891), Mr. Cramp summed up as
follows:

.pm letter-start
“The commercial disadvantages resulting from a monopoly
of our ocean-carrying trade by foreign fleets attracted
public attention many years ago. From the first
there was practical unanimity as to the existence of these
disadvantages, and a like concurrence in the opinion that
‘something ought to be done’ to improve the situation;
but upon the question of remedy there have always been
wide divergences of view. It having been generally conceded
that the remedy must at least begin in national legislation,
the dispute has been simply as to what the character
of that legislation should be. A certain faction contended
that nothing was required beyond a simple repeal
of the navigation laws, to permit the free importation and
registry of foreign-built vessels; and bills to that effect
have been introduced, and in many cases discussed, in
nearly every Congress since 1870. In no case has a bill
of this character passed both Houses of Congress, and but
once has the measure received a majority in either House.
That was in the Forty-seventh Congress, when a ‘Free
Ship Amendment’ was proposed by Mr. Candler, of
Massachusetts,—a bitter opponent of American ship-building,—to
what was known as the ‘Dingley Shipping
Bill,’ and Mr. Candler’s amendment was attached to the
bill by a small majority. The result of this amendment
was to kill the bill. It is not my purpose to discuss the
merits of this proposition, further than to say that whatever
.bn p124.png
.pn +1
increase in American tonnage might accrue from it
would be gained at the expense of the destruction of
American ship-building. That may be set down as an
axiom to be observed as a necessary factor in every discussion
of the subject. As pointed out at the beginning
of this paper, the ship-building industry in Great Britain
has been developed to such enormous proportions, and the
facilities of construction enlarged to such a scale, that our
own comparatively few and feeble shipyards would be
instantly overwhelmed in the competition the moment our
market was thrown open to them to unload their old and
worn-out wares on American ‘bargain-hunters.’

“This fact is now so well understood, that I think there
is no hazard in saying that a large majority of the best
minds of all parties are convinced that the experiment of
trying to augment our merchant marine by a policy calculated
to destroy our ship-building industry would not be
conducive to the general public interests.

“The other mode of remedy advocated has been that
of adopting, in behalf of our own shipping, a policy
similar to the one which has produced such striking results
elsewhere; that is to say, public encouragement to the
ownership and operation of American-built vessels in the
foreign trade. This subject has for many years claimed
a large share of the attention of Congress, commercial
organizations, and the press. Its discussion has taken a
wide scope, involving several exhaustive inquiries by congressional
committees, numerous petitions and resolutions
from boards of trades and chambers of commerce, with
almost innumerable papers in the public prints, and
speeches in our public halls; the whole forming what may
be called the ‘Literature of our Merchant Marine.’ Its
volume is so vast, that but the barest reference to its
details can be made here. Suffice it to say, that it covers
.bn p125.png
.pn +1
every conceivable point at issue; and it has been so universally
published, that no person of ordinary intelligence
and education can have excuse for ignorance or misinformation
on the subject.

“The results of this agitation and discussion have been
bills in Congress from time to time, providing for a more
liberal and enlightened policy on the part of the government
toward the national merchant marine. Some of these
bills proposed special compensations to particular lines
for carrying the mails. Such bills have failed in consequence
of the objection that they involved the principle
of special legislation. Other measures proposed a general
bounty based upon tonnage and distance actually travelled
in foreign trade. This plan at the outset seemed more
popular than any other, and there was at one time strong
probability of its enactment into law. But it finally failed,
partly on account of clashing of diverse interests, and
partly by reason of ‘party exigencies,’ real or supposed,
in the House of Representatives. It is hardly pertinent
at this time to point out the benefits that would have
accrued, directly and incidentally, to every branch of our
national life and industry, from a tonnage law properly
administered. I have never hesitated, and do not now
hesitate, to declare that ten years of its operation would
result in placing our merchant marine in the foreign trade
on a footing second only to that of Great Britain in
amount, and vastly superior to it in character and quality
of vessels. And I still hope to see such a policy adopted
at no distant day.

“I have gone into detail to this extent because it seemed
necessary to do so in order to show that, loud as has been
the outcry of ‘subsidy’ raised against the act recently
passed, it is still, as a matter of fact, less liberal than
.bn p126.png
.pn +1
existing provisions of the British government for their
own ships already in the trade to be competed for.

“Thus far I have dealt with facts only; and I have
been careful to avoid any matter susceptible of controversy.
In conclusion, I will venture a few deductions of
my own, based upon the foregoing statements of simple
facts. I will assume at the start that our internal development
of farms, workshops, mines, railways, coastwise,
lake, and river commerce, etc., has reached a point at
which capital has reached its zenith of profitable investment
in them, and must look for some new field, not only
for further original investment, but also for the protection
or betterment of investments already made. In my
judgment, our energy and enterprise during the last
twenty-five years have exhausted all the large chances of
fortune within the boundaries of the United States. Our
existing industries of every description represent an enormous
volume of local ‘plant’ and productive organizations
quite up to our local requirements for some time; hence
it is necessary to seek outlets for an inevitable surplus of
product, and, in default of such outlet, there must be a plethora
of production which is bound to result in stagnation,
or, in other words, national apoplexy. For this there can
be but one preventive, ‘an ounce’ of which is said on traditional
authority to be ‘worth a pound of cure,’ and that
is in the development and retention of external market
outlets. It is my opinion that we can never secure these
until we can ourselves command the avenues to them.
Commerce has its ‘strategy’ no less than war. In war,
strategy depends on lines of operation and communication.
At this time we possess neither for either commerce
or war. Our great rival controls both in every sense of
the word. To-day we could not even defend our own
coasts against her obsolete iron-clads in war, and we cannot
.bn p127.png
.pn +1
control our own foreign commerce as against the
poorest and least seaworthy of her myriad of ‘ocean
tramps.’ If, for any reason, she were to withdraw from
our trade the vessels which, by virtue of our acquiescence,
do all our trans-Atlantic fetching and carrying for us, our
peerless nation would be laid helpless under an embargo
compared to which that of Jefferson’s administration
would be but a mere trifle of annoyance. It has seemed
strange to me that so little attention is paid to this fact.
What would our political independence be worth, if circumstances,
likely to occur at any moment, should visit
upon us the consequences of our commercial servitude to
England? and in a less, though still important, degree to
Germany?

“This is a plain statement of fact that I do not think
any reasonable person will have the temerity to dispute.
For the present I have only to add, that we have done
nothing as yet to lift this yoke from our necks. It cannot
be done except by restoring our merchant marine and
our naval power to their former status upon the high seas.
The attempts thus far made in that direction are but
feeble. I am not sanguine that they will be strong in our
time, but I hope so. It may be that this result will not
come until we have received a sterner lesson of our weakness
and helplessness than any one now anticipates.

“This pitiable condition on the ocean is emphasized by
the contrast of our unrivalled power, resource, and enterprise
within our own borders. It seems, indeed, the
strangest anomaly of modern civilization, that the most
enlightened, most ambitious, most energetic, most productive,
and internally most powerful nation on the globe
should be externally among the weakest, most helpless,
and least respected.

“The sole remedy for this situation is ships with seamen
.bn p128.png
.pn +1
to handle them, whether for peace or for war;
whether to carry our enormous exports, and bring our
immense imports, and receive therefor the tremendous
tolls which now flow into foreign coffers, or to vindicate
the majesty and power of our flag abroad in the world
to a degree befitting our status in the community of
nations.

“There is no lack of raw material, no lack of skill to
fashion it into the instruments of commerce. We have
the iron and the steel; we have the men to work them
into the finished forms of stately ships; we have the
money to promote the most colossal of enterprises by sea.
All we need is assurance of a steady national policy of
liberal and enlightened encouragement, based upon a
patriotic common consent, and elevated above the turmoils
of politics or the squabbles of parties. One decade
of such a policy would make us second only to Great
Britain on the high seas, either for commerce or for defence;
and two decades of it would bring us fairly into
the twentieth century as the master maritime power of
the globe.”
.pm letter-end

These observations, though written and
printed in 1891, are as true and pertinent now
as they were then; and they will remain true
and pertinent indefinitely because they embody
the practical logic of a situation; they point
out the consequences it entails, and they suggest
the only remedy that has been approved
by the cumulative experience of other nations.
The lines of fact are broad, plain, and unmistakable.
No one disputes them.
.bn p129.png
.pn +1

As before remarked, a quite brief experience
demonstrated that the Ocean Mail Pay Act of
March 3, 1891, was both inadequate in its
scope of operation and insufficient in its volume
of aid to produce any marked betterment
of the condition of our foreign trade. The
restricted nature of its application and the
comparatively small amounts paid were not
sufficient to encourage the establishment of
new lines, the opening of new sea routes, or
the construction of new and up-to-date vessels
under the American flag. One result of this
development was the formation of a committee,
composed of the most prominent ship-builders
and ship-owners in the country,
known as the Committee on the Merchant Marine.
Of this committee Mr. Cramp was one
of the originators, and always among the
most prominent and active members. Its object
was to concentrate the power of individuals
in a concerted body for the purpose
of furnishing facts and disseminating knowledge
with regard to the condition of the merchant
marine and its needs not only in Congress,
but also among the people throughout
the country. Hitherto the efforts of individuals
had been exerted singly and often divergently;
but it was hoped and believed that,
by the organization of this committee and
.bn p130.png
.pn +1
through the concerted action which would result
from its deliberations and researches, a
harmonious and uniform scheme might be
brought forward which would ultimately command
the public support of all men animated
by a patriotic desire to see the American flag
restored to its former proud rank on the high
sea.

The first result of this policy was the formulation
of a bill based upon tonnage and distance
travelled. It was to some extent analogous
to the system then prevailing in France
commonly known as the tonnage bounty system.

When this bill was first brought forward,
being introduced by Mr. Frye, of Maine, in
the Senate, and by Mr. Dingley, in the House of
Representatives, the foreign steamship owners
or their agents in this country at once became
greatly alarmed. They had not offered a very
vigorous resistance to the passage of the
Ocean Mail Pay Act of 1891, because their
knowledge of the business and their keen sense
of the situation taught them that there was not
much danger to their interests in that bill.
They made a show of opposing it, of course,
but they spent very little money or time and
made no really determined effort to beat it.
In fact, the foreign steamship owners and the
.bn p131.png
.pn +1
managers of the foreign lines which were
doing the ocean-carrying trade of the United
States realized before that bill became a law
what it took our people two or three years to
find out. But when the tonnage bounty bill
was brought forward, with the general applicability
of its provisions to all kinds of vessels
engaged in the foreign carrying trade, and
proposing, as it did, a rate of bounty which
would have gone far toward equalizing the
difference in cost of seafaring labor and subsistence
as between American and foreign
ships, the owners and managers of the steamship
lines[#] and tramps that were carrying the
commerce of the United States determined
.bn p132.png
.pn +1
that it must be beaten at all hazards and at
any cost. This struggle began in 1894. The
original tonnage bill passed the Senate, but
was smothered in the House. The owners and
managers of the foreign steamship lines could
not control the Senate, but they appeared able
to affect the action of the House of Representatives
negatively, at least, if not positively.

.pm fn-start
These managers of foreign lines proceeded systematically.
Whatever may have been the activity of their
competition for the carrying trade of the United States,
they were unanimous in their determination to prevent
the growth of an American merchant marine. Acting
under the guise of a pretended business combine, which,
for convenience, they termed “The North Atlantic Traffic
Association,” they raised funds, hired lobbyists,—among
whom appeared ex-officials of positions as high as the
Cabinet,—and by every possible means known to modern
ingenuity thwarted every effort of those favoring American
interests, both in and out of Congress. This combination
has no reason for existence except that of organized
and systematic lobbying against American interests in the
corridors and committee rooms of the American Congress.
.pm fn-end

A similar measure was brought forward
again in the Congress elected with President
McKinley in 1896, and the bill passed the
Senate, again to meet the same fate as its
predecessor in a Republican House of Representatives
with a thorough working majority,
notwithstanding that the policy of aid to
American shipping had been a cardinal plank
in the platform of that year, upon which that
House had been elected. The defection was
almost wholly among Western Republicans.

.if h
.il fn=i132.jpg w=600px id=iron
.ca
BATTLESHIP NEW IRONSIDES
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP NEW IRONSIDES]
.sp 2
.if-

During the contest over the bill in the Congress
under consideration, the tactics of the foreign
steamship owners and managers, personally
as well as through their hired agents, were
a disgrace to the good name of American legislation.
They threw off all disguise and openly
lobbied on the floors and in the corridors and
committee rooms of the House to prevent consideration
of the bill. In that Congress there
was every prospect that if the Senate Bill
.bn p132a.png
.bn p132b.png
.bn p133.png
.pn +1
could be brought up for consideration it would
pass with some trifling amendments, which
could easily be adjusted in conference committee.
The whole strategy of the alien shipping
interests was to prevent consideration, which
they ultimately succeeded in doing by working
upon the susceptibility or the apprehensions
of certain Republicans from the far Western
States.

In 1898, the tonnage bounty bill in a modified
form was brought forward again; this time
with a limitation of the amount to be expended
under its provisions in any one fiscal year to
nine millions of dollars, but it met the same
kind of opposition that had beaten its two
predecessors, and it shared their fate, passing
the Senate and being denied consideration in
the House.

Finally, in the Congress elected in 1900 and
assembling in 1901, a tonnage bill still further
modified was brought forward and passed the
Senate. For a time it was believed that the
alien ship-owners and managers would not be
able to beat this bill as they had its predecessors,
and strong hopes were indulged by its
friends that it would receive consideration in
the House. Even up to the last few weeks of
the closing session of the Fifty-seventh Congress
which expired March 3, 1903, the Chairman
.bn p134.png
.pn +1
of the Committee on Merchant Marine
and other advocates and friends of the bill
believed that they would be able to get a rule
for its consideration even at the last moment.
But that hope, like all the others, passed away.

.tb

To go back a little, it may be worth while to
remark here that the national misfortune did
not even end with the failure of these bills,
and the consequent continued depression or
paralysis of the American foreign carrying
trade. There was from time to time sufficient
prospect, or at least possibility, of the passage
of a practical and effective law for the aid and
encouragement of American shipping to induce
the investment of a large amount of capital
by sanguine persons in new ship-building
plants of considerable magnitude, whereby the
trade as it stood was not only greatly overdone,
but the skilled ship-building labor of the
country was overdrawn. There seemed to be
a theory that plenty of money to invest in plant
or to sink in unprofitable enterprises could be
depended on to make up for the lack of experience
in the management of shipyards and
want of skill in ship-building labor. The result
was disastrous not only to the investors in the
stock and bonds of the new shipyards, but also
to the entire ship-building industry, as it had
.bn p135.png
.pn +1
been developed on a practical and legitimate
basis.

With the final failure of all legislation to
promote American commerce in the foreign
carrying trade, there was no resource left for
either the new shipyards or the old except such
work as the coastwise trade might provide and
the construction of naval vessels. As for the
coastwise trade, it was already well provided
with new and highly serviceable steamships
likely to fill the demands of the traffic for several
years to come, so that little or no new
work could be expected from that quarter.

The naval programme did not in any year
put forward as many ships as there were ship-yards.
The government itself seemed to adopt
the policy of fostering and promoting the new
shipyards at the expense of the old, whereby
the former were overloaded with work which
they could not do, and they invariably became
so hopelessly delinquent as to make the time
clause of the contracts an utter farce. New
shipyards, which had never completed a ship
of any description, were loaded with 15,000
and 16,000-ton battleships of the most complex
and difficult construction, requiring the highest
skill and the most approved experience in
every respect to carry on the work required
for their completion.
.bn p136.png
.pn +1

It is not necessary to particularize further
on this point, except to say that very large
and important vessels, awarded to new and inexperienced
concerns with a contract time for
completion of three years, could not by any
possibility be finished inside of six or seven.
So the question naturally has arisen as to
whether, in the formulation of its ship-building
programmes or in its output of awards to
contractors, the government really desires to
augment its naval force in the shortest possible
time or to figure as a good Samaritan toward
new, inexperienced, unskilled, and needy shipyards,
owners, and managers. Such a policy
is based upon the fundamental error that what
is called “plant” makes a shipyard. The
real shipyard is not merely ground, waterfront,
buildings, and machinery, commonly
called plant; but with a thoroughly organized
<i>personnel</i> in staff and working-men; with a
generation or more of training and experience
behind them. That is a complete shipyard.
So far as mere plant is concerned, the size of
a new shipyard or the amount of money spent
on it cannot create a range of capabilities. The
indispensable and over-ruling requisite is the
trained staff and trained men that are in it.
The lay-out of land, buildings, and machinery
is but a small factor in the operation of an
.bn p137.png
.pn +1
effective shipyard. Another thing to be primarily
considered is that there are no enterprises
of industrial, railroad, or mining interest
that can be compared with a large modern
shipyard for intricacy of professional and
mechanical subdivisions in its organization.

Every handicraft or mechanical pursuit is
to be found in such a shipyard or closely correlated
with and contributory to it. The grouping
of these diverse elements into a harmonious
working whole needs the hand not only of
a master, but a master of long continuous
training; and in the adjustment of the various
parts of the group, it is time, experience, and
knowledge of the men composing it which are
indispensable.

Returning now to the main theme, it seems
proper to explain what the real bone of contention
is in this struggle between the impulse
of American patriotism and the greed of foreign
ship-owners. It all goes back to the fundamental
navigation laws of the United States
which prohibit the registry of any foreign built
ship under the American flag except in certain
cases provided by law, which are not sufficiently
numerous to be formidable.

In their warfare against government aid and
encouragement to American shipping, the foreign
.bn p138.png
.pn +1
ship-owners and ship-builders have not
met the issue squarely or fairly face to face.
They have invariably resorted to a subterfuge
which is commonly known as the doctrine of
free ships, the meaning and significance of
which are not understood by the general public,
and its consequences are realized most imperfectly,
if at all.

The phrase viewed as a glittering generality
is seductive, and it is regarded by many people
as a mere proposition to enable American ship-owners
to buy their ships where they can get
them the cheapest, as the saying is. It is a
curious fact that, with all the learning and
the so-called logic of political economists, they
have never yet, from Adam Smith down,
clearly defined to us what really constitutes
cheapness in all its elements, or what constitutes
the reverse, or costliness. A mere difference
in dollars and cents for a given thing to
perform a certain work by no means expresses
the difference. It may, and often does in fact,
befog or confuse the mind. A bad or poorly
constructed thing may be called cheap, and a
good, well-constructed thing may be termed
costly, measured by dollars and cents, and yet
practically, in view of efficiency, durability,
and all the other elements of desirability, the
so-called costly thing may be actually cheaper
.bn p139.png
.pn +1
than the so-called cheap thing, both being intended
for the same purpose.

A free ship law, or the repeal of our existing
navigation laws, would unquestionably load
our registry with ships cheap in dollars and
cents, but they would prove dear in everything
else. In order to do what lay in his power to
correct these misapprehensions and clear away
this fog of ignorance on that particular subject,
Mr. Cramp, in the <i>North American Review</i>
for April, 1894, printed a paper entitled
“Our Navigation Laws.”

In the course of this paper he called attention
to certain facts of permanent historical
value which there seemed a tendency to forget
or ignore:

.pm letter-start
“At the time of the Franco-German War of 1870~71,
even so sturdy a patriot as General Grant, then President,
was persuaded for a time that it would be a good thing
for our commerce, as a neutral nation, to permit American
registry of foreign-built vessels, the theory being that
many vessels of nations which might become involved in
the struggle would seek the asylum of our flag.

“Actuated by powerful New York influence, already
conspicuously hostile to the American merchant marine,
General Grant, in a special message, recommended that
Congress enact legislation to that end. This proposition
was antagonized by Judge Kelley, of Pennsylvania,—always
at the front when American interests were threatened,—in
one of his most powerful efforts, couched in the
.bn p140.png
.pn +1
vehement eloquence of which he was master, which impressed
General Grant so much that he abandoned that
policy, and subsequently adhered to the existing system.

“I will not stop here to point out in detail the tremendous
political and diplomatic advantage which England
would enjoy when dealing with other maritime
powers, if she could have always at hand an asylum for
the lame ducks of her commercial fleet in time of war.
Her ocean greyhounds, that could either escape the
enemy’s cruisers or be readily converted into cruisers
themselves, might remain under her flag; but all her
slow freighters, tramps, and obsolete passenger boats of
past eras would be transferred by sham sales to our flag,
under which they could pursue their traffic in safety
during the war under peace rates of insurance, and without
any material diversion of their earnings, which would
of course be increased by war freight rates, returning to
their former allegiance at the end of the war. The lack
of such an asylum amounts to a perpetual bond to keep
the peace.

“From the end of the Civil War to about 1880 there
was but feeble effort to revive ship-building in this
country. All our energies of capital and enterprise, as I
have remarked elsewhere, were directed to the extension
of railways in every direction, to the repair of the war
ravages in the South, to the settlement of the vast territories
of the West,—in a word, to purely domestic development,
pending which England was by common consent
left to enjoy her ocean monopoly.

“Such was the state of affairs in 1883-85, when the
adoption of the policy of naval reconstruction offered to
American ship-building the first encouragement it had
seen in a quarter of a century.

“When we began to build the new navy, every English
.bn p141.png
.pn +1
journal, from the <i>London Times</i> down, pooh-poohed the
idea that a modern man-of-war could be built in an American
yard, modern high-powered engines in an American
machine-shop, or modern breech-loading cannon in an
American forge. Many of the English ship-builders
rubbed their hands in actual anticipation of orders from
this government for the ships and guns needed; and they
blandly assured us that they would give us quite as favorable
terms as were accorded to China, Japan, and Chile.
And, to their shame be it said, there were officers of our
navy who not only adopted this view, but did all they
could to commit our government to the pernicious policy.

“In 1885, when Secretary Whitney took control of the
Navy Department, the efforts of English ship-builders to
secure at least a share of the work were renewed. By this
time the English were willing to admit that the hulls of
modern ships could be built in the United States; but
they were satisfied that our best policy would be to buy
the necessary engines, cannon, and armor from them.
Secretary Whitney, however, promptly decided that the
only article of foreign production which the new navy
needed was the plans of vessels for comparison. This was
wise, because it placed in the hands of our builders the
results of the most mature experience abroad, at comparatively
small cost. But one of the earliest and firmest
decisions of Mr. Whitney was that our naval vessels, machinery
and all, must be built at home and of domestic
material.

“The efforts of the English builders to get the engine-work
for our new navy were much more serious and
formidable than is generally known. A prominent member
of the House Committee on Naval Affairs proposed an
amendment to a pending naval bill empowering the Secretary
at his discretion to contract abroad for the construction
.bn p142.png
.pn +1
of propelling machinery for our naval ships. The
language was, of course, general, but every one knows that
the term ‘abroad’ in this sense would be synonymous with
Great Britain, and nothing more.

“Mr. Whitney promptly met this proposition with a
protest in the shape of a letter to the Naval Committee
dated February 27, 1886. He said that, so far as he was
concerned, he would not avail himself of such a power if
granted. There was no occasion for such power; and it
could have no effect except to keep American builders in
suspense, and thereby augment the difficulty of obtaining
capital for the enlargement of their facilities to meet the
national requirements. Mr. Whitney’s protest was so
vigorous that the proposition died from its effects in the
committee and has been well-nigh forgotten. The proposer
himself became satisfied that he had been misled by
the representations of naval officers who were under English
influence, and did not press his amendment.

“I have brought these facts forward for the purpose
of emphasizing my declaration that the promotive influence
behind every movement against our navigation laws
is of British origin, and whenever you put a pin through
a free-ship bill you prick an Englishman.

“The portion of Mr. Whitney’s letter referring to the
proposed free-engine clause in the Naval Bill of 1886 was
as follows:

“‘I think our true policy is to borrow the ideas of our
neighbors as far as they are thought to be in advance
of ours, give them to our ship-builders in the shape of
plans; and, having this object in view, I have been
anxious to acquire detailed drawings of the latest machinery
in use abroad, and should feel at liberty to spend
more in the same way in getting hold of the latest things
as far as possible for the purpose of utilizing them. We
.bn p143.png
.pn +1
have made important accumulations in this line during
the last six months. I think I ought to say to the committee
that I have placed myself in communication with
some of the principal marine-engine builders of the
country within the last three months for the purpose of
conferring with them upon this subject. I detailed two
officers of the navy,—a chief engineer and a line officer,—who,
under my directions, visited the principal establishments
in the East. They recognize that in the matter of
engines for naval ships we are quite inexperienced as
compared with some other countries. It is this fact,
doubtless, which the committee has in view in authorizing
the purchase and importation of engines for one of the
vessels authorized to be constructed under this act. If
the committee will permit me to make the suggestion, I
find myself quite satisfied, after consultation with people
engaged in the industry in this country, that it would not
be necessary for me to avail myself of that discretionary
power in order to produce machines of the most advanced
character. Our marine-engine builders in general express
their inability at the present moment to design the latest
and most approved type of engines for naval vessels,—an
inability arising from the fact that they have not been
called upon to do anything of importance in that line. At
the same time, they state that if they are given the necessary
time, and are asked to offer designs in competition,
they would acquaint themselves with the state of the art
abroad and here, and would prepare to offer to the government
designs embodying the latest improvements in the
art. And they are ready to construct at the present time
anything that can be built anywhere else if the plans are
furnished. As I find no great difficulty in the way of
purchasing plans (in fact, there is an entire readiness to
sell to us on the part of the engine-builders abroad), I
.bn p144.png
.pn +1
think the solution of the question will be not very difficult,
although it may require some time and a little delay.’”
.pm letter-end

At this writing (1903), only eighteen years
have elapsed since the date of Secretary Whitney’s
letter. The wisdom of his policy needs
no eulogy beyond the history of the development
of steam-engineering in the United States
during that brief period. In fact, no other
eulogy could be a tenth part as eloquent as
that history is.

The policy of Secretary Whitney was in fact
an echo of the sturdy patriotism that framed
the Act of December 31, 1792, dictated by the
same impulse of national independence and
conceived in the same aspiration of patriotic
pride.

.if h
.il fn=i144.jpg w=600px id=iowa
.ca
BATTLESHIP IOWA
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP IOWA]
.sp 2
.if-

And now, in the face of this record so fresh
and recent, the same old demand for English
free ships is heard again in our midst, promoted
by the same old lobby and pressed on
the same old lines. Are we never to hear the
last of it? Is there to be a perennial supply
of American legislators willing to promote a
British industry by destroying an American
one? To all history, to all logic, they oppose a
single phrase: “Let us buy ships where they
are cheapest.” Well, if national independence
is valueless, and if everything is to be subordinated
to cheapness, why not get our laws
.bn p144a.png
.bn p144b.png
.bn p145.png
.pn +1
made in the House of Commons? The members
of the House of Commons legislate for
nothing. Senators and Representatives charge
$5000 a year for their services, besides stationery
allowance and mileage. The House of
Commons makes laws cheaper than our Congress
does. Our ships and our capacity to
create them are as much a symbol of independence
as our laws are; and if it is good
policy to get the former where they are cheapest,
why not get the latter on the same terms?

British warfare against American ships and
shipping by no means stopped at extravagant
subsidies to her own ships; did not stop at
determined, and thus far successful, efforts to
defeat American legislation of a similar character;
did not even stop at vigorous and often
corrupt attacks upon our navigation laws
through the lobbies of our own Congress.

Of course, all these considerations at this
writing (1903) have become ancient history.
The iron ship has not only completely dominated
British naval architecture, but that of all
other European countries, and has established
itself on an equally permanent and secure footing
in the United States. A few wooden ships
are still built in this country, but they are
mostly schooners for the coastwise trade, and
really cut little or no figure in commercial conditions
.bn p146.png
.pn +1
outside of our own coast. Yet, although
it be ancient history, viewed in the light of the
enormous changes that have occurred in thirty
or thirty-five years, still, it is instructive to
know the springs and motives of the public
statecraft and the private commercial strategy
which forced the iron ship in and the wooden
ship out. That this was bound to come in the
nature of things does not admit of doubt; but
it is equally clear that the policy of interested
parties forced the situation in favor of British
shipping interests, and at the time adversely
to those of the United States both as to ship-owning
and as to ship-building, which are
inseparably interdependent.

In 1897, Mr. Cramp, being prevented by
other business from attending a hearing before
the Committee on the Merchant Marine on the
day set for his appearance, addressed to it a
letter, in which, after briefly reviewing the conditions
and causes already set forth, he said:

.pm letter-start
“The interests of ship-owning and ship-building are
identical, because no nation can successfully own ships
that cannot successfully build them.

“No nation can either own or build ships when, unprotected
and unencouraged, if it is brought in competition
with other nations that are protected and encouraged.

“This is the existing condition of the ship-owning and
ship-building interests of the United States.
.bn p147.png
.pn +1

“The resulting fact is that the enormous revenue represented
by the freight and passenger tolls on our commerce
and travel is constantly drained out of this country
into British, German, and French pockets, in the order
named, but mainly British; while the vast industrial increment
represented by the necessary ship-building inures
almost wholly to Great Britain.

“For this drain there is no recompense. It is sheer loss.
It is the principal cause of our existing financial condition.

“So long as this drain continues, no tariff and no monetary
policy can restore the national prosperity.

“Until we make some provision to keep at home some
part at least of the three hundred and odd millions annually
sucked out of this country by foreign ship-owners
and ship-builders, no other legislation can bring good times
back again.

“It is a constant stream of gold always flowing out.

“The foreign ship-owner who carries our over-sea commerce
makes us pay the freight both ways.

“For our exports we get the foreign market price less
the freight.

“For our imports we pay the foreign market price plus
the freight.

“No fine-spun theory of any cloistered or collegiate
doctrinaire can wipe out these facts.

“The fact that so long as the freight is paid to a
foreign ship-owner, so long will it be a foreign profit on
a foreign product, is fundamental and unanswerable.

“The English steamship is a foreign product, and its
earnings, which we pay, are a foreign profit.

“No sane man will argue that a foreign profit on a
foreign product can be of domestic benefit.

“Add to this the fact, equally important, that the
carrier of commerce controls its exchanges, and the condition
.bn p148.png
.pn +1
of commercial, financial, and industrial subjugation
is complete. Such is our condition to-day.

“Great Britain has many outlying colonies and dependencies.

“The greatest two are India and the United States.

“She holds India by force of arms, whereby her control
of that country costs her something. She has to pay
something for her financial and commercial drainage of
India.

“She holds the United States by the folly of its own
people, whereby her control of this country costs her
nothing. She has to pay nothing for her financial and
commercial drainage of the United States.

“But the amount of her annual drainage of gold from
the United States far exceeds that from India.

“Therefore the United States is by far the most valuable
of all the dependencies of Great Britain.

“In the relation of India to England there is something
pitiable, because India is helpless.

“In the relation of the United States to England there
is nothing that is not contemptible, because it is the willing
servitude of a nation that could help herself if she
would.

“England is wide awake to those conditions, and keenly
appreciates their priceless value to her.

“The United States blinks at them, half dazed, half
asleep, insensible of their tremendous damage to her.

“England, clearly seeing that in this age more than
ever before ocean empire is world empire, strains every
nerve to perpetuate her sea power and exhausts her resources
to double-rivet the fetters which it fastens upon
mankind.

“Though in 1885 England already had a navy superior
to those of any two and equal to those of any three other
.bn p149.png
.pn +1
powers, if not to all others, she has since that date built
a new navy which, with what remains most available of
the old one, overshadows the world, and makes the sea
as much British territory as the County of Middlesex.”
.pm letter-end

While this contest was going on between
American ship-owners and ship-builders on
the one hand and the alien combinations who
control our ocean commerce on the other, a
vast amount of American capital was gradually
invested in shipping under the British flag,
and at least an equal amount awaited any reasonable
encouragement to build ships in this
country to sail under the American flag. Of
course, it would have been folly for the men
who controlled this capital to invest it in
American ships with a clear handicap of at
least 15 to 20 per cent. against them in operating
expenses, ton for ton, in competition with
the aided, fostered, and subsidized fleets of
England, Germany, and France. For a long
time this mass of capital was held in hope of
the adoption of a policy by our government
that would tend to lift the handicap and equalize
as far as possible the burdens of operating
American ships as compared with others. But
when Congress adjourned March 4, 1901,
leaving the shipping question where it had
been ever since the Civil War, and offering, if
possible, less hope than ever before, the mass
.bn p150.png
.pn +1
of American capital that had been held back
was let loose. Soon rumors that a great
merger of British steamship lines with the International
Navigation Company was in progress
filled the air. It soon appeared that there
was plenty of American capital to invest in
ships under foreign flags, but none under the
American flag so long as the existing situation
might last. The ship-owners may have been
patriotic, but their patriotism was not enthusiastic
enough to make them willing to pay a
penalty of 15 to 20 per cent. for the sake of it.
This movement soon took shape in the organization
of the International Mercantile Marine
Company, in which was merged the control and
management of the International, the White
Star, the Leyland, and the Atlantic Transport
Lines; the whole forming by far the greatest
aggregation of vessels and tonnage ever
grouped under one control. This control was
American,[#] but the ships were of British registry
except six, built by the Cramps and several
others,—the “St. Louis,” “St. Paul,”
“Kroonland,” and “Finland,” American
built, and the “New York” and “Philadelphia”
(formerly the “Paris”), British built,
.bn p151.png
.pn +1
but admitted to American registry by the special
Act of 1892.
.pm fn-start
Since this was written, the whole ownership of the
Line is British.
.pm fn-end

The Americans were determined to own and
operate ships. They would have preferred to
run them under the American flag, but Congress—or
rather a fraction in the House of
Representatives—compelled them to use the
British ensign! The commercial and financial
effect of this was that the American investors
got the benefit of the lower wages
and cheaper subsistence of foreign seafaring
labor. The vessels were American as to ownership
only. No American officer or seaman
or engineer or fireman was employed in them.
They added nothing to the sea power of the
country; they did nothing toward forming a
nursery of American sailors to be in readiness
for an emergency. On the contrary, they were
a constant school for the Naval Reserve of a
power that might become as hostile politically
as she has been industrially and commercially
from the beginning of our existence as an independent
nation. None of these great facts
appealed to the narrow and demagogic faction
in the House. They could see in it nothing but
“a trust,” and their parrot-cry resounded
from the banks of the Wabash to the foot-hills
of the Rocky Mountains.

Many men, hitherto hopeful, believe that any
.bn p152.png
.pn +1
further effort to restore our foreign carrying
trade under the American flag must be in vain.
They argue that, if the Houses of Representatives
elected in 1898 and 1900 would not pass
a Shipping Bill, none can ever be chosen that
will. If foreign influences and alien doctrines
could prevent consideration in those two
Houses of bills that had already passed the
Senate in each Congress, those influences and
those doctrines are likely to maintain their
potency indefinitely. If this be true, the American
flag in the foreign trade is doomed to utter
extinction within a few years on the Atlantic
Ocean, and its survival in the Pacific is a
matter of extreme doubt.

A strange feature of this contest in its later
stages was the fact that the confederated
trades-unions of the country arranged themselves
unanimously against the American and
in favor of the alien policy. Trades-unionism
is founded upon a doctrine or dogma of protection
more sweeping and more drastic than
any other ever known. They cheerfully maintain
and sometimes exultantly proclaim that,
when nothing else will serve to accomplish
their ends, violence and crime become logical
and legitimate instrumentalities for enforcement
of their protective doctrine. They take
no account of the fact that the enactment of a
.bn p153.png
.pn +1
favorable shipping law would open new and
wide avenues of remunerative employment for
American mechanics that are now closed.
Their motive in opposing such legislation
seems to be a sort of blind, groping revenge
against a few ship-builders and ship-owners
who have resisted their unreasonable and ruinous
demands. It is a remarkable fact that the
leaders and managers of the confederated
trades-unions are all foreigners.

Naturally, such organizations, so led, fall
easy dupes to the wiles of the alien ship-owners,
who have never left any stone unturned
or any expedient untried to defeat or
smother in our own Congress legislation calculated
to promote and extend our merchant
marine.

Whatever the distant future may bring
forth, there seems to be at this time and for
the near future as little prospect of the development
of a new and purely American merchant
marine in the foreign trade as there has
been at any time since the old one was destroyed.

Whatever may be the fate of the American
merchant marine, it cannot be said that during
the campaign for its resurrection, lasting almost
continuously for over thirty years, Mr.
Cramp has ever withheld from its advocacy
.bn p154.png
.pn +1
any part of his knowledge, study, observation,
and experience; and if, partly through the
feebleness of our own patriotism in legislation
and administration, and partly through the
superior and more aggressive patriotism of
foreign ship-owners and ship-builders, the
American merchant marine should become extinct,
it will not be his fault.
.bn p155.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2 id=ch04
CHAPTER IV
.sp 2
.pm ch-head
Condition of Navy after Civil War—Admiral Case’s
Fleet—“Virginius’s” Scare—“Huron,” “Alert,” and
“Ranger”—Secretary Hunt—First Advisory Board—Secretary
Chandler—“Puritan” Class—Finished—Steel—Hon.
J. B. McCreary and Appropriation Bill
for New Navy—Members of Second Naval Advisory
Board—Standard for Steel for New Ships, “Chicago,”
“Boston,” “Atlanta,” and “Dolphin”—Secretary
Whitney—Beginning of New Navy, by Charles
H. Cramp—“Baltimore,” “Charleston,” and “Yorktown”—Purchase
of Drawings by Navy Department—Commodore
Walker—Premium System—Mr. Whitney’s
Views—Premiums Paid—Attack on System—Secretary
Tracy—War College Paper—Classifying
Bids.
.pm ch-head-end

<sc>After</sc> the Civil War the navy was neglected,
being, so far as its cruising vessels were concerned,
a wooden navy of not only obsolete
types, but decayed or decaying vessels, which
gradually became a reproach to the country
and a laughing-stock for other maritime
powers.

At the time of the “Virginius’s” difficulty
with Spain, which occurred about five years
after the close of the Civil War, a “grand
fleet” was assembled at Key West under the
command of Rear-Admiral Case. This fleet
.bn p156.png
.pn +1
consisted of a large number of wooden cruising
steamers of various types and classes, all obsolete,
many of them unseaworthy, and all incapable
of meeting an up-to-date ship of that
period (1874-75) with any chance of success
whatever. To these wooden hulks were added
the double-turreted monitors “Terror,”
“Amphitrite,” and “Monadnock,” which
were built at the navy-yards of wood, and a
batch of old worn-out single-turreted monitors.
The bottoms of the wooden monitors were so
weakened structurally that, whenever an effort
was made to wedge up the spindles so that the
turrets could revolve, the bottom went down
instead of the turret going up, the latter necessarily
remaining immovable. Unquestionably
any one, or at most any two, of our first-class
modern battleships at this writing, 1903, could
have annihilated and sunk the entire fleet in
two or three hours, although it consisted, all
types and classes taken together, of over
forty vessels. This was an object lesson, and it
to some extent aroused the sensibilities of the
country; but the then existing administration
of the Navy Department was under the absolute
control of the navy-yard rings, and all
naval work of every description was done in
navy-yards. The “Spanish Scare,” as it was
called, did, however, have the effect of spurring
.bn p156a.png
.bn p156b.png
.bn p157.png
.pn +1
Congress to provide for the construction
of eight (8) new vessels, the first provided for
since the Civil War. Of these, three were
given out to be built by contract; two, the
“Huron” and “Alert,” small iron sloops-of-war
or gun-vessels, were given to John Roach
and built at his works at Chester; and another
of the same class, the “Ranger,” was given to
Harlan & Hollingsworth, of Wilmington, and
built there. The other five were built in navy-yards,
and were completed at different periods
between 1875 and 1879.

.if h
.il fn=i156.jpg w=600px id=alab
.ca
BATTLESHIP ALABAMA
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP ALABAMA]
.sp 2
.if-

With this exception, nothing whatever was
done toward increase or betterment of our
naval force from 1865 until 1883. However,
in 1881, General Garfield, having been elected
President the preceding year and inaugurated
the 4th of March, 1881, appointed Judge William
H. Hunt, of Louisiana, Secretary of the
Navy. General Garfield understood the naval
needs of the country, referred to the subject
vigorously in his inaugural, and quite early in
his administration, or about a month before he
was assassinated, prompted his Secretary of
the Navy to take measures looking to the
modernization of our national marine. The
result of this was the convening of a board
early in the summer of 1881, of which Admiral
John Rodgers was President. The instructions
.bn p158.png
.pn +1
of this board were to investigate the existing
state of foreign navies, to inquire into
the immediate needs of our own, and to formulate
a ship-building programme on modern
lines, to be carried out as soon as the resources
of the country would permit. On the 7th of
November, 1881, this board, which is commonly
known to history as the “First Naval Advisory
Board,” reported in accordance with its
instructions. It is not necessary here to go
into detail with regard to the ship-building
programme which they recommended. Suffice
to say, that not one of the ships or types of
ships which they recommended was ever actually
built; but their deliberations and report
attracted general public attention, caused the
subject to be widely and patriotically, although
not very intelligently, discussed in the newspapers,
so that, while the action of this first
Naval Advisory Board did not produce any
actual or visible results, it at least served to
popularize the subject of the “New Navy.”

.if h
.il fn=i158.jpg w=600px id=maine
.ca
BATTLESHIP MAINE
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP MAINE]
.sp 2
.if-

In 1882, Mr. Hunt was appointed Minister
to Russia, and was succeeded in the Secretaryship
of the Navy by William E. Chandler, of
New Hampshire. Mr. Chandler was a vigorous,
active man, and lost no time in taking
advantage of the public interest which had
been aroused. The result of the further investigations
.bn p158a.png
.bn p158b.png
.bn p159.png
.pn +1
and reports which he caused to
be made, and his communications to the President,
and through the President to Congress
based thereon, resulted in an act, approved
March 3, 1883, providing for the construction
of four new cruising vessels, and the launching
and engining of the four double-turreted
monitors “Puritan,” “Terror,” “Amphitrite,”
and “Monadnock,” which at that time
had been on the stocks about eight years.
These were built of iron, and took the places
in the Navy Register of the worthless wooden
monitors of the same names.

On the first lot of new vessels and engines,
the bids were all considerably below the cost
estimated by the Advisory Board and the Bureaus,
and the contracts were let as follows:
For the four vessels, and the engines of the
“Puritan,” monitor, to Mr. John Roach; for
the engines of the “Terror,” monitor, to William
Cramp & Sons; and for the “Amphitrite,”
monitor, to the Harlan & Hollingsworth
Company, of Wilmington, Delaware. Work
under all these contracts proceeded with commendable
alacrity.

Considerable difficulty was at first experienced
in procuring material for the new steel
ships. The standard established by law was
very high, and the methods of test devised by
.bn p160.png
.pn +1
the board, to say the least, did nothing to
ameliorate the rigors of the statute. The steel-makers,
however, bravely persevered, and
finally overcame their difficulties in the main,
though a historical <i>résumé</i> of the progress of
the new navy would be incomplete without the
statement that none of the contractors, under
the Act of March 2, 1883, made any money,
and some of them suffered serious loss; and
this statement applies equally to the manufacturers
who made the steel for the pioneer
ships,—at least one old and well established
concern being wrecked by the difficulties encountered,
while others were embarrassed.

The year 1884 was signalized by a Presidential
campaign of unusual bitterness, and,
notwithstanding the cordiality with which all
parties had joined hands in the inception of
the new navy, the first session of the Forty-eighth
Congress developed what for a time
threatened to be at least a temporary hiatus.
But wiser counsels at length prevailed, and,
though no additions were made to the list of
new ships authorized, sufficient appropriations
were made to prevent stoppage of work on
those already under contract.

The results of the year 1884 were chiefly
interesting because they demonstrated, after
much bitter debate and heated discussion, that
.bn p161.png
.pn +1
the cause of the new navy had acquired impetus
sufficient to vanquish the party passions
of even so violent a Presidential campaign as
that which marked that year. That campaign
over, the Forty-eighth Congress, at its second
session, took up with zeal the promotion of
the new navy, and the act approved March 3,
1885, authorized four additional vessels, toward
the construction of which $1,895,000 was
appropriated with practical unanimity. The
Act of March 3, 1885, marked an epoch in the
history of the new navy. Prior to that time,
the legislative practice had been to require
separate enactment to authorize the construction
of new vessels for the navy. In this case
the authorization appeared in the body of the
regular Naval Appropriation Bill, and that
practice has been followed ever since. This
innovation was debated in Committee of the
Whole, and a point of order made to strike
out the proposed authorization. The point of
order was overruled by Hon. James B. McCreary,
a Democratic member from Kentucky,
with the approval of Speaker John G. Carlisle;
Mr. McCreary being Chairman of the Committee
of the Whole on the Naval Bill. Mr. McCreary
ruled: 1st. That legislation in pursuance
of any settled or established policy was
germane in the annual appropriation bill which
.bn p162.png
.pn +1
dealt with that subject matter. 2d. That the
increase of the navy was clearly a settled and
established policy, to which all branches of the
government were committed. 3d. That in view
of that fact the authorization of additional vessels
of war could not be considered new legislation
in the meaning of the rules, but must be
regarded as progressive legislation in a direction
previously sanctioned by Congress; that
therefore the authorization of new ships was
germane to the regular naval appropriation
bill for each year, and was in order.

It is hard to overestimate the value of this
ruling to the interests of the new navy. Every
one familiar with legislative processes knows
the advantage which appertains to the “right
of way” enjoyed by a regular appropriation
bill as compared with the average chances of
an independent measure. These advantages
are so marked, that it is quite proper to say
that Mr. McCreary’s rule on this point was of
greater importance than any other single incident
in the legislative history of naval reconstruction.
In the Act of March 3, 1885, appeared
another clause prohibiting the repair
of any existing wooden vessel when the cost
of such repair should exceed 20 per cent. upon
the whole cost of such vessel entirely new.
This clause was adopted upon the recommendation
.bn p163.png
.pn +1
of Secretary Chandler, made in the
previous year; its obvious object being to
render impossible the perpetuation of the old
and obsolete wooden ships. Its effect soon became
apparent in a rapid elimination of old
wooden vessels from the navy, until by 1890
only sixteen of them remained on the active
list, and nearly, if not quite, every one of these
was then in her last commission. It is impossible
to overestimate the salutary effects of
this clause. 1st. It “cleared the decks” of a
lot of obsolete lumber. 2d. It stimulated public
opinion to demand prompt production of new
and modern ships to take the places of the
old and obsolete. 3d. It put an end to a policy
of makeshifts which was always extravagant,
often wasteful, and sometimes corrupt.

The building of the four pioneer ships involved
several new departures. The Congress
that authorized their construction and made an
appropriation toward it, also made provision
for creating what was termed a second “Naval
Advisory Board,” which was to have charge
of the details of their building. By this expedient
Congress hoped to avert the evils of
the Bureau system on the one hand, and to
limit the one-man power of the Secretary on
the other. This board consisted of five members,
three naval officers and two civilians, to
.bn p164.png
.pn +1
be selected by the Secretary of the Navy. Of
the two civilians, one was a ship-builder, the
other a mechanical engineer. The ship-builder
was Henry Steers. This gentleman was a
nephew of George Steers, a somewhat celebrated
naval architect in his time, whose principal
achievement was the design of the yacht
“America,” which won the cup which the
English have struggled ever since to recapture.
The famous steam-frigate “Niagara,” built a
short time before the war, though constructed
in a navy-yard, was designed by Henry Steers.
During the paralysis of American ship-building
which followed the Civil War, Mr. Steers
became discouraged at the outlook and, having
a considerable fortune, went into the banking
business.

The other civilian member, the mechanical
engineer, was Miers Coryell, of New York.
This gentleman was connected in his professional
capacity with the Cromwell Line of
steamships plying between New York and New
Orleans. He had shortly before the time under
consideration designed an engine for the
“Louisiana” of that line, which Mr. Roach
built, involving an entirely new departure in
sea-going engine construction. Perhaps the
most concise way to describe this engine would
be to say that it represented an effort to introduce
.bn p165.png
.pn +1
the walking-beam of a side-wheel river
steamboat into the engine compartment of a
screw steamship. The advantage claimed for
it was that it permitted the use of vertical
cylinders within a deck-height not sufficient to
admit the regular type of vertical inverted
cylinders. This it undoubtedly did; but there
its merit stopped. For the rest it was cumbrous,
complicated, and of weight exceedingly
disproportionate to its power. This unspeakable
device Mr. Coryell offered to the Advisory
Board, and, to the speechless amazement of the
engineering world, it was adopted as the propelling
machinery of the most important ship
then authorized for the navy. It is worthy of
remark here that these beam-engines were subsequently
taken out of the “Chicago,” and a
pair of vertical inverted or slightly inclined
engines of the usual type substituted. And it
might also be observed that this work, with
some alterations in the hull, was done in the
New York Navy-Yard at a cost of $1,300,000
as against an original contract price of $889,000
for the whole ship new; or, in other words,
the cost of re-engining and overhauling the
“Chicago” in a navy-yard was 40 per cent.
more than the first cost of the new ship under
contract in a private shipyard!
.bn p166.png
.pn +1

The Navy Bureaus were not slow to discern
what the creation of the Advisory Board
meant for them. At first they tried to defeat
it. Finding that impossible, two of the Bureau
chiefs besought the Naval Committees of the
Senate and House to provide that at least one
of the four ships be built in a navy-yard. No
member of the Senate committee favored this
proposition, and but two members of the
House committee, both of whom, it is hardly
necessary to say, represented navy-yard districts
and danced to the music of labor agitators.
Thus, at the inception of the new navy
the navy-yard snake was “scotched,” if not
killed.

When the contracts and specifications were
drawn up in form, two facts became evident:
One was that the knowledge of the new conditions
of naval construction possessed by the
authorities of the navy itself was altogether
academic; and the other was that neither
naval authorities nor civilians interested had
any adequate idea of what the requirement of
the law in regard to material actually signified.
The law said that the ships must be built of
“steel, of domestic manufacture, having a
tensile strength of 60,000 pounds to the square
inch, and an elongation of 25 per cent. in eight
inches.”
.bn p167.png
.pn +1

Verbally, this was the English Admiralty
standard for mild steel plates and shapes. But
the English had an elastic system of inspection
which left much to be determined by the judgment
and knowledge of the inspector. The
system adopted by our earlier inspectors of
material was rigid as a rock and inelastic as
cast-iron. The letter of the law, not the spirit
of it, was their guide. These requirements and
the mode of enforcing them would have been
drastic had the mild-steel industry been in a
flourishing condition. But as a matter of fact
it had not been developed at all in this country;
so they were formulating crucial requirements
for the product of an industry which did
not exist. The production of mild steel, or at
least its use in naval construction, was still in
the experimental stage then, even in England,
its native home. The “Iris” and “Mercury,”
the first all-steel ships built in England,
had not been in commission more than
two years, when the requirements for our new
ships were formulated by the naval authorities
and embodied in an Act of Congress.

Bessemer steel was produced in large quantities
here at the time for making rails and
tank-plates. But Bessemer could not stand the
navy tests. Nothing but open-hearth steel
could do it, and at the time when bids were
.bn p168.png
.pn +1
asked for the first four ships there was not
an open-hearth mill in the country that could
make the ingots required for the plates and
shapes of the sizes and qualities demanded.
Still, American steel-makers were found willing
to undertake the task, though the sequel
soon proved that their conceptions of what
confronted them were quite vague. When one
surveys the open-hearth steel industry as it
exists in the United States to-day (1901),
largely exceeding that of Great Britain, and
greater than that of all the rest of the world,
exclusive of the United Kingdom, put together,
it seems impossible to realize that it is all the
growth of a score of years. As late as 1887
there was no forging-mill in this country that
could forge a three-throw crank-shaft in one
piece, and the “Baltimore’s” crank-shafts of
that description had to be imported from Whitworth’s
works in England.

Such were the conditions which confronted
the ship-builders who made estimates and
offered bids for the construction of the four
pioneer steel ships of the new navy. When
the bids were opened early in July, 1883, it
became apparent that the views of bidders as
to the character of the task they proposed to
undertake were quite divergent. To avoid
prolixity, we will deal only with the “Chicago,”
.bn p169.png
.pn +1
which was, in fact, the representative
ship. For that vessel there were but two bidders
worth considering,—Mr. Cramp and Mr.
Roach. Mr. Roach bid $889,000 for the hull
and machinery. Mr. Cramp bid a little over
$1,000,000, or about 14 per cent. in excess of
his competitor. As the sequel proved, Mr.
Cramp, conservative as his bid was, or as
it appeared to be, underwent no misfortune
in failing to get the “Chicago” at $1,025,000.
Whether Mr. Cramp could have been more
successful than Mr. Roach was in creating
the new open-hearth steel industry required
to produce the material demanded by the
law and the specifications need not be discussed.
It may, however, be said that the
excess of his bid over that of Mr. Roach was
due wholly to his misgivings on this point;
because on all other points involved, such as
experience, skill, and efficiency of organization,
he had some advantage.

Mr. Roach got all the ships. The contracts
were signed July 26, 1883. The keel of the
“Chicago” was laid December 5, 1883; she
was launched December 5, 1885, only fifty-two
days before the contract date for completion,
which was January 26, 1886. Meantime the first
of the ships, the despatch-boat “Dolphin,”
had been completed, put on trial, and had failed
.bn p170.png
.pn +1
to meet the requirements of the law. Here the
evils of the inflexible, inelastic, or “cast-iron”
form of contract became instantly evident.
The Navy Department could not accept the
ship under those conditions without violating
the law. Mr. Roach thereupon threw up his
hands, and the government, as provided in the
contract, had to take possession of the ships
as they stood in his shipyard and complete
them with its own resources, at the risk and
expense of Mr. Roach and his bondsmen. This
action on his part is hard to understand or
explain. He was perfectly solvent. Although,
as the law and the contract stood, the Navy
Department could not accept the “Dolphin,”
in view of her deficiency in performance, Congress
was soon to assemble, and Secretary
Whitney was ready to ask for an amendment
or modification of the law which would enable
him to accept the ship with an equitable penalty
for her deficiency, which, by the way, was
not great. It was said at the time that Mr.
Roach acted upon the advice of certain political
friends holding high rank; that a certain
group of Republican politicians believed that
their party needed a martyr just at that juncture,
and they thought Mr. Roach would make
a good one. Be this as it may, the government
finished all the ships in the Roach yard,
.bn p171.png
.pn +1
and the “Chicago,” contracted for July 26,
1883, was ready for her first commission the
middle of April, 1889,—five years and nearly
nine months building. We have dwelt with
some prolixity on this branch of the subject
for two reasons: first, because it was the beginning
of the most important epoch in our
naval history; and, second, because the errors,
miscalculations, and consequent disasters it
developed became themselves of very great
value as object lessons for guidance or warning
in subsequent transactions.

When Mr. Whitney became Secretary in
March, 1885, he found ready to his hand authorization
for four more ships, the designs
of which had been partially worked out by the
Bureaus during the previous winter. He, however,
proceeded slowly; so deliberately, that
the contract for the first of the four ships built
under the authorization of March 3, 1885, and
August 3, 1886, was not signed until December
17, 1886, a year and nine months after he
assumed the office. This delay was due to a
variety of causes, the most important of which
are interestingly and instructively described
by Mr. Cramp himself in an account of his
personal connection with the transactions. It
may be premised that when Mr. Whitney became
Secretary of the Navy, he very soon
.bn p172.png
.pn +1
sought to avail himself of Mr. Cramp’s experience,
professional ability, and practical
knowledge. Mr. Cramp responded in the same
spirit of frankness and candor as that in which
the Secretary invited him. There was no
mincing of matters in any direction. Mr.
Cramp hewed to the line on all the abuses and
shortcomings of the old régime, and he also
pointed out methods by which they could be
overcome or, at least, compelled to get out of
the way. Mr. Whitney was a thorough business
man and an able lawyer. Far removed
both by character and by fortune from any
possible temptation, Mr. Whitney’s sole object
in taking the navy portfolio was to promote
the public welfare, and thereby add lustre
to his name.

But let Mr. Cramp tell his own story in his
own way.
.pm h3 "THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW NAVY."
.pm letter-start
“The practical beginning of the new navy occurred
under the Administration of Mr. Chandler, and while he
was Secretary of the Navy the ‘Chicago,’ ‘Boston,’ ‘Atlanta,’
and ‘Dolphin’ were constructed.

“The hulls of these vessels had been designed by the
Advisory Board, and were about equal to any vessels constructed
abroad at that time so far, I might say, as the
models and general designs were concerned. Their outfit
and guns were not fairly up to the prevailing practice
.bn p173.png
.pn +1
abroad, and their engines were very inefficient and commonplace.
They were not designed by the board, but were
principally the designs of the contractor. The ‘Chicago’
had engines of quite a fantastic design, suggested by one
of the members in the board. The models and designs of
the hulls, as compared with what had preceded them in
the Navy Department after the end of the Civil War,
were great achievements over the ridiculous specimens of
the ship-building art that we were loaded with during that
time. They were the production principally of Messrs.
Steers and Fernald, assisted by Mr. Bowles, and were up
to most of the requirements of the time.

“When the vessels were tried under the following Administration,
that is, during the Secretaryship of Mr.
Whitney, it was found that the power of the engines and
the consequent speed developed were not up to the requirements
of the law, although it might be said that they
were up to the requirements of the contract.

“There was some considerable delay on the part of the
Secretary, Mr. Whitney, in receiving the ships from the
contractors on that particular account, a decision having
been made by the Attorney-General that vessels contracted
for and subsequently not coming up to the requirements
and not in full accordance with the law were worthless,
and would not be accepted.

“A violent uproar pervaded the entire country at that
time on account of what they called the hesitating attitude
of Mr. Whitney.

“The political administration of the government having
changed, it was asserted that it was on account of the
politics of the contractor that the vessels had not been
accepted. Among the people who argued thus, all considerations
of contract requirements of law were entirely
ignored, and Mr. Whitney received untold denunciations
.bn p174.png
.pn +1
from these sources; but he was one of those men whom
adverse criticisms as to what he had done never disturb
in the slightest degree.

“Mr. Whitney finally accepted the vessels conditionally,
after more or less contention which consumed some little
time. But no more unfair denunciation or criticism of the
actions and efforts of any man ever occurred than fell to
his lot at that time.

“The second lot of vessels was given out by Mr. Whitney,
who succeeded Mr. Chandler. Two of these vessels
were built on plans provided by Mr. Whitney, and two
were on modified plans of Mr. Chandler.

“In compliance with the provisions of the act which
authorized the ‘Secretary to prepare drawings,’ Mr.
Whitney purchased from Armstrong the drawings that
had been prepared for the Spanish government, and the
drawings of the ‘Naniwa Khan,’ which ship they had
built for Japan. These two vessels became the ‘Baltimore’
and ‘Charleston.’ Cruiser No. 1 of Mr. Chandler’s plans
was not given out; as the bids were above the limitation
price, the smaller cruiser was given out under modified
conditions. This vessel became the ‘Yorktown.’

“Before the advertisement was printed, Mr. Whitney
invited all of the expectant bidders to examine the plans
and specifications which he had purchased, and without
exception all recorded their indorsement, and some in extravagant
terms. After Mr. Whitney’s retirement, the
contractor who had indorsed them in the most extravagant
manner was the first and only one to find fault.

“We bid on all the vessels and in accordance with the
conditions of the advertisement with the exception of that
of the ‘Yorktown.’ On that vessel we bid on the government
designs, and designs of our own which embodied a
.bn p175.png
.pn +1
proposition to install the first triple-expansion engines in
the navy. Our bid for the ‘Newark’ being higher than
the government allowance, we did not get her. As I said
before, she was not awarded.

“When it was found that Mr. Whitney had purchased
abroad the drawings that I have already referred to,—the
drawings of the vessels that ultimately came to be the
‘Baltimore’ and ‘Charleston,’—he was fiercely assailed by
certain parties in the Navy Department, while certain
others indorsed his action; but the Bureau of Construction
and Repair and the Bureau of Steam Engineering were
conspicuous in their opposition. The most conspicuous in
support of the Secretary was Commodore Walker. We
received our share of adverse criticism because we had
indorsed the steps he had taken.

“The design of the ‘Baltimore’ and the ‘Charleston’
represented the best types of vessels that were constructed
up to that time. They were far in advance of any other
war-ships of that period, and in fact they really formed
the basis of future constructions in the world’s navies.

“It was more by good luck than by good management
that Mr. Whitney secured those particular drawings which
proved to be of such superior character. They were offered
to our Naval Attaché, who happened to be abroad
in England at that time, by the Armstrong Company.
They had designed the two vessels which subsequently became
the ‘Baltimore’ and ‘Charleston’ of our navy. The
design of the ‘Baltimore’ was made in competition with
Thompson for the Spanish government. For certain reasons,
which I need not mention here, the designs of Thompson
were accepted and the contract for the construction of
the ship was awarded to them. She was known as the
‘Reina Regente.’ It was at this point that the Armstrongs
presented their rejected drawing and the drawings for the
.bn p176.png
.pn +1
‘Naniwa Khan’ for sale to our Naval Attaché there. They
had already built two vessels like the ‘Naniwa Khan’ for
the Japanese navy. These vessels were looked upon by
the experts of the naval world as being the two best
specimens of their type that had ever been built up to
that time.

“At the time the sale was made, the Armstrongs, knowing
nothing of the capabilities of this country and having,
like most British ship-builders and many Americans at
that time, a very mean and very poor opinion of every
ship-builder in this country, they suggested that, in awarding
the contract, a condition should be inserted providing
for the payment of superintendents whom they should
send over from their works to superintend the building,
and designing of the engines, and operating them after
their completion. Considering what to them appeared a
barbarian incapacity on our part, they were loath to risk
their reputation without protection.

“We accepted the condition at the time, anxious to get
the contracts, feeling sure that it would never be needed,
and that we could prevail upon Mr. Whitney and the
naval people as to the impropriety of it.

“After the contract was awarded and the work was
started, Mr. Whitney concluded that, notwithstanding the
provision was there, he would never use it, and never
require it of us.

“In fact, we made a great many improvements in the
boilers of the ‘Baltimore,’ and some improvements in the
engines. These improvements in the boilers of the ‘Baltimore’
formed the basis and the standard of construction of
all the Scotch boilers that have been built for the navy
since that time.

“At the beginning of our work on these ships we did
not get much co-operation on the part of some of the
.bn p177.png
.pn +1
Bureaus, in view of the foreign character of most of the
work, and in view, too, of the fact that some of it was
of our own, both being equally obnoxious, as they originated
outside of the Bureaus. We met with a great deal
of opposition at the beginning in getting up the specifications
and plans.

“Certain subsequent changes in the <i>personnel</i> that were
made in the Bureau of Steam Engineering—Mr. Melville
having been placed at the head of it—modified the situation,
and he joined the Secretary in his efforts with his
usual vigor. A part of the trouble I refer to in getting
a start on the work was owing to lack of experience and
knowledge of contract and specification requirements
which were placed in the Law Department of the navy
for the first time.

“The Law Department of the navy at that time was
beginning to make a show, and to them, under some mistake,
was delegated the getting up of the contracts and
specifications. It was here where my trouble commenced.
The Law Department endeavored to provide for everything
that could possibly occur, or everything that they
thought would occur, and for many matters that could not
be considered at all; and the specifications soon began to
assume enormous proportions, being filled with impossible
requirements.

“I got over most of these difficulties and minor details
which they intended to lug into the contract by having
introduced at the termination of certain paragraphs of
the specifications, where explanations were unsatisfactory,
misleading, and inadequate, a clause using the words: ‘As
the Department may determine.’

“My previous experience with the Navy Department
and naval officials generally led me to believe that I could
always make out my case when it was right.
.bn p178.png
.pn +1

“At the beginning of the work, Mr. Whitney notified
us that he considered himself and all the naval officials
as partners and associates of the contractor, each mutually
interested and determined to get the best vessel they could
for the navy. He considered that the government ought
to co-operate with the contractors, and that the contractors
should in turn co-operate with the government; that the
inspector was not an enemy, and never once considered
him so. He considered it was his duty to afford all encouragement
possible in aiding the contractors to carry
out the plans. During the close of a conversation which
I had with Mr. Whitney at one time during that period,
he said to me: ‘I want you to inform me of what you
see going wrong, no matter where the fault originated;
and I will hold you personally responsible in every case
where you neglect to inform me whenever anything is not
going right or not being done right, whether it be your
own fault or that of the government.’

“Coming back to the ships and referring to the purchasing
of the drawings abroad: At the time that Mr.
Whitney bought those drawings, it occurred to us that
the triple-expansion engine which was being developed by
Kirk was a marked advance over the plain compound of
Elder; and I suggested to Mr. Whitney the propriety of
buying plans of triple-expansion engines from us for the
smaller ship which afterward was the ‘Yorktown.’ Of
course this was before the ships were given out. He
told us to go ahead. We went to work and made the
drawings, which we thought were much in advance of
anything of that kind in existence, and we fully expected
that they would be bought by Mr. Whitney, as he had
purchased the foreign drawings. When the drawings were
finished, I took them down to Washington and showed
them to him. He was at this time so disgusted with and
.bn p179.png
.pn +1
tired of the great uproar that had been made about purchasing
drawings abroad, that he did not say much about
it. He did not decline, however, to buy them; but, finding
that he was not enthusiastic, I accepted promptly the
situation, and simply exhibited them to him as something
we had gotten up. I then returned home and threw them
aside, and prepared for the coming opening of the bids
which had been advertised for in the papers. The day
before the bids were to be opened, I suddenly conceived
the idea of giving the triple-expansion plans another
chance by making an alternative bid on the ‘Yorktown,’
embodying engines of the triple-expansion type. So I
rushed back to Philadelphia, got the drawings that we
had previously prepared, and returned to Washington in
time to put them in with our other bid for the ‘Yorktown.’
As we were responsible for the horse-power, weight, etc.,
we felt that we could get it a great deal better, and more
satisfactory results all around, with triple-expansion engines
than with uncertain and unknown performance of
the Bureau drawings. Our bid being lowest on triple-expansion
engines, being the only one, the contract was
awarded to us.

“The success of these engines in the ‘Yorktown’ was
of a highly marked character, and it emboldened us to
introduce them in our bids for the new lot of construction
that had been advertised for.

“It was at this time the <i>New York Herald</i> published
in large type a paper of mine on the triple-expansion
engine, and Commodore Walker had it printed in the
Reports of the Information Bureau. Walker was always
in the front when a good thing was to be promoted, and
was conspicuous in his co-operation with Mr. Whitney.

“When the ships that followed the ‘Baltimore’ were
given out, we secured the contracts for the construction of
.bn p180.png
.pn +1
the ‘Philadelphia’ and ‘Newark.’ We bid on the ‘Newark’
a second time. A great deal of unpleasant feeling
was manifested on the part of the Bureau of Construction
when we failed to bid within the limitation price at
the time she was first advertised. We introduced in her,
however, the triple-expansion engine in place of the Department’s.
We also bid on ‘Philadelphia’ with hull
duplicate of the ‘Baltimore,’ with triple-expansion engines
of the same type as the ‘Yorktown.’

“What ultimately became the ‘San Francisco’ was
given to Mr. Scott, who bid on the basis of ‘Baltimore’s’
plans of hull with the ‘Baltimore’s’ engines. After the
contract was awarded to him, he agreed to substitute the
‘Newark’s’ hull plans in place of the ‘Baltimore’ type
with a design of engine that the Bureau of Steam Engineering
had made at our shipyard by some of their
officers who were on duty there and certain of our
draughtsmen,—a type of engine that they considered to be
an improvement over the ‘Baltimore’s’ engines. The
Department granted this substitution.

“The Bureaus that had denounced Mr. Whitney for
buying foreign drawings had been spending money very
lavishly for some years in <i>securing plans abroad</i>. The
Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Construction
were spending about $100,000 a year in the
purchase of drawings.

“The hull of the ‘Yorktown,’ which was designed by
the Bureau, was based on the design of the ‘Archer’ class.

“The ‘Newark,’ which was also designed by the Bureau
at that time, was based on the design of the ‘Mersey’
class as to specifications and general construction, while
the model was not of that class.

.if h
.il fn=i180.jpg w=600px id=russ
.ca
BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—RUSSIAN
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—RUSSIAN]
.sp 2
.if-

“The Bureau of Engineering, which had been laboring
for some years with a view to a consolidation of all of
.bn p180a.png
.bn p180b.png
.bn p181.png
.pn +1
the constructive departments of the navy,—hulls, engines,
guns,—under their Bureau, bought abroad entire plans
of ships, hulls, and engines combined. I saw a complete
set of plans and drawings of the ‘Polyphemus,’ which
was designed as a sort of ram by the British government,
and also the two vessels ‘Warspite’ and ‘Impérieuse,’
rather of a fantastic design, which the British government
was building. These vessels were somewhat of a
departure from previous vessels constructed in the British
navy and were very crude. They were designed by some
one in England who was not up to the capabilities of his
fellow-constructors there. They were not duplicated.
They are the poorest specimens of ships in the British
navy.

“Mr. Whitney was exceedingly fortunate in the officer
whom he found at the head of the most important Bureau.
This was Commodore John G. Walker, then Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation, and unquestionably the ablest and
most forceful man of his time in the navy. American
naval officers, as a rule, are able men in the professional
sense; but Walker, while equal to the very best and
superior to most of them in that regard, possessed an
additional fund of tact, equipment, and energy in purely
administrative directions seldom equalled and never surpassed
in the history of our navy. He had enjoyed, also,
considerable experience in civic responsibility, having been
for a considerable period identified with the management
of an important railway corporation prior to his appointment
as Chief of the Bureau in 1881. His term of four
years was about to expire when Mr. Whitney assumed
office, but at the instance of the latter he was immediately
reappointed, and served through the entire term until 1889.
Commodore Walker was exactly the man for the place,
which was that of chief adviser to the Secretary. To a
.bn p182.png
.pn +1
perfect acquaintance with the <i>personnel</i> of the service,
he joined a freedom from narrow predilections and selfish
aims seldom found in any veteran regular officer of any
branch, and his sense of the material needs of the navy
was broad, keen, and practical. Moreover, in mental character
and manly temperament he was congenial to Mr.
Whitney. For these reasons, and imbued with a common
purpose, Commodore Walker and the Secretary coalesced
from the first day of their association, and remained in
the most perfect accord throughout the four most important
years in the history of the new navy. On some
occasions it happened that Walker sustained the Secretary
and helped him carry out most important reforms
and policies of progress against powerful opposition in
the navy itself and in the Department.

“Commodore Walker’s influence among Senators and
Representatives in Congress, built up during his first four
years in the Bureau, was superior to that of any other
officer, and occasionally it proved equal to that of a considerable
majority of them combined. His powers were
uniformly exerted in behalf of the readiest and most
practical methods of increasing the navy in number, excellence,
and force of its ships and in organization and
training of its <i>personnel</i>. Against all efforts to perpetuate
the obsolete, cumbrous, and abnormal navy-yard system
of construction he set his face with all the strength and
resolution he possessed. For detailed discussion of the
questions involved in this phase of the subject, neither the
limitations of space nor the patience of scientific readers
offer opportunity. Suffice it to say, that the antique, red-tape-ridden
and muddle-brained policy of trying to build
new ships of the modern type under military methods
was in the main abandoned.

“Commodore Walker also ably supported Mr. Whitney’s
.bn p183.png
.pn +1
policy of purchasing modern designs and plans of
hulls and machinery abroad, a policy which a large and
influential group of naval officers vehemently opposed.
On the whole, it is not too much to say that, in the all-round
importance of his usefulness to the new navy,
Commodore Walker fairly divided honors with Mr. Whitney
himself.

“That Walker’s all-round ability and energy were
understood and appreciated by others besides Secretary
Whitney is abundantly attested by the fact that upon
his retirement in 1897, at the age of sixty-two, he was
appointed chairman or president of the Isthmian Canal
Commission, which he still holds at this writing (1903),
in his seventieth year. Taking his career altogether from
graduation at the Naval Academy in 1856; then through
the Civil War, in which he played a distinguished part;
then for some time in the civic pursuits already mentioned;
then as Chief of Bureau and principal adviser
to the Secretary for eight years; then as Admiral in command
of the ‘White Squadron’; and, finally, as president
of the Canal Commission, it is safe to say that few officers
in our navy have done more important public service than
John G. Walker.”
.pm letter-end

The most important matter adjusted in the
conferences of Mr. Cramp with Mr. Whitney
was the arrangement of the form of contract
so that it might be, within a narrow margin,
flexible or elastic. The operation of other contracts
had clearly shown the need of such
modification, and a solution was reached without
difficulty, though not without much deliberation.
.bn p184.png
.pn +1

The matter under immediate consideration
was the form of contract for the “Baltimore.”
The guarantee to be required was that her engines
should develop a mean of 9000 collective
indicated horse-power for four consecutive
hours, a lower or minimum limit being also
prescribed. They had before them the form
of contract for the Roach ships.

Mr. Cramp remarked that the guarantee for
the “Baltimore” was 9000 indicated horse-power.

“Suppose, Mr. Secretary,” he said, “that
we should use that form of contract, and the
engines of the ‘Baltimore’ should develop only
8999 indicated horse-power, what could you
do?”

“Well, Mr. Cramp, under this form of contract,
construed according to law, I could not
accept her. There ought to be a way of averting
such a possibility. What can you suggest?”

Mr. Cramp then proposed to apply to our
naval contracts the principle often recognized
in agreements for construction of merchant
steamships and also in the naval contracts of
foreign governments, namely, a sliding scale
of penalties for deficiency in performance, with
a minimum limit; and, in case the ship should
prove unable to reach the minimum limit after
.bn p185.png
.pn +1
a fair number of trials, the owner (if a merchant
vessel) or the government (if a naval
ship) might at will either reject her altogether
or accept her under a supplemental agreement.
Mr. Cramp also explained the usual basis upon
which penalties for deficiency were computed
and imposed in our own merchant practice and
in foreign navies.

The Secretary assented to this suggestion,
and pronounced it the only business-like plan
for solution of the difficulty he had heard. But
he said that, in order to make the arrangement
perfectly equitable, there should be a premium
for excess over and above guaranteed performance,
corresponding to or commensurate
with the penalty for deficiency.

These discussions led to the adoption of
what became known as the premium system.
Some time afterward, when Mr. Whitney was
before the Naval Committee, the subject came
up, and one member referred to it as “a bonus
to contractors.”

“If you use the word ‘bonus’ in the sense
of a gift,” said the Secretary, “it is a misapprehension.
It is part of an equitable transaction.
Performance is a prime element of
value in a ship-of-war. We stipulate in our
contracts for a specific performance. We consider
the guaranteed performance as representing
.bn p186.png
.pn +1
the normal value of the ship. If upon
trial the performance falls below the normal,
it reduces the value of the ship to that extent,
and we meet it with proportionate penalties
deducted from the contract price. But if upon
trial the performance exceeds the normal, the
value of the ship is increased, and we propose
to meet such cases with premium proportionate
to the excess of guaranteed performance.
In either case we simply pay for as good a ship
as we get, be it above or below the normal. It
is a poor rule that won’t work both ways.”

Mr. Whitney’s terse observations embodied
the whole logic of the penalty and premium
system, and his argument was so conclusive
that no further discussion seemed to be desired.
The system remained in effect nearly
ten years, and was applied to every vessel built
for the new navy up to and including the
“Iowa” and “Brooklyn.” Every ship built
by Mr. Cramp earned a premium for excess of
either indicated horse-power or speed. None
of his ships exhibited deficiency. The list is
rather interesting, because it exhibits more
graphically than any other method could do
the actual extent to which the contract requirement
was exceeded in each case.
.bn p187.png
.pn +1
.dv class=font85
.ta l:25 r:15
“Yorktown” (horse-power)     |  $39,825.00
“Baltimore” (horse-power)    |  106,441.00
“Newark” (horse-power)       |   36,857.00
“Philadelphia” (speed)       |  100,000.00
“New York” (speed)           |  200,000.00
“Columbia” (speed)           |  300,000.00
“Minneapolis” (speed)        |  414,600.00
“Indiana” (speed)            |   50,000.00
“Massachusetts” (speed)      |  100,000.00
“Iowa” (speed)               |  217,420.00
“Brooklyn” (speed)           |  350,000.00
                             | –––––––––––
                            |$1,915,143.00
.ta-
.dv-
.sp 2
When the administration of Mr. Whitney
ended in March, 1889, he left over to his successor
the most important work in the way
of new departure yet attempted. Of his successor,
General B. F. Tracy, of New York, Mr.
Cramp, speaking of the man and the task before
him, says:

.pm letter-start
“Secretary Tracy entered the Navy Department under
very favorable auspices. He was himself free from entanglements,
political or personal. His previous public
life, aside from service as a colonel and brigadier-general
in the Civil War, had been confined to legal and judicial
positions, his highest post having been that of Justice
of the New York Court of Appeals, the Court of last
resort. To the affairs of the Navy Department in general
he applied the judicial habits formed on the Bench.
In technical matters, he enjoyed at the outset of his administration
the continuing services of Commodore—now
.bn p188.png
.pn +1
become Rear-Admiral—Walker, whose term extended till
December, 1889; and who, by the way, had the honor,
after eight years of service as Chief of Bureau, to command
the first American squadron of modern war-ships
known to history as ‘the White Squadron.’

“With regard to the task of rebuilding the navy, which
was then, and still is, the chief responsibility of a Secretary,
Mr. Tracy had but to carry on a programme already
well begun. He was not, however, content with following
simply the lines laid out before him. He at once proceeded
to lengthen them and to widen their scope. Under
his administration was begun and carried out the ‘battle-ship
and armored cruiser programme’ which gave to the
navy the fleet that made our success in the Spanish War
so swift and so easy.

“The distinguishing traits of Tracy’s administration
were the unbroken co-operation between the executive and
legislative branches of the government in everything pertaining
to the new navy, and the remarkable progress
made in size, power, speed, and other prime qualities of
war-ships, together with the almost incredible development
of all contributory industries. In this connection
should also be mentioned the constant and powerful support
which President Harrison gave to the Secretary of
the Navy in every possible manner, from first to last.

“In his methods of considering propositions laid before
him, Mr. Tracy was always deliberate and cautious;
but in executing a programme once resolved upon, he
was equally prompt and peremptory. He never determined
to begin anything until he could foresee the end of
it, and when he had reached a conclusion on that basis
he was wont to push practical operations with untiring
energy. In some respects, when giving preliminary consideration
.bn p189.png
.pn +1
to subjects, he may have been less self-reliant
or more disposed to feel the influence of his military subordinates
than Mr. Whitney was; but in energy of execution
he had no superior. As a general consequence, Mr.
Tracy’s four years in the Navy Department made a history
that compares favorably with that of any predecessor
from the foundation of the Department itself in 1797 to
his own time.

“One of the first and most important matters that
came before Secretary Tracy was the design of the
armored cruiser ‘New York,’ the appropriation for its
construction having been one of the last acts of the
Congress that went out with Mr. Whitney. This ship
was intended to be an echo to the ‘Blake’ and ‘Blenheim’
type of protected cruisers, and they were the
largest heretofore constructed. The question was asked
by the Secretary of the head of one of the Bureaus,
during the discussion of the details of the ship, if there
could not be an improvement in the salient features of
the design over the ‘Blake,’ as merely copying her was
obnoxious to him. He had heard of the ‘Dupuy de Lome,’
the first of the armored cruisers, and he conceived the
idea of adding vertical armor on the sides of the ship
in addition to the sloping armor of the protected deck as
an additional protection, and of sufficient importance to
warrant its adoption in the new design. He argued that
no projectile could penetrate the outer plates and strike
the sloping plate at the same angle in both, etc.

“Strong objections were urged by the head of the
Bureau who had been consulted about it, and the legend
of weights of the ‘Blake’ as published and the distribution
of them in the ‘Blake’ were shown with the assertion
that nothing could be done. The Secretary became more
persistent as the opposition increased, and the wires between
.bn p190.png
.pn +1
the Department and the British Admiralty became
hot from the number of messages that passed as to the
‘Blake’ and ‘Blenheim.’

“While the Secretary was perplexed with the opposition
of officers who should have aided rather than opposed
him, we happened to meet, and he asked if I could duplicate
the ‘Blake’ and her performance if side armor of
moderate thickness were added, and also asked my views
of the ‘Dupuy de Lome’ and other ships of the same
kind.

“I promptly stated that I could do it, and explained
the idea of ‘Dupuy de Lome,’ also giving him the names
of three other armored cruisers the French had under
way. I went into the Secretary’s room at 3 <sc>P.M.</sc> and discussed
the whole subject with him till 8 <sc>P.M.</sc>; then left,
and promised to return promptly with additional information.

“At the next interview I furnished the Secretary with
a complete detail of what would be required to make an
armored cruiser on the ‘Blake’s’ dimensions and performance,
and stated that I would like to bid in Class II on
an alternative design with side armor.

“The Secretary handed my details and allotment of
weights to the proper officer, and the Department proceeded
to get up the plans and specifications. Frequent
interviews with the Secretary occurred as the work progressed,
and I felt sure that under Class II, permitting
alternative designs, the contract would be awarded. Before
the time for awarding the contract had arrived, I
found that the plans were being developed under the
conditions that I had given the Secretary; but when the
plans were exhibited before bids were sent in, it transpired
that the boilers had been placed three abreast in
.bn p191.png
.pn +1
the government plans, bringing them within a few feet
of the side of the ship.

“I then designed a plan for arranging the six boilers
in pairs, making the coal-bunkers on the sides of the
ship. This arrangement of coal-bunkers facilitated the
prompt coaling of the ship and the handling of it. It
also permitted a liberal amount of ‘coal protection’ for
the boilers and engines, which was considered of important
value at that time, and, what was of more weight
than any other consideration, the introduction of two
longitudinal bulkheads that extended the entire length of
the engine and boiler spaces on each side of the ship.
With three boilers abreast, the ship was liable to be sunk
at any time by a collision with a coal-barge or passing
schooner; any penetration of the side abreast of boiler,
besides resulting in a speedy foundering, would certainly
unship the side boiler, adding thereby an explosion to the
other damage.

“With the boilers in pairs, it would be necessary for
a ramming vessel to penetrate the side and two bulkheads
and enter ten feet to do any damage, so the chances of
being destroyed by ramming would be reduced to a minimum.
I also lengthened the vessel over the Department’s
plan, but kept all the conditions of specifications intact,
except as to dimensions.

“After the bids were opened, it was found that ours
was the lowest in Class II, and lower than any other
bid, taking the competition as a whole. The Secretary
then called a conference, at which all the bidders and the
Chief Constructor were present, and, after thorough discussion
of all the points involved, awarded the contract
to the Cramp Company under the bid in Class II on the
modified plan I had suggested and offered as to boiler
arrangement and other details conformable to it.
.bn p192.png
.pn +1

“The ship was named the ‘New York,’ and on trial trip
she largely exceeded her contract speed and requirements
of coal endurance and in all other respects; while the
‘Blake’ on trial was a failure; her engines had to be
practically rebuilt, and then did not come within the
scope of reasonable competition.

“Mr. Tracy can fairly claim credit for the design of
the ‘New York,’ and the project for the construction of
the ‘Indiana,’ ‘Massachusetts,’ and the ‘Oregon’ class of
battleships was also due to his foresight.”
.pm letter-end

It is not within the scope of this Memoir to
trace the progress of the new navy ship by
ship, or even by naval programmes from year
to year. For the purpose of this work, it
suffices to say that, of the total number of
battleships, armored cruisers, and first-class
protected cruisers actually in service at this
writing (1903), Mr. Cramp has built about a
majority as against all other American ship-builders
combined. There are ten battleships
in commission, of which Mr. Cramp has built
five; two armored cruisers, both built by him;
ten protected cruisers of the first class, of
which five hail from Cramps’ shipyard: that
is to say, a total of twenty-two vessels, all first-class
in their respective types, of which Mr.
Cramp has built twelve as against ten by all
other American ship-builders put together,
navy-yards included.

.if h
.il fn=i192.jpg w=600px id=retv
.ca
BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—DOCKING WITH SUBMARINE
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—DOCKING WITH SUBMARINE]
.sp 2
.if-

Of course, we exclude from this reckoning
.bn p192a.png
.bn p192b.png
.bn p193.png
.pn +1
the two show-ships built by Armstrong for a
South American government and foolishly
bought by our Navy Department in the paroxysmal
flurry incident to the outbreak of the
Spanish War. The main excuse for buying
them was that, if we did not, Spain would. So
be it. Better to have let Spain buy them, if
they could not have strengthened her navy
more than they did ours. At any rate, had
Spain bought them, we might have captured
or destroyed them, as we did nearly all her
ships. They would probably have been worth
capture or destruction, but they were never
worth buying.

Since 1887, a period of sixteen years, Mr.
Cramp has completed fifteen ships for the
navy (including the “Vesuvius” and “Terror”),
and is building three more at this
writing. In every case these ships embody in
plan and design more or less of his own knowledge,
skill, and experience. In some cases the
designs are altogether his own. In others the
machinery is his, with important modifications
of the Department’s hull. In no case has he
built a ship wholly upon the plans of the Department.
While this has redounded to the
benefit of the navy, it would be idle to say that
it has been in the long run advantageous to
Mr. Cramp. On the other hand, its tendency
.bn p194.png
.pn +1
has been otherwise: A certain class of naval
officers have chosen to consider Mr. Cramp’s
constantly recurring propositions to modify
and improve their designs as having the force
and effect of criticisms, and, to say the least,
they have not been grateful to him for his
pains. On the contrary, no little jealousy and
some resentment have been the results, and
he has been made to feel their consequences
more than once. The chief misfortune of this
state of affairs is that it precludes the cordial
co-operation which should exist between officers
of the Navy Department and a contractor
engaged in building naval vessels, and creates
in its stead a sense of antagonism which tends
to augment the difficulties of naval construction,
which are great and perplexing enough
at the best.

But Mr. Cramp has not concerned himself
with the building of naval ships alone. He has
delved into the problems presented by the uses
to which the ships are put when completed.
The results of his observations in this direction
were embodied in an address to the Naval
War College read before that institution, June
18, 1897, by invitation of the Commandant, a
little less than a year before the Spanish War.
The experience of that struggle, brief as it
.bn p195.png
.pn +1
was, and decided almost wholly by sea power,
made this paper little short of prophetic.

Some extracts from it will serve to exhibit
the trend of Mr. Cramp’s thought in the direction
of the practical uses and needs of ships-of-war
after they leave the ship-builder’s
hands. Among other things he said:

.pm letter-start
“The accomplishment of the objects of sea-warfare will
depend partly upon the character of the armaments and
partly on the wisdom with which their operations are
directed; nor can any one gainsay that the wisdom of
direction will depend on the conversancy of officers with
the nature and necessities of the material units of which
the armaments are composed.

“These propositions being taken for granted, it becomes
clear that there can be no effective system of teaching
the art of naval warfare which does not embrace
exhaustive study of and consequent close familiarity with
the instruments by which the principles of the art are to
be carried into force and effect.

“From this point of view it must be admitted that
questions within the province of the naval architect and
problems which he is best qualified to solve form an essential
part of such a curriculum in its largest and most
comprehensive aspects.

“The unvarying tendency of naval progress is to exalt
the importance of the naval architect and to augment the
value of the constructor as a factor in the sum-total of
sea power.

“The naval armament of to-day is a mechanism. If
we view it as a single ship, it is a mechanical unit whose
warlike value depends on its excellence as a fighting machine.
.bn p196.png
.pn +1
If we view it as a fleet, it is an assembly of mechanical
units, the warlike value of which will depend
alike on the excellence of each unit as a fighting machine,
and on the adaptation of each unit to its consorts to produce
the most symmetrical efficiency of the group as a
whole.

“For this reason, the word seamanship, in the old-fashioned
or conventional sense, has ceased to cover adequately
the requirements of knowledge, skill, and aptness
which the modern conditions of naval warfare impose
upon the officer in command or subordinate.

“By this I mean not to depreciate seamanship pure
and simple, but to point out that modern conditions require
an enlargement of the meaning of the term and a
broadening of its scope of function far beyond the exactions
of any former period.

“In the old days there was no essential difference in
ships except in size. Experience in a sloop-of-war qualified
an officer to assume, at once and in full efficiency,
equivalent duties in a frigate, a seventy-four, or a three-decker.
Familiarity with one ship, irrespective of rate,
was familiarity with all ships. Tactical lessons learned
in manœuvring one fleet were alike applicable to the
manœuvring of all fleets. Even the application of steam
as a propulsive auxiliary in its earlier stages did not radically
alter the old conditions. At all events, it did not
practically erase them, as the present development has
done.

“This growth of complexity and elaboration, and this
almost infinite multiplication of parts and devices in modern
ships, have entailed upon the naval architect and
constructor demands and difficulties never dreamed of in
the earlier days. The staff required to design and construct
an ‘Iowa’ is multiplied in number, and the complexity
.bn p197.png
.pn +1
of its organization augmented, as compared with
that required for the design and construction of the ‘New
Ironsides,’ almost infinitely.

“Similar conditions apply to command and management;
so that, while the building of a modern battleship
entails enormous work and responsibility on the naval
architect, constructor, and staff, the effective use of her
as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal variety
and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval
warfare in this college.

“Such questions and such problems cannot be relegated
to the category of details. Even if we consider the art of
naval warfare in the aspects only of strategy and tactics,
both will be affected for better or for worse by the
behavior and performance of the units composing the
force in operation. This being admitted, it follows that
the behavior and performance of the units will be as the
knowledge and capacity of captains and their staffs, and
that no extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing
the whole can overcome or evade the consequences of
incapacity and failure on the part of a captain commanding
a part.

“As the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship,
so will its manœuvring power be limited by the capacity
of its poorest captain. As it might easily happen that the
slowest or least handy ship and the poorest captain
would be joined, the quality of the other ships and the
ability of the other officers would go for nothing.

“In view of the complex character of the ships themselves,
and the difficulty and danger of manœuvring them
under the most favorable conditions, as pointed out, the
experience of the first general action will demonstrate
the necessity of having all the battleships in a fleet as
nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity of performance.
.bn p198.png
.pn +1
Such provision would not equalize the personal
factor of different commanding officers, but it would
at least give them all an equal chance at the start.

“For this reason I have always considered it unwise to
multiply types or to modify seriously those which the best
judgment we are able to form approves.

“These considerations seem conclusive against multiplication
of types, and in favor of adhering to one that
plainly meets the requirements of our national situation
and policy.

“The composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions
would minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties
referred to earlier, but they would still remain very great,
and nothing can mitigate them except frequent and arduous
drill in squadron of evolution, so that our captains
may become familiar with their weapons before being
called upon to use them in actual battle. There will be
scant opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the
outbreak of war.

“In my judgment, it is hardly possible to overvalue the
importance of homogeneity in fleet organizations, and I
am sure that the very first and perhaps greatest lesson
taught by an encounter between fleets of modern battleships
will be the advantage of similarity of type and
equality of performance in the units of action.

“To this element of the art of naval warfare, then, I
would invite your most earnest and penetrating attention
and study.

“Assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and
the material of the fleet in the most effective possible
condition, so far as relation of units to each other and
to the sum-total is concerned, we have still left for consideration
the difference between men, the lack of uniformity
in <i>personnel</i>. Homogeneity of material may be
.bn p199.png
.pn +1
attained by adherence to a wise programme of design and
construction; but homogeneity of <i>personnel</i>, in the sense
of uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals, is
beyond human art or science to produce, because the difference
between men is the decree of a higher power. The
existence of this college is itself a devout recognition of
that great fact, because its whole objective is to mitigate
or minify as much as possible this inherent human frailty,
by exhausting the resources of training and study, of precept
and example.

“I do not by any means argue that the commander of
a ship should be a naval architect or constructor. But,
having familiarized himself with the principles of that art
which touch directly and immediately his function of
handling his ship under sea conditions of common occurrence,
and having gained sufficient knowledge of her
traits, he should be able to form an instant and correct
judgment as to her point of best behavior in any sea-way.
It goes without saying that sea experience is the only
school in which these problems can be worked out.

“Knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by
study of the experience of others. Close and earnest
attention to this course of, at best partial, information
cannot serve as a substitute for experience of one’s own.
At most it can only provide a sound basis on which to
take quick advantage of one’s own experience, when confronted
with an actual situation.

“This brings me to the proposition that the modern
battleship, with all its complexities, weights, and peculiarities
of design and model, entails upon commanding
officers a new requirement which I can find no better terms
to describe than ‘battleship seamanship.’ It is a development
of the seafaring art which, as events have proved, is
by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most actively
.bn p200.png
.pn +1
exercised navy of the world; therefore it would be
too much to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude
and, hence, less means for distribution of opportunities
to gain experience.

“It therefore follows indisputably that navies of the
lesser magnitude should constantly exhaust their means
of enabling officers to gain sea experience by keeping all
their large ships in active evolution all the time.

“Having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical
unit herself, we may profitably pass to brief
consideration of the great number and variety of mechanisms
composing her. In the strict professional or
technical sense, these mechanisms concern mainly the engineer
and the electrician. But as the foundation of all
warlike efficiency in <i>personnel</i> is discipline, and as the
foundation of all discipline is the inevitable principle of
a single head, one commander, who is to all intents and
purposes an absolute monarch, it should follow that ‘the
king can do no wrong.’

“I have already remarked that the captain need not
be a naval architect or constructor to comprehend and
be able to apply the group of principles of that art
which touch his functions directly in managing his ship
as a whole; likewise, I would say here that he need not
be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous
and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control
are essential to the efficiency of his command.

“But, if he really commands, he must know enough
about the instruments that do his work to know when
they are doing it well and when not; to know whether
his subordinates immediately in charge of the several devices
are operating them properly or not; to know when
defects exist and when they have been made good. If he
does not know or cannot learn these things, he must
.bn p201.png
.pn +1
depend wholly on subordinates immediately in charge;
and their reports will be law to him, or if not law, at
least decisions from which he has no appeal. Manifestly
such a situation is utterly incompatible with the independent
and self-relying autocracy which is the essential
and fundamental principle of naval command, without
which discipline must sooner or later vanish into mere
empty form or conventional myth. These facts, even
more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity
of type, previously touched upon, so that in learning
the traits of one battleship the officer acquires experience
and knowledge applicable at once to the discharge of his
duties in another.

“The foregoing discussion is limited to matters affecting
the unit of action, the single ship, and the captain.
Passing to consideration of the unit of operation, the
fleet and the admiral, we find another array of problems
equally within the scope of this paper.

“Let us assume that the composition of the fleet has
been made as nearly homogeneous as possible, by carrying
out the principles previously stated for ships and
their captains, and that the admiral finds himself in
command of an ideal fleet as to material and <i>personnel</i>.
Actual differences in efficiency among the several units
of action will still remain, and it will become the first
duty of the admiral to ascertain and locate these diversities
with unerring judgment and unsparing perception.
He should know to a nicety the personal equation of
every captain and the effective individuality of every ship.

“Among the captains he should be able to differentiate
the traits of relative quickness of perception, promptness
of action, readiness of responsibility, and boldness of execution.”
.pm letter-end
.bn p202.png
.pn +1

Among the most important services of Mr.
Cramp to the new navy was his instrumentality
in bringing about the system of classifying
bids. Prior to 1885, whenever contract
construction was to be done, the plans of the
Department, pure and simple, were the standard.
If any bidder proposed to deviate from
them in any way,—no matter how palpable the
improvement,—his bid would be held irregular
and thrown out. The issue came on the machinery
of the ships authorized by the Act of
March 3, 1885. Of these four ships, the “Baltimore’s”
plans had been purchased abroad,
hull and machinery, and were accepted practically
without change. But the Department’s
design involved the then nearly, if not quite,
obsolete compound engine for the other three,
“Newark,” “Yorktown,” and “Petrel.” Mr.
Cramp, desiring to bid on the “Newark” and
“Yorktown,” was doubtful whether he could
develop the indicated horse-power, which the
form of contract required him to guarantee,
with the Department’s compound engines. He
was, however, confident that he could do it
with triple-expansion engines of his own design.

To overcome the difficulty, he suggested to
Secretary Whitney that, in issuing the circular
asking for proposals, a classification of bids be
.bn p203.png
.pn +1
provided for. This suggestion was at once
adopted, and bids were authorized to be offered
in three classes: Class I, the Department’s
plans pure and simple; Class II, the Department’s
plans modified by the bidder as to hull
or machinery or both; and Class III, the bidder’s
plans wholly. This arrangement broke
up the embargo of the Bureaus, and admitted
the results of the study, experience, and skill
of practical ship-builders. Some of the Bureaus
fought the plan with all their energy,
but the contest they made had no other result
than to convince them that Mr. Whitney was
the <i>de facto</i> as well as the <i>de jure</i> head of the
Department,—a quite novel experience for
them! Some time afterward Classes II and
III were merged, so that all departures from
the Department’s plans, whether modifications
of them or complete substitution of bidder’s
plans for them, were grouped under Class II,
which has become the established practice in
inviting proposals. Mr. Cramp’s bids have
usually been in Class II; involving in most
cases more or less extensive modifications of
the Department’s plans, and in two cases, the
“Philadelphia” and the “Maine,” his own
plans complete. The value of this new departure
lay in the fact that it gave the Navy
Department the benefit of all the progress of
.bn p204.png
.pn +1
the country in the ship-building art as actually
practised by men who were building ships for
a living, and emancipated it from the dominion
of the cloister. It has become a part of the
permanent policy of the government.

.if h
.il fn=i204.jpg w=600px id=variag
.ca
CRUISER VARIAG—RUSSIAN
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: CRUISER VARIAG—RUSSIAN]
.sp 2
.if-

The history of Mr. Cramp’s contributions
to the new navy must, at this writing, be left
an unfinished chapter. Having built and delivered
to the government five first-class battleships,
two first-rate armored cruisers, five first-class
protected cruisers, together with a
double-turreted monitor, a gunboat and a torpedo
vessel, he is yet building three armored
cruisers of the largest dimensions and most
approved type. His contributions to the
literature of the subject, ranging over a score
of years, have been in their way of hardly less
importance and interest than his achievements
in producing its warlike material. Their full
test, in all forms and through all channels,—hearings
before committees, communications
to the Navy Department and its Bureaus,
newspaper interviews and magazine papers,—would,
if reproduced in extenso, fill two volumes
larger than this one. Suffice it to say
here that there is no practical subject pertaining
to naval art or science, from the design
and construction of ships-of-war to their management
in service, which he has not from time
.bn p204a.png
.bn p204b.png
.bn p205.png
.pn +1
to time discussed as opportunity offered or
occasion required. If he has at times shown
a spirit approaching intolerance when dealing
with invasions of his profession by inexperienced,
untrained, or incapable men, it may be
explained by the logic of a favorite quotation
of his own, “Fools rush in where angels fear to
tread!” Be this as it may, it is yet to be said
that, if not always charitable in his criticisms
and not always liberal in the standard of competency
which he has set so high and maintained
so vigorously, his professional motives
have always been worthy and his efforts sincere
and earnest. Whatever may be the future
growth or achievements of the modern American
navy, the name of Charles H. Cramp will
ever be found indelibly stamped upon its historical
origin and primary development. The
ships he has built have won battles, gained
campaigns, and vanquished the enemies of the
country in war. They have held the lead in
renewing the one-time waning naval prestige
of our flag, and in restoring the sea power of
the United States to its rightful rank among
the nations.
.bn p206.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2 id=ch05
CHAPTER V
.sp 2
.pm ch-head
Armstrong’s—Russian War-ship Construction—Arrival of
“Cimbria” at Bar Harbor—Visit of Wharton Barker
to Shipyard—Visit of Captain Semetschkin and Commission
to the Yard—Purchase of Ships—Newspaper
Accounts—Captain Gore-Jones—Mr. Cramp’s account
of Operations—“Europe,” “Asia,” “Africa,” and
“Zabiaca”—Popoff and “Livadia”—Visit to Grand
Duke Constantine—Anniversary Banquet in St.
Petersburg of Survivors of “Cimbria” Expedition—Object
of Visit to Russia—Mr. Dunn and Japan—Contract
for “Kasagi”—Jubilee Session of Naval
Architects in London—Visit to Russia—Correspondence
with Russian Officials—Visit to Armstrong’s—Japanese
War-ship Construction—“Coming Sea
Power”—Correspondence with Russian Official—Invited
to Russia—Asked to bid for War-ships—Our
Ministers abroad—Construction of “Retvizan” and
“Variag”—“Maine”
.pm ch-head-end

<sc>The</sc> old Latin poet Horace introduces his
First Book of “Sermons or Satires” by addressing
to his great patron, Mæcenas, the
question:

.pm verse-start
“Qui fit, Mæcenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem
 Seu ratio dederit, seu fors objecerit illa
 Contentus vivat? laudet diversa sequentes?”
.pm verse-end

.pm letter-start
(“How is it, Mæcenas, that no one lives content with
the lot that endeavor has given to him or that fortune has
.bn p207.png
.pn +1
thrown in his way? but emulates those following other pursuits?”)
.pm letter-end

Mr. Cramp reached the condition described
by Horace early in the last decade of the nineteenth
century. He had exhausted the opportunities
of American ship-building, both for
war and for commerce. A fleet, not only respectable
in number but formidable in type
and power,—a fleet embracing battleships,
armored cruisers, and protected cruisers,—bore
the impress of his art and heralded the
distinction of his name. To this compact war-fleet
he had added two ocean greyhounds, the
first of their type built in the Western hemisphere.
In prosecution of all this advancement,
if we take the decade from 1885 to 1895, he
had multiplied the area of the shipyard by
two, and its capacity alike in number and size
of steamships and their machinery more than
three. In 1889, some people—and among them
his own associates in the ownership of the
yard—were afraid to undertake the armored
cruiser “New York.” Mr. Cramp met this
obstruction with radical action, as was his wont
in every emergency; and in four years from
that time he had laid the keels of Atlantic greyhounds
whose register tonnage was more than
two thousand tons greater than the total displacement
of the “New York.”
.bn p208.png
.pn +1

Mr. Cramp had long been emulous, some
Englishman might say envious, of the wonderful
career of Sir William Armstrong and of his
marvellous success in securing foreign contracts.
On one occasion, returning from a visit
to Elswick with a party from the British Institution
of Naval Architects, of which he is a
member, Mr. Cramp remarked that “Armstrong
and his establishment had ceased to be
ship-builders in the ordinary acceptation of
the term and had become navy-builders. They
do not trouble themselves,” he said, “with isolated
ships; to all intents and purposes they
undertake to build whole navies in bulk for
ambitious maritime states in South America
and Asia.” At the time of the visit referred
to, with exceptions hardly worth mention, the
navies of Brazil, Argentine Republic, Chile,
Japan, and China had been built, engined,
armed, armored, munitioned, equipped, and
outfitted at Elswick; and every ship was ready
for battle when she finally sailed from Armstrong’s
works. In addition to this, Elswick
had done a great deal of work for European
states, having, at one time or another, contributed
in some degree to every European
navy, great or small, except those of France
and Russia.

To a man of Mr. Cramp’s untiring aspiration
.bn p209.png
.pn +1
and restless ambition, this was a spectacle
not to be supinely endured. He therefore determined
to see what could be done, and he
selected what seemed to him the most promising
directions of effort,—Russia and Japan.
In dealing with the Russians he had initial advantages.
The first was that Russia never had
a war-ship, except the nondescript “Livadia,”
built in England, though she had been a liberal
patron of English engine-builders. The second
point of advantage was that in 1878-79
a considerable volume of work had been done
by Cramp for the Russian navy, involving
conversion of three large merchant steamships
into auxiliary cruisers and the construction of
one small cruiser.

The history of this interesting event, an
event of international importance, is as follows:

In the early part of the year 1878 the North
German Lloyd steamer “Cimbria” appeared
at Bar Harbor with about sixty Russian officers
and about eight hundred men. Their
presence at that place created a great sensation.
Visitors thronged there; and the officers
were entertained at Bangor and also in the
neighboring towns. The common sailors, however,
who were allowed to go ashore about one
hundred and fifty at a time, were cruelly disappointed.
.bn p210.png
.pn +1
They would go along the streets
searching for vodka in vain. The Maine law,
which was in full force, was something beyond
their comprehension. “There is everything
in the world here but vodka,” they would say
to one another, and even to their officers, when
they returned to their ship from shore liberty.

Almost at the same moment when the “Cimbria”
arrived in the waters of Maine, Mr.
Wharton Barker visited Cramps’ shipyard.
The banking concern of Barker Brothers was
at that time the representative of the Barings,
who were the financial agents of Russia. Mr.
Barker informed Mr. Cramp that he was delegated
to arrange for the conversion and fitting
out of a number of auxiliary cruisers for
the Russian navy, and that he had selected the
Cramp Company as the professional and mechanical
instrumentality for that purpose. He
arranged for a visit of a number of Russian
officers to the office of the Cramp Company.
These officers had come over independent of
the “Cimbria,” but arrived about the same
time. They were the Committee or Board
which had been appointed to decide on all questions
that might arise in connection with the
naval project mentioned. The head of this
Board was Captain Semetschkin, Chief of
Staff of the Grand Duke Constantine, who was
.bn p211.png
.pn +1
then General Admiral of the Navy. Besides
Captain Semetschkin, the Board consisted of
Captain Grippenburg, Captain Avalan, Captain
Alexeieff, Captain Loman, Captain Rodionoff,
and Naval Constructor Koutaneyoff.
This was in 1879. At this writing (1903) Captains
Semetschkin and Loman have passed
away; Captain Avalan is now Vice-Admiral
and Imperial Minister of Marine; Captain
Alexeieff, now Vice-Admiral, is also Viceroy
of Manchuria; Captain Rodionoff is an
Admiral; and Naval Constructor Koutaneykoff
is Constructor-in-Chief of the Russian
navy.

Upon examination of Cramps’ shipyard,
they decided that Mr. Barker’s selection was
well judged, and approved his recommendations
that the work projected be done there.

The war between Russia and Turkey was
still in progress, and there was every indication
at that moment of British intervention.
The purpose of the Russians was to fit out a
small fleet of auxiliary cruisers or commerce
destroyers to cruise in the North Atlantic in
the route of the great British traffic between
the United States and England. Their idea
was that the fitting out of such a fleet with its
threatening attitude toward their North Atlantic
commerce might or would deter the
.bn p212.png
.pn +1
British from armed intervention in behalf of
the Turks.

At first the Russians made pretence of great
secrecy as to their movements. “Pretence of
secrecy” is the only phrase that can adequately
express their attitude. On the other
hand, the appearance of the “Cimbria” on
the coast of Maine at Bar Harbor, filled with
Russian naval officers and seamen, was not concealed,
but on the other hand ostentatious. It
of course instantly attracted the attention of
the British Ministry and excited their apprehension
as to the possible outcome; apprehension
which the stories that for the time being
filled the papers of New York and New England
certainly did nothing to abate. An examination
of the files of the <i>Evening Star</i> and
the <i>North American</i> at this time would be interesting
reading. The <i>Evening Star</i>, May 1,
1878, has an account headed, “<i>What brings
the Russian Steamer to Maine?</i>” May 2:
“<i>Suspicious Craft.</i>” May 6: “<i>Suspicious
‘Cimbria’ to leave her Station.</i>” Some accounts
“<i>to stir up the Irish</i>.” May 8: “<i>An
Account of the ‘egg-eating’ incident</i>.”

The <i>North American</i>, May 13, states that the
captain of the “Cimbria” “has said that
Russia is preparing to attack Great Britain by
sea;” and refers to the disastrous effects on
.bn p213.png
.pn +1
our commerce during the Civil War by the
work of the Confederate cruisers which practically
drove the American flag from the ocean.

Captain Gore-Jones, the Naval Attaché of
the British Legation at Washington, and
others visited Bar Harbor at the time the
“Cimbria” was there. They made their visit
incognito, as they imagined, and they located
themselves daily on the landing pier near the
Bar Harbor Club House, where all the Russian
officers who were aboard the ship landed every
day. It happened that one of the officers knew
Gore-Jones notwithstanding his disguise. The
British Attaché was sitting upon the pier with
a slouch hat on his head and a fishing-rod in
his hand, intently watching and patiently waiting
for a bite, and apparently oblivious to all
that was going on except at the other end of
his line. When this officer passed him on the
pier, he said in very good English, “Captain
Gore-Jones, the fish do not seem to be anxious
to make acquaintance with you!”

The visit of these officers to the shipyard of
course was carried out with a great deal of
real secrecy, and arrangements were made to
buy three or four fine and up-to-date merchant
ships and to transform them into cruisers, and
also to build a small new cruiser.

Mr. Cramp first applied to the American
.bn p214.png
.pn +1
Line to buy three of their ships, but the president
of the company was too much astonished
to give him any satisfaction; or, at least, he
was not prepared to act as promptly as the
occasion required, and lost the chance of selling
the ships, to the most profound disgust of
Mr. Thomas A. Scott, of the Pennsylvania
Railroad, which corporation had a paramount
interest in the ships and wanted to sell them!

The “State of California” was on the
stocks at Cramps about ready to launch. This
board of officers inspected her. They also
looked at the “Columbus,” sailing between
New York and Havana, a ship that Cramps
had built for Mr. Clyde,—and the “Saratoga,”
a ship that had belonged to the Ward Line,
built by Mr. Roach for that same trade, and
were favorably impressed.

Up to this time the presence of these gentlemen
in Philadelphia was not known or suspected;
but when the purchases were made,
Mr. Barker decided that, while the time had
arrived when it was necessary to remove the
veil of secrecy, the Cramps should continue to
maintain it as to the actual work and its progress.

Mr. Cramp arranged with Mr. Alexander
McCleary with this end in view. Mr. McCleary
was at that time the principal reporter of the
.bn p215.png
.pn +1
<i>Evening Star</i>, and a friend and member of the
Harrison Literary Association, to which Mr.
Cramp belonged. The whole affair was managed
by him most admirably. On May 16 the
<i>North American</i> and <i>Evening Star</i> made the
first announcement that indicated what the
Russians really intended to do. These papers
gave an account of the sale of the “State of
California,” and that $100,000 was paid on
account to A. A. Low & Co., the agents of the
Pacific Coast Navigation Company. May 16
was the day of the launch, and on the next day
preparations were made to remove the joiner
and cabin work, a full account of which appeared
in the daily papers.

Mr. Cramp ultimately purchased in addition
the steamships “Columbus” and “Saratoga.”
These two and the “State of California,”
after being converted into auxiliary
cruisers, were named the “Europe,” “Asia,”
and “Africa.” Then the Russians contracted
for a small cruiser which they called the
“Zabiaca” (Mischief-maker). This ship was
a regularly designed man-of-war of a special
type, and at the time of her completion was the
fastest cruiser in the world. The four ships
were fitted out under the direction of their
captains respectively. The commander of the
“Europe” was Captain Grippenburg; of the
.bn p216.png
.pn +1
“Asia,” Captain Avalan; of the “Africa,”
Captain Alexeieff; and the commander of the
new cruiser “Zabiaca” was Captain Loman.

The three ships purchased and converted
into commerce destroyers were, so far as internal
arrangement and outfit were concerned,
altered altogether as to the respective ideas of
their commanders, and they all differed very
much. They embodied very complete and
somewhat ornamental accommodations, and
every modern convenience as understood at
that time was included in their design.

During these operations the show of secrecy
was maintained, but Captain Gore-Jones still
zealously endeavored to keep himself and his
government <i>au courant</i> with everything that
was going on. In pursuit of this duty, he
managed on one occasion to get into the shipyard
in the disguise of a workman and on the
pass or ticket which was then issued for the
admission of workingmen. He was, however,
soon observed by Captain Avalan of the
“Asia,” who at once reported the fact of his
presence to the office. Captain Gore-Jones was
then politely but firmly ushered out of the
shipyard and requested not to enter it again.

.if h
.il fn=i216.jpg w=600px id=stp
.ca
AMERICAN LINER ST. PAUL
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: AMERICAN LINER ST. PAUL]
.sp 2
.if-

This incident of Captain Gore-Jones’s futile
attempt to play detective attracted wide attention
and much comment. Among the newspaper
.bn p216a.png
.bn p216b.png
.bn p217.png
.pn +1
articles on that subject was one in the
columns of the Washington <i>Sunday Capital</i>,
a journal then having national reputation for
wit and humor. The material part of it was as
follows:

.pm letter-start
“Among the ornaments of the Diplomatic Corps is a
possible, though not altogether probable, successor of
Nelson. He appears in the Congressional Directory as
Captain Gore-Jones, Naval Attaché of H. B. M. Legation.
Neither one of his two names, viewed separately, suggest
aristocracy. Both viewed together in normal condition
are not calculated to excite suspicion of blue blood. Still,
Gore-Jones is an aristocrat. The hyphen is what does it.
For the rest, Gore-Jones, being an English naval officer,
is a Welshman born in Ireland.

“His duties are supposed to be the observing of things
naval in this country. Being unable to discover a navy,
or anything resembling one, in possession of the United
States, it occurred to him that perhaps he might find
here a navy or part of one belonging to some other
power. In fact, it was rumored in the Corps Diplomatique
that Gore-Jones had been notified that he must either
find a navy in this country somewhere and belonging to
somebody or lose his job. Naturally, his first quest would
be at our navy-yards (so-called), but at none of these
could he even detect symptoms of naval intention. All
he could find was a few old hawse-holes. He was informed
that these had been accumulated by that jolly old
tar, the rotund Robeson, with the intention of building
wooden tubs around them whenever Grant might happen
to run for a third term. He was also informed that the
present reform administration of the venerable Richard
.bn p218.png
.pn +1
W. Thompson, of Indiana, viewed these hawse-holes with
suspicion. This was because they were hollow; whereas
the venerable reformer believed that everything about a
ship should be solid.

“Despairing of the navy-yards, Gore-Jones turned his
attention to places where merchant-ships were constructed.
He heard that the Cramps, of Philadelphia, were building
something that did not look merchant-like. He resolved
to see it. Incidentally, he had heard rumors that the
queer craft at Cramps’ was being paid for along by instalments
of Russian money.

“Trouble was brewing between Russia and England.
Aha! At last! Gore-Jones had struck it rich. Let him
unearth this foul conspiracy to imitate in 1879 the pious
example England had set with the ‘Alabama’ in 1863,
and he would surely get a star. He might even get a
garter.

“But how? Cramp had views of his own as to private
property. He was not under diplomatic jurisdiction,
as were the navy-yards. In fact, the sign was out at
Cramps’, ‘No English need apply!’ This, however, was
rather incentive than obstacle to Gore-Jones. He needn’t
be English. Nature had endowed him with an assortment
of mental and bodily peculiarities, mostly bodily,
that adapted him to almost any nationality. He resolved
to be an Irishman. He at once began an arduous practice
of the brogue. First he had to get rid of the cockney
drawl which is enjoined by regulation in the English
navy. Demosthenes is said to have overcome a tendency
to stutter by orating with his mouth full of pebbles.
Gore-Jones got rid of the regulation cockney drawl of the
English navy by talking with his mouth full of Irish
whiskey.
.bn p219.png
.pn +1

“Finally, he considered all preliminary difficulties overcome,
and began a siege of Cramps’ shipyard by regular
approaches. Finding it impregnable to front attack, he
resolved to flank it. This he accomplished by taking possession
of an adjoining lumber yard in the night-time.
Early in the morning he entered the fortress by its sally-port.
Success was in his grasp,—almost. It glittered,
then it glimmered, then it fizzled out. There was one
peculiarity he couldn’t overcome. That was his remarkable
resemblance in form and figure to ‘Punch’s’ standard
cartoon of ‘John Bull.’ He could smoke a short, black
pipe with the bowl turned down equal to the most Corkonian
Irishman in Fishtown. He could also fairly imitate
that peculiar accent produced by filtering conversation
through the teeth, commonly known as the brogue, particularly
when the conversation was diluted with a mouthful
of Irish whiskey. But he couldn’t escape his shape. One
of the Russian officers on duty at Cramps’, with that
keenness characteristic of Napoleon’s ‘scratched Tartar,’
penetrated all his disguises. Then he was ignominiously
ejected by one of those decrepit men who, when they get
too old to build ships, are usually employed by Cramps’
as watchmen. <i>Sic transit gloria mundi.</i> Exit Gore-Jones.
But he will remain with us. He will hold his job. He
deserves to. He has done what no American has ever
been able to do since the collapse of the Rebellion. He
has discovered a navy—an actual, real, live navy—in the
United States. The fact that it is a Russian navy and
not an American one, humiliating as it may be to us, is
a huge feather in the cap to him. We hasten to doff our
editorial chapeau to Gore-Jones. We are confident he
will get his star. We fervently hope he may get also the
garter.”
.pm letter-end
.bn p220.png
.pn +1

At this point Mr. Cramp’s own narrative
of the subsequent proceedings will be more
graphic and interesting than any other form
of description could be:

.pm letter-start
“Great activity marked the progress of alterations and
fitting out of the vessels. The yard was filled with men,
some working night and day, and the vessels were all
fitted out at a very early date, considering what had to
be done. They were more than rebuilt. Each ship was
fitted out for an admiral and the accommodations for
officers and men were ample. They were full sparred
and square-rigged.

“The indications that the English would join the Sultan
at any time still prevailed at the time the vessels were
ready to go to sea. When the ‘Europe,’ ‘Asia,’ and
‘Africa’ were ready to depart, they had to go without
any guns, because all the loose guns that the Russians
could spare from the navy were mounted on forts, and
none could be appropriated for these ships, so they had
to depart without guns. They expected when they came
here to be able to purchase guns in this country from
some of the gun manufacturers, and they were very
much amazed to find that our government had not permitted
any gun factories to exist here. So they had to go
without.

“The captains all showed great determination and
pluck, but their going away was not under the conditions
usually attending the departure of war vessels. They expected
when they left that England would openly espouse
the cause of Turkey before they arrived at the other side,
and they were all prepared to sink their ships rather than
surrender. They felt that their case was particularly
.bn p221.png
.pn +1
hard and that their hands were tied, and having no guns
they were at the mercy of the enemy. They could not
find much satisfaction of sinking with their own ships
unless they had done some damage to the enemy, so under
the circumstances their sailing was a very sad occasion.

“The ‘Zabiaca’ being a new vessel, it took longer to
finish her, and by the time she was finished the war with
Turkey was over, and they managed to get guns to put
aboard her.

“The fitting out of this small fleet of commerce destroyers
had the effect that the Russians originally intended
it to have. It deterred the English from going
in with the Sultan. The merchant fleet of England is too
great and too vulnerable to permit their country to go to
war for a trifle. England would suffer more in a war
than any other nation on account of the large number
of merchant-men under her flag; and it was because of
the great number of her ships and the danger and loss
from their destruction that made the British government
and its people labor so hard to have our navigation laws
repealed, so that a fictitious sale could be made and the
vessels of their merchant marine could be put under the
protection of the American flag. As two of our statesmen
said (Henry C. Carey and Judge Kelley), ‘As long
as our navigation laws remain as they are, England will
be under perpetual bonds of indemnity to keep the
peace with all the small nations in the world, because
their merchant-ships cannot fly to the protection of the
American flag.’ In this case the English saw the scheme
of the ‘Alabama’ applied to themselves.

“These vessels went abroad, and most of them became
flag-ships on foreign stations.

“The ‘Europe’ and ‘Africa’ became flag-ships, and the
‘Asia’ was afterward taken by the Grand Duke Alexis,
.bn p222.png
.pn +1
who made a yacht of her, and a very handsome one she
made. She remains the Grand Duke’s yacht to this day.

“The rest of the history of this transaction is generally
known. The vessels were fitted out, went to sea, and
made their way to Russian ports without interruption,
and a final treaty of peace was effected through the Congress
of European Powers at Berlin. I believe that the
strongest argument the Russian government could offer to
persuade Great Britain against intervention was the fitting
out of these vessels as commerce destroyers in our
shipyard.

“The next year during a trip abroad I visited Paris. I
found there Captain Semetschkin, who told me that the
Grand Duke Constantine was in the city and would like
to receive me. The captain arranged that I should call
the next morning, and at the same time informed me that
the Grand Duke had given a contract for a new ship,
afterward called the ‘Livadia,’ designed by Admiral
Popoff and Dr. Zimmerman, to be built at the Fairfield
Works at Glasgow. Admiral Popoff was a notable example
of that type of man to which, for example, De
Lesseps, and Keely of motor fame, and Eads belong.
Such men affect an almost celestial knowledge in everything
they undertake, and that affectation, coupled with an
apparent sincerity of manner, earnestness of purpose, and
unflinching nerve, often enables them to captivate people
of good information on general topics, but unacquainted
with the technique of engineering problems; and who
therefore are unable to detect the cunning charlatanry of
such pretenders.

“Admiral Popoff had fascinated the Grand Duke Constantine
with his peculiar type of war-ship, which was a
circular floating turret of large dimensions that could
be revolved by means of her propellers, so that, porcupine-like,
.bn p223.png
.pn +1
she could present her ‘bristles’ in every direction
to an enemy.

“Quite a number of the Popoff type of floating batteries
were built, and a dry-dock was constructed for their
special accommodation when repairs might be necessary.
The ‘Livadia’ was the last production of Admiral Popoff,
who, as I have already remarked, designed her with the
assistance of Dr. Zimmerman, of Holland. She was not
circular like her predecessors, but was oval in shape, the
transverse diameter being almost but not quite equal to
the conjugate, and she was fitted with three screws entirely
under the bottom. Captain Semetschkin informed me
that the Grand Duke was much impressed with this new
design, and that nothing could shake his belief in its
success. Being thus forewarned, I could avoid giving him
an adverse criticism in case he brought the subject up by
simply exercising a little diplomacy, as it was not my
desire or intention to cross his predilections in any way.
When I called on the Grand Duke at the Russian Legation,
I found him reclining on a sofa, having severely
injured his leg in a fall. He arose as I entered and invited
me to take a seat in front of him. Being full of
the subject, he immediately asked me if I would visit
Glasgow soon, and when I stated that I intended to go
there at an early date he gave me a letter to Captain
Goulaieff, Russian Naval Constructor, who he said had
charge of the construction of the new ‘Livadia,’ and that
he had had prepared a working model fifteen feet long
with engines complete as an experiment, and he wanted
me to see it.

“I am sure he fully believed in the successful future
of this type. He stated that he was confident that it
would revolutionize merchant-ship as well as war-ship
.bn p224.png
.pn +1
construction, and his enthusiasm was unbounded in the
contemplation of it.

“When he had exhausted the subject, which took some
time, in elegant English and with fascinating fluency of
speech, he changed the subject, and I was subjected to one
of the most severe examinations in naval construction,
equipment, and technical practice that I ever encountered.
Of course, there was a change from my attitude of listener
to that of a sort of principal in the conversation that
followed.

“In referring in a complimentary way to the new
fleet that we had turned out,—the outcome of the ‘Cimbria’
expedition,—the Grand Duke stated that one quality
in them that impressed him more than any other was the
large coal carrying capabilities of the vessels, and he
asked me how I explained it. I stated that the models
of the ships were of the best American type with certain
improvements of our own.

“Expressing himself in a complimentary manner as to
what we had done and as to what I said, he then put the
question to me with much ‘empressement’ and sympathetic
interest of manner: ‘Mr. Cramp, from what school of
naval architecture did you graduate?’

“Fully appreciating all that was involved in the question
from his stand-point and what he considered of paramount
importance,—the necessity of the Technical School
for Naval Officials—I was prepared for the question, and
determined that my answer should be apropos; and that
I would not permit myself and my profession to be disparaged,
knowing that in Russia and on the Continent
generally there were no great private shipyards, and that
if a naval architect or ship-builder there did not graduate
from a technical school, he was practically nowhere at
that time. Trained as I was in Philadelphia in a first-class
.bn p225.png
.pn +1
shipyard, surrounded by others of the same kind
and in close contact with New York, which city occupied
the head and front of the ship-building profession in the
world, I felt myself doubly armed and more than confident
when my answer came promptly after the question.

“I said: ‘Your Imperial Highness! when I graduated
from my father’s shipyard as a naval architect and ship-builder,
there were no schools of naval architecture. I
belong to that race which created them!’

“This unexpected answer, and the gravity of my
manner, astonished for an instant the Grand Duke, who
glanced at Captain Semetschkin, and rising to his feet
he bowed profoundly to me and sat down.

“The history of the ‘Livadia’ is well known,—encountering
a storm in the Bay of Biscay she was somewhat
battered up under the bottom forward. On account of
her peculiar shape and light draught she did not respond
quickly to the motions of a head sea; when her bow was
lifted clear of the water, the following seas would strike
the bottom very severely before she would come down.

“After serving at Sebastopol somewhat under a cloud,
she was laid up; the propeller engines were ultimately
put in three new gun-boats.”
.pm letter-end

The departure of the “Cimbria” from Russia
was a great event there, and all the officers
who left Russia on that expedition have continued
ever since to meet yearly on March 28
(O. S.), that being the date of their departure
from Russia. On March 29, 1898, twenty years
afterward, Mr. Cramp happened to be in Russia
arranging for the contract between his
Company and the Russian government for the
.bn p226.png
.pn +1
construction of the battleship “Retvizan” and
the cruiser “Variag.” A committee of officers
at the time called and invited him to be
present at their annual banquet as a guest.
This committee was composed of some of the
younger officers who were on the “Cimbria”
expedition. They stated that no guest had
ever been invited to one of these banquets, but
they considered Mr. Cramp’s connection with
the fitting out of that fleet entitled him to the
distinction of being the only guest they ever
had on one of those occasions. He found there
Vice-Admiral Avalan, the Assistant of the
Minister of Marine and now Minister of Marine,—he
had been captain of the “Asia;”
Admiral Grippenburg, who had been captain
of the “Europe;” and also about thirty of
the sixty officers who left on the “Cimbria” on
its first voyage. Of those absent, a great many
had died, and some, of course, were away.
Admiral Alexeieff was in China.

Mr. Cramp had begun his overtures with a
view to naval construction for Russia as early
as the fall of 1893. During that period the
Russian Atlantic fleet was present in our
waters to take part in celebrating the four
hundredth anniversary of Columbus’ discovery.
The Grand Duke Alexander was an
officer in that squadron, which during its stay
.bn p227.png
.pn +1
in our waters was at anchor for some time in
the Delaware, and its officers freely visited the
shipyard, carefully inspecting and examining
all the work then going on. The general result
was that they became enthusiastic with regard
to the development of the art in this country
and with the character of work being done toward
the rebuilding of our navy, and they were
also profoundly impressed with the facilities
of Cramps’ shipyard which might be utilized
for increase of the Russian navy. They
frankly said, however, that just at that moment
it did not seem to be the policy of their
government to have important work done for
the Russian navy in foreign shipyards. This
was, of course, true, for at that time Russia
was not building any kind of naval construction
more important than torpedo-boat destroyers
outside of her own domain. During
the following years (1894, 1895, 1896) certain
correspondence passed between Mr. Cramp
and high officials in the Russian Ministry of
Marine; though little progress was made during
those years except to call the attention of
the Russians in a vivid and forceful manner
to the capacities and facilities which he controlled,
and to strengthen the <i>entente cordiale</i>
which had so long existed between the Russian
naval authorities and himself.
.bn p228.png
.pn +1

At this point it becomes necessary to take up
a new branch of the general subject, which is
that of foreign work.

.if h
.il fn=i228.jpg w=600px id=medi
.ca
MEDI-J-IEH LAUNCHING—TURKISH
Copyright, 1904, by John W. Dawson
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: MEDI-J-IEH LAUNCHING—TURKISH<br>
Copyright, 1904, by John W. Dawson]
.sp 2
.if-
While the correspondence with the authorities
of the Russian government above referred
to was going on, our Minister at Tokio, Mr.
Dunn, called the attention of the Japanese government
to the fact that their expenditure of
vast sums of money on a new navy in England
principally, and also in France and Germany
on a smaller scale, was well known; and in
a diplomatic way he suggested that some of
that kind of patronage bestowed upon the ship-building
interests in the United States would
be extremely gratifying to the American people.
He also thought that the popularity of
such a project in this country would be made
universal if part of the proposed patronage
should be awarded to the Atlantic and part to
the Pacific coast. Minister Dunn’s suggestion
was taken up by the American Trading Company
in the Orient, and their joint advocacy
of the scheme was crowned with success. Acting
upon intimation of such a suggestion, the
Cramp Company and the Union Iron Works
of San Francisco sent agents to Japan, and
when they returned, contracts were made with
the Japanese Minister Toru Hoshi, representing
the Imperial Government, and the two
.bn p228a.png
.bn p228b.png
.bn p229.png
.pn +1
ship-building companies above mentioned. The
ship built by Cramp is now known in the
Japanese navy list as the “Kasagi,” and that
built by the Union Iron Works of San Francisco
as the “Chitose.”

Up to that time the Japanese navy had been
built almost exclusively in England, and with
unimportant exceptions wholly by Armstrong.
Of the vessels which won the naval battles on
the Yellow Sea in the Chino-Japanese War of
1894 almost all, with the exception of a few
torpedo craft, were built by Armstrong & Company
at Elswick.

There was, however, one difficulty in the way
of Japanese patronage of American shipyards
in the construction of naval vessels. This difficulty
soon came to the surface, but was averted
by the urgency of diplomatic considerations.
It grew out of the fact that the money which
Japan was using to augment her navy was that
which she realized from the Chinese Indemnity
paid under the provisions of the Treaty of
Shimonoseki. This indemnity had been furnished
by Russia and financed in England or
by English capitalists; and it appeared that
there was a sort of tacit, if not express, understanding
that most of it was to be spent in
naval construction, and that the ships which
it was to pay for should be built in English
.bn p230.png
.pn +1
shipyards. However, the Japanese naval authorities
were extremely desirous of adding
one or more American-built ships to their fleet;
their idea, from the professional point of view,
being that, as they were then about prepared,
or had been for some time engaged in preparing,
to build ships at home in their own
dock-yards, the possession of one or more
American-built ships would be of value as
samples, models, or object lessons. Finally,
after considerable negotiation carried on
partly with or through the Japanese Minister
at Washington, and partly at head-quarters
in Tokio, the Japanese government awarded
a contract to Cramp for the construction
of a first-class protected cruiser of the
highest attainable speed. This contract was
signed by Mr. Cramp on behalf of the
Company and by Toru Hoshi, the Minister,
on behalf of his Majesty, the Emperor of
Japan. The vessel, the “Kasagi,” was
originally designed to be of about 5000 tons
displacement, but was modified to a displacement
of about 5500 tons. The guaranty was
17,000 indicated horse-power and twenty-two
and one-half (22½) knots speed, to be determined
by four runs, two each way over a measured
course ten knots long. Upon her completion
the ship was taken in charge by the
.bn p231.png
.pn +1
Japanese captain and crew, and upon her
arrival home immediately took a conspicuous
place in the Japanese navy. Although this
vessel gave the most profound satisfaction in
every respect, and although she had been built
in the United States at a cost that compared
quite favorably with relative contract prices
elsewhere, the Japanese did not repeat the experiment
for reasons already intimated. In
fact, all the influence of British diplomacy
upon the policy of Japan was successfully employed
in securing the maintenance of the
British alliance in opposition to the advance
of the Russians in the direction of the Pacific
and to retain the monopoly that English ship-builders,
principally Armstrong, had previously
enjoyed, and to prevent or prohibit
the construction of any more vessels of war in
the United States or in American shipyards.

Mr. Cramp continued his active correspondence
with the Russian authorities with constantly
increasing prospects of success. So
promising had the situation become in the summer
of 1897, that Mr. Cramp, who had gone to
Europe to attend the Jubilee Session of the
British Institution of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers, concluded to make a flying
visit to St. Petersburg before the meeting. His
stay there was not long, only about a week.
.bn p232.png
.pn +1
His object was to survey the ground and to
ascertain definitely what prospect there was for
the then rumored intention of the Russian
government to put forth a large and formidable
naval programme during the ensuing
winter.

Mr. Cramp returned to England from St.
Petersburg, and took part in the many meetings
of the Jubilee Session referred to. One of
the events of that occasion was a visit to the
great Elswick Shipyards and Ordnance Works
of Armstrong & Company, which Mr. Cramp
himself describes in a private letter as follows:
.pm h3 "VISIT TO THE ARMSTRONG WORKS."
.pm letter-start
“The officers of the Society of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers of the United States with certain officers
of the American navy were invited to meet the representative
Naval Architects and Marine Engineers of foreign
nations and participate in the meetings of the International
Congress of these bodies in London during the
month of July, 1897.

“After various entertainments under the auspices of
the Institute and a visit to and reception by the Queen at
Windsor Castle, the party went to Scotland; after visiting
Glasgow and stopping at Edinburgh, where Sir
Andrew Noble and Philip Watt, of the Armstrong Works,
met them; they were to be escorted to the Works in the
afternoon. Feeling sure that a visit of that kind to such
a shipyard with a great crowd and in such limited time
would be very unsatisfactory, and its results necessarily
.bn p233.png
.pn +1
incomplete, I concluded to go on to Newcastle the night
before and make an exhaustive visit to the works there
before the arrival of the large crowd. This being the
greatest shipyard in the world, I desired to examine its
new constructions in progress, with regard to their novelties
in device and design, in my own way and my own
time, without being carried along by a great crowd as in
a ‘personally conducted’ tour. I therefore went on to
Newcastle the night previous to the projected visit. When
I arrived at the hotel in Newcastle, I found a Russian
Naval Architect, Mr. Tchernigovsky, in the act of registering,
and had gone there for the same reasons that I
had, and we concluded to go to the works together. When
we arrived at the Armstrong Works and had registered
our names and had asked to be conducted through the
works, we found that all the principals had gone to Edinburgh,
to return with visitors, and, after some hesitation
on the part of the official in charge, we were escorted
through the works by one of the clerks.

“We found that there were eighteen war vessels on
the stocks! a list of which was found in the programme
of the visit given us in the afternoon. The destination of
the majority of the ships was known, but not indicated
in the programme. Before we left Newcastle, I was enabled
to locate all of the ships.

“We had not gone far in the shipyard before I saw a
7-inch armor plate suspended on slings ready for hoisting
in its place on what appeared at first to be a high-speed,
large protected cruiser, but on ascending the brow stage
we found it to be an armored cruiser of advanced type
and speed and with very heavy armor for that type of
vessel.

“When we asked the young man as to the nationality
of the ship he could not tell, but stated that was one of
.bn p234.png
.pn +1
the ships building on account of the firm. This was as
interesting to Mr. Tchernigovsky as it was to me, and our
examination was rather prolonged, no objection being
made by the young man who escorted us, who not being
a mechanic was indifferent as to our actions. We found
before we left the works that there were two or three
battleships of advanced type and superior model and
three or four armored cruisers, whose destination was unknown
to the people at the works outside of the office.
There was one thing that we were sure of, that these
ships were not building by the company for sale, and that
there was an important mystery to be solved.

“By the time we returned to the office, we found that
the Edinburgh crowd had arrived, ready for luncheon,
after which the whole party went through the works;
there was but little time to see what was going on, and
the character and the existence of these important ships
entirely escaped the notice of the visitors. There were
a number of Japanese and Chinese officers present with
the visitors.

“We had for some time before this visit secured possession
in China of copies of certain plans and specifications
for an advanced type of armored cruiser, and after
an examination we found that they were proposals of the
Thames Iron Works for raising a loan and for building
a fleet for the Chinese navy.

“The resemblance between the armored cruisers building
and the Chinese plans was so great, that I am sure the
Japanese ships were made from copies of the Thames
Iron Works drawings. The whole scheme of the Thames
Iron Works was excellent and feasible, and the Chinese
lost a fine navy by not accepting the offer.

“I thought that the construction of such an advanced
type of war vessel under the conditions was of sufficient
.bn p235.png
.pn +1
importance to inform Lieutenant Colwell, our Naval Attaché
at the United States Embassy. When I called on
him, he seemed surprised to find that I had made the
‘discovery;’ and he stated that he had wired a cipher
despatch to Washington describing the ships, and that
they were for the Japanese, and that he had been informed
of it by the Chinese Naval Attaché, who was a very bright
man and whose knowledge of the fact was from an absolutely
correct source. Mr. Colwell stated that no one but
the Chinese Attaché and himself was aware of it outside
of the Armstrong’s and the British government. Of
course, the last persons to be suspected of knowing anything
about the matter were the Japanese. Mr. Colwell
was well posted as to the object of the great enterprise.

“It was easy for Armstrong’s to keep a matter of this
kind quiet, as they had built so many war vessels for
various countries, and with eighteen on the stocks they
would not be noticed; and, besides, they were never without
one or two vessels under construction for sale.

“The character of the vessels and the information that
I gathered from Mr. Colwell and the Chinese Attaché,
and the fact that London was filled with foreign naval
officers, diplomats, and others in attendance on the festivities,
gave me opportunities to secure much important information
as to what was going on behind the scenes.
The Japanese in numbers and importance exceeded the
delegates of the other nationalities that participated in
the Naval Architects’ ceremonies, and they were treated
in the most obsequious and deferential manner by all of
the British dignitaries, ship-builders, ordnance and armor
makers, dealers in supplies, and the English people generally.

“Soon after the Armstrong visit I met a Japanese
nobleman, Marquis Ito, or Iendo, at the Lord Mayor’s
.bn p236.png
.pn +1
reception. He was the head and front of the Japanese
contingent, judging from the amount of adulation that
prominent British dignitaries and ship-builders accorded
him. Desiring to be sure of the facts in relation to the
Japanese ships at the Armstrong Works I accosted him
with an air of knowing all about it and as if there was
no use of his denying it,—hurrying along with my description
in elaborate detail, giving him no opportunity
to reply,—I said: ‘Oh, Marquis Ito! I have just examined
your very fine ships at the Armstrong Works.
They are superior to anything in any navy, British or
any other, and with the speed of twenty knots and 7-inch
armor and excellent model, etc.;’ running along without
giving him time to reply until I got out of breath and
stopped.

“During my talk his face was a study. It was impossible
to note or guess at his impressions, and I was
extremely doubtful as to the result; but the fact that we
were then building a Japanese war vessel, the ‘Kasagi,’
led him to believe that I knew something, particularly as
my elaborate description in detail of the qualities of the
ships under construction was correct; so, being sure that
I was thoroughly posted, he made no denial, but bowed
smilingly and with an air of approval. I had no opportunity
of discussing the new fleet with Mr. Tchernigovsky
after we left the Armstrong Works, but from information
I subsequently received I was satisfied that his early visit
to Newcastle was not accidental.

“The discovery of the construction of this fleet was the
origin of my article on ‘The Coming Sea Power’ in the
<i>North American Review</i> of October, 1897.

“I ascertained while in London, from additional sources
not to be mentioned here, that the construction of these
ships was undertaken in consequence of a secret alliance
.bn p237.png
.pn +1
between Great Britain and Japan to prevent the United
States from securing possession of the Sandwich Islands
and to head off the Russians in the Pacific, etc.

“The great engineering strike in Great Britain during
this time delayed the delivery of the Japanese vessels and
the construction of the great fleet of British ships then
under way for two or three years, and the whole thing
fell through because the favorable opportunity had
passed. The delay gave them time to think it over. And,
besides, we were beginning to make a show of naval
power. It was also at this time that the Germans were
beginning to show their practical aspirations in the direction
of ‘sea power.’

“The construction of the ships and their object was
known also to Captain Gregorovitch, Russian Naval
Attaché in London, and that probably accounted for the
visit of Mr. Tchernigovsky.

“One interesting circumstance in connection with this
strike and its consequences was the fact that under the
operations of the strike a very large number of the best
English shipyard workmen and engineers went to Germany,
and became permanently located there in the
shipyards; and while their absence crippled Great Britain,
they more than any other cause advanced the construction
of the German navy; so that while the leaders of the
strike in England gained nothing by it there for the
engineers but disaster to themselves and their country,
they were conspicuously instrumental in assisting the most
powerful rival of England.

“It would be an interesting subject for reflection or
discussion as to what might have been the consequences if
the strike had not occurred and the Japanese and British
fleets had been finished two years before they were.

“At the time these fleets were started there existed
.bn p238.png
.pn +1
throughout the naval world a lull in war-vessel output, particularly
so in Russia and the United States, until some
time after the announcement of the Japanese policy. The
Germans had, however, been much in advance in the way
of waking up and realizing the real situation.”
.pm letter-end

The programme of the visit to the Armstrong
Works embraced the following list of
war vessels then building there. This programme
did not indicate the destination of
any of these ships, so far as they were being
built for foreign account, and that designation
included all of them except one third-class
cruiser of 2800 tons displacement building
there for the English navy. Therefore the
destinations of all war-ships then building at
the Armstrong Works which are noted in the
margin of the programme are those dropped
from other sources of information, all of
which turned out to be absolutely true. It
should be explained here that the policy of
the Armstrong Company in building vessels
of war for foreign navies always was to keep
their destination secret as long as possible.
And here it may be added that Brassey’s
“Naval Annual,” the most comprehensive
work of its kind that ever existed, did not in
its issue for the year 1897 contain the destination
of any of these ships building at Armstrong’s
for foreign account, and that the same
.bn p239.png
.pn +1
work for the next year did give their destinations
based upon the disclosures made by Mr.
Cramp in connection with Commander Colwell,
our Naval Attaché in London, and the Naval
Attaché of the Chinese Legation there. With
this explanation, we present a copy of the programme
of the visit, with Mr. Cramp’s annotations
as noted above.
.sp 2
.nf c
<s>THROUGH NEW SMITH’S SHOP TO </s>
<l>ELSWICK SHIPYARD.</l>
.nf-

Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Limited, have now
under construction the following vessels of war:
.sp 2
.dv class=font85
.ta h:35 r:8 l:8 l:11
<th>                                             |    Tons.   |Speed in Knots.|For
One armored-clad battleship                      |  14,800    |18         |(Japan.)
One armored-clad battleship                      |  12,200    |18         |(Japan.)
Two first-class armored cruisers, each of        |   9,600    |20         |(Japan.)
One first-class armored cruiser                  |   8,500    |20         |Chile.
Two fast protected cruisers                      |  4,500     |24         |China.
Two fast protected cruisers                      |  4,300     |22½        |(Japan.) Portugal.
One fast protected cruiser                       |   4,250    |21         |Chile.
Two armor-clads                                  |   3,800    |17         |Norway.
Three fast protected cruisers, each of           |   3,450    |20         |Brazil.
One third-class cruiser                          |   2,800    |18         |England.
One training ship                                |   2,500    |14         |
One torpedo-boat destroyer                       |     300    |30         |
Two first-class armored cruisers, contracted\
for Besides mercantile vessels at their shipyard\
at Walker.                                       |9,750       |20         |(Japan.)
.ta-
.dv-
.sp 2
By the end of the year 1897, or rather during
this year, besides the ships enumerated above
.bn p240.png
.pn +1
for Japan there were in course of construction
elsewhere:

One battleship (“Fuji”), in commission.

One battleship, 14,800 tons, building at
Thames Iron Works.

One battleship, 14,800 tons, building at
Thompson’s.

One battleship, 10,000 tons, under consideration,
the Armstrong Works (contract not
signed).

One armored cruiser, 9600 tons, ordered at
Vulcan Works.

One armored cruiser, 9600 tons, ordered at
St. Nazaire.

Four torpedo-boat destroyers of 30 knots,
similar to British destroyers of 30 knots, building
at Yarrow.

Four torpedo-boat destroyers of 30 knots,
similar to British destroyers of 30 knots, building
at Thornycroft.

One torpedo-boat destroyer of 30 knots (?),
similar to British destroyers of 30 knots, building
at Schichau.

Eight torpedo boats of 90 tons, Schichau.

Four torpedo boats of 90 tons, Normand.

The Japanese battleships are named “Yashima,”
“Hatzure,” “Mikasa,” “Asahi,” and
“Shikisima.”

.if h
.il fn=i240.jpg w=600px id=launch
.ca
MEDI-J-IEH IN COMMISSION
Copyright, 1904, by John W. Dawson
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: MEDI-J-IEH IN COMMISSION<br>
Copyright, 1904, by John W. Dawson]
.sp 2
.if-


The first-class armored cruisers with seven-inch
.bn p240a.png
.bn p240b.png
.bn p241.png
.pn +1
side armor at Armstrong’s were the
“Asama,” “Idzumo,” “Iwate,” and “Takima;”
at St. Nazaire, France, “Azuma;”
and at the Vulcan Iron Works, Stettin, Germany,
the “Yakumo.” Five battleships, 6
armored cruisers, and 21 torpedo boats under
construction in 1897, in addition to the
ships in their own yards.

Soon after his return to America, Mr.
Cramp decided that the results of his visits
to the Armstrong Works should be given to
the public, as there were no obligations of
secrecy imposed on him, and particularly as
he thought that the United States was, or
should be, interested in the matter; besides,
he desired to extend the field of the operations
of their ship-building works abroad and
secure a small portion of the construction of
war-ships which England, France, and Germany
had monopolized, and for that purpose
he prepared a paper, which was printed in the
November number of the <i>North American Review</i>
for 1897. This paper added a considerable
scope of discussion applying directly to
the relative naval activity of Russia and
Japan, and drawing, or rather pointedly
leaving for inference, the conclusion that
Russia was not keeping pace with the development
.bn p242.png
.pn +1
of her already great and rapidly
growing rival in the Oriental Pacific.

This paper was as follows:
.pm h3 "“THE COMING SEA POWER.”"
.pm letter-start
“Most well-informed people have a pretty clear general
idea that the present is an era of unexampled naval
activity throughout the civilized world; that great fleets
are building everywhere; that the ships composing them
are of new types, representing the highest development of
naval architecture and the most exquisite refinement of
the art of naval armament. Doubtless, a much smaller
number of persons are aware that a new factor of imposing
proportions has come into the general situation;
that the newest member of the family of civilization is
with rapid strides reaching a status of actual and potential
sea power with which the older nations must henceforth
reckon most seriously.

“It is, however, questionable whether any one not intimately
conversant with the current history of modern
ship-building, or not qualified to estimate properly the relative
values of actual armaments, can adequately conceive
the vast significance of the prodigious efforts which this
youngest of civilized nations was then, and still is, successfully
putting forth toward the quick and sure attainment
of commanding power on the sea.

“In order to estimate accurately the significance of the
current naval activity of Japan, it is requisite to trace
briefly her prior development as a maritime power.

“The foundation of the Japanese navy was laid by
the purchase of the Confederate ram ‘Stonewall,’ built
in France in 1864, surrendered to the United States in
1865, and shortly afterward sold or given to Japan. This
ship was soon followed by another of somewhat similar
.bn p243.png
.pn +1
type, built at the Thames Iron Works in 1864-65, now
borne on the Japanese navy list as the ‘Riojo,’ and used
as a gunnery and training ship.

“From that time to the period of the Chinese War the
naval growth of Japan was steady, and, considering her
very recent adoption of Western methods, rapid.

“At the beginning of that war, Japan, though possessing
a very respectable force of cruisers and gunboats,
mostly of modern types and advanced design, had no
armored ships worthy of the name. The old ‘Stonewall’
had been broken up, the ‘Fu-So,’ the ‘Riojo,’ the ‘Heiyei,’
and the ‘Kon-Go,’ built from 1865 to 1877, were obsolete,
and the ‘Chiyoda,’ the only one of modern design and
armament, was a small armored cruiser of 2450 tons, with
a 4½-inch belt, and no guns larger than 4.7-inch caliber.

“The unarmored fleet, however, on which she had to
rely, was for its total displacement equal to any in the
world. It embraced three of the ‘Hoshidate’ class, 4277
tons and 5400 horse-power; two of the ‘Naniwa’ class, 3650
tons and 7000 horse-power, which had been considered
by our Navy Department worth copying in the ‘Charleston;’
the ‘Yoshino,’ 4150 tons and 15,000 horse-power, and
about fifteen serviceable gun-vessels from 615 to 1700
tons. All of the cruisers had been built in Europe, but
most of the gun-vessels were of Japanese build, and represented
the first efforts of the Japanese people in modern
naval construction.

“Among the results of the war was the addition of
several Chinese vessels to the Japanese navy, including the
battleship ‘Chen Yuen,’ of 7400 tons and 6200 horse-power,
and the ‘Ping Yuen,’ armored coast defence ship,
which had been captured by the unarmored cruisers of the
Mikado.

“At the end of the war Japan had forty-three sea-going
.bn p244.png
.pn +1
vessels, displacing in the aggregate 79,000 tons,
of which seven serviceable ships, with total displacement
of 15,000 tons, were prizes.

“The navy of Japan in commission at that time (1897)
embraced forty-eight sea-going ships, of 111,000 tons displacement,
and twenty-six torpedo boats. The five sea-going
vessels, of 32,000 tons total displacement, which had
been added since the war, represented the most advanced
types of modern naval architecture, and included two
first-class battleships of 12,800 tons each, the ‘Fuji’ and
‘Yashima.’

“The ship-building programme then in progress of
actual construction was calculated to produce by the year
1903 a total effective force of sixty-seven sea-going ships,
twelve torpedo-catchers, and seventy-five torpedo boats,
with an aggregate displacement of more than 200,000 tons.

“To the navy in commission or available for instant
service, already described, Japan now adds, in plain sight
under actual construction in various stages of forwardness,
a new fleet vastly superior to it in power and efficiency.

“Here I desire to say that the word ‘progress,’ in its
conventional sense, does not adequately indicate the naval
activity of Japan. The word implies continuity, by more
or less even pace, in one of two directions, or in both;
one direction is an increase in tonnage, with but little or
no improvement in efficiency; and the other is a marked
advance of new ships in all the elements of offence, defence,
staying power, and economy.

“The first condition of progress is represented by the
present activity of most nations who are sailing along
evenly and with self-approval in fancied superiority. The
second condition is represented by Japan, who suddenly
.bn p245.png
.pn +1
appears as a cyclone in a smooth sea of commonplace
progress.

“Japan is not only building more ships than any other
power except England, but she is building <i>better ships in
English shipyards than England herself is constructing
for her own navy</i>. While other nations proceed by steps,
Japan proceeds by leaps and bounds. What other nations
are doing may be described as progress, but what Japan
is doing must be termed a phenomenon. She is building:

“(1) Three 14,800-ton battleships, which are well advanced
at the Armstrong Works, Thompson’s, and Thames
Iron Works, respectively.

“(2) One battleship of about 10,000 tons, commencing
at the Armstrong Works.

“(3) Four first-class armored cruisers of 9750 tons displacement
and twenty knots speed at the Armstrong
Works; one at the Vulcan Works, Stettin, Germany,
and one in France.

“(4) Two 5000-ton protected cruisers of about twenty-three
knots speed; one at San Francisco and one at
Philadelphia.

“(5) One protected cruiser of 4300 tons and about
twenty-three knots speed, at the Armstrong Works.

“(6) Four thirty-knot torpedo-boat destroyers at Yarrow’s.

“(7) Four more of similar type at Thompson’s.

“(8) Eight 90-ton torpedo boats at the Schichau Works,
Elbing, Germany.

“(9) Four more of similar type at the Normand Works,
France.

“(10) Three 3000-ton protected cruisers of twenty
knots, three torpedo gunboats and a despatch vessel, at
the Imperial Dock-yard, Yokosuka, Japan.

“(11) The programme for the current year embraces
.bn p246.png
.pn +1
a fifth armored cruiser of the type previously described
(9600 tons and twenty knots), to be built also at Yokosuka.

“This is Japan’s naval increase actually in sight. Excepting
the ships building at Yokosuka, the whole programme
has come under my personal observation.

“Comparison with the current progress of other powers
discloses the fact that Japan is second only to England
in naval activity, being ahead of France, much in advance
of Germany, and vastly in the lead of Russia and
the United States. It must also be borne in mind that
the new Japanese fleet comprises throughout the very
latest and highest types of naval architecture in every
respect of force, economy, and efficiency.

“The spectacle of Japan surpassing France and closely
following England herself in naval activity is startling.
Considering the shortness of the time which has elapsed
since Japan entered the family of nations or aspired to
any rank whatever as a power, it is little short of miraculous.
Yet it is a fact, and to my mind it is the most
significant single fact of our time. Nations do not display
such energy or undertake such expenditure without a
purpose.

“It can hardly be maintained that Japan aims her vast
preparations at the United States; at least, not primarily.
The pending Hawaiian affair has given rise to some
irritation, but its importance has been systematically exaggerated
by the English press. It cannot, in any event,
go beyond the stage of diplomatic exchanges. Japan will,
doubtless, receive from the United States sufficient
assurance that the rights of her subjects in Hawaii will
be protected in case of annexation, and thus far she has
asked no more than that. She is certainly entitled to no
less.
.bn p247.png
.pn +1

“The object of the English in encouraging Japan to
make a bold front against the United States was and is,
like all their objects, purely commercial. They hoped to
stir up in the Japanese mind an ill-feeling that would
prevent the award of any more contracts to American
shipyards, and even this characteristic stratagem is not
likely to have more than a temporary effect. Thus I think
it may be assumed that Japan’s immense naval preparation
is not made with the United States in hostile view;
certainly not mainly.

“Assuming these conditions to be beyond dispute, and
considering that the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway
will at once make Russia a great Pacific power,
politically and commercially, her naval situation in those
seas must become a matter of prime importance; perhaps
not of equal importance with that of the United States
now, but at once sufficient to challenge the best efforts
of her statesmen.

“Having all these facts in view, and being in a position
to judge with some accuracy of the significance and value
of preparations which came under my own observation
during a recent tour of Europe in my professional capacity,
I could not help remarking the vast difference
between the naval activity of Japan and that of the other
two first-rate pacific powers, Russia and the United States.
The existing situation in Russia and the United States,
relatively speaking, can hardly be called more than the
merest perfunctory progress, whereas the activity of
Japan is really marvellous. If she were simply meditating
another attack on China alone or unsupported, no such
fleet as Japan is now building would be needed; certainly
not the enormous battleships and the great armored
cruisers. It must therefore be assumed that Japan’s purpose
is the general one of predominant sea power in the
Orient.
.bn p248.png
.pn +1

“Japan may, and probably does, meditate a renewal of
her efforts to establish a footing on the Asiatic mainland.
Possibly, she may have in view the ultimate acquisition of
the Philippine Islands! (This was written the year before
the Spanish War.) But, whatever may be her territorial
ambitions for the future, it is as plain as an open
book that she intends, before she moves again, to place
herself in a position to disregard and defy any external
interference. This may be the true meaning of Japan’s
extreme activity in naval preparation at this time.

“I may say without violation of confidence that a
Japanese gentleman of distinction, a civilian, not long
ago remarked in conversation on this subject that ‘while
Japan was forced by circumstances to yield much at Shimonoseki
that she had fairly conquered, she still secured
indemnity enough to build a navy that would enable her
to do better next time!’

“In view of all these facts, the question at once arises:
Are Russia and the United States prepared or are they
preparing to meet such conditions, and to maintain their
proper naval status as Pacific powers? My answer to
that question, based on observations of Japan’s naval
strength already in sight and on what I know of her intended
programme for further increase in the immediate
future, as compared with the relative conditions of Russia
and this country, would be in the negative.

“Just now Russia is trying the experiment of reliance
on her own Imperial dock-yards, including two semi-private
shipyards under government control; while the
United States has halted completely. The Russian dock-yards
are efficient, as far as they go, and turn out good
work, judging from such specimens as I have seen. But
their capacity is not adequate to the task that is presented
by the situation which I have delineated. No other nation
relies wholly on its own public dock-yards for new naval
.bn p249.png
.pn +1
constructions. England, with public dock-yards almost
equal in capacity to those of the rest of the world combined,
builds over 65 per cent. of her displacement and 97
per cent. of her horse-power by contract with private
shipyards and machine-shops. France, with very great
dock-yard facilities, builds a large proportion of her hulls
and machinery by contract. The same is true of Germany,
Italy, and the United States. But Russia has no great
private ship-building facilities, and there are no visible
signs of the immediate development of resources of that
description.

“Japan, on the contrary, though she has some facilities
of her own, is drawing upon the very best resources
elsewhere to be found; she is drawing on the ship-building
power at once of England, France, Germany, and the
United States. Not only that, but more than that; the
vessels Japan is building in the shipyards of England,
France, and Germany are superior to any vessels those
nations are building for themselves, class for class.

“Hence, viewing the situation from any point at will,
the conclusion of any one qualified to judge must be that,
in the race for naval supremacy in the Pacific, Japan is
gaining, while Russia and the United States are losing
ground.

“It requires little prescience to discern that the issue
which is to settle that question of supremacy as between
the powers may not be long deferred.

“Though Japan’s naval activity is primarily significant
of a purpose to secure general predominance in Oriental
seas, and though, as I have suggested, there is no
immediate reason for, or prospect of, trouble between
Japan and the United States involving naval armaments;
yet, in the broad general sense of dignity on the sea, our
country can by no means safely ignore or be inattentive
.bn p250.png
.pn +1
to the progress of our Oriental neighbor toward the rank
of a first-class sea power in the Pacific Ocean. The completion
of her fleet now building will, inside of three
years, give Japan that rank, and the future programme
already laid out will accentuate it. The superior quality
of Japan’s new navy is even more significant than its
enormous quantity. She has no useless ships, none obsolete;
all are up to date.

“Meantime, the attitude of the United States seems
quite as supine as that of Russia. It is not necessary to
go into minute detail on this point. Suffice it to say
that, taking Russia, Japan, and the United States as the
three maritime powers most directly concerned in the
Pacific Ocean, and whose interests are most immediately
affected by its command, Japan at her present rate of
naval progress, viewed with relation to the lack of progress
of the other two, must in three years be able to
dominate the Pacific against either, and in less than ten
years, against both.

“I have heard the question raised as to the character
and quality of the Japanese <i>personnel</i>; I have heard the
suggestion that, magnificent as their material may be,
their officers and men are not up to the European or
American standard. It is not my intention to discuss
this phase of the matter. But it is worth while to observe
that, if the Japanese officers with whom we are in daily
contact as inspectors of work we are doing for their
government are average samples, they have no odds to
ask of the officers of any other navy whatsoever as to
professional ability, practical application, and capacity to
profit by experience. And it should also be borne in mind
that they have had more and later experience in actual
warfare than the officers of any other navy, or of all other
navies. While all other navies have been wrestling with
.bn p251.png
.pn +1
the theoretical problems of war colleges, or encountering
the hypothetical conditions of squadron evolutions, fleet
manœuvres, and sham battles, the Japanese have been sinking
or taking the ships, bombarding the towns, and forcing
the harbors of their enemy. I do not know how others
may view this sort of disparity in experience, but in my
opinion it is the most portentous fact in the whole situation,
and because of it no navy that has not done any
fighting at all has the slightest license to question in any
respect the quality of the <i>personnel</i> of the Japanese navy
that has done a good deal of extremely successful fighting.

“On the whole, the attitude of Japan among the powers
is in the last degree admirable. Her aspirations are exaltedly
patriotic, and her movements to realize them are
planned with a consummate wisdom, and executed with a
systematic skill, which nations far older in the arts of
Western civilization would do well to emulate.”
.pm letter-end

In this paper, it need hardly be said, Mr.
Cramp hewed to the line. He did not flatter
the Russians nor did he omit to advise them
of the full extent and unquestionable consequences
of their procrastination and supineness.
When the paper was prepared and had
been finally revised, Mr. Cramp still hesitated
about publishing it in that form. “The Russians,”
he said, “are extremely sensitive; they
know their weakness, or the best minds among
them know it quite as well as I have pointed
it out in this paper. Of course, I intend it as
an appeal to their patriotism and to their sense
of their country’s needs; but I am afraid that
.bn p252.png
.pn +1
it will hurt the sensibilities of some of them.”
However, after further consideration, Mr.
Cramp determined to print the paper as it
stood, and it was done. Probably no article
appearing in an American magazine in many
years, if ever, received as widespread or as
earnest attention in Europe as did Mr.
Cramp’s paper on “The Coming Sea Power.”
As soon as the <i>North American Review</i> arrived
in Europe, the paper was translated and
printed in Russian and German and a copious
synopsis of it in French, in the naval periodicals
of the respective countries. It was also
extensively discussed and criticised in the English
press, both in the service papers and in
the regular daily journals. In St. Petersburg,
besides being translated and printed in the
principal Russian magazine and discussed in
the newspapers, it was made the basis of an
address by one of the most eminent Admirals
in the Russian navy. Mr. Cramp’s cautious
apprehension, already referred to, that it
might touch the susceptibilities of Russian officers
proved groundless; and it has been openly
admitted by high officials of the Russian Ministry
of Marine that the arguments and considerations
so vigorously advanced by Mr.
Cramp had an effect of no little potency in
turning the scale of Russian policy, which a
.bn p253.png
.pn +1
few months later found expression in the great
naval programme of 1898.

Early in the following spring Mr. Cramp
received advices from St. Petersburg that the
Ministry of Marine would be glad to entertain
plans and proposals from him for the construction
of at least two first-class battleships, two
first-class protected cruisers of the highest
speed, and thirty torpedo boats, under the new
programme which had then, February, 1898,
been finally authorized by the Ministry and
approved by the Emperor Nicholas II.

Upon receipt of this information or suggestion,
Mr. Cramp lost no time in preparing for
the voyage. Although the time of year, early
in March, was the most inclement season for
a visit to the great northern capital, he cheerfully
accepted the situation. So far as the
general scheme and outline plans were concerned,
he had substantially worked them out
in anticipation, and not much delay was caused
on that account. Early in March, 1898, Mr.
Cramp sailed on the American Line steamship
“St. Paul,” bound for St. Petersburg by the
way of Southampton. Upon his arrival at the
Russian capital, he was immediately turned
over to the tender mercies of what is known as
the Technical Board. This in Russian naval
administration is a Board composed of officers
.bn p254.png
.pn +1
representing all the branches of the service,—Line,
Construction, Engineering and Ordnance,
or the Artillery Branch, as they call it.
The membership of this Board is considerable
in number. For several weeks they subjected
Mr. Cramp to a species of inquisition which
might well have appalled a man of less resources,
less determination, or less confidence
in his own ultimate mastery of the situation.
It is not worth while, even did our limits of
space admit, to go into detail of Mr. Cramp’s
discussion of his proposed designs and plans
with the members of the Technical Board.
Suffice to say, that after some weeks of consideration,
taking the widest possible range, a
general agreement was reached, leaving but
few questions open for subsequent determination,
none of which were of vital importance.
The sequel of the whole transaction was that
on the 23d of April, 1898, contracts were signed
by Mr. Cramp on behalf of the Company, and
by Vice-Admiral V. Verhovskoy, Chief of the
Department of Construction and Supply, on
behalf of the Emperor, for the construction of
two vessels, one first-class battleship, now
known as the “Retvizan,” and one first-class
protected cruiser of the highest practicable
speed, known as the “Variag.”

In his operations at St. Petersburg leading
.bn p255.png
.pn +1
up to these important contracts, which aggregated
nearly seven millions of dollars, including
extra work ordered during construction,
Mr. Cramp encountered powerful and
persistent opposition from three widely diverse
sources. First, there was an element
strongly intrenched in the Ministry of Marine,
who opposed the award of contracts to foreign
builders other than the French. This element
of opposition was powerfully represented on
the Technical Board, and its influences were
shown particularly in the Ordnance installation
and in the Engineering section, who
wanted everything done in Russia. It proved
factious and troublesome, though not otherwise
formidable, because the decision to have
some of the ships in the programme of 1898
built abroad had already been reached in
higher quarters. In fact, though not definitely
so announced by the Russian government, it
was known by the middle of March, 1898, at
least by those intending to bid, that the Ministry
of Marine had decided to award contracts
for the construction of two first-class battle-ships,
one armored cruiser, and three first-class
protected cruisers of the highest speed in
foreign shipyards, and a large number of torpedo
boats.

The French and German shipyards were
.bn p256.png
.pn +1
represented not only by their own agents and
experts, but they were backed, and their claims
to consideration urged, with all the power and
influence their respective Embassies and banking
houses could command at the Court of St.
Petersburg.

However, this situation was not at all unforeseen
or unexpected by Mr. Cramp. To
encounter opposition from the agents of the
foreign banking houses and diplomats was a
normal condition of this kind of business.
Fortunately for Mr. Cramp, or, rather, fortunately
for American industrial interests at
large, we also had an ambassador at St.
Petersburg in 1898. He was not of the common
run of American diplomatic representatives
“near” foreign Courts. He was different.
Almost from the foundation of our
government, a rule—amounting to unwritten
law—had prevailed which forbade American
diplomatic representatives abroad to do or say
anything in aid or furtherance of commercial
or industrial enterprises of American citizens
in the country to which they were accredited.

Object lessons were before them. During
Polk’s Administration, James Buchanan, then
Secretary of State, had removed, or rather
transferred to another post, a United States
Minister to one of the South American Republics
.bn p257.png
.pn +1
on the Pacific slope. This Minister
had committed the, in United States “diplomacy,”
unpardonable offence of indorsing the
drafts of certain whale-ship captains upon
their owners in New Bedford and Nantucket.
The ships of these captains were in distress,
having been dismasted in tempestuous passages
around Cape Horn, and they had made their
voyage to Valparaiso under jury-masts. Arrived
there, they needed money to repair and
refit their battered and storm-beaten ships.
Our Minister to Chile used his good offices to
help them get their drafts cashed so they could
repair their vessels and pursue their voyages.
This, from the view-point of primitive United
States “diplomacy,” was of course a crime,
and the Minister was made to suffer for it!
Ultimately this unwritten law or tacit doctrine
found expression on the floor of the Senate, in
a debate on the Consular and Diplomatic Appropriation,
from the lips of Thomas F.
Bayard:

.pm letter-start
“The purity and dignity of our foreign representation,”
he said, “must be preserved! The law now recognized,
though unwritten, should be made statutory! If an
American Minister abroad should use any of the influence
or employ any of the prestige or credit which he may derive
from his status as a representative of this country
to aid or further or promote any scheme or project of
.bn p258.png
.pn +1
American citizens in that country, having private gain in
view, he should be held answerable for official misdemeanor!”
.pm letter-end

Buchanan and Bayard have already found
their proper levels in American history, and
need not be discussed here, even if their memories
were worth discussion. But the theory
they applied to our diplomatic representation
was for many years the rule. The result
was that our “diplomatic service” (so-called)
down to, we may say, the end of Cleveland’s
last Administration, had become little else than
a hospital for political cripples, or a sanitarium
for over-worked old lawyers and nervously
prostrated college professors. It was
the laughing-stock of foreigners and the object
of cynical, albeit good-natured, contempt on
the part of our own people. It had become a
symposium of urbane uselessness and solemn
stupidity.

All this was changed in our representation
at St. Petersburg in 1898. Our Ambassador
there was the Hon. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, of
Missouri. He was neither a political cripple,
nor an overworked old lawyer, nor a college
president needing a gilt-edged vacation.

He was a great and successful manufacturer,
a man of broad and keen business instincts,
and he thought that any scheme calculated to
.bn p259.png
.pn +1
disburse about seven million dollars among
the workingmen and steel mills of the United
States was well worthy the earnest attention
and the best officers of the most dignified Ambassador.
Imbued with such ideas, Mr. Hitchcock
helped Mr. Cramp all he could. He may
not have been as noisy about it as the German
Ambassador or as strenuously in evidence as
the French Ambassador, but he was none the
less active or effective in his efforts to subserve
and promote the interests of his country and
her citizens. The maw-worm doctrine of
Buchanan and the raven-like croaking of Bayard
were lost upon such a man. Taking the
situation altogether, it is safe to say, so far
as diplomatic representation was concerned,
the commercial and industrial interests of the
United States and of American citizens in the
Russian Empire were quite as well guarded in
1898 as were those of France and Germany.

The third element of opposition which Mr.
Cramp had to encounter and overcome was of
a purely technical or mechanical character.
His plans involved installation of water-tube
boilers of the Niclausse type. But up to that
moment, ever since the adoption of the water-tube
system by the Russian navy, the Belleville
type of boiler had held undisputed sway
there. The enormous wealth of the Belleville
.bn p260.png
.pn +1
people, their straightway, open-handed mode
of doing business with naval officials, not only
in Russia but in England as well, and their
aptness in placing valuable things where they
would do the most good, were all notorious.
They had for some time admitted that the
Niclausse system was their most formidable
rival, and naturally they were ready to exhaust
their resources to prevent its introduction into
the Russian navy, where their monopoly, up
to that time, had been perfect and invulnerable.
This discussion was, of course, carried
on wholly between Mr. Cramp and the Russian
technical authorities. It was a subject that
could not be touched by diplomacy or by personal
influence; a contest to be fought out
wholly on the mechanical merits of the respective
systems and decided entirely by skilled
judgment. In this kind of contest Mr. Cramp
was at home, and he won. His staple argument
was that for any naval power to surrender
itself to a single type of proprietary
boiler, thereby creating a monopoly against
itself, could not be else than unwise; that the
era of water-tube boilers was still in the experimental
stage, that perfection was yet to
be developed, and was doubtless a long way
off. Exhaustive trials already made had demonstrated
a wide range of efficiency and consequent
.bn p261.png
.pn +1
merit in the Niclausse system, and
while it was no part of his contention to decry
or depreciate the rival type, comparative performances
of official record beyond dispute
argued that sound marine engineering policy
would forbid the exclusion of the Niclausse
system. By the weight of these arguments Mr.
Cramp carried all his points. The ultimate
result of a six weeks’ campaign was the award
of contracts for construction of six vessels in
foreign shipyards: one first-class battleship
and one armored cruiser to the Forges et
Chantiers, of France; one first-class battleship
and one large protected cruiser of the
highest attainable speed to Mr. Cramp, and
two protected cruisers of type similar to the
last-named to Germany yards, the “Germania”
of Kiel and the “Vulcan” of Stettin.

Upon these awards, Mr. Cramp came home
and began construction at once. Indeed, while
still in St. Petersburg, he had placed orders
for important parts of the material required,
and had contracted for the necessary armor.
At the outset some delay occurred, due to the
extreme deliberation observed by the Russian
Inspectors in approving detail plans and specifications,
and to some changes made in the
character and quality of material for protective
decks after the contract was signed.
.bn p262.png
.pn +1
But notwithstanding these delays, Mr. Cramp
completed and delivered both his ships long in
advance of either the French or German builders,
and such time penalties as had accrued by
reason of the initial delays already referred
to were remitted by direction of the Emperor
Nicholas II himself.

The trial conditions imposed upon these
ships were the most drastic and crucial ever
known; they being required to develop their
maximum speed for twelve hours continuously,
as against four-hour or measured mile trials
in other navies.

Upon the completion and delivery of these
ships, Mr. Cramp had achieved the distinction
of having done the greatest volume and highest
value of ship-building for foreign accounts
ever performed in an American shipyard. On
their arrival at St. Petersburg, both ships were
personally inspected by the Emperor, who was
so pleased with the “Variag” that he ordered
her detailed as escort to the Imperial yacht in
a trip to Cherbourg.

It is worthy of remark that in the fall of
1898 our Navy Department advertised for proposals
to construct three battleships, now
known as the “Maine” class. The plan put
forth by the Department was a modified and
slightly enlarged “Alabama,” with a speed
.bn p263.png
.pn +1
requirement of seventeen knots as against sixteen
in the original type. Mr. Cramp offered
to build an eighteen-knot ship within the statutory
limit prescribed for one of seventeen
knots, and used his Russian battleship as a
basis of design. His proposition was accepted,
and the other bidders—Newport News and the
Union Iron Works, to each of whom one ship
was awarded—were required to adopt Mr.
Cramp’s conditions of dimension and performance.
In this manner the American navy
as well as the Russian profited by Mr. Cramp’s
interesting and remarkable “Campaign of
1898.”
.bn p264.png
.pn +1
.sp 2
.pb
.sp 4
.h2
CONCLUSION
.sp 2
<sc>The</sc> foregoing chapters have dealt wholly
with Mr. Cramp in what may be termed his
public capacity,—in his attitude of a public
servant of most important rank and most unfailing
usefulness. The fact that he has been
such a public servant, without official position
or emolument, stands doubly to his credit.
Viewing him in that relation alone, it may be
said that he has designed and built, or has
been responsible for the designing and building,
more than three hundred ships of all kinds,
classes, and destinations during more than half
a century. It requires more than a second
thought to adequately measure the impress a
man makes upon the fortunes and the destinies
of his era when he creates over three hundred
ships either for commerce or for war.

.if h
.il fn=i264.jpg w=600px id=indi
.ca
BATTLESHIPS INDIANA AND MASSACHUSETTS
.ca-
.if-

.if t
.sp 2
[Illustration: BATTLESHIPS INDIANA AND MASSACHUSETTS]
.sp 2
.if-

Dismissing for the moment all thought of the
perishability of things made by human hands,
the imagination does not need a free rein to
fancy an imperishable monument in legend,
in tradition, and in history. The ships themselves
run their course, meet their fate, and
pass away. But the descendants of the men
who sailed in them to the uttermost parts of
.bn p264a.png
.bn p264b.png
.bn p265.png
.pn +1
the earth, if merchant vessels, or the progeny
of the men who fought in them to save the
country or to set a weaker people free, if men-of-war,
will forever cherish their memories.
In such a way Charles H. Cramp has linked his
name with the era of his lifetime; and nothing
has been attempted in the foregoing Memoir but
to make, in assembled form, permanent record
of the most important relations he has sustained
to the destiny-shapers of mankind, the
most arduous of the tasks he has undertaken,
the most signal of the triumphs he has
achieved, and the most perplexing of the difficulties
and obstacles he has encountered.

No attempt has been made to portray the
gentler and more genial side of his nature; that
could be found in a survey of his social personality
for its own sake and dissociated from
professional striving or public service. From
this point of view purely, another volume equal
in extent to the foregoing could be written.
But here the opportunity is denied. The
boundless hospitality, the unflagging generosity,
the inevitable good cheer and helpfulness
to all who had in any way earned his confidence
or invoked his gratitude, must be
passed over with simple mention.

Immersed though he always was in affairs
of the most practical and matter-of-fact nature,
.bn p266.png
.pn +1
Mr. Cramp could always find time for
the society of the clever Bohemians of literature,
art, and the drama. No other association
was so congenial to him. No other business
man of his time numbered so many friends and
close acquaintances in that fraternity as he.
In him they always found quick appreciation
of their abilities and, when occasion might require,
ready and cordial responsiveness to
their incidents of vicissitude. During the
scores of years through which he figured in a
capacity as public and in affairs as momentous
as ever fell to the lot of the highest official,
constantly engaged in operations closely affecting
the vitality and integrity of the nation,
incessantly subject to a scrutiny hardly less
searching than “the fierce light which beats
upon a throne,” the files of American print for
a lifetime may be searched in vain for an ill-natured
personal criticism upon his acts or
achievements or an aspersion upon his character.
Even partisans of his rivals, no matter
what might be the bitterness of contention or
the rancor of faction, always halted at personal
animadversion upon him. This was not because
he himself was reticent in criticism or
always cautious in comment. Having always
ready and welcome access to the columns of
the most noted periodicals and the greatest
.bn p267.png
.pn +1
newspapers, and being by no means stingy of
rhetoric, his innumerable newspaper interviews
and frequent magazine papers invariably
“spoke his mind” with neither extenuation
nor malice, and always hewed to the
line.

On one occasion he submitted a professional
paper in manuscript to a friend of literary
pursuits whose judgment he held in high
esteem. “In that paper,” he said, “I have
done my best to avoid all controversial tendency.
Please look it over and give me your
view as to whether or not I have succeeded.”

It was a paper on the subject of water-tube
boilers involving discussion of the various
types, and referring to the policies of different
naval administrations at home and abroad in
dealing with them.

“Well,” he inquired, when his friend returned
the paper, “what do you think of it?”

“I understood you to say, Mr. Cramp, that
you desire to avoid controversial matter in this
paper?”

“Yes.”

“And you would strike out anything that
might partake of that nature?”

“Yes.”

“Well, in that case, there would be little
left but the title of the paper!”
.bn p268.png
.pn +1

The fact is, that whenever Mr. Cramp undertook
to write or dictate for publication upon
professional topics, he was almost instinctively
controversial, almost intuitively combative.
His long experience and his drastic training
enabled him to see through any device within
his professional sphere as through a pane of
glass, and he could read its shortcomings or
its defects as an open book. In such premises,
it was never his wont to be sparing. But his
criticisms were so uniformly sound, his comments
so logical and practical, and his motives
so palpably beyond question, that he was seldom
combated at all, and never successfully.

In the foregoing chapters we have reproduced
extracts from his published papers and
correspondence upon purely professional subjects.
As the reader has perceived, they involve
not only knowledge of everything within
the immediate sphere of his own vocation, but
also a broad and generous group of the problems
of international politics and diplomacy.
Mr. Cramp was not merely an adept in the
design and construction of ships, he was
equally versed in that more subtle array of
physical and moral forces which in our day
have come to be grouped under the general
head of “Sea power;” and his conception of
the ultimate international objects to be subserved
.bn p269.png
.pn +1
and wrought out by the ships he built
was as clear as his knowledge of the details of
their building.

In the domain of general thought, of history,
and of ethics, Mr. Cramp was only a little less
prolific than in the literature of his own profession.
His address to the Netherlands Society
on the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth
century, delivered at the Union League, January
24, 1898; his “Forecast of the Steel
Situation,” published January 18, 1900, which
events two years later converted into prophecy,
and a recent article written for the journal
of the Central High School (<i>The Mirror</i>) on
the subject of Fakes and Pretenders, introducing
as his text the notorious Keely and his
“motor,” with many others like them, must
be passed over with simple mention. Reproduction
of them even by extract or in synopsis
could only reinforce the impression, already
clear, of the wide diversity of his thought, the
vast scope of his observation, the keen thoroughness
of his research, and the wonderful
assimilative capacity of his mind.
.sp 2
.pb
\_
.sp 2
.dv class=tnbox // TN box start
.ul
.it Transcriber’s Notes:
.ul indent=1
.it Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected.
.it The Table of Contents was reformatted to save space.
.it Typographical errors were silently corrected.
.it Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation were made consistent only when a\
predominant form was found in this book.
.if t
.it Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
.if-
.ul-
.ul-
.dv-      // TN box end